Middle powers in the modern state system : a case study of Australia's role as a regional actor by Chia, Keng Wei Edmund
Middle Powers In The Modern State System: 
A Case Study of Australia's Role As A Regional 
Actor 
by 
Edmund Keng Wei Chia, B.A. (Hons.) 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor Of Philosophy 
DECLARATION 
This Thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or 
diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of 
background information and duly acknowledged in the Thesis, and the 
best of the candidate's knowledge and belief no material previously 
published or written by another person except where due 
acknowledgement is made in the text of the Thesis. 
ii 
Edmund Keng Wei Chia 
AUTHORITY OF ACCESS 
This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying in 
accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
Foreign policy represents the effort of a state to defend its interests in 
international relations, and power encapsulates the various factors that 
measure the limits of a state's capacity in the promotion of its national 
interests. This thesis examines the various factors, under the rubric of 
power, which has guided the foreign policy of a middle power, Australia. 
It argues that middle powers occupy a special niche within the context of 
regional subsets of the general state system. It demonstrates that a middle 
power, like Australia, is attracted to the use of multilateral institutional 
arrangements, as a vehicle for influence in foreign policy, to defend 
general interests within its geographic region. Four geographic regions, 
the South West Pacific, the Antarctic region, the South East Asian region 
and the Indian Ocean region, are surveyed. This thesis finds that 
multilateral institutional arrangements have become the primary agency 
of Australia's regional influence as a middle power but concludes that the 
utility of regional arrangements varies with the geographic context in 
which a middle power is situated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of middle powers in international relations. More specifically, this is a 
critique of Australian foreign policy. This thesis tests the hypothesis that multilateral 
institutional arrangements enhance the capacity of a middle power like Australia to 
assume a role of leadership and influence within its geographic region. To define the 
context, in which states interact with one another, this thesis begins with a discussion 
of the state system. This is followed by an analysis of Australia's role as a middle 
power within its geographic region. It concludes by arguing that Australia's 
experience within its immediate geographic region provides sufficient evidence to 
validate the hypothesis. 
In international relations theory, there is a longstanding divide between the Realists 
and Idealists with regard to the premises held about the nature of states and their 
relationships with one another. The Realist perspective of states is one of egotistical 
and self-serving actors, and so they essentially see international relations as a contest 
for power in furtherance of self-interest. In contrast, Idealists put their faith in ideals 
that take precedence over self-interest and tend to believe in the viability of a state 
system bound by rules based on universal principles — rules that states would honour. 
However, both these traditional perspectives have been challenged by the 
accumulated weight of change in the modern state system. The growing range of 
transboundary activity between states and the kaleidoscope of inter-state 
relationships in the modern era have led to the proliferation of international 
institutions, particularly in the form of international organisations or regimes, to 
regulate these relationships. These changes introduce a new element of complexity 
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into the discourse on international relations. A new divide (or perhaps it is the old 
divide with new sets of jargon) has emerged. The Inheritors of the idealist tradition, 
such as Neoliberalists or Institutionalists, contend that international institutions 
embody patterns of behaviour based on the expectations, customs and laws of states 
within the state system. Thus, Institutionalists argue that such institutions represent a 
framework upon which states order their relationships with one another and should 
be regarded as significant actors within the state-system in their own right. In 
contrast, the Neorealist heirs to the Realist tradition, argue that realpolitik still apply 
in international politics in spite of international institutions, and that the imperatives 
driving the national interests of egotistical self-serving states would always override 
any potential for a sustainable universal order in the state system. This divide 
between the Neoliberalists/Institutionalists and the Neorealists in international 
relations theory informs an important component of the approach this paper takes to 
the role of middle powers in the modern state system. 
This thesis is also premised on the assumption that states can be usefully 
differentiated from one another and labelled as great, middle or small powers. Some 
writers have found it convenient to classify states in terms of their capacity for 
influence in international relations.' They argue that small powers have little or no 
influence in international affairs whereas great powers have a wide range of interests 
and the capacity to defend those interests. Middle powers fall into the largely 
unexplored chasm in knowledge between the two. Relatively little is known of 
middle powers save their capacity to assert themselves beyond their own territorial 
boundaries and defend limited interests within the general state system, or at least in 
1 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Hedley Bull & Carsten Holbraad (eds.), London, Leicester University 
Press, 1995. John Fitzpatrick, 'Power Structures in the Asia-Pacific Region', in Asian Defence 
Policies: Great Powers and Regional Powers, Geelong, Deakin University Press, 1992. pp1-28. 
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their geographic region. 2 Instead, much of the literature on international relations 
theory has focused on the role that great powers play in international arrangements. 3 
Many of the theories on international relations are derived from studies of 'change' 
and 'effect' in the state system. As great powers have often been the agents of 
'change' and are seen as the states best able to stamp their influence on the state 
system, they have frequently been the subjects of study in international relations. 
While such studies are informative and have guided much of the debate in 
international relations, their emphasis on great powers might distort or bias our 
understanding of the motives and actions of the majority of states within the state 
system that are not great powers. Thus, Carsten Holbraad warns that: 
"Those who concentrate exclusively on the interrelations of the 
great powers enjoy the obvious advantages of dealing with the 
chief actors but are in danger of taking a too Olympian view of 
international po lit ic s." 4 
Great powers are guided by considerations of international policy, as well as by their 
own capabilities for unilateral action, that less powerful states do not possess. To 
extrapolate from the motives and actions of great powers, and then apply such 
generalisations as a theory to how smaller states behave in the state system is likely 
to prove inappropriate and inaccurate. For example, a survey found that Americans 
were concerned about their trade relationship with Japan and resistant to any regime 
2 Martin Wight, Power Politics. 
3  Among the 'classics' of this line of analysis are: Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 
1919-1939 : An Introduction To The Study Of International Relations, London, Macmillan and Co., 
1939. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (fifth 
Edition), New York, Knopf, 1985. Robert, 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 
the World Political Economy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984. Paul Kennedy, The Rise 
and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict Since 1500 to 2000, London, 
Fortuna Press. 1989. 
4  Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics, London, Macmillan, 1984. p3. 
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that might result in greater relative gains for Japan.5 Neorealists have used this as an 
example of how considerations of relative gain could override considerations of 
absolute gain. 6 However, this is not the case with Australia, which does not appear to 
possess similar concerns with respect to its trade relationship with the United States 
even though the relative gains in this trade relationship are clearly in favour of the 
United States. Therefore, theories on international relations based on studies of great 
powers might not accurately or adequately address the motives and actions of states 
that are not great powers, and as such, they present an incomplete account of 
international relations. Moreover, there are very few states that may consider 
themselves great powers.' Instead, the state system comprises mainly small and 
middle powers. Therefore, a better understanding of the motives and actions of states 
that are not great powers is required for a broader appreciation of the state system, as 
opposed to a review of the star actors that usually command the spotlight on the 
world stage. 
This thesis investigates the role of middle powers through the experience of Australia 
within regional institutional structures in the state system. It assumes that Australia is 
an egotistical state actor whose primary concern is the pursuit of narrow national 
interests in international relations. 8 It queries the manner by which Australia is best 
able to assert its influence within the state system and the extent to which Australia 
5 Micheal Mastanduno, 'Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response To Japanese Industrial 
Policy', in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David A. Baldwin (ed.), New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1993. pp250-264. 
6 Micheal Mastanduno, 'Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response To Japanese Industrial 
Policy'. pp250-264. 
7 Henry Kissinger has noted that the international system of the twenty-first century will probably 
only contain 6 major powers, and a "multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries". Henry A. 
Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994. pp23-24. 
8 While idealists would challenge a discussion of international relations premised on egotistical self 
interest by states, both the Neoliberalists and the Neorealists operate from the premise of egotistical 
state actors in international relations. Although discussion on the merits of the alternative theoretical 
positions on the state system is not the focus of this study, the arguments advanced in this thesis are 
probably more inclined towards Neoliberalism. They emphasise international institutions as a 
5 
may protect and pursue its interests by influencing the shape of the international 
arrangements affecting its interests. Krasner suggests that in: 
"... a power-oriented research programme, power is exercised not 
to facilitate cooperation but to secure a more favorable distribution 
of benefits. And analysis seeks to explain outcomes in terms of 
interests and relative capabilities rather than in terms of institutions 
designed to promote Pareto optimality." 9 
In accordance with the assumption of egotistical state interest, this paper explores 
Australia's efforts to secure "a more favorable distribution of benefits" 1° through 
multilateral arrangements within its region, as well as the manner in which such 
regional arrangements reflect the "interests and relative capabilities" of the states 
involved. It examines the significance of power, in terms of Australia's capacity to 
control the international environment that it is a part of, and its endeavour to order 
the arrangements within that environment in its best interests. The intent is to explain 
the motivations that might prompt a middle power such as Australia into multilateral 
institutional arrangements and the extent to which its capabilities, relative to that of 
other states, provide it with the opportunity to secure beneficial outcomes. Holbraad 
advises that: 
"[Mil analysis of the conduct of middle-ranking powers may not 
only illuminate the international system from an unfamiliar 
perspective but may also present some of its processes in a 
perspective truer than those frequently associated with either 
traditional or more novel approaches." 
significant factor in international relations and the propensity of middle powers to address their 
concerns through such institutions. 
9 Stephen Krasner, 'Global Communications and National Power', in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: 
The Contemporary Debate, David A. Baldwin (ed.), New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. 
p243. 
to The spelling of certain words in this thesis is generally based on a British dictionary but where 
American authors have been cited, the American spelling has been retained. 
Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics. p4. 
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Therefore, it is hoped that this study of middle power motivations and capabilities 
will advance the understanding of egotistical state behaviour, as well as provide a 
useful beginning for further comparative studies on how different states behave. 
Australian foreign policy has been traditionally dominated by three factors 
throughout its history. Its sense of vulnerability as a Western nation situated at the 
edge of Asia, its values and ideals as a nation, and its economic interests in an ever-
changing world. 12 These are the broad themes underlying Australia's engagement 
with the other nations in its region and the rest of the world. In the pursuit of these 
interests, Australia has traditionally sought the protection of a 'great and powerful 
friend'. I3 Great Britain and the United States have both served in this role as great 
power allies to Australia. However, changes in the global geopolitical environment 
within the past decade have resulted in the reappraisal of foreign policy for many 
nations, including Australia. In particular, Australia's geographic region has 
experienced radical transformation into "a more complex and changeable strategic 
environment." I4 The Cold War has ended and with its conclusion, the state-system is 
no longer polarised into two opposing camps. Australia's Southeast Asian 
neighbours have developed rapidly and narrowed the gap, in terms of both economic 
wealth and military capability, between themselves and Australia. The United 
Nations Law of the Sea has also raised issues concerning overlapping jurisdiction 
and resource management in the maritime environment that have been previously 
quiescent or overshadowed by other interests. These and other changes challenged 
traditional strategic assumptions. Thus, a study of Australia's responses to these 
12 A.C. Palfreeman, 'The Political Objectives', in In Pursuit of National Interests: Australian Foreign 
Policy in the 1990s, F.A. Medianslcy & A.C. Palfreeman (eds.), Sydney, Pergamon Press, 1988. pp85- 
105. 
13 Coral Bell, (ed.) Agenda For The Nineties: Studies of the Context for Australian Choices in Foreign 
and Defence Policy, Melbourne, Longman-Cheshire, 1991. 
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changes within its geographic region will help to illustrate the considerations that 
influence the foreign policy of a middle power as it manoeuvres itself to an 
advantageous position within the state system. 
The proliferation of multilateral international regimes in the state system is another 
significant development that has affected international relations and influenced 
Australian foreign policy. Crawford notes the fact that "while the contribution that 
institutions make to stability and world order is far from clear, the contemporary, and 
global, states system is the most institutionalized in history." I5 Australia has not been 
untouched by this trend towards the comprehensive institutionalisation of state 
relations. Security issues that have had their origins elsewhere have troubled the 
peace of mind in Australia and could pose a genuine threat to Australia's interests, 
including its sovereignty. The growth of communism in Southeast Asia during the 
1960s and more recently the unresolved issue of overlapping jurisdictional claims in 
the Spratly Islands affected political stability in Australia's region, and the latter 
could have the potential to escalate into a more direct threat to Australian strategic 
interests. The currency crisis in Southeast Asia and the sea robberies in the Straits of 
Malacca that disrupted the traffic of oil to Japan have a direct bearing on Australia's 
economic interests. Transboundary environmental problems such as pollution or the 
use of driftnets in the Southwest Pacific fisheries resulting in wasteful bycatch have 
also been matters of serious concern to Australia. These and other issues have been 
increasingly addressed by regional multilateral institutional arrangements. Indeed, 
some might argue that such matters involving transboundary interests could only be 
addressed through multilateral institutional arrangements. Thus, in view of the 
14 Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1994. pll. 
15 Robert M.A. Crawford, Regime Theory in the Post Cold War World: Rethinking Neoliberal 
Approaches to International relations, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996. p3. 
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increasing consciousness of "global interdependence and the sheer range of 
international activity that demands some commonly agreed action," 16 Australia can 
not afford to be disengaged from the political processes that shape international 
multilateral arrangements and which inevitably affect its national interests. 
Therefore, a closer examination of the part that Australia has played in the process of 
initiating new regimes and Australia's capacity for influence within existing 
institutional arrangements is necessary, especially in terms of the opportunities that 
they offer a middle power to secure beneficial outcomes for itself. 
In its examination of middle powers, this thesis explores two broad themes. First, it 
examines the concept of a 'middle power' and what it means to be a middle power in 
a world where states are differentiated in terms of their capacity to defend their 
national interests in international relations. The concept of power in international 
relations has usually been reduced to a question of military strength. Even studies of 
power focused on multilateral institutions within the state system tend to examine 
institutional arrangements in the context of how they affected military strength. 17 
Thus, there is often an implicit assumption that the disparities in power among states 
would be mirrored by similar disparities in influence within the institutional 
arrangements in the state system. In analysing the concept of a middle power, the 
question of the extent to which the power of a state, in terms of military strength, 
actually correlates with the power and influence that it may wield through the 
institutional arrangements of an international multilateral structure shall be 
addressed. The other significant theme in this thesis is the extent to which states 
might assert influence through multilateral arrangements in the pursuit of national 
16 Gareth Evans, 'The Labor Tradition', in Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign  
Policy, David Lee & Christopher Waters (eds.), Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1997. p19 
17 Robert Powell, 'Absolute and Relative Gains' in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary 
Debate, David A. Baldwin (ed.), New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. pp209-233. 
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interests. To appreciate the role of middle powers in international relations, this 
thesis explores the concept of a 'currency of influence' within institutional 
arrangements. By investigating the role that Australia played as a middle power 
within its geographic region, this thesis determines the extent to which multilateral 
institutional arrangements serve as effective vehicles of influence for middle powers, 
as well as enhance their capacity to affect their international environment. The 
hypothesis that multilateral institutional arrangements enhance the capacity of 
middle powers like Australia to assume a role of leadership and influence within its 
geographic regions is tested. 
To test the hypothesis, a theoretical model based on pre-defmed assumptions, briefly 
enumerated above, pertaining to the state system, middle powers and institutional 
arrangements shall be constructed. Such models, according to Huntington, facilitate 
our ability to: 
1. order and generalise about reality; 
2. understand causal relationships among phenomena; 
3. anticipate and, if we are lucky, predict future developments; 
4. distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; and 
5. show us what paths we should take to achieve our goals." 
The use of theoretical constructs helps to highlight the premises upon which we base 
our arguments and lend structure to our outlook on issues. As Huntington further 
elaborates: 
"Simplified paradigms or maps are indispensable for human 
thought and action. On the one hand, we may explicitly formulate 
theories or models and consciously use them to guide our behavior. 
Alternatively, we may deny the need for such guides and assume 
that we will act only in terms of specific "objective" facts, dealing 
with each case "on its own merits." If we assume this, however, we 
delude ourselves. For in the back of our minds are hidden 
18 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, London, 
Touchstone, 1998. p30. 
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assumptions, biases, and prejudices that determine how we 
perceive reality, what facts we look at, and how we judge their 
importance and merits." 19 
However, as with all such constructs, the validity of the assumptions made will be 
open to challenge. No theory can be presented as an absolute truth. At best, a theory 
is merely a mindset that guides our outlook on a given issue. The theories advanced 
by the Realists, Idealists, Rationalists, Neoliberalists, Institutionalists, Neorealists 
and others are no different. They furnish us with their individually structured 
perspectives on international relations and in so doing, advance our understanding of 
the motivations that drive the actions of states, and of how the state system is 
structured. Thus, like the proverbial glass that is half-full or half-empty depending on 
how one looks at it, international relations theories are merely guides that are more 
often reflective of the attitudes of those who hold them than prescriptive standards. 
They are not always mutually exclusive, and the relevance of one theory in a 
particular circumstance need not invalidate the applicability of another theory in 
other circumstances. Where the theories advanced suggest "two simultaneous 
opposing trends", the challenge lies in the ability to "set forth under what 
circumstances one trend will prevail and under what circumstances the other will". 20 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that within the parameters of this thesis, the assumptions 
made will be logically consistent and provide coherent structure to the arguments 
made. 
The first chapter examines the nature of the state and the state system, and stipulates 
the assumptions upon which this thesis is premised. A conceptual framework of how 
states exist and relate to one another in defence of their individual egotistical 
interests is constructed to facilitate the discussion. This conceptual framework will 
19 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. p30. 
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account for the concept of powers and the significance of power within the state 
system. This chapter also investigates the growth of multilateral regimes. Multilateral 
institutional arrangements have introduced a new dimension to the state system, and 
play an increasingly significant role as a vehicle of state influence in international 
relations. This chapter sets out the basis for the contention that states, which possess 
the appropriate resources, may exploit the opportunities within the framework of 
multilateral arrangements to defend and pursue their egotistical interests in 
international relations. 
The second chapter follows on from the first by analysing the concept of a middle 
power. It discusses the features that distinguish a middle power from other powers 
and examines the difficulties in establishing an all-embracing definition for a middle 
power. A working definition for a middle power is developed and two templates are 
constructed to help guide the discussion in the subsequent chapters. The key 
elements of the first template include highlighting the ambition and capacity to 
assume significant influence within a geographic region as the critical benchmarks 
for identifying middle powers. The second template produces a checklist of the 
factors that underpin a middle power's capacity to manifest significant influence 
within its region. Together, they establish a methodological framework for the 
subsequent investigation into the role of Australia as a middle power in its 
geographic region, and the basis upon which its influence, if any, is based. 
The third chapter discusses, in general, the role that Australia has played as a middle 
power in its region, as well as the context in which Australian foreign policy is 
framed. The Conservative and the Labor traditions in Australian foreign policy are 
20 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. p36. 
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scrutinised for their attitudes towards international multilateral arrangements, and the 
bases for those attitudes are discussed. It is argued that Australia is a middle power in 
a geographic environment undergoing significant geo-political changes. These geo-
political changes have challenged traditional premises and Australian priorities in 
foreign policy. Australia responded to many of these challenges by engaging its 
region through multilateral international institutions. Thus, it is proposed that the 
differences between the two traditions in Australian foreign policy on the value of 
multilateral arrangements are a matter of degree rather than irreconcilable and 
opposed positions on the need for, and participation in, such multilateral 
arrangements. This chapter qualifies the ideal type established in the previous 
chapter with the empirical facts of Australian political culture to provide context to 
the hypothesis that multilateral institutional arrangements enhance the capacity of 
middle powers like Australia to assume a role of leadership and influence within its 
geographic regions. By identifying some of the issues affecting Australian mindsets 
towards foreign policy, this chapter elaborates upon the framework that has been 
developed in the previous chapter to facilitate a more in-depth investigation of 
Australia's role as a middle power within its region in the following chapters. 
To establish whether the hypothesis has empirical validity, four politically distinct 
regions geographically adjacent to Australia will be examined in the second part of 
the thesis. These are not case studies in the usual sense as the methodological 
demands and rigorous scrutiny required by a 'proper' case study would not be met. 
Instead, there is a broad overview followed by a selective focus on the key issues for 
middle powers and multilateral institutions identified in each region. This is due to a 
belief that it would be preferable, in this thesis, to identify trends in the practice of 
foreign policy in the regions around Australia, and then to make a general and 
13 
comparative assessment with respect to Australia's role as a middle power; as 
opposed to an in-depth study of any one region or issue, and then extrapolating from 
that one case study a general understanding of middle powers. A benefit of the 
approach selected is that it lends itself to greater opportunities for comparison of 
Australia's role as a middle power across four regions. For example, Australia's role 
as a middle power and the issues that it confronts in the South Pacific region may be 
measured against its role in other regions, with similarities and differences 
highlighted to provide a general observation on middle powers. A detailed case study 
of Australian engagement with multilateral arrangements in the South Pacific region 
might reveal more about Australia's role in the South Pacific but fail to address the 
considerations that affect its policies as a middle power in general or in other regions. 
The drawbacks of the approach adopted would be the sacrifice of detail for brevity. 
In selectively addressing issues in each region, the omission of significant factors 
that might only be revealed after detailed study in the final analysis would be a 
greater possibility. Every effort has been made, through an extensive survey of the 
literature and careful analysis, to identify the issues of consequence that would best 
serve as exemplars to illustrate the role of middle powers in international relations. 
Nevertheless, there is, inevitably, an element of subjective judgement involved in the 
selection of the issues scrutinised, and which would be employed to test the 
hypothesis that the capacity of middle powers to defend their interests is enhanced by 
multilateral institutions. 
The four regions that shall he examined are the Southwest Pacific, Southeast Asia, 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, and the Indian Ocean. The first three of the four 
regions discussed are well known for the role that regional institutions have played in 
shaping the political arrangements for the region, whereas the absence of similar 
14 
institutions in the fourth provides an interesting contrast. Multilateral institutional 
arrangements within these regions will be examined for the opportunities they offer 
to a middle power like Australia for influence. The dynamics of inter-state relations 
within these regions, and how regional institutional arrangements affect, and are 
affected by the relative power of, state actors shall also be investigated. It shall be 
argued that although the nature and extent of Australian power varied in each of 
these four regions, multilateral institutional arrangements, formal and informal, 
consistently represented a reliable vehicle for Australian political influence. 
The first of the regions examined (Chapter 4) is the South West Pacific. In the South 
West Pacific region, the United Nations Law of the Sea has bestowed vast new 
maritime territories, with attendant rights and obligations, on small states that are ill 
equipped to shoulder these new responsibilities. This has resulted in the development 
of a number of regional institutions to pool the collective resources of the small 
states within the region in response to common interests. Although Australia is 
generally considered a middle power, the great disparity in power between itself and 
the other states in this region provided it with the opportunity to assert itself in a 
manner akin to that of a great power. As a nation situated at the edge of the region, if 
not within the region itself, Australia has played a significant role in the multilateral 
arrangements that have emerged in this region. Thus, Australia's participation in 
multilateral institutional arrangements with the smaller island states in the region 
raises the interesting question of how a middle power should conduct itself in a 
regional sub-system where it possesses capabilities akin to that of a great power. This 
chapter explores the role that Australia played in the regional institutions of the 
South Pacific. It highlights the means through which Australia has asserted its 
influence within the region through its role in regional institutions. It argues that in 
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terms of relative gains, the smaller Pacific Island states gained far more than 
Australia, but that the latter persisted with cooperation and continued to pursue its 
interests through regional multilateral arrangements as the preferred option in its 
dealings with the smaller powers of the South Pacific. Thus, in spite of the 
asymmetries of power between itself and the other states in the South Pacific region, 
Australia relied on participation in regional multilateral arrangements as the primary 
channel of its influence. 
The second of the regions examined (Chapter 5) is the Antarctic and the Southern 
Ocean region. Australia has substantial interests in this region. Australia has claimed 
42% of Antarctica and jurisdiction over the waters in the Southern Ocean adjacent to 
the Australian Antarctic Territory. Australia's sovereignty claims in Antarctica are 
disputed. However, Australian interests are managed through the Antarctic Treaty 
System, a melange of interrelated regimes, which regulate international relations and 
all activity within the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region. This chapter investigates 
the currency of influence within these regional institutional structures. It contends 
that as a wealthy and technologically advanced middle power, Australia is able to 
effectively defend its Antarctic interests through its capacity to influence regional 
multilateral arrangements. It is proposed that, for Australia, the issue has not been so 
much whether multilateral institutional arrangements have proven useful in the 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean region, but rather, whether regional or global 
multilateral arrangements would better serve Australian interests. In the Antarctic 
and Southern Ocean region, where pre-existing regulatory arrangements have 
customarily provided the pattern for State behaviour, the introduction of the United 
Nations Law of the Sea has resulted in a situation where overlapping regimes have 
the potential to cause confusion. The concept of 'common heritage', which is derived 
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from the evolution of the Law of the Sea, has been used to challenge the validity of 
the Antarctic Treaty System and the privileged position of states like Australia within 
the latter. These and other issues arising from the overlap between global and 
regional arrangements pose an interesting dilemma for Australia as an egotistical 
state actor. In this instance, the issue is whether a middle power like Australia would 
derive greater gains from unilateral action, or a regional multilateral arrangement, or 
a global multilateral arrangement. The peculiarities of the Antarctic region and the 
special interests associated with it give rise to the possibility that it might be a special 
case, with considerations that would not apply to other regions. Nevertheless, this 
chapter argues that Australia's experiences in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean 
region reinforces the proposition that middle powers seek opportunities through 
regionalism and multilateral institutional arrangements to defend their interests in 
international relations. It also provides an opportunity for the argument that middle 
powers like Australia are guided more by their instincts as egotistical state actors 
than any other considerations. Thus, middle powers do not seek greater 
institutionalisation of international relations, so much as a set of international 
arrangements amenable to their interests. 
The third region examined (Chapter 6) is the Southeast Asian region. Australia's 
capacity to defend its interests in the South East Asia is limited by several factors. 
Australia has always been ambiguous about its place in the South East Asian region, 
giving rise to the observation that Australia might be "in the region" but it is not "of 
the region". Unlike the South West Pacific region, the states of the South East Asian 
region are significantly more powerful. Therefore, the South East Asian states have 
been better able to resist regional multilateral arrangements when they perceived that 
such initiatives would place them at a relative disadvantage vis-à-vis other states in 
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the region. Hence, the issue of Australia asserting itself in a manner akin to that of a 
great power in contemporary South East Asia does not arise. Australia faces an 
interesting challenge in South East Asia where it has yet to be fully accepted as part 
of the region; more so as many of Australia's primary strategic interests lie within 
the Southeast Asian region. The South East Asian region has been identified, at 
various times, as the greatest potential threat to security, as well as vital in terms of 
economic opportunity and regional stability, to Australia. 21 Moreover, the ability of 
the South East Asian states to withstand attempts at coercion by a middle power like 
Australia is coupled with the relative lack of regional multilateral institutional 
arrangements in which Australia could play an influential role. This chapter 
investigates the strategies adopted by Australia as a middle power in order to 
overcome the obstacles in the way of a more influential role for itself within the 
South East Asian region. It argues that even though Australia's capacity for influence 
in this region has been limited by various factors, it has been able to overcome these 
difficulties by consistent and persistent efforts to initiate and facilitate regional 
multilateral processes. Therefore, by successfully fostering 'a habit of consultation 
and dialogue' within the South East Asian region, Australia established a regional 
environment that enhanced its own capacity to defend its interests within the region. 
The fourth and last of the regions examined (chapter 7) is the Indian Ocean region. 
The geographic parameters of the Indian Ocean are clear. However, the community 
of interests or the sense of identity that distinguishes a group of states that share a 
common geographical region are as yet ill defined. Thus, while the Indian Ocean 
region might be defined in terms of geography, it has yet to develop a sense of 
regionalism to qualify as a region in terms of a political community. As a middle 
21 Gareth Evans & Bruce Grant, Australia's foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, Carlton, 
Melbourne University Press, 1991. 
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power situated at the rim of the Indian Ocean, Australia has an inchoate interest in 
the developments of this region. In contrast to the other regions, multilateral 
institutional arrangements, or even plans for such arrangements, in the Indian Ocean 
region have remained at an embryonic stage. Neorealist considerations, arguably, 
find their strongest expression in this region. The deep enmity between India and 
Pakistan suggests that considerations of relative gains would be vehemently stressed, 
and this represents a significant impediment to the development of any significant 
regional arrangement. The issue, however, remains whether regional arrangements, 
or efforts towards initiating such arrangements, would serve Australian interests. The 
test for Neorealist assumptions is whether the overriding concern for relative gains 
represented an insurmountable obstacle to the establishment of regional 
arrangements in the Indian Ocean 'region'. Although the answers to such issues can 
only be validated by time and experience, it shall be argued that Australia, as a 
middle power, has an interest in promoting regional institutions within the Indian 
Ocean, and possesses the capacity to do so. 
In conclusion, this thesis argues that participation in multilateral institutional 
arrangements enhances the capacity of middle powers, like Australia, to assume a 
leadership role and to influence developments within their region. It recognises the 
fact that the determination of what represents national interest may vary from time to 
time and from leader to leader. However, it is argued that the channels and 
instruments through which these fluctuating expressions of national interests are 
defended tend to remain fairly constant. Thus, the 'medium' through which 
Australian influence is expressed, such as the use of foreign aid, technical assistance, 
diplomatic ties, or other means, tends to remain fairly constant, even though the 
'message' they convey might vary from time to time. As such, it is possible to 
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evaluate the extent of Australia's influence as a middle power in each of the regions 
discussed, by examination of the means through which Australia articulated its 
interest as a state. It is argued that the pursuit of, and participation in, regional 
multilateral institutional arrangements tends to offer a middle power, like Australia, 
significant opportunities to influence regional developments in a fashion that make it 
a more effective actor in international relations. Although Australia's capacity for 
Realist expressions of coercive power varied in each of the regions surveyed, it shall 
be demonstrated that Australia's capacity for leadership in regional multilateral 
institutional arrangements has consistently presented it with favourable opportunities 
to assume an influential role in regional affairs. 
CHAPTER 1 
"There is another side to the problem. The community of nations 
consists of small and near-great Powers as well as the Big Three or 
the Big Four. The second part of the problem of world organization 
is to ensure that these leading Powers will pay due regard to the old 
but still cherished doctrine of equality of States. They should allow 
fair representation to smaller Powers on any world organization, 
and so gain their confidence and support. No sovereign State, 
however, will wish to think that its destiny has been handed over to 
another Power, however great. Nor does history at all support the 
view that wisdom is confined to the strongest nations or that 
knowledge is found only at the centre of power. Therefore, a 
successful world organization requires an enthusiastic contribution 
from smaller Powers both in counsel and in material support. It 
must be remembered that a so-called small Power may in certain 
areas and in special circumstances possess great, if not decisive 
influence." — H.V. Evatt l 
Introduction 
Australia is often described as a 'middle power' in world affairs. However, this raises 
questions about being 'middle' of what, and what it means to be a 'power' in world 
affairs. The appellation of middle power carries with it certain assumptions about our 
understanding of Australia's place in international affairs. 
A survey of some of the literature on international relations suggests that there are 
three premises made when we speak of a 'middle power'. 2 The first premise is the 
I H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia: Speeches,  W. MacMahon Ball (ed.), Sydney, Angus & 
Robertson Ltd, 1945. p212. 
2 More of this literature will be developed later in this chapter, but some of the more useful for 
developing these premises were: Martin Wight, Power Politics, Hedley Bull & Carsten Holbraad 
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existence of a state system. Without the premise of a general state system, there 
would be no frame of reference to discuss the concept of states and their relationship 
with one another. Therefore, a state system comprising states as discrete actors that 
engage one another in a variety of relationships is implicit in the reference to a 
'middle power'. The second premise is the relevance of power as the determinant 
upon which relationships between and among states in the state system are 
predicated. If the reference to middle 'powers' is to be useful, then the ability of at 
least some states to defend interests beyond their territorial boundaries through the 
use of power, in their interaction with other states, must be presumed. The third 
premise holds that 'power' can be measured, and that states possess physical 
attributes and resources that may be translated into varying degrees of power. 
Therefore, it is possible to situate states broadly within a hierarchy, as well as define 
the states situated in the median of this spectrum of powers as 'middle' powers, 
based on their capacity to defend their national interests and influence in 
international relations. 
While it will be shown that the above premises have some validity, it will also be 
argued that power is not the sole determinant upon which all relationships between 
states are based. It will be demonstrated that multilateral institutional arrangements 
also influence the order of international relations and that the former continues to 
grow in significance. The ability of a state to defend its interests effectively through 
multilateral institutional arrangements must also be taken into account if we are to 
fully appreciate the role of a state (or its potential) in international relations. It is 
(eds.), London, Leicester University Press, 1995. Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International 
Politics, London, Macmillan, 1984. G.R. Berridge, International Politics: States, Power & Conflict 
Since 1945, New York, Prentice Hall, 1997. pp9-21. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Gregory A. Raymond, 
A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century,  New York, St Martin's Press, 
1994. 
22 
argued that the presence of multilateral institutional arrangements mitigates the role 
of power and represents an additional medium for influence in the state system. 
This chapter begins by tracing briefly the development of the modern state system, 
and explores the premise that sovereign states are equal to one another. It 
demonstrates that the premise of equality within the state system is a fiction and that 
states are differentiated in terms of power. Concepts of power in the study of 
international relations tend to be derived from theories based on Realism. 3 These 
theories provide a useful guide towards understanding the role of power in 
international relations by illustrating how power can define the capacity of a state to 
defend its interests, and how states are differentiated in terms of power, within the 
state system. Notwithstanding minor variations, these Realist theories of international 
relations inevitably portray a state system that is structured on the basis of power, 
and where power can only be constrained by greater power. However, it is argued 
that over the years of debate about the nature of the state system, considerable 
evidence emerged to suggest that the naked and unbridled exercise of state power in 
international relations was not as common as realists proposed. It is argued that this 
development implied that an ever growing range of state activity in international 
relations is being regulated, and/or guided, by arrangements that might affect the 
interests of states, as well as inhibit the arbitrary use of power. Thus, the relevance of 
traditional Realist assumptions has been subjected to doubt, even by its would-be 
supporters. At the forefront of the effort to revise old orthodoxies are such new 
perspectives as "Neorealism" and "Neoliberalism" advanced by scholars attempting 
3  Hobbes and Machiavelli produced two of the seminal works upon which the concept of realism was 
based. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (ed. & intro. by J.C.A. Gaskin), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1996. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, (trans. & intro. by George Bull), London, Penguin, 1995. 
However, the modern exposition of the theory of realism are arguably most often associated with Carr 
and Morgenthau. Edward Hallett Carr, The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939 : an introduction to the 
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to address what appeared to be an increasingly prominent role played by multilateral 
institutional arrangements in the state system. 4 These theories attempt to reconcile 
the role of power with the existence and growing significance of multilateral 
institutional arrangements in the state system, and to demonstrate that the two are not 
mutually exclusive and must both be studied to fully appreciate the role of the state 
in international relations. 
This chapter reinforces the view that, while states are accepted by one another as 
juridical equals, they may also be differentiated usefully from one another in terms of 
the physical attributes and resources that they possess. States can translate the 
attributes/resources that they possess into power (which includes the capacity to 
wield coercive force) over other states in international relations. This in turn suggests 
that some states have a greater capacity to get their own way in international 
relations than others because of their superior power. However, it is demonstrated 
that the ability to assert coercive force is not the only, or even the primary means, by 
which developments in contemporary international relations are determined. 
Multilateral institutional arrangements, have become an increasingly common feature 
of the state system, and play an important role in international relations. It shall be 
shown that multilateral institutional arrangements serve both to regulate the actions 
of states, as well as provide a medium through which states can defend their interests 
in the state system. 
study of international relations, London, Macmillan and Co., 1939. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (fifth Edition), New York, Knopf, 1985. 
4 For an articulation of Neorealist and Neoliberalist theories, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979. & Robert, 0. 
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1984. respectively. 
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The State System 
Early polities were often defined either by ethnicity or by religion. While there were 
arguably a few exceptions, most of these polities would not have perceived 
themselves as autonomous sovereign states with clearly defined territorial 
boundaries. Instead, these early polities often saw themselves as divided parts of the 
whole. Ethnicity, defined by membership in a tribe or by a common culture, often 
provided a frame of reference for these early polities. Indigenous American 
governments, 
"... in particular - the Iroquois Confederacy or the Haudenosaunee, 
comprised of five (later six Indian nations) and the All Indian 
Pueblo Council, comprised of all the Pueblos - are centuries - old 
115 
Similarly, the Chinese saw themselves as one people united by culture. The rulers of 
the warring states of China declared themselves 'Emperors' of all China, and saw 
themselves as rulers of a temporarily divided nation rather than as leaders of 
politically autonomous sovereign units, even though the division often lasted 
centuries. 6 Similarly, sultans of autonomous Islamic polities would see themselves as 
part of a wider Islamic polity, and subject to the dictates of their religion.' 
5 Mary B. Davis, Native Americans in the Twentieth Century, An Encyclopedia, New York, Garland 
Publishing, Inc, 1994. p651. 
6 For a more detailed analysis of the theme of centralism and the cycle between Imperial rule and 
diffused polities in China, see Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese: A History, second edition, New York, 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Edwin 0. Reischauer & John K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great 
Tradition, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960. Theodore De Bary, Sources of Chinese 
Tradition, New York, Columbia University Press, 1960. 
7 Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements In The Middle East, 
London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1989. pp124-134. Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and the 
Future of World Politics, Post-Cold War Edition, Harper Collins, 1995. pp41-43. 
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Another significant theme that coloured the relationship of early polities was the 
notion of imperial rule, based on the assumption that there was only one real 
sovereign "whose realm is universal". 8 
"If in practice some peoples were outside imperial political control, 
this was a wrong to be righted, since all owed allegiance to the 
universal lord." 9 
Thus, when a British diplomatic mission sought to establish ties with China in the 
late 18th century, they were regarded (as others before them) as supplicants from a 
vassal state. 10 Similarly, the Roman Emperor was declared dominus mundi, 'lord of 
all the world'." Thus, the issue of 'international' relations was largely based on 
whether a polity belonged within 'civilisation' and thus subject to the authority (at 
least nominally) of the Emperor, or lay outside the embrace of 'civilisation'. 12 
However, the divide in 'international relations' was usually not centred on the issue 
of imperial authority, but on ethnicity and/or religion. Ethnicity and religion often 
coincided with the notion of imperial authority to establish the mindset that guided 
the relationship between polities in the pre-modern era. The Chinese perspective of 
foreign relations was, for much of its history, premised on the fact that a person was 
either 'Chinese' or `Barbarian'. I3 Likewise, religion provided another divide for 
'international relations' wherein the world was perceived in terms of the 'faithful' 
and 'infidels' (or heathens or pagans). 
8 Peter J. Taylor, 'The Modern Multiplicity of States', in Globalization; Theory and Practice, Eleonore 
Kofrnan & Gillian Youngs (eds.), London, Pinter, 1996. p101. 
9 Peter J. Taylor, 'The Modern Multiplicity of States'. p101. 
I° This is an example of an initial encounter between conflicting paradigms. The clash of civilisations 
proved to be irreconcilable and inevitably led to war. For an account of the arrival of British in China 
and the subsequent war, see Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, (fifth edition), New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1995. pp130-134 & 154-193. 
II Peter J. Taylor, 'The Modern Multiplicity of States'. p101. 
12 William Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism, New York, 
Touchstone, 1993. p17. 
13 Yen-Ping Hao & Erh-Min Wang, 'Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations, 1840-95', in The 
Cambridge History of China, Volume 11, Late Ching 1800-1911, Part 2, John K. Fairbank & Kwang-
Ching Liu (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980. pp142-145. 
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"... the notion of a territorial state with individualised citizenship, 
secular law and principles of sovereignty, is alien to the 'Muslim 
mind'. It is contrary to the political models of Islamic history ... 
[where] the all-inclusive Islamic umma, which knows no territorial 
'national' boundaries, but operates with the concept of dar-ul-islam 
(the house of Islam), which distinguishes the domains of Islam 
from those of the infidels." 14 
A similar divide was articulated by St Augustine, who declared that: 
"And thus it has come to pass, that though there are many and great 
nations all over the earth, whose rites and customs, speech, arms 
and dress are distinguished by marked differences, yet there are no 
more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call 
two cities, according to the language of our Scriptures. The one 
consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those 
who wish to live after the spirit." 15 
Thus, 'international relations' for these early polities was based on a paradigm 
substantially different from the modern state system. While violence remained 
common, such polities were usually guided by the dictates of their religion or tribal 
custom (culture) in their relations with the other polities that shared their paradigm. 
Only when polities from two different paradigms encountered each other, as when 
the Christian Europe confronted the Islamic 'world', or when the Europeans 
discovered the 'New World', was power the paramount factor in the violent 
resolution of conflict. Therefore, in the case of medieval Europe, wars that were 
declared against fellow Christian rulers must be seen as 'just', whereas wars against 
heathens were, by definition, 'just wars'. 16 This observation was again reiterated by 
14  Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements In The Middle East. 
p130. 
5  St Augustine, 'City of God', in Princeton Readings In Political Thought: Essential Texts Since 
Plato, Mitchell Cohen & Nicole Fermon (eds.), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996. p135. 
16  J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, The Barbarian West 400-1000, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985. p15. 
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Francois Guizot who observed that in the struggle between 'Christianity and 
Mahommedanism', the "moral unity of [European] nations was shown". 17 
It was in Europe that the concept of a modern state, and consequently, a modern state 
system developed. The evolution of the state system in Europe went through several 
phases. It began with the division of Europe into various tribes, which had settled 
and laid claim to territory. 18 The expansion of the Roman Empire saw the 
establishment of a universal political authority, which the subsequent spread of 
Christianity in Europe entrenched. With Constantine's 'Edict of Milan' which 
'legalised' Christianity, and later the endorsement of Christianity by Emperor 
Theodosius as the sole religion of the Roman Empire, I9 religion came to provide a 
universal paradigm, which endured even after the fall of Rome, under which the 
political units of Europe were organised. 2° 
The political units of 'pre-modem' Europe did not see themselves as sovereign in 
their own right, but as part of a greater polity that descended from, and inherited the 
authority of, the Holy Roman Empire. 21 
"The innumerable kingdoms, fiefs and cities which composed 
medieval Christendom did not assert (perhaps they were too poorly 
organized to assert) their political independence in the absolute 
terms of the modem state."22 
17  Francois Guizot, The History of Civilization in Europe, (trans. William Hazlitt, Intro. & (ed.) By 
Larry Siedentop), London, Penguin, 1997. p141. 
18  Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, London, Verso, 1996. pp  113-118. David 
Nicholas, The Evolution of the Medieval World: Society, Government and Thought in Europe, 312- 
1500, London, Longman, 1992. pp50-81. 
19  David Nicholas, The Evolution of the Medieval World: Society, Government and Thought in 
Europe, 312-1500. p30 
20  R. Allen Brown, The Origins of Modern Europe: The Medieval Heritage of Western Civilization, 
Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 1972. 
21  Norman Davis, Europe: A History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. p298 & p302. 
22  Martin Wight, Power Politics. pp23-24. 
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Territorial control was significant, but not the defining source of political authority. 
Authority, as opposed to power, could only be exercised under the sanction of the 
Church, 
"No renaissance ruler believed either that his claims to 'sovereign' 
status as 'emperor within his own kingdom' implied the abrogation 
of his duties as a prince of Christendom or that the political 
independence of his realms ruptured the various practices which 
mediaeval Christendom had adumbrated for the government of its 
affairs in both peace and war."23 
Thus, all rights and obligations with respect to political power, including not only 
those pertaining to relations between ruler and ruled, but also that which applied to 
relations between rulers, were enumerated by the paradigm established by 
Christianity in Europe. More important, this paradigm was accepted by the polities of 
pre-modern Europe as legitimate and binding. This meant that in theory, polities in 
dispute with one another were subject to the authority of the Church. 24 In practice, 
medieval society in Europe submitted to the authority of the Church, or at the very 
least, was swayed by the counsel of the Church in most matters. 25 Thus, 
"modern history as contrasted with medieval history is a history of 
powers, forces, dynasties and ideas ... Medieval wars are, as a rule, 
wars of rights; they are seldom wars of un-provoked, never wars of 
absolute unjustifiable aggression; they are not wars of idea or 
liberation, or of glory, or of nationality, or of propagandism." 26 
This paradigm persisted until divisions within the Catholic Church, and resentment 
against the interference by the Church in the secular affairs of princes, undermined 
23 Maurice Keens-Soper, 'The Practice of a States-System' in The Reason of States: A Study in 
International Political Theory, Micheal Donelan (ed.), London, George Allen & Unwin, 1978. p26. 
24 Thomas F.X. Noble, 'The Papacy In The Eighth and Ninth Centuries', in The New Cambridge 
Medieval History II c700-c900, Rosamund Mckitterick (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1995. pp563-586. 
25  Julia M.H. Smith, 'Religion and Lay Society', in The New Cambridge Medieval History II c700- 
c900, Rosamund Mckitterick (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995. pp654-678. 
26 W. Stubbs, Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1886. p209 & p217. Cited in Martin Wight, Power Politics, p26. 
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the all-encompassing embrace of universal Christendom. 27 With the religious wars in 
Europe came the eventual separation of temporal political power from religion, and 
religion ceased to be the ultimate source of political legitimacy or a prescriptive 
guide for the exercise of political power. Instead, ultimate authority within specified 
territorial boundaries was vested in the sovereign of that land. Thus, the modem state 
system evolved with the secular state in Europe. 
The features of modem statehood were first established by the Peace of Westphalia. 
The Peace of Westphalia referred to the European settlements of 1648, which 
brought an end to the religious wars following the Reformation and the Counter-
Reformation, including the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch, and the 
German phase of the Thirty Years' War. 28 
"The peace of Westphalia was important in establishing a territorial 
base-line which was continually referred to in treaties down to 
1789. It also established certain principles which influenced 
international relations throughout the same period. ... The principle 
was now accepted that each state could have its own religion ... At 
the same time, while states were still to strive for hegemony, there 
was also general acceptance that all states were independent and 
theoretically equal ...". 29 
The organising theme of European polities was no longer based on membership of a 
universal religion. With the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (he who governs the 
territory decides its religion), there was no longer a universal religion to sustain even 
the myth of political unity under one Church in Europe. Nor did religion continue to 
be the primary source of legitimacy for political power. Instead, scholars like Bodin, 
Locke and Rousseau introduced and developed secular concepts of sovereignty to 
27 V.H.H. Green, Renaissance and Reformation: A Survey Of European History Between 1450 and 
1660, London, Edward Arnold, 1964. pp  I8-28. 
28 Geoffrey Parker (ed.), The Thirty Years' War (second edition), London, Routledge, 1984. 
29 Derek McKay, H.M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers: 1648-1815,  London, Longman, 1983. p6. 
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invest power in the state as the ultimate source of authority. 30 Thus, political power 
came to be based on the control of, and loyalty from people, within clearly defined 
territorial boundaries. 3I Derived from the Latin term superanus and the French term 
souverainete, the concept of sovereignty was intended to convey the fact that 
supreme political power now resided in the sovereign, who was not answerable to 
any other.32 Consequently, the state system that emerged was based on two 
conditions: 
"First, there are independent political units acknowledging no 
political superior, and claiming to be 'sovereign'; and secondly, 
there are continuous and organized relations between them." 33 
With the Peace of Westphalia, the state system (the whole) became "nothing but the 
sum of its parts". 34 Each state represented a discrete polity, equal to each other in 
the sense that they were all sovereign states because majestas est summa in cives ac 
subditos legibusque soluta potestas (the sovereign that makes the laws can not be 
bound by them). Sovereign states answered only to international arrangements to 
which they have voluntarily submitted. 
The principle of sovereign and equal states was not universally applied outside 
Europe until after the Second World War. Instead, the age of European colonisation 
saw the subjugation of non-European states as client states by the powers of Europe. 
James Mayall explained: 
313 Jean Bodin, Six Books of a Commonweale,  (trans. by K.D. McRae) Cambridge: Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Press, 1962. John Locke, Two Treatises of government,  (intro. by Peter Laslett), 
New York, New American Library, 1965. Jean-Jacque Rousseau, The Social Contract, (trans. & intro. 
by Maurice Cranston), Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1968. 
31  The 'people' were first 'subjects', and later 'citizens' — corresponding with the development of a 
concept of sovereignty that regarded sovereignty as being ordained by God, to the concept of popular 
sovereignty. See Ernest Barker, Social contract: Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau,  London, 
Oxford University Press, 1971. 
32 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis Of International Society,  London, Allen & Unwin, 
1986. chapters 1 & 2. 
33 Martin Wight, Power Politics. p23. 
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"[The Europeans were able to] defend the double standard by 
invoking what one might call 'the barbarian option': the rule which 
applied in relations between 'civilised' peoples did not 
automatically apply beyond the civilised world." 35 
Thus, the relationship between the European powers and their client states were not 
based on sovereign equality. It was not until the unsuccessful attempts by Germany 
and Japan to establish 'universal empires' in the Second World War, that the 'double 
standard' was seriously challenged. The Atlantic Charter, the Moscow Declaration, 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposal had all acknowledged the principle of sovereign 
equality, and pledged to respect the belief "that small nations and great, though 
unequal in power, must be equal in rights." 36 The "double standard" was eroded 
when decolonialisation after World War Two saw many new states "invested with a 
legal status and a legal equality with all other states". 37 
The newly formed United Nations reiterated the basic principles of a general state 
system comprising equal and independent sovereign states. This was reflected in the 
Charter of the United Nations, which reinforced respect for "the accepted 
international precept for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence,"38 and states in Article 2 of its Charter that: 
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members. 
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and 
justice, are not endangered. 
34 Martin Wight, Power Politics. p26. 
35 James Mayall, 'International Society and International Theory', in The Reason of States: A Study in 
International Political Theory, Micheal Donelan (ed.), London, George Allen & Unwin, 1978. p127. 
36 MacMahon Ball, 'Introduction', in H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia: Speeches,  Sydney, 
Angus & Robertson Ltd, 1945. pviii. 
37 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, New York, W.H. Freeman 
and Company, 1989. p58. 
38 Commonwealth Secretariat, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, Marlborough House, 
London, 1985. p4. 
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4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations. 39 
Therefore, with the end of the colonial era and the foundation of the United Nations, 
international relations premised on the interaction of equal and sovereign states 
within a global state system began to form the theoretical basis upon which modern 
theories of international relations were constructed. ° 
The Concept Of Power 
The concept of power touches on assumptions of equality in the state system, and is 
one of the perennial themes in the debate on the nature of international relations. 41 
While many states formally acknowledge the principle of sovereign equality, respect 
for equality and sovereignty in international relations is frequently criticised, and 
often with good cause, as being more theoretical than rea1. 42 In particular, some 
scholars point to structures of dependence between 'core' states and 'peripheral' 
states, and other manifestations of inequality in international relations, as evidence of 
neo-colonialism and of the myth of equality among sovereign states. 43 Therefore, 
39 Charter of the United Nations, signed at the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization, San Francisco, June 26, 1945. 
4° For two other brief and easily accessible discussions on the development of the state system, see 
Roger D. Spegele, Political Realism in International Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996. pp102-126. Or Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics. pp19- 
45. 
41 Edward Hallett Carr, The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939 : an introduction to the study of 
international relations. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace (fifth Edition). Harold Sprout & Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, 
Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962. 
42 Barrie Axford, The Global System: Economics,Politics and Culture, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996. 
pp33-62. 
3 For a discussion on the evidence of structural inequality in the general state system, see Immanuel 
Wallerstein, The Modem World System. Volume I, New York, Academic Press, 1974. Andre Gunder 
Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969. 
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there appears to be a serious disjunction between the de facto and the de jure status 
of states within the state system. 
The disparity between the nominal equality of states and the 'reality' of their unequal 
status is based on the fact that states can be differentiated in terms of their capacity to 
exercise power in defence of their interests. When states achieve sovereignty, they 
vest ultimate constitutional authority in themselves. However, relations between 
sovereign states are difficult to avoid and such inter-State relations are often 
predicated on the concept of power. Seyom Brown explains: 
"Under the assumption that each nation-state is a self-governing 
unit, relations among them would seem to only be a marginal 
feature of the system. But even prior to the contemporary age of 
'interdependence', international relations have been quite 
prominent among various groups of countries. Why? One basic 
reason is that many countries are far from self-sufficient in certain 
goods required or desired by their peoples, including, in some 
cases, physical security and public order, and therefore will attempt 
to acquire these goods from other countries, sometimes by 
commerce, sometimes by conquest. Another reason is that often 
countries commonly use the same resource areas (oceans, rivers, 
the atmosphere, outer 'space), and the people of one country using a 
particular resource get in the way of or affect the condition of the 
people of another country. The determination of who gets what, 
when, where, and how in such contested areas necessitates 
international negotiation or fighting."'" 
The relevance of power as a concept in international relations rests upon the fact that 
states interacted with one another on terms of sovereign equality in a system where 
the absence of a constitutional authority is conspicuous. Thus, the pattern of the 
relationship between states can only be established by reference to normative 
practice or voluntarily contractual arrangements or coercion. Realist theories of 
international relations argue that "the determination of who gets what, when, where, 
and how" in international relations usually involve negotiation or fighting, but that 
34 
the chance for success of a state in defending its interests, regardless of the means 
employed, is based primarily on its power. 45 
Realists argue that power is the yardstick that differentiated states in the state system 
from one another. Disparity in terms of land, wealth, population, and other resources 
set sovereign states apart from one another. This meant that some states possessed a 
greater range of capabilities and are better able to defend their interests in 
international relations than other states less fortunately endowed. These capabilities 
ranged from the capacity to subjugate other states, to the stipulation of the terms 
under which trade is conducted, to the imposition of international regimes to 
legitimise, or to defend a desired pattern of behaviour in international relations. 
Therefore, the Realist perspective of international relations is one where powerful 
states may alter or impose arrangements within the state system to suit their interests, 
whereas weaker states had to conform to the resulting structures to the best of their 
ability.46 Thus, Russett and Starr argue that: 
"By the principles of sovereignty and international law all states are 
juridically equal - but in practice some are more equal than 
others:4 
A distinction is made between the concept of states as 'sovereign' and the concept of 
states as 'powers'. The concept of 'sovereign states' simply referred to the legitimacy 
and monopoly of power within defined territorial boundaries. In contrast, the notion 
of 'powers' explored the probability that an actor within the state system will be in a 
" Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics, Post Cold War Edition. 
pp11-12. 
45 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (fifth Edition). 
46George Couffignal, 'The Inter-American System after the Cold War', in Power and Purpose after the 
Cold War, Zaki Laidi (ed.), Oxford, Berg, 1994, pp169-171. 
47 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice. p58. 
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position to carry out its will, beyond the territorial limits of its sovereign jurisdiction, 
"despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which the probability rests."'" 
The varying capacity of states to affect relationships and/or proceedings within the 
state system led to the inference that it was possible to identify a structure within the 
state system that was defined by power. Martin Wight was one author who described 
a state system based on a hierarchical structure of states that ranged from minor 
powers to great powers.49 According to Wight, small powers had limited or no 
impact on the system beyond their ability to exercise sovereignty within their own 
territorial boundaries, whereas the influence of great powers was manifested 
throughout the entire state system. For Wight and other Realists, power was 
synonymous with the capacity of 'powers' to defend their interests in international 
relations. Wight argues that: 
"The power that makes a 'power' is composed of many elements. 
Its basic components are size of population, strategic position and 
geographic extent, and economic resources and industrial 
production. To these must be added less tangible elements like 
administrative and fmancial efficiency, education and technological 
skill, and above all moral cohesion." 5° 
However, even though they cited various expressions of power, including the power 
to shape opinion or economic power, Wight and other Realist-inclined authors 
tended to take the view that Force was the ultimo ratio of power and that all other 
factors were subsumed by this fact. 51 
48 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich (eds.), New York, Bedminister Press, 1968. p53. Weber was not referring specifically to 
relations between states. However, Weber's definitive concept of power in social relations is also 
applicable to the study of power in international relations, and paraphrased above. 
49 Martin Wight, Power Politics. 
50 Martin Wight, Power Politics. p26. 
51 Zaki Laidi, 'Power and Purpose in the International system', in Power and Purpose after the Cold 
War, Zaki Laidi (ed.), Oxford, Berg, 1994. pp7-8. 
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For Realists, the power of a state, and its ability to influence arrangements in the 
inter-state system, is measured by its physical capacity to wage war. 52 The 
population of a state was significant for the potential size of the armies that it could 
field. Social conditions were examined in terms of their capacity to affect the 
cohesiveness, morale, and/or other factors governing an army's ability to fight. 
Economic potential was judged in the light of a state's capacity to fund an army. The 
level of technology in a country was measured in terms of the sort of armaments that 
it could potentially wield. Diplomacy was simply an instrument to organise military 
alliances, and/or the means to shape the international structure, based on a pecking 
order, established by force of arms. Wight, himself clearly regarded military 
capabilities as the primary basis of power, and notes that: 
"... the phrase 'power politics' ... is a translation from the German 
word Machtpolitik, which means the politics of force - the conduct 
of international relations by force or the threat of force, without 
considerations of right and justice." 53 
Wight elaborated on the primacy of power in international relations with the analogy 
that: 
"... just as in domestic politics influence is not government, so in 
international politics influence is not power. It is concrete power in 
the end that settles great international issues."54 
Such assertions were typical of the 'traditional' view of international relations, and 
interpretations of international relations by Carr, Morgenthau, and Kennedy have 
also been based on similar perspectives. Carr and Kennedy examined the relationship 
between the states of Europe. In particular, they charted the use of power, by the 
52 Harold Sprout & Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics. John Stoessinger, The 
Might of Nations 3rd edition, New York, Random House, 1969. John Garnett, Contemporary 
Strategy, London, Croom Helm, 1975. 
53 Martin Wight, Power Politics. p29. 
54 Martin Wight, Power Politics. p26. 
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great powers of Europe, to influence the pattern of international relations and thereby 
affect the fate of nations within the state system. 55 Morgenthau looked at the impact 
of power on international relations during the Cold War era, and the resultant 
structure that emerged from bi-polar politics and the confrontation between the super 
powers.56  Power-oriented perspectives of 'international' relations have been around 
even before the concept of the modern state originated with the peace of 
Westphalia. 57 These studies all shared a view that the world is organised according to 
the interplay of power wielded by sovereign states in international relations, and 
portray a state system where states contended with one another over mastery (but not 
necessarily conquest) of that state system. 
The power-based perspectives of international relations also explore the notion of a 
hierarchy of states that can be established on the basis of a range of criteria. A 
popular theme is the construction of quantitative measures to assist in the 
measurement and comparison of state power. Writers such as Galtung or Kennedy 
have surveyed and highlighted the power base of states in terms of population, gross 
national product, armed forces, and other 'tools of coercion', and built conceptual 
55 Edward Hallett Can-, The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939 : an introduction to the study of 
international relations.  Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict Since 1500 to 2000,  London, Fortuna Press, 1989. 
56 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (fifth edition). 
Wight's concept of a 'dominant power' might be roughly analogous to the concept of a 'super power'. 
A 'super power' or 'dominant power' is "one that might measure strength against all its rivals 
combined". Martin Wight, Power Politics. p34. The term 'super power' in this paper is used 
specifically to refer to the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is intended as a 
term of convenience, as opposed to an analytic concept, simply because much of the literature refers 
to these two states as 'super powers'. In this thesis, however, where the focus is on middle powers, the 
distinction that separates super powers or dominant powers from great powers is not significant. Thus, 
for the purposes of this thesis, dominant or super powers shall be treated as being similar to great 
powers — that is, as powers possessing the capacity and inclination to defend system-wide interests. 
57  Indeed, such power-oriented perspectives of dealings between polities have been recorded and 
debated since Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, and the writings of Kautilya. For a 
critique of Thucydides, see Paul A. Rahe, l'hucydides' Critique of Realpolitik', in Roots of Realism, 
Benjamin Frankel (ed.), London, Fran Cass 1996. Or Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, `Thucydidean 
Realism: Between Athens and Melos', in Roots of Realism, Benjamin Frankel (ed.), London, Fran 
Cass 1996. For a sample of Kautilya's writings, see Theodore de Bary, Sources of Indian Tradition, 
Volume One: From the Beginning to 1800,  revised and edited by Ainslie T. Embree, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1988. pp247-249. 
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models for a hierarchy of states based on the possession of a selection of physical 
attributes. 58 Kegley and Raymond have also provided a useful schedule to compare 
and contrast some of the conceptual models that have been developed. 
Contending Views of the Elements of National Power 
Crabb 
(1965: 7) 
Hartmann 
(1983: 41-67) 
Kulski 
(1968: 98-101) 
Lerche & Said 
(1963: 59) 
Morgenthau 
(1985: 127-183) 
Geography Geographic 
element 
Size, location Geographic 
position 
Geography 
Economic 
resources 
Economic 
element 
Economic 
resources & raw 
materials 
Resource 
endowment 
National 
Resources 
Technological 
resources 
Technological 
resources 
Educational & 
technical level 
Military Forces Military element Military 
potential 
Military power Military 
preparedness 
Population Population Demographic 
element 
Population 
characteristics 
Population & 
manpower 
National 
Character 
Historical, 
psychological, 
sociological 
element 
National 
character 
National morale National morale 
Organizational 
administrative 
element 
Quality of 
national leaders 
& elites 
Political 
economic & 
social structure 
Quality of 
government 
Ideology 
Industrial 
Capacity 
Industrial & 
agricultural 
productive 
capacity 
Industrial 
capability 
International 
strategic position 
Quality of 
diplomacy 
Land, maritime, 
and air 
transportation 
capacity 
58 Johan Galtung, On the Way to Superpower Status: India and the EC Compared,  Indian Ocean 
Centre For Peace Studies, Occasional Paper No 2, 1991. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. 
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Organski 
(1968: 124) 
Palmer & 
Perkins (1957: 
35-91) 
Stoessinger 
(1969: 15-27) 
U.S. Army 
(1960: 2) 
Van Dyke 
(1966: 199-200) 
Geography Geography Geography Geographic 
component 
Geographic base 
Resources Natural 
resources 
Natural 
resources 
Economic 
component 
Economic 
system 
Economic 
development 
Technology Economic & 
industrial 
development 
Scientific & 
inventive 
potentialities 
Armed 
establishment 
Military 
component 
Population Population Population Demographic 
base 
National 
character 
Sociological 
component 
National morale Morale National morale 
Political 
development 
Leadership Government: 
national 
leadership 
Political 
component 
Government 
organization & 
administration 
(wisdom of 
leadership) 
Ideas Ideology Ideology 
Productive 
capacity 
Strategic 
Position 
Transport & 
Communications 
Intelligence 
Source: Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Gregory A. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace? Great 
Power Politics in the Twentieth Century, New York, MacMillan, 1994. pp14-15. 
Others like Rosenau created a conceptual framework of the state system based on the 
degree to which states affected, and were affected by, their external environment. 59 
According to Rosenau, great powers would have 'policy outputs' that had a high 
impact on the state system, but remained resistant to 'inputs' from their external 
environments. In contrast, small powers had low or no influence on the state system, 
but were highly susceptible to influence from their external environment. 
59 James N. Rosenau(ed.), Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International 
Systems, New York, The Free Press, 1969. 
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Inputs 
Outputs 
High Low 
h 
Hig Egypt 
Nigeria 
U.S. 
U.S.S.R. 
Congo 
Cyprus 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Low 
Source: James N. Rosenau(ed.), Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of 
National and International Systems, New York, The Free Press, 1969. p59. 
Such perspectives were useful in that they gave expression to an intuitive 
understanding of international relations. It seemed only logical that large, wealthy 
and populous states would have a greater ability to determine the arrangements 
within the state system that affected the fate of other states, in contrast to small, poor 
and sparsely populated states who would have little or no impact on such 
arrangements. 6° 
The arguments canvassed earlier contend that the theoretical equality of sovereign 
states in the state system is rarely upheld by practice in international relations. They 
also demonstrated that states could be usefully differentiated on the basis of power. 61 
While differentiation can produce a hierarchy of powers, which can in turn be 
translated into a guide to the capacity of states to defend their interests in 
international relations, Ian Clark cautioned that: 
"The description of the state system as hierarchical should not be 
understood in too precise a sense. Waltz has used the term to define 
a structural ordering principle of a political system and, in this 
sense, it is to be contrasted with an anarchic order. The present 
work employs the term in the less specialised sense of meaning a 
social arrangement characterized by stratification in which, like the 
angels, there are orders of power and glory and the society is 
6° MacMahon Ball, 'Introduction', in H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia: Speeches.  pviii. 
61 Coral Bell, 'The International Environment and Australia's Foreign Policy', in In Pursuit of 
National Interests: Australian Foreign Policy in the 1990s,  F.A. Mediansky & A.C. Palfreeman (eds.), 
Sydney, Pergamon Press, 1988. pp69-70. 
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classified in successively subordinate grades. This hierarchy is 
commonly assigned in terms of politico-strategic power, yielding 
the traditional youpings of great powers, medium powers, and 
small powers."6 
Likewise, this thesis employs the term `hierarchy' to describe the structural 
classification of states according to perceptions of their capacity, based on "politico-
strategic power", to defend their interests within the state system. 
Constraints On Power Politics 
Realists had offered a compelling critique against utopian visions of the state system. 
However, the Realist argument that national interests might be advanced through the 
unfettered use of naked power, especially military power, has come under strong 
challenge because of geopolitical changes. With the change in mood in the post Cold 
War era, scholars such as Ken Booth and Geoffrey Till write of "New Times for Old 
Navies" and of "turning warships into lawships", and less `glamorous' roles for 
navies.63 The arguments that the use of force in international relations has become 
passé included arguments by scholars such as Andrew Linklater who argue that: 
LG 
. states no longer regard territorial conquest as central to 
economic development ... In early modern Europe [and earlier], it 
is often argued that, violence was endemic partly because the 
absolutist state assumed that economic growth required conquest 
and war. False expectations of the economic benefits of territorial 
expansion compounded the tensions which led to the First World 
War. The twentieth century has witnessed the rise of the trading 
62 Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform And Resistance In The International Order, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989. p2. 
63 Ken Booth, 'The Future of Navies in Peacetime: The Influence of Future History on Sea Power' in 
Naval Power in the Pacific: Towards the Year 2000, Hugh Smith and Anthony Bergin (eds.), Boulder, 
Lynne Rienner, 1993. pp143-162. Geoffrey Till, 'A Post-Cold War Maritime Strategy for NATO', 
Naval Forces, Vol.XIII, No.III, 1992. pp8-15. 
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state which eschews the use of force for strategies of global 
commerce and investment."64 
Similar sentiments were echoed by political leaders like the Malaysian Prime 
Minister, Mahathir Mohamad who claims: 
"There was a time when wars could be won at what may be termed 
as a reasonable cost. It no longer is. Even the richest oil nations can 
be bankrupted by a few days of hurling ballistic missiles at each 
other. In the end there is so little to show - no new empires, no 
subject people and no new sources of wealth to plunder. Powerful 
nations have invaded and conquered only to negotiate ignominious 
retreats with nothing to show except a long list of casualties. 
Conquest is a messy business in an age where people matter and 
where the names will not simply lie down and submit."65 
In addition to the arguments that the use of force might no longer be as rewarding, 
the threat of retaliation also limited the use of either military or economic power in 
the pursuit of state interests by many states. 66 Many contemporary great powers, 
including the United States, were also restricted in the unbridled expression of their 
power, particularly military power, by liberal democratic political systems. 67 There 
was a perception that wars must be fought for moral reasons, as well as by moral 
means.68 While some of these sentiments may be dismissed as political rhetoric, 
there is no denying that the coercive use of force in state sanctioned violence within 
the state system is generally regarded as undesirable, international cooperation is 
widely and popularly perceived as very desirable. There appeared to be a growing 
64  Andrew Linklater, `Neo-realism in Theory and Practice', in International Relations Theory Today, 
Ken Booth & Steve Smith (ed.), Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996. pp254-255. 
Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Regionalism, Globalism and Spheres of Influence: ASEAN and Challenge 
of Change into the 21st Century, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989. p12. 
66  Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics, Post Cold-War Edition. 
p245. 
67  Liberal democracies like the United States are generally considered to be highly accountable to their 
electorate and must be able to justify the use of force before being able to do so. Peter J. Anderson, 
The Global Politics of Power, Justice and Death: An Introduction to International Relations, London, 
Routledge, 1996. pp30-40. For a treatment of linkages between domestic interests and international 
policy, see James Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International 
Systems. 
68 Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York, Basic Books, 1977. 
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belief in the international community that states ought to abide by a common set of 
rules, and international regimes are generally perceived to advance this ideal of 
international cooperation. 69 
International regimes are commonly regarded as being synonymous with 
international treaties, conventions and agreements. While political scientists have 
adopted more precise defmitions in the study of international regimes, the concept of 
an international regime has been criticised, notably by Susan Strange, for its 
ambiguity." Notwithstanding issues of precision in terminology, or the distinction 
made between legally 'enforceable' (hard law) and legally unenforceable regimes 
(soft law), there are a few features of international regimes that may be taken as 
generally accepted!' 
Regimes possess a structure that generates 'principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures'. International regimes may be, and are often defmed by the 
terms of a treaty or agreement between two or more states. However, long-standing 
practices in international relations may also give rise to international regimes when 
tradition acquires the status of customary law through time, and become a set of 
principles defined as 'beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude' that affect the 
69  The rhetoric of diplomats and the media certainly promotes this belief even though it is regarded by 
some as idealistic and/or naive. See Kevin Clements & Robin Ward (eds.), Building International 
Community, Cooperating for Peace Case Studies,  St Leonards: NSW, Allen & Unwin, 1994. Gareth 
Evans, Cooperating For Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, St Leonards: NSW, 
Allen & Unwin, 1993. 
7° Susan Strange, 'Cave! Hic dragones: a critque of regime analysis', in International Regimes, Steven 
D. Krasner (ed.), Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993. pp337-354. 
71  While it might be argued that the nature of sovereign states is such that they can not be bound by 
any authority other than their own, states generally acknowledge a commitment to honour contractual 
arrangements with other states, and hence these arrangements are considered legally enforceable. In 
contrast to the contractual arrangements that fall under the rubric of international law, states also 
engage in collective declarations of common purpose and/or declarations of common values. While 
these declarations are considered useful guides that reflect the intent of states, or prevailing standards 
by which the actions of states could be measured, they are not generally recognised as a binding 
obligation by sovereign states, and hence they are not deemed to be legally enforceable. 
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behaviour of states in a predictable fashion. 72 Krasner proposed that regimes might 
be regarded: 
“
... as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations". 73 
In this thesis, the more discriminating distinctions associated with the concept of a 
regime shall be ignored. It is not the purpose here to examine these distinctions in 
depth. Instead, the term 'regime' will be held to represent all multilateral and 
institutionalised arrangements between states. Thus, within the context of this thesis, 
the concept of a regime will be deemed to include international organisations, 
regulatory arrangements and other international arrangements, which establish a 
pattern in international relations that guide the way states behave or make decisions 
within the state system. 74 
Historically, power and international regimes play a significant role in international 
relations. 75 Much of contemporary international maritime law was shaped by great 
powers who imposed international regimes that suited their interests on other states. 
Pax Britannica saw Britain exercise its military strength, during an era when it was 
the dominant power, to unilaterally impose a 3 mile limit on the territorial sea, stamp 
out slavery, secure the right to free passage, and enforce other oceanic regimes on all 
72 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables', in International Regimes,  Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991. 
p2. 
73 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables'. p2 
74 For the purposes of this thesis, the terms 'regime' and 'multilateral institutional arrangements' are 
interchangeable. The term 'regime' is used in much of the literature discussed in this chapter, and is 
employed in this chapter. However, as a matter of personal preference and because it conveys more 
clearly the intended concept, the term multilateral institutional arrangements would be used for the 
following chapters. 
75 Mark W. Zacher, Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and 
Communications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
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states in the state system. 76 While many states have accepted these regimes as just or 
desirable, it remains a fact that they were put in place by a great power acting 
unilaterally in pursuit of its own interests, and which had the capacity to construct 
international regimes binding on all others within the state system. The significance 
of international regimes rests in the fact that they are also deemed to be binding on 
the states that 'created' them, as well as the fact that such regimes often remained in 
place even after the state that imposed them had diminished as a power. Hence, Kim 
Nossal argued that international regimes are important: 
"[B]ecause institutions tend to take on a life of their own, smaller 
powers understand full well that international organisations can 
serve to constrain the larger powers, lashing them, as it were to an 
institutional mast."77 
The capacity of these and other regimes to constrain the exercise of power by states, 
introduces another dimension to the issue of 'who gets what, when, where, and how' 
in international relations. 
The role that international regimes can play in constraining the power of states 
through institutionalised arrangements achieves even greater significance in light of 
the fact that the contemporary state system is characterised by a proliferation of 
international regimes, pertaining to all aspects of international relations. 78 
International regimes regulate trade, harmonise national laws, give direction to 
policy, coordinate defence and govern many other issues that affect how states 
behave. The proliferation and pervasiveness of international regimes within the state 
76  Mark W. Zacher, Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and 
Communications. p7 & p46. 
77  Kim Richard Nossal, 'Middle Power Diplomacy in the Changing Asia-Pacific Order: Australia and 
Canada Compared', in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, Richard Leaver & James L. Richardson 
(eds.), Boulder, Westview Press, 1993. p215. 
78  Herr, R. and E. Chia (1995). The Concept of Regime Overlap: Toward Identification and 
Assessment. Senior Practitioners Workshop on Overlapping Maritime Regimes, March 1995. Ed. B. 
W. Davis. Hobart, Tasmania, Antarctic CRC Monograph. 2: 11-26. 
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system lends weight to the view that the role of multilateral institutional 
arrangements in international relations, with respect to the determination of 'who 
gets what, when where, and how', can not be ignored. 
The continued and all-encompassing expansion of human activity across national 
boundaries has been the subject of many studies, 79 and the growth of transboundary 
activity is a theme consistently found in many of the explanations for the increasing 
number of international regimes. In particular, functionalist accounts of the role of 
international regimes have been popular. In the absence of an all-embracing world 
government, states have adopted various multilateral arrangements to facilitate 
continuous and organised relations with one another. The evolution of human society 
and the advance of technology have made the establishment of regimes necessary, 
both as a means of regulating activity, and a way of affirming established patterns of 
behaviour that guide the interaction, between states, their governments and their 
peoples. The need for states to coordinate their actions is reflected in the many 
transboundary transactions such as trade and commerce between states, or 
movements of people between states, which require a clear understanding and 
agreement between the states involved. For example, the simple business of posting a 
letter to a friend in another country involves a regime. 80 
"The Universal Postal Convention, adopted in 1874, which 
specifies the types of correspondence that may be transmitted 
internationally; prohibits mailing of certain articles and 
commodities, such as narcotics; provides for the redirection or 
return of correspondence that cannot be delivered; regulates 
payments when the mail goes through the territory of several 
79 Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration, Washington, D.C., The 
Brookings Institution, 1996. James Hawdon, Emerging Organizational Forms: The Proliferation of 
Regional Intergovernmental Organizations in the Modem World System, Westport, Greenwood Press, 
1996. James N. Rosenau & Hylke Tromp (eds.), Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, 
Aldershot, Avebury, 1989. Micheal Smith, Richard Little, & Micheal Shackleton, Perspectives on 
World Politics, London, Croom Helm, 1981. 
80 Mark W. Zacher, Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and 
Communications. pp181-211. 
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members; and guarantees freedom of transit throughout the entire 
union [comprising nearly all independent nations and their 
territories]." 8 I 
Regimes served to harmonise regulations among states so as to facilitate business, 
social or other transactions, and to bring about predictability and order, and instil 
confidence within the state system, by clarifying the duties and obligations of states 
with respect to one another. 
Arthur Stein describes transboundary issues, which mandate some degree of 
cooperation and coordination between states, as 'dilemmas of common aversion' and 
'dilemmas of common interests'. 82 The phrase 'dilemmas of common interests' 
reflect the need for states to cooperate in order to achieve commonly desired 
objectives. In contrast, the phrase 'dilemmas of common aversion' suggest a 
collective desire to avoid an outcome that is undesirable to all. Both refer to the 
increasing schedule of issues on the international agenda that can not be resolved 
unilaterally. There appears to be a growing number of instances where international 
regimes emerged as responses to transboundary issues that were recognised as global 
or regional concerns and which required a multilateral response in order to achieve a 
satisfactory solution." For example, concerns raised by warnings of global warming 
and of the hole in the ozone layer prompted calls for a multilateral response, and 
resulted in the Convention on Climate Change. 84 While the failure to establish 
81 Microsoft Encarta Encyclopaedia CD ROM. 
82 Arthur Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', in Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David A. Baldwin (ed.), New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1993. pp29-59. 
83 Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), The International Politics of the Environment, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992. Alan Lipietz, Green Hopes: The Future of Political Ecology, 
translated by Malcolm Slater, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995. Edith Brown Weiss, Environmental 
Change and International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions, Tokyo, United Nations University 
Press, 1992. Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics. ppl 87-202. 
84 Ros Taplin, 'International Environmental Regimes: Analytical Perspectives and Insights from the 
Global Climate Change Regime Process', Paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies 
Association Annual Conference, Monash University, 29 Sept 1 October 1993. 
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uniform standards for greenhouse gas emissions raised doubts about the efficacy of 
the Climate Change Convention, there is general acknowledgement that some issues 
threaten the interests of all states, and that no state acting on its own could provide an 
adequate response to such issues. International regimes offer a means to overcome 
the limitations of states and unilateralism in confronting some of the challenges of 
the contemporary state system. 
There has been a proliferation of international regimes in recent years in response to 
the growing number of transboundary environmental issues affecting states. These 
include the Southern Blue Fin Tuna Treaty, which addresses the issue of resource 
management for highly migratory species; the Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, which deals with pollution from ships; and the South Pacific 
Regional Environmental Programme, which manages the environment at a regional 
level. Consequently, there is a wealth of literature that focused on the role of 
international regimes as an organising theme for the state system. 85 However, many 
of these perspectives are tinged with Idealism, and portray a state system driven by 
the imperatives of ecological determinism. 86 
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of the advocates whose interests emphasised 
environmental issues, the growing number of international regimes also emerged as a 
response to other transboundary issues. Cross-border crime continues to be an issue 
that defies unilateral solutions. 87 For example, the spate of sea-robberies in the Straits 
of Malacca in the early 1990s was a problem with transboundary crime that was only 
85  See for example, Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment In A 
Stateless Society, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1994. 
86 See for example, Alan Lipietz, Green Hopes: The Future of Political Ecology. 
87  Edmund Chia, 'The Response To Piracy And Sea-Robbery In The Straits Of Malacca And Adjacent 
Waters: Law Enforcement And Regional Cooperation', unpublished honours thesis, University of 
Tasmania, 1993; Ellen, Eric, 'Asian Piracy: Who, When, Where, and How', presented at the Asian 
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(temporarily) resolved with a set of agreements involving Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. These agreements established what each state might do in response to sea-
robbery in each other's territorial waters and this resulted in more effective Police 
enforcement. 88 Disputes over overlapping territorial and jurisdictional claims also 
emerged as issues to which international regimes provided a response. For example, 
the disputed sovereignty claims over Antarctica created a potential for conflict that 
was addressed by the creation of the Antarctic Treaty System. The Antarctic Treaty 
System provided an arrangement that enabled the disputing parties to side step the 
contentious issue of sovereignty (and later the issue of mineral exploitation), while 
allowing other activities to proceed unimpeded. 89 
International regimes also flourished as mechanisms to facilitate confidence building 
and to achieve peace in international relations. The cooperation or coordination or 
both that is required for the formation and maintenance of a regime is often as 
important as the regulatory objectives of the regime itself. The means can be as 
important as (or perhaps even more important than) the ends in the formation and 
maintenance of an international regime. International regimes are often pursued as 
confidence building measures, and were particularly significant during the 
atmosphere of tension affecting international relations during the Cold War. 9° The 
Incidents at Sea regime arose out of the confrontational brinkmanship that occurred 
Investment Conferences on Piracy In South-East Asia, Regent Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, 28 - 29 July 
1992. 
88 Straits Times, Singapore, March 12. 
89 W.M. Bush, 'The Antarctic Treaty System: A Framework For Evolution — The Concept Of A 
System', in Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change?  R.A. Herr, H.R. Hall, & M.G. Haward (eds.), 
Hobart, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1990. pp119-168. 
9° Desmond Ball and Sam Bateman, 'An Australian Perspective on Maritime CSBMs in the Asia-
Pacific Region', in A Peaceful Ocean? Maritime Security in the Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era, 
Andrew Mack (ed.), Kuala Lumpur, Allen & Unwin, 1993. pp158-186. 
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when American and Soviet warships encountered each other at sea during the Cold 
War." 
"Necognition of the dangers of naval incidents eventually led the 
United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate their Incidents at 
Sea Agreement in 1971-72. 92 
The procedural rituals that this regime imposed guided all subsequent encounters 
between American and Soviet warships and "is widely regarded as having 
successfully reduced the frequency and severity of superpower naval incidents while 
building greater trust and confidence at sea." 93 Thus, international regimes served to 
alleviate the mistrust and tension between states through the patterned and 
predictable arrangements that they establish. 94 
It should be noted that a distinction should be made between once-off ventures and 
the sustained arrangements for cooperation and coordination that are institutionalised 
through regimes. Summit meetings and similar events might be deemed to be 
confidence building measures, but they are hardly 'regimes' - not even by the loose 
standards adopted for that term by this paper. In contrast, international regimes can 
represent the efforts of states to sustain and institutionalise desirable multilateral 
arrangements as a policy to improve relations with one another. The Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) illustrated the usefulness of institutionalised 
arrangements in this regard. 
91 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 'Agreements to Prevent Incidents at Sea and Dangerous Military Activities: 
Potential Applications in the Asia-Pacific Region'. pp44-61. 
92 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 'Agreements to Prevent Incidents at Sea and Dangerous Military Activities: 
Potential Applications in the Asia-Pacific Region', in A Peaceful Ocean? Maritime Security in the 
Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era, Andrew Mack (ed.), Kuala Lumpur, Allen & Unwin, 1993. p46. 
93 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 'Agreements to Prevent Incidents at Sea and Dangerous Military Activities: 
Potential Applications in the Asia-Pacific Region'. p44. 
94 Sam Bateman, 'Maritime Confidence and Security Building Measures and the Law of Sea', 
presented at the Conference on Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction In The Pacific, Kuala 
Lumpur, 6-9 June 1993. 
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"The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was 
created in 1967 to promote regional reconciliation and manage 
intramural disputes following a period of tension between 
Indonesia and Malaysia."95 
At its inception, the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations had 
little in common. In fact, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore had just emerged from 
a period of hostile political and military confrontation with one another. Thus, in 
contrast to the usual objectives of establishing collective arrangements for security or 
trade, its primary purpose was to function as a confidence building measure, and any 
other functional role tended to be incidental. Nevertheless, ASEAN represented a 
regime that resulted in a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures, both formal and informal, which in turn established a basis for the 
development of functional cooperation on other issues, and a sense of common 
identity, among its member. 96 Indeed, it might be argued that the ASEAN had 
evolved into a structure that might, to some extent, and through consensus, shape the 
individual foreign policies of its member states. 97 Therefore, there is a significant 
difference between multilateralism, which simply refers to activity in international 
relations that involved more than two states, and multilateral institutional 
arrangements, which described the repetitive and predictable processes in which two 
or more states were engaged. Institutional arrangements should be distinguished from 
once-off ventures, because the former develops structures that are sustainable to 
95 .James E. Goodby & Daniel B. O'Connor, 'The Utility Of International Organisations For Collective 
Action In Regional Conflict', in Regional Conflicts: The Challenge To US-Russian Co-operation, 
James E. Goodby (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. pp216-217. 
96 Alison Broinowski (ed.), Understanding ASEAN, London, MacMillan, 1982. Micheal Leifer, 
ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, London, Routledge, 1989. Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regional 
and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict', in Journal of International Affairs, 
46, 2, Winter 1993. pp439-467. Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regional Arrangements and International 
Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12, 4 March 
1991. pp269-305. 
97 See for example the ASEAN diplomatic initiatives with respect to the civil aviation dispute with 
Australia and the diplomatic opposition to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. ASEAN Document 
Series, 1967-1985, ASEAN Secretariat, Jarkarta, 1985. p191 & pp327-346. 
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reinforce the original objectives, and which are also capable of evolving, whereas the 
latter is not. 
International regimes have the capacity to guide the actions of states and to affect 
their interests. While power continues to play a significant role in international 
relations, in the contemporary state system, we are faced with increasing evidence 
that power is not usually exercised in an unbridled fashion, and that states are guided 
by customs, laws, and other expectations in their dealings with one another. 98 
Therefore, Realists who posit a view of international relations based on power have 
not, and perhaps can not repudiate the fact that significant constraints on the capacity 
of a state to exercise power do exist in the state system. 99 Regimes regulate the way 
states trade, respond to transboundary problems and arrive at collective decisions. 
Thus, any discussion of power and powers in the contemporary state system has to 
account for the role of both states and international regimes in the state system, as 
well as the dynamics of the relationship between states and international regimes. 
The growing number of issues in which they share a common interest reflects the 
increasing interdependence of nation states. Issues such as international trade, the 
need to deal with transboundary crime, or the urgency of regulating transnational 
activity to address common concerns such as environmental problems, encourage a 
multilateral response, and this is seen in the expansion of international regimes.' °° 
98 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, London, Macmillan, 
1977. 
99 James N. Rosenau, 'Subtle Sources of Global Interdependence: Changing Criteria of Evidence, 
Legitimacy, and Patriotism', in Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, James N. Rosenau & 
Hylke Tromp (ed.), Aldershot, Avebury, 1989. pp31-46. 
lc* Robert Owen Keohane & Jospeh S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, U.S., Harper Collins, 1989. 
Robert 0. Keohane, & Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1973. Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the 
Environment In A Stateless Society, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1994. International Maritime 
Organization, Report of the IMO Working Group on the Malacca Strait Area, 28 February to 10 
March 1993. 
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Consequently, international regimes have pervaded much, if not most aspects, of 
international life. In an interesting observation that is tinged with idealism, but 
perhaps reflective of popular opinion, the Encyclopedia Britannica states: 
"The increase in the interdependence of states restricted the 
principle that might is right in international affairs. The peoples of 
the world have recognized that there can be no peace without law 
and no that there can be no law without some limitations on 
sovereignty. They have started, therefore, to pool their 
sovereignties to the extent needed to maintain peace, and 
sovereignty is being increasingly exercised on behalf of the peoples 
of the world not only by national governments but also by organs 
of the world community. ”101 
The growing institutionalisation of international relations represented by 
international regimes suggests that multilateral institutional arrangements must also 
be studied as potential instruments of state policy in foreign relations, if we are to 
fully appreciate the capacity of a state to defend its interests within the state system. 
The Significance Of The `Neo -Schools' 
In response to the issues canvassed above, and other issues raised by the growing 
presence of international regimes in the state system, two 'new' schools of thought in 
the study of international relations emerged. The advocates of these schools of 
thought have been labelled Neoliberals and Neorealists. 
Neoliberalists or Institutionalists assign greater importance to the effect of regimes 
on the state system. l°2 They hold regimes to be significant for the predictability of 
101 Encyclopaedia Britannica  CD ROM Edition, 1997. 
102 Some Neoliberalists appear to prefer the new label of `contractualise or 'contractual theorists'. 
Keohane explains: "In After Hegemony, I referred to a functional theory' of international regimes. 
However, since that phrase carries connotations of sociological functionalism, with which I do not 
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the processes that they institutionalise and contend that regimes place the exercise of 
power by rational state actors under specific constraints. Neoliberalists regard: 
"... these patterns of practice as significant because they affect 
state behaviour. Sophisticated institutionalists do not expect 
cooperation always to prevail, but they are aware of the 
malleability of interests and they argue that interdependence creates 
interests in cooperation." 1°3 
Thus, Neoliberalists argue that rational actors allow themselves to be guided by 
regimes, not because they are compelled by a greater power, but because it is in their 
interest as a rational and egotistical actor to do so. 1 " In contrast to traditional utopian 
arguments where altruism supplied the motive for cooperation, Neoliberals argue that 
selfish egoism from rational actors can also supply an interest in the construction of, 
support for, and participation in, regimes that act as constraints on power within the 
state system. 
Neoliberalists share some of the assumptions that Realists hold and are acutely 
conscious of traditional Realist objections to utopian assumptions of authority that 
supersedes the jurisdiction of sovereign states. Keohane acknowledges this when he 
states that: 
"Institutionalists do not elevate international regimes to mythical 
positions of authority over states: on the contrary, such regimes are 
established by states to achieve their purposes. ... Nevertheless, 
those institutions that succeed in facilitating mutually beneficial 
cooperation will become valued for the opportunities they provide 
to states, they will therefore acquire a certain degree of 
permanence, and their rules will constrain the exercise of power by 
governments. Governments will still seek to attain their ends, 
identify, I now use the language of `contractualism' rather than functionalism'." — Robert O. Keohane, 
'The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American Research Programme', in 
Regime Theory and International Relations, Volker Rittberger (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997. 
p36, footnote 6. 
103 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
p8. 
1°4 Notwithstanding the fact that decisions in international relations are not always guided by 
rationality. 
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including increasing their shares of the gains from cooperation 
through the use of political influence. However, the exercise of 
influence will depend not merely on their material capabilities but 
also on the relationship between their ends and means on the one 
hand, and the rules and practices of the international institution, on 
the other." 1°5 
Therefore, Neoliberalists do not discount the potency of power in international 
relations and share the Realists' premise of states as selfish egotistical actors. 
However, they contend that selfish egoism does not preclude the existence of 
common interests, and that where such harmony of interests arise, states are prepared 
to constrain their use of power through institutional arrangements to achieve their 
desired purpose. Neoliberals see the growth in international regimes as empirical 
evidence that states are prepared to voluntarily submit themselves to mechanisms 
that constrain their actions and regard international institutions as forums for 
international relations that affect and are affected by states in pursuit of their 
interests. 1°6 
In contrast to the Neoliberalists, Neorealists acknowledge the role of international 
regimes in international relations, but argue that such institutions have but minimal 
impact on traditional perspectives of power politics. 107  Indeed some argue that: 
"The very term neorealism is contentious, because many realists 
regard the ideas it conveys as containing nothing that would merit 
the prefix 'neo'." 108 
105 Ro, • pert 0. Keohane, 'Institutionalist Theory, Realist Challenge'. p274. 
106 See R.M. Axelrod & R.O. Keohane, The Evolution of Cooperation, New York, 1984. Elinor 
Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for 
Natural Resources and the Environment, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989. Oran Young, 'The 
Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment', in 
International Organization, 43. pp 349-75. 
107 Miles Kahler, 'Institutional-Building In the Pacific', in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic 
and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.), St 
Leonard's, Allen & Unwin, 1994. 
108 Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations. 
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Neorealists argue that considerations of 'absolute gain', advanced by Neoliberalists 
to support their proposition of a tendency towards the institutionalisation of 
international relations, does not adequately address the issue of 'relative gains'. 
Grieco points out the crux of the dispute between the Neorealists and the Neoliberals 
when he states: 
"My realist-informed argument begins with the point that, for 
weaker partners, the rules of collaborative arrangements will 
provide them with more or fewer opportunities for having effective 
'voice opportunities" in the process of deciding how cooperation 
will proceed with the arrangement and thus how they will be 
treated by their stronger partners. This yields what I call the 
binding thesis: if states share a common interest and undertake 
negotiations on rules constituting a collaborative arrangement, then 
the weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the 
rules so construed will provide for effective voice opportunities for 
them and will thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their 
domination by stronger partners." I°9 
Thus, the focus of a Neorealist argument is not so much how multilateral institutional 
arrangements can satisfy common interests, but rather how those arrangements will 
affect the relative position of states within the state system. As Grieco put it: 
realists view states as what I have called "defensive 
positionalists" interested in achieving and maintaining relative 
capabilities sufficient to remain secure and independent in the self-
help context of international anarchy"' I° 
The inference made by the Neorealist arguments is that states will resist institutional 
arrangements, even when common interests are served, if they believe that they 
would gain less from the arrangement than other states." 1 
109 Joseph M. Grieco, 'International Cooperation', in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate, David A. Baldwin (ed.), New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. p331. 
11° Joseph M. Grieco, 'International Cooperation'. p303. 
111 Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism', in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David A. 
Baldwin (ed.), New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. 
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Egotistical priorities and inter-state rivalry can also affect the effectiveness of 
multilateral arrangements, especially regional institutions, even though cooperation 
might appear to be the rational course of action. 112 An example of the impediment 
that relative costs presents to the challenge of developing cooperative institutional 
arrangements is seen in the difficulties of initiating regional action in Southeast Asia 
to address the issue of marine pollution from land based sources. Davis and Williams 
states that: 
"[There are considerable differences in terms of resource 
endowment and economic strength among Asian nations and a 
desire to avoid a situation where laxity of environmental control by 
one nation is perceived as a comparative advantage relative to 
neighbouring states who may be pursuing environmental regulation 
and sustainability goals." 113 
Thus, Realists argue that Neoliberalism adds little to our understanding of 
international relations, as the motivation and actions of states within such 
institutional arrangements simply mirror the patterns of behaviour already described 
by the traditional Realist theories. 114 
Neorealism builds on the arguments of its Realist forebears by acknowledging the 
significance of international regimes in international relations and endeavouring to 
account for the different guises of that power assumes in the contemporary state 
112 K. Snidvongs, 'Sustainable Development of Coastal Areas: The Southeast Asian Experience', 
Paper presented at the Coastal & Maritime Zone Planning & Management Conference, Centre for 
Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 9-10 September 1994. An alternative view is presented in 
Desmond Ball, 'The Most Promising CSBMs for the Asia/Pacific Region', Paper presented at the 
conference on The Asia-Pacific Region: Links between Economic and Security Relations, Institute on 
Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), University of California, May 1993. 
113 Bruce Davis & Caroline Williams, 'Regional Action on Land-Sourced Marine Pollution in 
Southeast Asia: An initial reconnaissance', Paper presented at International Boundaries and 
Environmental Security: Frameworks for Regional Cooperation Conference, 14-17 June 1995, RELC 
Singapore. See also T. Falkenberg, 'Trade and Environment: The Difficult Debate', International  
Challenges, Vol 14, No 1, 1994, pp33-43. 
"4 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Mass, Reading, 1979. Robert Gilpin, War 
and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981. Joseph M. Grieco, 
Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tarrif Barriers to Trade, Ithaca, Cornell 
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system. This broader perspective of power held by Neorealists may be contrasted 
with Realist theories, which were regarded as conventional wisdom in an earlier era 
and based on the assumption that military power represented the primary, if not only, 
means of defending state interests. As Cox explains, 
"The 'new realism' has in common with the old realism a concern 
with power relations; but it finds the power relations of the present, 
those that bear upon world order, to be different from those 
assumed to be dominant in conventional state-centred thinking." 5 
Chris Brown has made a similar observation and states that, 
"... most observers ... feel that something did change with realism 
in response to the pluralist challenge; [and that] neo-realism is one 
way of noting this change, [and] its synonym 'structured realism' 
another." 116 
Technological and social changes have resulted in a plethora of transnational 
relationships, ranging from people to people linkages through mediums such as the 
Internet to non-government organisations with international agendas to multinational 
corporations. These transnational interests complicate the process of identifying state 
interests and require states to re-examine the traditional methods through which 
power and diplomacy is exercised. Thus, while Neorealism continued to be guided 
by the direction taken by traditional Realist theories, it takes a divergent path in order 
to account for these changes in the state system. 
Upon closer inspection, Neorealist and Neoliberalist appear to share some common 
views on international relations. Both schools of thought see states as selfish, 
egotistical, but rational actors that construct or exploit international regimes within 
University Press, 1990. David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. 
Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988. 
115 Robert W. Cox, 'Reconsiderations', in The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism & 
World Order, Robert W. Cox (ed.), Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 1997. p245. 
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the state system for advantage. While the Neorealist and Neoliberalist offer 
competing explanations for the role of regimes and states in international relations, 
they are not irreconcilable. In essence, Neoliberalists assert that "institutions that 
succeed in facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation will become valued for the 
opportunities they provide to states". 117 By adding a proviso that states would only 
engage in collaborative arrangements that did not compromise their relative strength 
vis-à-vis other states, Neorealists simply refined the arguments advanced by 
Neoliberalists by stating the terms under which states sought to participate in such 
arrangements. The hypothesis advanced by Neo liberals, that rational and egotistical 
states seek out and participate in international institutions in order "to attain their 
ends, including increasing their shares of the gains from cooperation through the use 
of political influence", is not refuted!" Therefore, both schools of thought appear to 
be arguing that regimes do or can represent an arena wherein states defend their 
national interests, albeit with different points of emphasis. 
The opportunity for states to legitimise, defend and pursue their interests in the state 
system exists in the processes leading to the determination of, as well as in the 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures contained in, international 
regimes. 119 Thus, the discourse between the Neorealists and Neoliberalists facilitates 
our appreciation of international relations by addressing not just the ostensible 
purposes that regimes serve, but also the egotistical state interests that are satisfied 
by such regimes. 
116 Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations.  p45. 
117 Robert 0. Keohane, 'Institutionalist Theory, Realist Challenge'. p274. 
118 Robert 0. Keohane, 'Institutionalist Theory, Realist Challenge'. p274. 
119 It has been suggested that both neorealism and neoliberalism are time-bound to this present 
historical era, with its unique and historically specific geo-political conditions, and thus, more 
appropriate labels for them might be 'Westphalian realism' and 'Westphalian liberalism'. See Mark 
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Issues For The Contemporary State System 
The traditional theories of Idealism and Realism, which purport to supply a rationale 
for international relations, fail to adequately address the issues raised by the 
existence and growing number of international regimes within the state system. 
Idealism is really premised on what ought to be, as opposed to positing an 
explanation for what is. It can be argued that the development of a state system that 
increasingly relies on international regimes to regulate the behaviour of states, or to 
impose obligations and responsibilities on states, or both, represents an 'ideal' for 
supporters of global or international governance. However, Idealists have generally 
failed to address the issue of how such regimes come about, and whether they are 
genuinely based on universally accepted ideals or if they merely give institutional 
expression to the preferences of hegemonic powers. While Realism purports to 
account for what actually happens in the state system, it too does not adequately 
account for the emergence and proliferation of international regimes. Not even when 
many of these regimes represent, at the very least, institutions that can moderate the 
use, and diminish the role, of power. 
The growing number and presence of international regimes, and their role in the 
determination of "who gets what, when, where, and how" in international relations, 
raises several issues. One of the primary issues that has generated much discussion is 
the possibility that states may exploit the opportunities offered by international 
regimes, both as an arena and an instrument, to defend national interests. 12° 
W. Zacher, Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and 
Communications. p18. 
120 Clive Archer, International Organizations, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983. p130. Archer 
was actually referring specifically to international organisations, but the concept he raised would be 
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International regimes represent "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations". 12 ' However, the notion of a convergence in the 
expectations of actors does not offer insight as to whether this process can be 
deliberately manipulated or the conditions under which states would voluntarily 
submit to regimes or whether the coincidence of interests in international relations is 
natural, irresistible and inevitable. Instead, it is only through examining the dynamics 
of regime creation and maintenance that we discover whether competitive interests 
continue to be a significant factor, even in international arrangements whose 
ostensible intent is to facilitate cooperation or coordination. For instance, Perrow 
argues that: 
"... there is always a struggle within an institution because control 
of that institution can bring a variety of rewards including security, 
power, and survival." 122 
International regimes give rise to principles, norms and decision-making procedures, 
affecting the interests of all states that fall within their regulatory arrangements. 
Therefore, it would only be natural to expect states involved in the creation, 
maintenance, or both, of international regimes to seek to maximise their interests 
while doing so. And to ensure that the principles, norms and decision-making 
procedures that best serve their interests, and which reflect their values, are given 
expression in regimes where possible. The intuitive inference that follows would be 
applicable to all multilateral institutional arrangements and not just 'formal' organisations. Archer 
also referred a potential role for international organisations as actors in the state system. However, it is 
beyond the ambit of this thesis is to discuss in greater detail the metamorphosis of international 
organisations into independent actors in the state system. Instead, the focus is on states, and in 
particular how middle powers like Australia exploit multilateral institutional arrangements in order to 
serve their ends. 
121 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables'. p2. 
122 Stephen Krasner, 'Global Communications and National Power'. p243. Krasner was citing the 
arguments of Perrow in Charles Perrow, Complex Organixations: A Critical Essay, New York, 
Random House, 1986. p132. 
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that powerful states are far more likely to get their own way within such 
arrangements than less powerful states. 
In spite of international law, which regards all states as juridical equals, there is often 
considerable disparity in terms of the resources and power possessed by the states at 
the bargaining table negotiating international institutional arrangements. 
Consequently, it should not be surprising if international regimes tend to favour the 
interests and values of more powerful states. Indeed, it would be unusual if the more 
powerful states do not seize the opportunity offered by international regimes to assert 
their preferences on matters affecting their interests. 123 Some scholars have argued 
that the ability to dominate the agenda of international regimes represents a subtle 
assertion of hegemonic power. 124 On the other hand, Mark Zacher posts an 
appropriate reminder that: 
"... there is a host of international regimes governing a myriad of 
issues ... It would be foolish not to recognize that they are shaped 
in part by the interests and power of the larger states, but it seems 
equally foolish not to appreciate their promotion of the interests of 
the great majority of weaker states." 125 
This thesis recognises the fact that the traditional struggle by states to defend 
competitive and egotistical interests within the state system is also manifested in the 
phenomenon of international regimes. However, the key issue that it addresses is 
whether multilateral institutional arrangements enhance the capacity of states, 
specifically middle powers, to defend their interests. The Realist premise that 
military strength is the true measure of power in the state system is compared with 
123 Mark W. Zacher, Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and 
Communications. p2. 
124 Andrew Wyatt-Walter, 'The United States and Western Europe: The Theory of Hegemonic 
Stability', in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, Ngaire Woods (ed.), Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996. Micheal P. Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International Politics, Columbia, 
University of South Carolina Press, 1990. pp183-209. 
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the currency of influence that enabled a state to set the agenda for multilateral 
institutional arrangements. The struggle for influence within multilateral institutional 
arrangements involves dynamics that are different from the usual considerations that 
normally guide foreign policy in the absence of such institutions. Realist measures of 
power are based on the assessment of a state's capacity to impose its will on other 
states in the absence of multilateral institutional arrangements. However, the 
acceptance of international regimes by states imposes an obligation to abide by the 
dictates of those arrangements. Therefore, with respect to issues governed by 
international regimes, states can not exercise their power arbitrarily in order to carry 
out their will, but have to defend their interests within the parameters imposed by the 
terms of those arrangements, if they want those arrangements to remain viable. I26 
If we accept the thesis that multilateral institutional arrangements could be used to 
advance state interests, then the extent to which power, as recognised within Realist 
perspectives, is fungible would also be an important question. 127 If power is fungible, 
that would suggest that the traditional accruements of power possessed by a state can 
be translated into influence in multilateral institutional arrangements. On the other 
hand, if power is not fungible, it would suggest that multilateral institutional 
arrangements represent separate vehicles for influence that are not contingent on 
possession of traditional sources of power but which can also be used to determine 
outcomes in international relations. This implies that states traditionally perceived as 
weak might be capable of playing a greater role in the state system through the 
125 Mark W. Zacher, Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and 
Communications. p2. 
126 In point of fact, states could ignore the conditions set by multilateral institutional arrangements, but 
frequent and wilful disregard for international regimes is, by definition, impossible. Regimes describe 
a fact of compliance with a pattern of behaviour that was repetitive and predictable. In the absence of 
general compliance, an international regime does not, by definition, exist. 
127 Fungibility refers to the ease with which capabilities in one issue-area can be used in other issue 
areas. David A. Baldwin, `Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics', in Neorealism and 
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medium of multilateral institutional arrangements, whereas states traditionally 
perceived as powerful might experience a diminished capacity for coercion within 
such arrangements. 
A cursory glance at some contemporary regimes suggests that, in comparison to 
military strength, scientific expertise or diplomacy or economic resources may be 
more useful guides to the ability of states to command influence in international 
relations. Kegley and Raymond observes that: 
"Power is situationally specific: The components of a nation's 
resource base are relatively low in fungibility or usability. The 
military capabilities that allow an actor to influence one set of 
countries in a certain issue area may be useless in influencing other 
countries on a different matter." 128 
If this observation is valid, then the proposition that multilateral institutional 
arrangements offer some states greater opportunities for influence than would 
otherwise be commensurate with their status as a 'power' in the context of Realist 
perceptions of the state system, is sustained. The argument that small or middle 
powers can play a significant role in the state system through multilateral 
institutional arrangements, above and beyond the role ascribed to them by Realist 
inspired perceptions of the state system is reinforced by (relatively) recent empirical 
evidence. 
In the negotiation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it was 
noted that states abandoned traditional security alignments and realign themselves in 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David A. Baldwin (ed.), New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1993. p20. 
128 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Gregory A. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the 
Twenty-First Century. p16. 
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order to secure their interests within that regime. 129 Geographically disadvantaged 
states, archipelagic states, and the major maritime states aligned themselves 
according to their specific goals, as opposed to traditional loyalties, in order to 
pursue their interests more effectively within the context of United Nations Law of 
the Sea Conference. That 'power' remains an important consideration is seen in the 
fact that the United States was able to replace Part 11 of that Convention with an 
amended agreement more amenable to its interests. 130 The 1994 Agreement Relating 
To The Implementation Of Part XI based almost completely on the United States' 
objections to Part XI of the Law of the Sea was clearly a concession to the great 
power interests of the latter. The Agreement legitimised the influence of the United 
States and ensured that it is able to defend its interests in all aspects of deep seabed 
mining covered by international law. 131 Nevertheless, the fact that the United States 
chose to pursue its interests within the context of the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention, as opposed to abandoning the process completely, is in itself a 
significant acknowledgement of the importance of international regimes as a vehicle 
for legitimising state interests. 
It is also noteworthy that military power was not a significant determinant of 
influence during the negotiation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
129  Biliana Cincin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht, 'Implications of the Earth Summit for Ocean and Coastal 
Governance', in Ocean Development And International Law, Volume 24, Number 4, October - 
December 1993. Tommy Koh, The Quest for World Order: Perspectives of a Pragmatic Idealist, 
Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1998. pp141-142. 
130 The 1994 Agreement Relating To The Implementation Of Part XI and United States Objections To 
The U.N. Convention On The Law Of The Sea, signed at New York, 28 July 1994. For another study 
of how the United States was able to resist regimes not amenable to its interests, see Barston's study 
of the Montreal meeting (6-10 June 1994) on Land-based sources of marine pollution. R.P. Barston, 
Modern Diplomacy, second edition, London, Longman, 1997. pp187-190. 
131  Hasjim Djalal, "Recent developments in the Law of the Sea", a luncheon speech by the Indonesian 
Ambassador-at-large on day one of the 29th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 
"Sustainable development and preservation of the oceans: the challenges of UNCLOS and Agenda 
21", June 19-22, 1995, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia. 
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Sea. 132  Indeed, the United Nations Law Convention on the Law of the Sea 
demonstrated that skills in diplomacy and coalition building are as important as 
Realist considerations of power. Thus, small powers like Singapore and Luxembourg 
were able to defend their interests successfully, in respect of land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged states, within the institutional processes available 
during the negotiations to establish the Law of the Sea. 133 
The skill and success of small or middle powers in defending their interests through 
multilateral institutional arrangements can also be seen in the Cairns Group, 
influential economic blocs such as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, and political lobby groups like the Association of South East Asian 
Nations. 134 These examples are not intended to demonstrate that law or some other 
ideal has replaced realpolitik considerations in the state system or that traditional 
realist premises of competitive and egotistical states, whose primary goal is to defend 
narrow self-interest, have been abandoned. Indeed, balance of power theories from 
the realist tradition may be used to explain the role of multilateral arrangements like 
the Cairns Group or the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries within the 
state system. 135 That is to say multilateral institutional arrangements can represent an 
attempt by small and medium powers to `gang-up' against more powerful states. 
However, non force-oriented perspectives of international relations contend that 
132  This is not to say that military power did not have a bearing on all aspects of the Law of the Sea. 
The U.S. policy of sailing warships through sea lanes claimed as territorial waters, to challenge the 
interpretation of international law by archipelagic nations like Indonesia, and to reinforce conventions 
in international customary law, would suggest that military power still plays a role. David Jenkins, 
'Dire Straits: Indonesia's Threat to our Ships', in Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 1993. 
Nevertheless, the 'compromise' with the United States on Part XI pertaining to deep sea beds has little 
to do with military power, and more to do with the extent of American economic interests. 
133  Tommy Koh, The Quest for World Order: Perspectives of a Pragmatic Idealist. pp20-24. 
134  Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers:  
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver, Melbourne University Press, 1993. 
Alison Broinowski (ed.), Understanding ASEAN. 
135  For a discussion of balance of power theories, see the classic by Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (fifth edition). Or a more recent discussion by 
Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, London, MacMillan, 1997. pp  104-110. 
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multilateral institutional arrangements represent an additional dimension in the state 
system, wherein the rules are different, and where power and influence are measured 
differently. 
The rule-based nature of modern multilateral institutional arrangements distinguished 
them from the simple grouping of states in traditional balance of power theories. The 
latter represents a coalition of states bound together by common interests, whereas 
the former represented a more complex arrangement that is defined by both common 
interests as well as common rules. Moreover, even though some argue that egotistical 
states only engaged in multilateral institutional arrangements to defend the 'status 
quo', 136 the dynamics of power, influence and interests within such arrangements 
would be significantly different from that of a general state system where different 
rules (some say no rules) applied. 
The fact that small and middle powers can exploit multilateral institutional 
arrangements to defend their interests in the state system suggests that influence in 
international relations is not necessarily contingent upon possession of the traditional 
accoutrements of power. Instead, as the success of Singapore and Luxembourg at the 
Law of the Sea negotiations demonstrate, other factors may also affect the ability of a 
state to defend its interest. As multilateral institutional arrangements can potentially 
be exploited to serve the interests of states, they can be regarded both as an 
instrument used to advance state policy as well as an arena where state interests are 
defended. This provides a framework for investigating the role of middle powers in 
136 Indeed, it has been argued that the normative goals, inherent in a middle power's calculation, for a 
post-hegemonic world includes promoting greater social equity and a greater diffusion of power. 
Thus, the role that middle powers play in encouraging institutional arrangements "to affirm the 
principle of adherence to acceptable rules of conduct by all powers, great and small" may be seen as 
the act of a defensive positionalist. Robert W. Cox & Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World 
Order. p250. 
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international relations, as well as the extent to which multilateral institutional 
arrangements enable middle powers to influence developments within their region. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the framework of the state system and provided the 
context for the concept of a 'middle power'. It has described a political environment 
based on a general state system comprising sovereign states that are legally equal but 
who interact with one another on the basis of power. The capacity of states to defend 
their interests within the state system is varied and this has led to the proposition that 
they may be classified as great, middle and small powers accordingly. The 
classification of states in terms of their capacity to influence international relations 
has provided a useful guide to the potential role of states in the state system. 
However, the capacity of states to influence international relations is constrained not 
only by their power relative to that of other states but also by the proliferation of 
international regimes, representing regulatory arrangements or institutionalised 
processes, that define or guide the actions of states. Regimes have imposed structure 
on international relations and effectively represented multilateral institutional 
arrangements through which states could defend their interests within the general 
state system. International regimes have also introduced a new dimension to 
international relations, presenting new opportunities for states to influence 
developments within the state system. 
It is also argued in this chapter that while power, perceived by Realists as the option 
to resort to coercive force, remains significant, it has become less relevant in the 
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determination of who gets what, when, where, and how in the contemporary state 
system. Technological development, economic and social revolution have resulted in 
complex interdependence such that the interests of many states, including great 
powers, incorporate substantial commitment not just to system influence but also 
system maintenance. The latter, which emphasises orderly procedures, has reinforced 
the value of multilateral institutional arrangements, even for egotistical states that 
possessed the traditional accruements of power. 
The trade off between a power-defined and a rule-ordered system, in favour of the 
latter, suggests opportunities for small and middle powers to exert greater influence 
within the state system. However, this also raises questions about the validity of 
traditional perceptions of states as small, middle or great powers, and the use of a 
state's physical attributes as a benchmark for estimating its influence within the state 
system. As a consequence of the nature of multilateral institutional arrangements, the 
currency of influence within such arrangements may be substantially different from 
that in the general state system. This lends substance to the proposition that 
multilateral institutional arrangements may enhance the (relative) capacity of some 
states for influence in international relations, while diminishing the (relative) 
capacity of others. Therefore, a review of the relevance of the concept of a middle 
power for the contemporary state system is in order. The next chapter debates the 
definitional issues surrounding the concept of middle powers and investigates the 
foundation upon which their capacity to influence developments within the 
contemporary state system is built. 
CHAPTER 2 
"The initial driving force is simply the urge to self-preservation. It 
is rooted in realism. But self-preservation, even in this critical 
period, is not seen as an end in itself. ... if nations are to live a 
good and civilized life they cannot live to themselves, but must be 
prepared to take part, to the full measure of resources, in common 
effort with other nations. Only by that collaboration can they and 
others be given freedom from tyranny and from want. If this 
collaboration is to be effective, it must be carried out in accordance 
with agreed principles. The task of the statesman is to formulate 
these principles, to win their free acceptance by those whom they 
affect, in his own and other countries, and to put them into practice. 
In this way national interests become harmonized in world 
interests, but not obliterated by them; and realism becomes inspired 
by idealism." - MacMahon Ball' 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the nature of power in general state system and drew 
attention to the theory that states may be differentiated in terms of their ability to 
defend their interests through power. This chapter focuses on states situated in the 
middle range of that spectrum, and investigates the role of states described as middle 
powers in international relations. The objective is to establish a better understanding 
of how a middle power can be defmed and thereby provide an analytical framework 
to guide the discussion in subsequent chapters, which investigate the sources from 
which middle power influence is derived. 
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Power is not an easy or only indicator of international status even though it remains 
an important one. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the discourse between 
Neoliberalists and the Neorealists offers two competing sets of assumptions about the 
role of states and international institutions in the state system. These differing 
accounts of the state system inevitably raise definitional problems for the concept of 
middle powers, particularly as the concept is exacerbated by both nominal and 
operational ambiguity. Nevertheless, this definitional morass must be traversed if we 
are to usefully apply the concept of middle powers in modern application. 
This chapter begins by exploring the concept of a middle power. The nominal 
defmitions of 'middle power', which have been traditionally applied in the literature, 
are canvassed. It is proposed that these nominal definitions tend to fall into two 
categories, based on structuralist perspectives and process oriented perspectives of 
international relations. Structuralist perspectives tend to assume a Realist or 
Neorealist view of international relations, and employ quantitative measures to 
define middle powers, as those states falling between great powers and small powers, 
in terms of the resources that they command or the range of interests that they are 
capable of defending. In contrast, process oriented perspectives tend to be more 
Rational or Neoliberal in philosophical orientation. Process oriented perspectives 
tend to emphasise the role of multilateral institutional arrangements in international 
relations, and defme middle powers as those states with a proclivity for, and the 
ability to assume a leadership role, in such arrangements. 
It will be demonstrated that neither of these nominal definitions is fully satisfactory. 
The difficulties in constructing an exhaustive checklist of quantifiable attributes in 
I MacMahon Ball, 'Introduction', in H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia: Speeches, Sydney, Angus 
& Robertson Ltd, 1945. pxix. 
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order to measure power, as well as the problems encountered in accessing the 
significance of qualitative attributes, limits the utility of nominal definitions derived 
from structuralist perspectives. Whereas, the difficulty of maintaining an exclusive 
measure in order to differentiate between middle powers and other states, which have 
assumed a leadership role or achieved influence while engaged in multilateral 
processes, limit the utility of nominal definitions derived from process oriented 
perspectives. Moreover, while the nominal definitions represented by the structuralist 
and process oriented perspectives provide a convincing exposition of middle powers, 
it can be argued that these accounts are valid only within the context of their 
respective theoretical frameworks. Thus, it is proposed that these nominal definitions 
of middle powers have limited utility and are inadequate when tested against 
empirical experiences characterised by historical and geographical diversity. 
In order to canvas an understanding of middle powers that is not limited by the 'ideal 
types' assumed in structuralist and process oriented perspectives, a broader working 
definition for middle powers that is generically applicable will be constructed. It is 
proposed that the consensus inferred from all the nominal definitions of middle 
powers examined suggests that a middle power is a state with both the ambition and 
the capacity, to exercise significant influence in a specific but limited, arena of 
international relations. Thus, ambition and the capacity for influence are identified 
as common themes found in both the structuralist and process oriented inspired 
definitions of middle powers, and they are adopted as benchmarks for a generic 
definition of middle powers in this thesis. The difficulties of establishing what 
represents 'significant influence' is also an issue that needs to be addressed. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it shall be stipulated that the manifestation of a capacity to 
defend general interests, such as the ability to guide developments and decision 
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making, within a geographic region, is sufficient to demonstrate the presence of 
'significant influence'. 
Finally, having addressed the issue of how a middle power might be identified, other 
questions are explored. How do middle powers assume a role of influence? What are 
the primary methods used to manifest influence? Do the methods used to establish 
influence vary from region to region? In order to address these questions Australia's 
role as a middle power in four separate geographic regions will be examined in the 
subsequent chapters. To guide that discussion, the initial template is elaborated upon 
to produce an additional framework for analysis that addresses the question of 
whether Australia can claim the status of a middle power, as well as the bases of its 
ability to claim significant influence within its geographic region. The review of the 
literature on middle powers suggests that there are two main schools of thought on 
how a middle power is able to achieve influence in international relations. 
Structuralist perspectives argue that physical attributes are the primary determinant 
of middle power status and the capacity of a state to influence developments in 
international relations. In contrast, process oriented perspectives argue that the role 
of middle powers, in the contemporary state system, is characterised by their 
capacity to achieve influence through multilateral institutional arrangements. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that Australia's influence in regional affairs, 
if any, would be based upon either or both these factors. Consequently, the working 
definition developed in this chapter provides a useful reference point from which to 
begin the investigation of Australia's role as a middle power in its region. In addition 
to verifying Australia's ambition and capacity to assume a role of significant 
influence within its regional environment, the extent to which physical resources, 
multilateral institutional arrangements, or other factors have played a part in 
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achieving that influence will also be queried. This analytical guide helps to maintain 
consistency in the discussion on Australia's role in the four geographic regions, and 
in the investigation of the principal factors that allows Australia to achieve 
significant influence as a middle power. 
The Concept Of Middle Powers In The State System 
In the discourse on the role of powers in the state system, the focus has been 
traditionally placed on the great powers. 2 In contrast, there has been relatively little 
said about the contributions of the 'lesser' powers. Nossal observes that: 
"Most of the reflections on the shape of the post-Cold War 
international order tend to focus on the future relationships among 
the great powers. Few analysts have been as resolutely great 
power-centric in their approach as Kennedy (1987), but concerns 
over the relations between the United States, Japan, Europe, 
Russia, and China tend to be an inexorable feature of the new 
international order."3 
Where the literature does refer to the role of middle powers in the state system, there 
is a tendency to dismiss their significance or to discuss them in the context of great 
powers.4 Indeed, Wight remarks that: 
"[t]he only distinction in normal diplomatic intercourse is that 
between great powers and other powers."5 
2 Anthony G. McGrew & Paul G. Lewis, Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation State, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989. 
3 Kim Richard Nossal, 'Middle Power Diplomacy in the Changing Asia-Pacific Order: Australia and 
Canada Compared', in Charting the Post-Cold War Order,  Richard Leaver & James L. Richardson 
(eds.), Boulder, Westview Press, 1993. p210. 
4 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics, London, Macmillan, 1984. p21. 
5 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Hedley Bull & Carsten Holbraad (eds.), London, Leicester University 
Press, 1995. p41. 
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In contrast to the general trend, Australian and Canadian political scientists have 
sought to make up for the neglect of middle powers in the literature with some 
interesting studies on the role of middle powers in international relations. 6 In 
particular, two aspects of middle power diplomacy have been examined; The role of 
middle powers as the resourceful clients of a great power, and the role of middle 
powers as 'entrepreneur states' in 'building coalitions of the like-minded' to establish 
international institutional arrangements. The role these studies ascribed to middle 
powers, and the manner in which they define 'middle power', are embodied in two 
distinctive perspectives, which may be described as 'structuralist' and 'process 
oriented'. 
Structuralist Perspectives Of Middle Powers 
While Wight himself did not attribute much significance to the role of a middle 
power in international relations, he did give clear expression to the concept of a 
middle power. Wight's schema of powers is largely based on the range of interests 
that a state is deemed capable of defending against the competitive and sometimes 
irreconcilable interests of other states in the arena of the general state system. To 
Wight, minor powers (including middle powers) are those that: 
"... have the means of defending only limited interests, and of most 
of them it is true that they possess only limited interests. ... [and of] 
some small powers, however, it may be said that the range of their 
foreign policy is so contracted that they have no interest except the 
'preservation of their independence."' 
6 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Melbourne, Oxford University 
Press, 1988. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle 
Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver, Melbourne University Press, 
1993. 
7 Martin Wight, Power Politics. p65 
76 
However, while all minor powers are characterised by the fact that they only have 
the means to defend limited interests, Wight suggests that it is possible to 
differentiate between middle powers and other minor (small) powers. Wight 
highlights the fact that middle powers possess the capacity to defend a range of 
interests effectively, and that while this capacity of middle powers is limited in 
comparison with great powers, it extends well beyond the preservation of their own 
independence and separates middle powers from other minor powers. Certainly, 
recognition of the distinction between middle powers and other minor powers can be 
traced to the perception of middle powers, prevalent during the Congress of Vienna, 
where some states sought to gain a larger voice in the proceedings by claiming a 
difference between themselves and smaller powers. 8 Therefore, Wight proposes 
that: 
"Two kinds of minor powers achieve an eminence which 
distinguishes them from the common run: regional great powers, 
and middle powers. Political pressures do not operate uniformly 
throughout the states-system, and in certain regions which are 
culturally united but politically divided, a subordinate international 
society comes into being, with a states-system reproducing in 
miniature the features of the general states-system. ... In such sub-
systems as these, there will be some states with general interests 
relative to the limited region and a capacity to act alone, which 
gives them the appearance of local great powers. ... Such regional 
great powers will probably be candidates, in the state-system at 
large, for the rank of middle power."9 
Wight's concept of middle powers portrays them as states that only have the means 
to defend limited interests within the general state system, but which possess the 
attributes of great powers within their geographic region. This archetype of middle 
powers distinguishes them from small powers whose ability to defend their interests 
is limited even within the confines of their geographical region, and from great 
powers that are not limited by their geography and capable of defending general 
8 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics. p21. 
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interests throughout the state system. The capacity to defend global interests, as 
opposed to regional interests, has also been cited by other scholars as the factor that 
distinguished great powers from minor powers. 
"Michael Haas distinguished more simply between major, middle 
and minor powers, applying the traditional criteria of global and 
regional interests. Middle and minor powers, he laid down, had 
primary interests only within a localised regional system. The 
former were 'locally prominent actors, who may be sought as allies 
by major powers but who are never leaders of a subsystem'. The 
only comfort of such powers, he thought, was that they could put 
minor powers in their place." 1° 
Again, this reiterates the theme of middle powers as being less than 'great', but more 
than 'small' within a structural hierarchy of states in the state system. 
The differentiation of states into great, middle or small powers provides the basis for 
the construction of theoretical models of the state system expressed as structural 
hierarchies. Such hierarchical structures are usually based on Realist appraisals of the 
means by which a state is capable of defending its interests within the state system. 
This capacity to defend state interests is in turn usually inferred from the possession 
of physical attributes commonly held to reflect the power of a state and determines 
its ability to defend its interests." Morgenthau, for example, cites geography, 
national resources, military preparedness, population, national character, national 
morale, quality of government, industrial capability and quality of diplomacy as 
attributes that define the power of a state. 12 While qualitative attributes like national 
character, morale or quality of government are recognised as significant, they are 
usually regarded by Realists as sufficient, as opposed to necessary conditions, for 
9 Martin Wight, Power Politics. p63. 
1° Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics. p73. 
11 Some of the attributes commonly used to assemble hierarchical structures were reviewed in the 
previous chapter. 
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power. As argued in the previous chapter, Realism is premised upon the capacity to 
wield coercive power, and therefore, it is the physical attributes, such as population, 
national resources, and military strength, of a country that are regarded as necessary 
conditions for power. Moreover, physical attributes can be measured quantitatively 
and ranked easily, in contrast to non physical attributes, which require qualitative 
measures and are hence susceptible to subjective biases. Therefore, structuralist 
hierarchies of power tend to focus on quantifiable attributes, and a simplistic reading 
of structuralist perceptions is rendered by the view that middle sized countries, with 
middle sized populations, middle sized economies and middle sized armies may be 
described as 'middle powers'. 
A hierarchical structure for the state system reflects the assumption that middle 
powers are able to enforce their will over smaller states but lack the capability to 
resist the will of great powers. Therefore, some authors have advanced the 
proposition that like other minor powers, a middle power would yield to the need for 
alliances, or a client relationship with one or more friendly great power, or both, in 
order to defend its interests against more powerful rivals." In a critique of realist 
perspectives, MacMahon Ball makes the observation that: 
"The actual tendency today is not to increase but to reduce the 
rights of small states. Such a policy is seldom frankly avowed, 
though it is possible for the great Powers to produce plausible 
arguments in its support. It can be argued that the submission by 
small powers to the will of their more powerful neighbours is 
inevitable, and that, since the small nations cannot do anything to 
avert this, it is sensible for them to group themselves around a 
controlling great state.” 14 
12 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (fifth Edition), 
New York, Knopf, 1985. pp127-183. 
13 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. See also Charles W. Kegley, Jr. 
& Gregory A. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the Twentieth Century, New 
York, MacMillan, 1994. pp94-96. 
14 MacMahon Ball, 'Introduction', in H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia: Speeches, Sydney, 
Angus & Robertson Ltd, 1945. pviii. 
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However, Realists suggest that unlike other minor powers, middle powers are better 
able to resist this tendency to rely on great powers, or at least to mitigate the 
consequences of such dependence. Scholars who see Australia's role as a resourceful 
client of a great power even argue that a middle power like Australia can derive some 
advantage from a dependent relationship with a great power. 15 In Power Politics, 
Wight argues that a middle power: 
"... is a power with such military strength, resources and strategic 
position that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and 
in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great 
power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of 
proportion to what the great power can gain by attacking it." 16 
Thus, middle powers may be regarded as significant actors in the state system and 
strategically poised between two or more great powers. Middle powers may be 
threatened at an undesirable cost, but can be wooed for a strategic gain. Holbraad 
notes that: 
"In the system of the balance of power, the function of secondary 
states ... was to provide barriers against territorial encroachments 
by stronger powers. To do that effectively, these states had to be of 
a certain size and strength. As had been the case with Clausewitz, 
the type of separating state with which Gagem was concerned was 
not a small passive buffer state but a middle-sized power able to 
play an active part in the balance of power." 17 
Therefore, it can be argued that in a system where the balance of power is an issue, 
great powers might find the cost of maintaining the 'loyalty' of a middle power, by 
allowing the latter to exercise some influence, to be less than that of alienating it. 
This in turn provides the basis for the argument that middle powers in a client-patron 
15 This is a major theme, for example, in: Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign 
Policy. 
16  Martin Wight, Power Politics. p65. 
17 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics. p25. 
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relationship with . a great power do not necessarily have to accept the role of a hapless 
pawn within the context of that relationship. 
The nuclear stalemate during the Cold War provided middle powers with many 
opportunities for influence, and in some circumstances, even the chance to play a 
pivotal role and act as mediators between the super powers." For example, middle 
powers were able to seize opportunities not available to great powers in the years of 
détente during the Cold War. Holbraad observed that: 
"... the improvement in super-power relations allowed some 
middle-sized powers to take initiatives of their own in regard to the 
central relationship of international politics, [and also] permitted 
such powers to assume roles in regional politics which in the years 
during the Cold War had been less possible." I9 
Thus, middle powers enjoyed a unique position in the state system. They possessed 
sufficient resources to play a significant role in the state system, yet not enough to 
appear threatening. Botoro highlights this characteristic of middle powers when he 
proposed that: 
"Middle-sized states are the most lasting, since they are exposed 
neither to violence by their weakness nor envy by their greatness, 
and their wealth and power being moderate, passions are less 
violent, ambition finds less support and licence less provocation 
than in large States. Fear of their neighbours restrains them, and 
even if feelings are roused to anger they are more easily quieted 
and tranquillity restored 
The cynical might regard them as super power proxies, however middle powers are 
often seen as trustworthy actors in the international arena where, because of their 
18 H.R. Cowrie, Asia and Australia in World Affairs, Melbourne, Nelson, 1987. pp217-224. See also 
Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, NJ, Princeton, 1992. 
19 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics. p4. 
20 G. Botero, The Reason of State, Book I, (trans. By P. J. and D. P. Waley), London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1956. pp8-9. cited in Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics, London, 
Macmillan, 1984. p12. 
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limited military resources, they are less likely than great powers to be regarded with 
suspicion and under less constraints with regard to their actions. 21 
Middle powers can create a niche for themselves in international relations because 
they possess the prestige and resources for international 'shuttle diplomacy' that 
smaller powers often lack, while being able to avoid the suspicion or resistance that 
confront, and often confound the efforts of great powers. Robert Cox argues that: 
"Middle powers ... could be an important influence [in 
international relations] ... because, unlike great powers, they were 
not suspected of harbouring intentions of domination, and because 
they had resources sufficient to enable them to be functionally 
effect ive." 22 
The significance of this distinction is clearly illustrated by Barston who highlights 
the demands that modern diplomacy place upon the resources of a state, particularly 
small states, when he states: 
"Deciding how best to participate effectively is an increasing 
dilemma for most states, given the increasing volume of 
international business. The continuous overstretching of resources 
is reflected in the complaints of many smaller and some larger 
actors, as we have seen, about their inability to attend multiple 
meetings of long-standing international conferences. ... Smaller 
actors too have to increasingly make strategic decisions about 
whether to attend ad hoc global conferences, as they juggle limited 
budgets, airline schedules and competing domestic expenditure 
requirements against the possibility of sponsorship, at a diplomatic 
cost, by a major 'donor' power."23 
21 Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers:  
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver, Melbourne University Press, 1993. 
Olav F. Knudsen (ed.), Strategic Analysis and the Management of Power, Johan Jorgen Hoist, the 
Coldwar and the New Europe, New York, MacMillan, 1996. See also W.W. Rostow, The United 
States and the Regional Organization of Asia and the Pacific, 1965-1985, Austin, University of Texas 
Press, 1986. 
22  Robert Dt W. Cox & Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. p241. 
23 R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy: second edition. p302. 
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Thus, middle powers are further differentiated from small powers in terms of their 
capacity to consistently play a more significant role in international diplomacy. This 
is not due to any qualitative advantages (such as the intrinsic and superior quality of 
diplomats representing middle powers) possessed by the former but to the fact that 
middle powers have the capacity to devote superior and quantifiable resources to 
diplomacy. 
In a speech that gave an indication of Australia's self-perception as a middle power, 
Francis Forde, former deputy Prime Minister of Australia states: 
"It will have to be recognized that outside the great powers there 
are certain powers who, by reason of their resources and their 
geographical location, will have to be relied upon especially for the 
maintenance of peace and security in various quarters of the 
world."24 
To Forde, a middle power occupies a special niche in general state system, and the 
disparity between small and middle powers meant that middle powers might adopt 
the role of a hegemon within their geographic region in the absence, or with the 
acquiescence, of a great power. Forde's perception of Australia's role in international 
relations reiterates some of the key themes of the structuralist perspective of middle 
powers. The first is that structuralist perspectives are to some extent relational. They 
assume that the role of a middle power is contingent upon its power relative to other 
states engaged within its sphere of activity. 25 The second is that the role of a middle 
power, like Australia, is based on its ability to support the interests of great powers 
(such as Great Britain and the United States) and to exercise influence in the context 
of its special relationship with, and access to, these powers. Thus, it is with these 
assumptions in mind that Forde was able to assert that, as a consequence of its 
24 Forde cited in Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics. p61. 
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"resources and its geographical location", Australia can "be relied upon" to play a 
role in "the maintenance of peace and security" in its corner of the world. 
The physical attributes of a state and its geography have emerged as two factors that 
can be regarded as defining characteristics of middle powers from the structuralist 
perspective. The physical attributes of middle powers provide them with the capacity 
to play a role in international relations that lies beyond the reach of small powers, 
and from which great powers are, by their very nature, disqualified. Whereas 
geography is significant in that it helps to define the extent to which middle powers 
have a significant role in international affairs, as well as represent the spatial context 
wherein their primary interests lay or to which they are limited. 
Process Oriented Perspectives Of Middle Powers 
The end of the Cold War and the increasing use of multilateral institutional 
arrangements in the contemporary state system prompted a significant change of 
focus in the study of middle powers. The growing economic interdependence of 
sovereign states and other changes in the modern world brought fresh interpretations 
of inter-state relations. Scholars and policy makers began to review other avenues of 
middle power influence in international relations with much greater interest in non 
force-oriented perspectives of international relations. 26 The broadening base of issues 
affecting inter-state relations, constraints on the use of force, and other factors in the 
contemporary state system resulted in an increasing number of multilateral 
institutional arrangements, which emerged as responses to these concerns. These 
25 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (fifth edition). 
pp 153-155 
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responses include the multilateral attempts to address global and transboundary 
issues such as economic interdependence, pollution, resource depletion, the hole in 
the ozone layer, and other concerns that threatened the national interests of modern 
states, though not necessarily their territorial integrity, through international 
institutional arrangements. 
The academic interest, especially in Australia, with respect to a role for middle 
powers that is oriented towards multilateralism and institution building in 
international relations has also been strong. In Australia, this was probably due in 
part to a government that was ideologically predisposed towards multilateralism, as 
well as a foreign minister that was extremely active in international diplomacy and in 
promoting a strong role for Australia in international multilateral arrangements. 27 
However, the interest in the study of middle power diplomacy might also simply be a 
reflection of the contemporary and general academic interest in the significance of 
multilateral institutional arrangements for modern theories of international 
relations. 28 
Structuralist perspectives of the role that middle powers played in international 
relations tend to be informed by Realism, while process oriented perspectives are 
more inclined to be guided by Rationalist or Neoliberalist assumptions. These 
schools of thought attempt to account for the role of institutional arrangements in 
international relations without discounting the significance of state power. While 
26 Paul Keating, Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1996. p16. 
27Gareth Evans was the Foreign Minister, in a Labor government that was in office from 1983 to 
1996. See Richard Leaver and Dave Cox, 'Introduction: the world according to Gar', in Middling, 
Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy, Richard Leaver and Dave Cox (eds.), 
Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1997. 
28There has been considerable activity with regard to multilateral institutional arrangements in the past 
decade. The more notable events of international diplomacy in which Australia was involved included 
85 
they disagree on the inevitability of conflict as the basic tenet of international 
relations, they both share the view that the contemporary state system, as well as the 
dynamics that govern inter-state relations, is guided by rules as well as by power. In 
the case of the Neorealists, rules established by multilateral institutional 
arrangements are constructed to impose, or resist, a hegemonic order, and the focus 
of study is to discover how this is achieved. 29 Rationalists and Neoliberalists tend to 
regard multilateral institutional arrangements as contractual arrangements made 
voluntarily to defend egotistical state interests, which may or may not have anything 
to do with the ambition to achieve ascendancy or hegemony over other states. 30 
Instead, their emphasis is on discovering the gains that prompt egotistical states to 
voluntarily agree to such multilateral arrangements in the first instance, and the 
factors that hinder or facilitate this process. 
Process oriented perspectives of middle powers focus predominantly on the role of 
middle powers in multilateral arrangements. The proliferation of multilateral 
institutional arrangements in the contemporary state system provides an additional 
impetus for studies on how states may defend their interests within an adversarial 
state system from a non force-oriented perspective. These studies include the work of 
Keohane and Nye, which advanced the hypothesis that sovereign states may exist in 
a state of complex interdependence within the context of a global economic 
framework, and may be driven by non-military imperatives in their relationship with 
the negotiation (and the coming into force) of the United Nations Law of the Sea and the World Trade 
Organisation, and the role played by the United Nations in the Cambodian elections and the Gulf War. 
29 See the previous chapter for a more detailed discussion of the contending arguments from the 
Neorealist and Neoliberalist interpretations on the relationship between states, multilateral 
institutional arrangements and the state system. 
39 Rationalists and Neoliberalists are also prepared to go beyond a state-centric view of international 
relations, and consider the possibility that multilateral institutional arrangements might become more 
than instruments or arenas, and assume the role of actors in some circumstances. 
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one another. 31 Studies from a non force-oriented perspective of how states have 
defended their interests within the state system include the observations of Biliana 
Cincin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht on the non-traditional coalitions established during 
the negotiations at the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea. 32 Oran 
Young also investigated the tactics employed by "entrepreneurial states" in the 
creation of environmental regimes and how some states have been able to exploit 
multilateral institutional arrangements to defend their interests. 33 These perspectives 
are premised on the assumption that states can defend their interests vis-à-vis other 
states, and/or bring about desired outcomes in international relations, through 
multilateral institutional arrangements, and that the exercise of influence within such 
arrangements is not necessarily determined by traditional Realist assumptions about 
power. While many of these studies do not address the role of middle powers 
specifically, non force-oriented perspectives provide an alternative context within 
which the role of states, including middle powers, in international relations can be 
explored. In particular, non force-oriented perspectives suggest that the role of 
middle powers can be better appreciated by investigating the manner in which they 
engaged in regime creation, and/or exploited the opportunities offered by 
participation in multilateral institutional arrangements, to defend their interests. 
In this context, Robert Cox proposes a "behavioral test of middlepowermanship", 
where middle powers are defined by their affinity for, and ability to exploit 
multilateral institutional arrangements in international relations. This approach 
provides a useful alternative to the focus adopted by Wight and other Realist inspired 
3 1 Robert Owen Keohane & Jospeh S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (second edition), U.S., 
Harper Collins, 1989. 
32 Biliana Cincin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht, 'Implications of the Earth Summit for Ocean and Coastal 
Governance', in Ocean Development And International Law,  Volume 24, Number 4, October - 
December 1993. 
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scholars. 34 The underlying premise is that middle powers will, by their very nature, 
have a vested interest in multilateral institutional arrangements, and therefore, they 
can be defined by their commitment to, as well as by the leadership role that they 
assume in, such arrangements. Nossal, who is one of the adherents to a non force-
oriented perspective of middle powers, explains that: 
"Middle powers have an abiding preference for multilateralism 
rather than bilateral approaches to statecraft. Such an attachment is 
driven by the middling size and capacity of these states. Their 
relative lack of capacity encourages a belief that international 
problems and conflicts of interest between sovereign states are best 
solved within the context of multilateral negotiations. Middle 
power diplomacy is guided by a belief that given the degree of 
contemporary interdependence, strictly bilateral dealings are a less 
effective, and often ineffective, means of resolving international 
disputes. Moreover, bilateral arrangements do not promote global 
norms as effectively as those arrived at through multilateral 
negotiations." 35 
Therefore, while Realists continue to maintain that a state's military power is the 
primary determinant of its position within the international order, process oriented 
perspectives have expanded the concept of power to include non-military 
considerations and the ability to wield influence within the framework of multilateral 
institutional arrangements. 
A similar approach to that of Cox is advanced by the Canadian, Lester Pearson to 
identify the role of middle powers in international relations. Pearson argues: 
"... that middle powers were always more likely to exhibit an 
unusual degree of international civic virtue. This is because they 
have insufficient power to generate the worldwide interests and 
33 Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the 
Environment, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989. 
34 Robert Cox & Timothy J. Sinclair, `Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order', in 
Approaches to World Order, Robert Cox & Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. p252. 
35 Kim Richard Nossal, 'Middle Power Diplomacy in the Changing Asia-Pacific Order: Australia and 
Canada Compared'. p215. 
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client regimes which make great powers partisan for one side or 
another in regional conflicts ... At the same time, however, middle 
powers have sufficient power to enable them to make a worthwhile 
contribution to the implementation of policies determined by global 
consensus through such bodies as the UN." 36 
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal also employ a similar method to investigate the role that 
Australia and Canada assume as middle powers in the general state system. 37 Like 
Cox and Pearson, Cooper, Higgot and Nossal focused on Australian and Canadian 
initiatives in the development and exploitation of multilateral institutional 
arrangements, and concluded that a middle power can be defined by the leadership 
role that it adopts in such arrangements. Indeed, support for the process of institution 
building is regarded by some as an end in itself, and not simply a means to an 
egotistical end, such as defending narrowly defined state interests. Cox suggests that: 
"In modern times, the middle-power role, ... has become linked to 
the development of international organization. International 
organization is a process, not a finality; and international law is one 
of its important products. The middle power's interest is to support 
this process, whether in the context of hegemonic order or (even 
more vitally) in the absence of hegemony." 38 
Therefore, the theme that middle powers have a vested interest in promoting 
multilateralism and multilateral institutional arrangements in international relations, 
as well as the capacity to defend their interests through both, is strongly reiterated in 
the literature. 
The process oriented perspectives of international relations challenge the realist 
argument that only great powers have significant and active roles within the state 
system, whereas 'lesser' powers can only react to the machinations of, and/or endure 
36 G.R. Berridge, International Politics: States, Power & Conflict Since 1945,  New York, Prentice 
Hall, 1997. p18. 
37 Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers:  
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. 
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as best they can under international arrangements created by, the great powers. The 
studies of international relations from a non force-oriented perspective emphasise the 
role of multilateral institutional arrangements in the state system, and in doing so, 
they infer a larger role for middle powers in the contemporary international society. 
To process oriented authors, the role of a state within the state system rests not 
merely on the question of how big or sharp a sword it possesses but is also 
determined by how skillfully it is able to exploit other instruments of influence, 
especially multilateral institutional arrangements. In short, while force-oriented 
perspectives define middle powers as powers that are capable of asserting themselves 
in a manner akin to a great power within their geographic region, non force-oriented 
perspectives suggest a different approach towards conceptualising middle powers. In 
process oriented perspectives, middle powers are regarded as states with the capacity 
to defend their interests successfully in international relations because of their 
leadership role in 'entrepreneurial activity', which allows them to create 
opportunities for influence through multilateral institutional arrangements in the state 
system. It is the emphasis on this entrepreneurial spirit towards diplomacy, rather 
than their military superiority over weaker states within their geographic region, that 
characterise the study of middle powers in process oriented perspectives. 
Definitional Difficulties With The Concept Of Middle Powers 
Structuralist and process oriented perspectives of international relations highlight 
definitive traits in states or state behaviour that can serve as nominal definitions for a 
middle power. However, these nominal definitions are contingent upon the 
38 Robert Cox & Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order. p243. 
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theoretical frameworks from which they are derived and this raises questions of 
definitional ambiguity. In particular, the limitations of the nominal definitions 
become evident when they are tested against empirical examples. 
One of the major problems with structuralist inspired definitions of a middle power is 
the difficulty of constructing an exhaustive and exclusive schema that accounts for 
all the potential physical characteristics of a state relevant to the measurement of 
power and quantifies them appropriately. 39 Soedjatmoko points out that, 
"Except for states on the two extremes of the spectrum, the super-
powers and the mini-states, the quantifiable criteria that some 
political taxonomists have used, like size of population, GNP, level 
of industrialisation, size of the armed forces and combinations 
thereof, have proved to be quite unsatisfactory: 4° 
The difficulties and limitations of constructing a quantitative measure to defme a 
middle power are highlighted by the fact that small well-trained armies with 
technologically advanced weapons can be more than a match for large, but less well-
equipped armies. Nor is it be simple (or possible?) to quantify such characteristics as 
the tactical ability of military commanders, or the diplomatic and/or personal 
influence of a King Hussein, Gareth Evans, the Dalai Lama or Lee Kuan Yew. 
The nominal definitions of a middle power from structuralist perspectives also suffer 
from the fact that they are largely based on static assessments of the power of states. 
Therefore, they fail to adequately account for situational or relational factors that 
39  Johan Galtung, On the Way to Superpower Status: India and the EC Compared, Indian Ocean 
Centre For Peace Studies, Occasional Paper No 2, 1991. Harold Sprout & Margaret Sprout, 
Foundations of International Politics, Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962. Hans J. 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (fifth Edition). 
40 Soedjatmoko, 'The role of the Medium and Small Nations in the new Asia-Pacific Setting', in 
Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies, Proceedings of the 39th Summer School, 
Australian Institute of Political Science, held at Canberra, 27-29 January 1973, Canberra, Angus and 
Robertson, 1973. p37 
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might enhance or diminish the capacity of a state to play a significant role in the state 
system. Soedjatmoko argues that: 
"Situational factors may also enable small countries to play a much 
more influential role than can be accounted for by use of single 
country criteria alone."'" 
In Power Politics, Wight describes a middle power in terms of its ability to dominate 
weaker states within a geographic region. This means that middle powers are defined 
by their capabilities within a geographic region, where power relative to the other 
states within the region determines the status of a state as a "regional great power", 
and within the context of the broader state system as a "middle power". The 
limitations of an analytical framework based on these premises are obvious. A weak 
state among states weaker than itself may find itself in the position of a regional great 
power and thus, a middle power. Whereas, a strong state that shares a geographic 
region with stronger states may well find itself reduced to the status of a minor 
power. Thus, while it may be an accurate reflection of the distribution of power 
within the confines of their respective geographic region, a definition of middle 
powers based on the concept of relative power is only useful in the appropriate 
context. 
Structuralist perspectives, which equate the power of a state with the interests that it 
is capable of defending, are based on traditional assumptions of realpolitik where 
power (and technology) determines the scope of interests held by a state. Thus, by 
definition, great powers are deemed to possess system-wide interests, whereas small 
powers have limited interests beyond the preservation of their own independence. 42 
However, the utility of employing the factor of 'interests' as a point of reference to 
41  Soedjatmoko, 'The role of the Medium and Small Nations in the new Asia-Pacific Setting'. p37. 
42 Martin Wight, Power Politics. p65 
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guide the identification of middle powers is challenged by the contemporary 
experience. While the scope of interests that a state held in international affairs might 
have corresponded with its status within the international community and served as a 
useful indicator of its power in an earlier age, this is no longer the case. 
In the modern state system, myriad multilateral institutional arrangements offer small 
states, especially middle powers, the opportunity to play a significant and effective 
role in many aspects of international relations. Thus, it can be said that there are very 
few states that "have no interest except the preservation of their independence" in the 
contemporary state system. Indeed, through the opportunities provided by 
multilateral institutional arrangements, even the micro-states of the South Pacific 
have pursued a variety of causes, some of them successfully, at the global level. 
Sovereign integrity over territorial possessions has become but one of the many 
concerns of states in the contemporary state system. The broadening perceptions of 
strategic interests that modern states hold may be seen in the South East Asian 
concept of 'comprehensive security', which includes economic, social and cultural 
concerns in addition to the traditional interest in protecting territorial integrity. 43 
The needs and opportunities for modern states to defend a broad span of interests are 
especially true of middle powers. Nossal observes that middle powers are developing 
an interest in a growing range of issues, and remarks: 
"Normally, one would expect a small state to confine its interests, 
and thus its diplomatic activities, to its own geographic region or to 
its dominant economic relationships; in this view, only great 
powers have interests that are global in scope. Middle power 
diplomacy, by contrast, is marked by its extended scope. Middle 
powers tend to be involved in a wide range of diplomatic matters, 
43 Desmond Ball, Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region (With Some Implications for Regional 
Security Cooperation), Canberra, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
1993. pp16-18 
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usually extending well beyond the regional or functional interests 
of the state:44 
Australia is exemplary of this modern archetype of a middle power; one that takes a 
broad view in its assessment of strategic interests and engaged in pursuing a very 
wide range of interests in its foreign policy. 
Australia possesses the resources to exploit opportunities to defend a comprehensive 
variety of interests in the contemporary state system, which is characterised by a 
myriad range of multilateral institutional arrangements ostensibly established to 
determine outcomes in international affairs. The proliferation of multilateral 
institutional arrangements in the contemporary state system enables wealthy and 
technologically advanced middle powers, such as Australia and Canada, to become 
as well represented as great powers, like the United States, in international forums. 
While they remain middle powers, they now have the opportunity to defend a wide 
spectrum of interests, many of which extend well beyond their geographic region, 
ranging from environmental issues to an international ban on landmines. Therefore, 
simply defining middle powers in terms of the range of interests pursued by a state or 
by making a simple distinction between global and regional interests is inaccurate 
and the usefulness of employing the traditional criteria of 'interests' to identify 
middle powers needs to be reassessed. 
In Middle Power Diplomacy in the Changing Asia-Pacific Order, Cooper, Higgott 
and Nossal chart the processes and leadership roles that Australia and Canada 
adopted in establishing multilateral institutional arrangements, and explored how 
these initiatives enabled them to defend their interests in international relations. They 
44  Kim Richard Nossal, 'Middle Power Diplomacy in the Changing Asia-Pacific Order: Australia and 
Canada Compared'. p213. 
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avoid the limitations of a static account of middle powers, often encountered in 
structuralist perspectives, by adopting a process oriented approach and furnished a 
guide on the dynamics that characterise middle power diplomacy. 45 However, like 
structuralist perspectives, process oriented perspectives fail to offer a schema that is 
both exhaustive and exclusive. Process oriented perspectives identify middle powers 
by the processes they engaged in and the roles they adopt within the state system. 
However, this raises other issues. 
The focus on the diplomatic activism of middle powers or middlepowermanship in 
multilateral institutional forums fails to address the issue of states that lack the 
ambition to pursue such a role and states that are not engaged in such processes. 
Thus, process oriented perspectives are unable to account for powers such as South 
Africa in the days of apartheid, when South Africa was arguably as well-endowed 
with resources as Australia, but did not possess commensurate influence in 
international society. Nor Myanmar, which is arguably "more powerful" than 
Singapore in terms of resources but possesses significantly less capability to assert 
any influence within the state system beyond its territorial boundaries. It is therefore 
obvious that simply identifying middle powers by the activity that they engaged in 
within the state system would disqualify some states that might otherwise be 
considered middle powers (or even great powers) simply by virtue of the potential 
represented by the physical attributes these states possess. It assumes a 'natural' 
ambition on the part of states to engage in and influence the processes within the 
• state system to the greatest possible extent, commensurate with their physical 
capability to do so. Whereas history has demonstrated that some states might, 
regardless of their ability to play a significant role in the state system, be disinclined 
45 Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a 
Changing World Order. 
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to act in such a manner. Switzerland, for example, is a state that deliberately chose to 
assume a low profile in international relations, in spite of its potential influence on 
the state system. While it is possible to speculate on the potential influence of a state 
in international relations, this is only possible when adopting a structuralist 
perspective of state power where power is measured in terms of physical attributes, 
which a state either possesses, or does not. In contrast, process oriented perspectives 
are limited by the fact that they can only identify states that have engaged or which 
actively seek to engage other states in the state system. States that lack the ambition 
to engage other states or are isolated by other states would remain outside the scope 
of process oriented perspectives. 
The use of middlepowermanship as a guide towards identifying middle powers also 
encounters difficulties in establishing exclusive categories. In spite of their disparity 
in power and resources, small island states in the South Pacific and large states like 
Japan may share a similar foreign policy orientation in terms of supporting initiatives 
for international institutions and relying on multilateral processes to achieve their 
objectives in international relations. This suggests that there may be limited utility in 
defining middle powers solely on the basis of how they behave. Small states are 
driven towards a preference for multilateralism and institutional arrangements in 
international relations because of their size and capacity. Similarly larger states may 
express a preference for multilateral approaches because of political culture or other 
factors, even if their size and innate capabilities suggest that other options are 
possible (or even more desirable from a realpolitik point of view). The concept of 
powers, great, small, or middle is only helpful if it is possible to usefully differentiate 
states from one another with these labels. Therefore, the inclusion of some physical 
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criteria as a basis for the classification of powers appears to be necessary if the 
definition of middle powers is to remain a useful analytical tool. 
In summary, the nominal definitions of a middle power that were canvassed earlier 
produce a concept of middle power that is plagued with definitional ambiguities. The 
basic image of a middle power is that it has greater capabilities than those possessed 
by small powers but less than that of great powers. However, the nature of those 
capabilities varies in description depending on the writers that examine them. 
Structuralist perspectives suggest that physical attributes are the primary 
determinants of the role that states can expect to play in international relations. In 
contrast, process oriented perspectives suggest that the contemporary state system 
offers smaller states opportunities, in the form of international multilateral 
institutional arrangements, to overcome the traditional limits that constrain their 
ability to defend a broad range of interests. A few reservations about whether these 
perspectives offer an exclusive or exhaustive guide to understanding middle powers 
remain. Nevertheless, the notion that middle powers might have predictable 
inclinations within the state system, as a consequence of the level of power they 
possess, or their capacity to seize the opportunities for influence that arise, or both, 
provides a useful platform from which to explore their role in international relations. 
Towards A Framework For The Identification of Middle Powers 
The foregoing discussion highlights some of the ambiguities presented by the 
nominal definitions of a middle power in the literature. While consistent within their 
respective theoretical frameworks, structuralist and process oriented perspectives fail 
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to address issues that fall outside the ambit of their respective theoretical 
assumptions of middle powers. This thesis explores the factors that represent a 
consistent and effective means through which a middle power like Australia is able 
to manifest its influence within its geographic region. However, in order to arrive at 
an objective assessment, it is necessary to first develop a working definition for 
middle powers that would not preclude the investigation of factors that lie outside the 
ambit of either structuralist or process oriented perspectives of middle powers. 
Fortunately, the preceding examination of the nominal definitions of middle powers 
has thrown out a few common themes that can provide useful guidelines for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
One common theme that has emerged in the discussion of structuralist and process 
oriented perspectives is that a state should at least possess the capacity to exercise 
significant influence over developments within a limited sphere of international 
activity before it is considered as a middle power. For those who adhere to 
structuralist perspectives, this is manifested in the capacity of a middle power to 
assume a hegemonic role within its geographic region or in its capacity to play an 
influential role in a system where there is a balance of power between great powers. 
For process oriented scholars, the influence of middle powers is manifested through 
their role in multilateral institutional arrangements, which is not necessarily confined 
by the geographic parameters that usually apply within structuralist perspectives but 
is shaped by the nature and scope of such arrangements. Thus, the literature produced 
by both structuralist and process oriented perspectives sketch an image that is 
recognisably similar. Like great powers, a middle power is able to play a significant 
role in international relations as an egotistical state in defence of its interests. 
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However, unlike great powers, the influence and interests of a middle power are 
limited to specific issues or specific geographic regions or both. 
While the broadly defined concept of a middle power as a state that wields 
'significant influence' within specific issue areas, or geographic regions, or both, in 
international relations provides a useful starting point for a working definition, the 
adjective 'significant' remains ambiguous. Influence can be proved (or disproved) by 
demonstrating the capacity to alter the decisions, actions, or opinions of another. 
However, the standard for 'significance' is inevitably subjective. It would be fair to 
say that all states exercise some influence over their environment in the state system 
to some degree. Therefore, at what point does this influence become 'significant'? 
The key issue lies in the benchmarks used to determine the level of influence. Thus, 
there is a need to establish the point at which influence over developments in the 
state system can be deemed significant, and yet fall short of the mark by which great 
powers are defined. For scholars like Wight, the 'significant influence' manifested by 
a middle power can be identified by its ability to assume a hegemonic role within the 
context of a regional sub-set of the general state system. 46 In contrast, the work of 
other scholars, such as Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, suggest that middle powers 
demonstrate 'significant influence' in international relations through a leadership role 
in agenda setting for multilateral initiatives. 47 At best, any attempt to establish the 
point at which influence becomes 'significant' is likely to be based on an arbitrary 
standard. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the presence of 'significant 
influence' is assumed if a middle power can demonstrate a sustainable capacity to 
influence outcomes within a specific sphere of international activity. 
46  Martin Wight, Power Politics. p63. 
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Another common theme found in both structuralist and process oriented perspectives 
•of middle powers is the assumption of 'ambition' on the part of the state. For the 
purposes of this thesis, 'ambition' is defined as the aspiration, desire, or inclination 
of a state to engage other states within the context of the state system in order to 
influence developments in international relations and defend its own interests. As 
middle powers are defined by their ability to exercise significant influence within 
limited spheres of international relations, absence of ambition on the part of a 
potential middle power to exercise its potential influence would make the discussion 
irrelevant. The term, or even the concept of, 'ambition' is not explicit in the literature 
but it does clearly affect the manner in which structuralist perspectives are applied to 
the concept of middle power and may be regarded as a necessary condition for 
process oriented perspectives. 
Within structuralist perspectives, the 'ambition' of a state to engage other states in 
the state system in order to achieve influence within the latter tends to be ignored as 
irrelevant. Instead, the focus of structuralist perspectives tends to be on the attributes 
representing the potential of a state for influence. There is an implicit assumption in 
some structuralist perspectives that, where possible, states will always seek to exploit 
their potential for influence. Whether states do so is not the issue, the fact that they 
do possess the potential to do so is. However, while we can speculate about a 'hermit 
nations' potential for regional or global influence, such speculation would be 
directed at how other states respond to the potential of this passive state, as opposed 
to how the latter translates its potential into political influence within the state 
system. For the purposes of this thesis, the utility of such an exercise would be 
limited. Nevertheless, although the factor of ambition is absent in structuralist 
47 Richard A. Higgott, & Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a 
Changing World Order. 
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perspectives, the issue of ambition can still provide the context for a discussion on 
the circumstances that might lead a state with the potential for significant influence 
to change its attitude about a more active role in international relations. 
Within process oriented perspectives of a middle power, 'ambition' represents a 
necessary condition. The arguments from process oriented perspectives are based on 
the notion that states can exploit institutional processes within the state system to 
defend their interests. Therefore, as the ability to achieve influence is contingent 
upon participation, it is clear that the underlying premise of such arguments is that 
states must possess the ambition to engage in or are already participating in such 
processes. As with structuralist perspectives of middle powers, it is possible to 
consider the 'what ifs', and explore the possibility that a 'hermit state' might chose 
to pursue a role consistent with that suggested by the process oriented perspectives. 
However, querying whether a state, which has not demonstrated the ambition to do 
so, can or will successfully adopt such a role, while offering some useful insight, is 
likely to be a purely speculative exercise. Moreover, any attempt to pursue this line 
of questioning will probably meet with the same difficulties encountered in 
structuralist perspectives, and that is the difficulty of identifying the relevant 
variables in a dynamic environment, and then being able to quantify those variables. 
In contrast, the assumption of ambition in states provides a reference point for 
process oriented perspectives that can be applied to empirical evidence in order to 
assess their success or failure in achieving influence, as well as the reasons for either 
outcome. 
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In applying the criteria of ambition and capacity for significant influence in 
international relations to the identification of middle powers, a simple and ideal type 
for middle powers is established. This may be represented in the following schema. 
Middle Power Wannabe 
Ambition 
No Capacity 
Middle Power 
Ambition 
Capacity 
Not A Middle Power 
No Ambition 
No Capacity 
Potential Middle Power 
No Ambition 
Capacity 
The absence of the capacity to assume significant influence prevents a state from 
claiming middle power status, even where there is an ambition to do so. In contrast, 
the capacity to claim influence without a corresponding ambition to do so simply 
suggests a middle power in potentia and not a middle power per se. Thus, ambition 
and capacity encapsulate the key elements that may be used to define a state as a 
middle power. 
In short, the preceding review of middle powers from perspectives described as 
structuralist and process oriented suggests that there are many factors that go into 
defining a middle power. A closer examination of the nominal definitions of a 
middle power reveals that while applicable within their respective theoretical 
frameworks, these factors result in definitional ambiguity when exposed to situations 
outside the ambit of those frameworks. To investigate middle power influence within 
its geographic environment, and to do so without precluding the insights from either 
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the structuralist or process oriented perspectives, it is necessary to distil the diverse 
premises about middle powers from both these perspectives into a broader and more 
operationally-based definition applicable to both. Thus, the capacity to exercise 
significant influence over developments within a limited sphere of international 
activity, as well as the ambition to do so, are identified as common themes that may 
be used as generic benchmarks in this thesis to identify a middle power. 
Strategies To Assess The Regional Influence Of Middle Powers 
The previous section established a generic framework for the identification of middle 
powers that would encompass both structuralist and process oriented perspectives. 
This section addresses some of the questions that arise from the construction of that 
framework. In applying the above framework to test the claim of a state to middle 
power status in a geographic region, the ambition and capacity of that state to 
exercise significant influence over developments within that region are examined. 
However, several other issues will inevitably be queried along with the above, 
including the interests that inspire an ambition for influence, the strategies that may 
be pursued to defend those interests and the resources that can be employed to 
successfully achieve those strategies. 
The question of whether a state possesses the ambition to assume a role of influence 
within its region might be a simple 'yes' or 'no'. However, the process of determining 
the reason for that answer provides an insight into the attitude of that state towards 
foreign policy, and perhaps more significant, its perception of its own regional 
interests. The lack of ambition to pursue regional influence might be due to 
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inadequate resources, more urgent priorities demanding limited resources in other 
regions, doubts about its chances for success, a lack of interest, or other factors. 
Whereas, the ambition to pursue regional influence might be due to the perception 
that there are specific strategic, economic or other interests in the region that must be 
defended or the belief that doing so serves a broader national interest. Regardless, the 
investigation of the presence or absence of ambition for regional influence guides the 
discussion towards a review of the interests or other issues that would lead a state to 
engage or abstain from pursuing regional influence. 
Similarly, the question of whether a state possesses the capacity to assume a role of 
regional influence opens up the discussion for a more thorough examination and 
understanding of middle powers. In addition to the obvious question of whether the 
capacity for influence exists, it also leads the way for the investigation into what 
brings about this capacity, and how this is translated into influence. 
The review of a state's capacity for influence in its region establishes not only the 
extent of its own resources but also benchmarks this against the existing influence or 
potential for influence possessed by other states within the region. The importance of 
a multidimensional approach towards the analysis of power/influence is emphasised 
by Susan Strange when she states: 
"I believe that the distinction has to be made between relational and 
structural power. Others have further distinguished coercive power 
from bargaining power and from the persuasive power of 
ideological dominance. These are all useful aids to thinking about 
power. ,,48 
48 Susan Strange, 'Territory, State, Authority and Economy: A New Realist Outology of Global 
Political Economy', in The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and the World Order, 
Robert W. Cox (ed.), Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 1997. pp5-6. 
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Thus, structuralist perspectives on the significance of power and relative power are 
given consideration and the applicability of such arguments within the regions 
surveyed in this thesis is weighed. The presence of multilateral institutional 
arrangements in, as well as the significance of these arrangements to, a geographic 
region is also examined. This thesis provides an opportunity to test the relevance of 
process oriented perspectives by exploring the capacity of a state to influence 
regional developments through the multilateral institutional arrangements in the 
regions surveyed. Finally, any evidence of factors that fall outside the expectations of 
either the structuralist or the process oriented perspectives but which provide a state 
with the capacity to assume a role of significant influence in its region is also likely 
to be revealed. 
The investigation of how a middle power is able to manifest significant influence 
follows on from the discussion on what provides it with the capacity to do so. 
Empirical evidence of 'significant influence' manifested by the state under scrutiny 
is reviewed. The examination of how a state is able to exercise 'significant influence' 
in its geographic region clarifies many issues. It offers insight into the regional role 
of the state being studied, as well as how it has translated, or may translate, its 
resources and other political assets into regional influence. In particular, it would be 
instructive to study the preferences of a middle power in situations where it has the 
capacity to pursue a variety of options in foreign policy. An analysis of why some 
policy options inspired by structuralist perspectives are preferred to those from 
process oriented perspectives, or vice versa, furthers our understanding of how a 
middle power might perceive itself and its role in international relations. It may also 
suggest possible trends within the general state system thereby lending greater 
weight to one or the other of the theories advanced on middle powers. 
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In summary, the review of the role of a middle power in its geographic region can be 
organised in terms of an investigation into its ambition for influence, its capacity for 
influence, and the manner in which it has demonstrated its influence, in regional 
affairs. Thus, the investigation into the role of a middle power, like Australia', within 
its regional environment can be represented by the following template. 
South Pacific 
region 
Antarctic 
region 
South East 
Asian region 
Indian Ocean 
region 
Ambition 
Capacity 
Capacity For Influence Based On: 
Physical 
Attributes 
Institutional 
Arrangements  
Other factors 
This template will be applied to the subsequent chapters in order to provide a 
consistent and useful guide for discussion. As with most, if not all, social science 
models, it is unlikely that this model would provide a guide of absolute certainty or 
supply a correlation that would prove infallible or constant. However, it might offer a 
guide to the tendency of one factor over others to represent the basis of middle power 
influence in the contemporary state system and to offer reasons on why this is so. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the nominal definitions of middle powers found in the 
literature on international relations. It has observed that the capacity of middle 
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powers to exercise influence in international relations has in the main been attributed 
to their possession of certain physical attributes. The ability of middle powers to 
exploit opportunities furnished by situational factors, such as history, the dynamics 
of the Cold War and changes in international attitudes on various issues is also noted. 
Thus, it has been proposed that a concept of middle powers can be organised in terms 
of either structuralist or process oriented perspectives. The structuralist perspectives 
tend to explain the concept of a middle power in terms of structural hierarchies 
derived from Realist premises about the role of power within the state system. 
Within structuralist perspectives, states are ranked in a hierarchy of power and 
middle powers are deemed to be those states that fall between the upper and the 
lower ends of the scale. In contrast, the process oriented perspectives look at middle 
powers in terms of their role in international relations, and in particular, their ability 
to assume a leadership role in, and support for, multilateral institutional arrangements 
within the state system. Process oriented perspectives tend to be based on the 
premise that multilateral institutional arrangements represent non force oriented 
mechanisms that enterprising states can exploit to influence developments in the state 
system, and that middle powers are characterised by their enthusiasm for, and 
leadership role in, such arrangements. 
This chapter has also addressed the definitional ambiguities of the nominal 
definitions canvassed. It argues that the nominal definitions of middle power that 
stem from structuralist and process oriented perspectives are not fully satisfactory. 
And that while these nominal definitions are consistent within the ideal type 
established by their respective theoretical frameworks, the limitations of these 
nominal definitions of middle powers are exposed when challenged empirically. 
Consequently, neither suffices as an all-embracing definition for middle powers in 
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practice, but rather, each of these nominal definitions have to be applied in the 
context of their respective theoretical assumptions. 
This thesis seeks to explore the various mechanisms through which a middle power, 
like Australia, manifests its influence and defends its interest, within its geographic 
region. However, adopting a nominal definition of middle power from either the 
structuralist or nominal perspectives would confine the scope of discussion within 
the parameters of their respective theoretical assumptions. An analytical framework 
based on a broader definition of middle powers, which is capable of providing a 
context for discussion and includes insights from both structuralist and process 
oriented perspectives, would be more useful. Therefore, to address the shortcomings 
of the nominal definitions and to develop a working definition of middle power that 
is applicable in a wider variety of circumstances, the nominal definitions are distilled 
to a generic definition that encompasses both structuralist and process oriented 
perspectives of middle powers. Two benchmarks, the ambition to exercise significant 
influence within a limited sphere of international activity and the capacity to do so, 
are advanced as characteristic traits of middle powers. These benchmarks, in turn, 
provide reference points for a more thorough investigation into the role of middle 
powers. In particular, they supply the context for the analysis, in subsequent 
chapters, of Australia's interests within the regions surveyed, as well as the means by 
which it may defend those interests and achieve the 'significant influence' upon 
which its role as a middle power is founded. 
CHAPTER 3 
"There are clear limits to our defence capacity and influence. We 
are a large country with a small population and industrial base. We 
are remote from traditional allies and from situations that are 
important to them. These are factors that, on balance, favour our 
security. But they also impose considerable constraints through our 
ability to influence events through our defence activity." — Paul 
Dibb i 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the concept of a 'middle power'. This chapter applies 
that analysis of the basic concept to Australia's perceptions of itself as a middle 
power and its role within the state system. The reasons why Australia is commonly 
described as a middle power are explored and it shall be demonstrated that Australia 
satisfies all the basic criteria that have traditionally defmed middle powers. Towards 
this end, the template developed in the previous chapter will guide the general 
discussion on Australia's role as a middle power in this chapter. In the previous 
chapter, two factors had been identified as key indicators that can be used to define a 
middle power. A state is a middle power if it has the capacity to assume a role of 
significant influence in international relations and the ambition to do so. These 
factors guide the general discussion in this chapter on Australia's perceptions about 
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Paul Dibb, Review Of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report To Minister For Defence, Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. p42. 
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itself as a middle power and the broad strategies that it has applied to the conduct of 
foreign policy. 
Two different perspectives have dominated the domestic discourse in Australia on 
the strategies that Australia should adopt in international relations and on the 
appropriate role for a middle power in world affairs. These two perspectives have 
guided the conduct of Australian foreign policy and may be termed the Conservative 
and Labor traditions. While adherents to these two perspectives disagree on how 
Australia can best defend its interests as a middle power, it shall be demonstrated that 
they have exhibited both an ambition for Australia to assume an influential role in 
international relations and a belief in its capacity to do so successfully. The 
Conservative strategy trades upon Australia's resources as a middle power to play an 
effective role as a valued 'loyal lieutenant' of great powers.2 It argues that influence 
in international relations is most effectively derived from Australia's ability to gain 
the ear of a powerful friend, as well as from the privilege of being included in the 
councils of the great as a valued ally. In contrast, the Labor strategy is premised upon 
Australia's ability as a middle power to build coalitions of the like-minded and 
argues that Australian interests are more effectively defended through entrepreneurial 
diplomacy and influence in multilateral institutional arrangements. 
These differing outlooks on the appropriate role for Australia as a middle power 
might, prima facie, suggest a schizophrenic approach to foreign policy. However, it 
is argued that this is not the case and that there are common themes that underpin 
Australian foreign policy. It is argued that, notwithstanding the two distinctive 
strands in Australian foreign policy, Australia's role as a middle power within its 
2 The term 'loyal lieutenant' was introduced by A/Professor Richard Herr, who used it, in lectures and 
in conversation with the author of this thesis, to describe Australia's relationship with great powers. 
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regional environment could be characterised by its ability to influence developments 
through multilateral institutional arrangements. Thus, while these two perspectives 
differ on the value of multilateral institutional arrangements, as well as on the extent 
to which a regional orientation should guide Australian foreign policy, the 
disagreement tends to be one of emphasis rather than on the fundamental premises 
concerning Australia's role as a middle power. It will be demonstrated that even 
though the Conservative approach appears preoccupied with issues of global security 
and the system-wide interests of its great power allies, it acknowledges the primacy 
of Australia's regional responsibilities. Indeed, the Conservative approach is 
premised upon Australia's capacity to defend the interests of its allies, as well as its 
own, within Australia's geographic region. The recent geo-political changes 
following the end of the Cold War has also undermined many of the basic premises 
underlying the Conservative strategy, thereby leading to even greater common 
ground in Australian foreign policy. Thus, it is proposed that the Conservative and 
Labor traditions in foreign policy have both demonstrated an ambition to command 
influence in international affairs, a belief in Australia's ability to do so, and a 
regional focus in articulating Australia's role as a middle power. 
Australia as a Middle Power 
Australia satisfies many, if not all, of the criteria listed as defining traits of a middle 
power by the mainstream perspectives described in the previous chapter. Australia 
has a small population but it exercises jurisdiction over an enormous territory and 
vast amounts of natural resources in comparison with other states. While Australia's 
military and diplomatic capabilities are less than those possessed by a few powerful 
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states within the general state system, they are equal or superior to many states, 
including those within its geographic region. Australia's presence on the global stage 
has been manifested in its achievements in culture, sport and technology, which are 
significant, even if they are not dominant. Therefore, based on the attributes it 
possesses, Australia is usually situated somewhere in the middle of the structuralist-
inspired schedules that purport to measure the relative power of states in the state 
system. 3 
Writers examining the structure of international relations during the Cold War have 
also positioned Australia as a middle power, "a state physically located 'in the 
middle' between the system's great powers.” 4 In terms of Realist perceptions of 
power, Australia is usually placed 'in the middle' between great powers with large 
armies and weapons of mass destruction at their disposal, and small powers whose 
military capabilities might be capable of dealing with civil unrest but little more. In a 
sense, Australia may have been regarded as the last Western outpost, geographically 
and strategically poised at the frontier between the communist powers, the Soviet 
Union, China and Vietnam, and the United States and the rest of the Western world 
(east of Australia). Such perspectives of a great divide in international relations were 
prevalent during the Cold War and may retain some residual influence. Such 
geopolitical structural perspectives might well remain relevant, especially as the next 
millennium might see Australia politically, economically, and physically located 
between China or Japan, the ascendant great powers, and the United States, the 
surviving superpower. 5 However, such visions of dichotomous future conflict remain 
3 Please refer to Chapter 1, p38. 
4 Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, & Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers:  
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver, Melbourne University Press, 1993. p17 
5 George Friedman, The Coming War with Japan, New York, St Martin's Press, 1991. Jeffrey T. 
Bergner, The New Superpowers, New York, St Martin's Press, 1991. Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, London, Touchstone, 1998. 
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speculative, and for the moment, the popular view is that the conduct of international 
relations is characterised by multipolar interests championed in myriad spheres 
within the state system. 6 
Multipolar interests and multiple arenas for the defence of those interests have been 
touted as attributes of the contemporary state system and they provide an important 
context for the characterisation of Australia as a middle power. Australia is very 
active in the sort of diplomacy described as middlepowermanship by process-
oriented scholars and which they claim is definitive of the role assumed by middle 
powers in international relations. In particular, scholars such as Cooper and Bateman 
have demonstrated Australia's priorities and leadership in such forms of diplomacy. 
Cooper, Higgott and Nossal have highlighted Australia's role in coalition building 
and agenda setting in such initiatives as the Cairns Agreement on Agriculture and the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meetings.' Bateman has stressed 
Australia's interest and endeavours in advocating maritime surveillance regimes and 
promoting confidence and security building measures within its geographic region. 8 
The repeated theme in such scholarly works is the proposition that states like 
Australia endeavour to pursue their interests through multilateral regimes within the 
state-system and that they act in a manner consistent with that expected of a middle 
power when they do so. 
6 Mohamad Mahathir, 'Beyond Confrontation: The Challenge of Peace in the Pacific', in Peace in the 
Making: Proceedings of the Third Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, June 16-19, 1989, Rohana 
Mahmood (ed.), Kuala Lumpur, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1991. Defending 
Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994. 
pp7-11. 
7 Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, & Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers:  
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. 
8 Sam Batemen, 'Strategic Change and Naval Roles', in Strategic Change and Naval Roles: Issues 
For A Medium Naval Power, Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood (eds.), Canberra, Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, 1993. 
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In short, Australia meets the criteria established in various scholarly works as 
nominal definitions of middle power status. 9 In terms of the benchmarks adopted by 
the working definition developed in the previous chapter, it is proposed that Australia 
has both the ambition, as well as the capacity, to exercise significant influence in 
specific spheres of international activity. Throughout its history, Australia has 
demonstrated an ambition to play a significant role in international relations. This has 
been expressed in various ways, from Menzies' determination to be included in the 
councils of great powers to Evatt's efforts to enlarge the role of international 
organisations and the influence of minor powers. Australia's ambition to command 
influence in international relations has been inspired by a variety of reasons, ranging 
from attempts to assuage anxieties about Australia's vulnerability to external threats 
to the desire to satisfy grand ideals. 10  It will be demonstrated in the following 
chapters that Australia's claim to middle power status is validated by the fact that its 
ambition is often matched by its capacity to satisfy those ambitions. The rest of this 
chapter discusses the strategies, especially those inspired by Conservative and Labor 
perspectives, through which Australia's ambition and capacity for influence as a 
middle power within the state system have been and can be expressed. 
Domestic Interpretations Of Australia As A Middle Power 
While Australia is generally perceived as a middle power, there have been differing 
domestic interpretations within Australia about what being a middle power entailed, 
9 These include Richard A. Higgott, & Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and 
Canada in a Changing World Order & Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers In International Politics. 
10 Ulrich Ellis, A History Of The Australian Country Party, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 
p262. David Lee, 'Liberal Internationalism and World Organisation', in Evatt to Evans: The Labor 
Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, David Lee & Christopher Waters (eds.) Canberra, Allen & 
Unwin, 1997. p51 
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especially with regard to the role and policies that should be adopted in international 
relations. The study of how Australia has interpreted its role as a middle power in 
international relations can be guided by the concept of 'orientation' in understanding 
foreign policy. Barston advises that: 
"In considering why states and other entities act in particular kinds 
of ways, the concept of orientation offers a useful starting point. 
Orientation can be defmed as the pattern of governmental and 
politically significant private attitudes, actions and transactions, 
which go to make up the [foreign policy] alignment of a country." 11 
Australian foreign policy has been characterised by two distinct trends, which can be 
described as the Conservative and the Labor approach to foreign policy. 
The Conservative approach tends to regard Australian interests as being best 
defended by support for Western great powers, as these powers have traditionally 
championed causes with which Australia has traditionally identified. Thus, energy 
and initiative are usually directed at maintaining and reinforcing access to these great 
powers in this foreign policy approach, with a view towards influencing these great 
powers to act in a fashion that would be beneficial to Australian interests. In contrast, 
the Labor approach towards foreign policy tends to place greater emphasis on 
multilateralism and is more assertive, in terms of initiative and participation, in the 
development of multilateral institutional arrangements within the state system: 2 
Therefore, while the Labor approach in foreign relations recognises the importance 
II R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, second edition, London, Longman, 1997. p35. 
12 The use of the labels 'Conservative' and 'Labor' are not intended to politicise the discussion. It has 
been demonstrated that there are many within the Australian Labor Party that might actually hold a 
'Conservative' view of foreign policy, and the reverse is probably true of the 'Conservative' parties. 
However, 'radical' does not really seem to be an apt label for that approach to, and perspective of, 
foreign relations that has been identified with Labor governments. Thus, the term "Labor tradition" is 
intended simply to refer to orientation towards international relations that is more enthusiastic about 
an 'independent' role for Australia, as well as being more eager to initiate, and participate in, 
multilateral institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, the observation that Liberal-National Coalition 
governments in Australia tend to be advocates of the "Conservative tradition", whereas Labor 
governments tend to advocate the 'Labor Tradition', seems valid. 
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of Australia's bilateral ties with great powers, it also attaches great significance to 
multilateral structures as vehicles for influence, which provide opportunities for a 
role that enables Australia to be more independent of its more powerful allies. 
These domestic perspectives on the role of Australia as a middle power are not 
mutually exclusive. Thus, it does not mean that an Australia aligned to the broad 
interests of its great power allies can not or will not unilaterally pursue an 
independent line in foreign policy when it is in its interests to do so. Nor is an 
Australia that enthusiastically and independently defends its interests in multilateral 
forums unaware of, or unappreciative of its great and powerful friends. Nonetheless, 
there are significant differences with respect to the underlying premises of these two 
foreign policy approaches, especially with regard to their respective attitudes towards 
multilateralism as an instrument of middle power diplomacy, and on the significance 
of regionalism. This contrast highlights their differing attitudes on the appropriate 
role for a middle power, such as Australia, in the contemporary state system. 
The Conservative Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy 
The Conservative orientation towards international relations has provided strong 
guidance to Australian foreign policy and has been, arguably, the dominant theme in 
Australian diplomacy for much of its history. The Conservative approach to foreign 
policy has been shaped by several factors, including Australia's ethnicity and history. 
The Conservative tradition places great value on Australia's ethnic links with its 
great power allies. The importance of this relationship is highlighted in a recent 
White Paper on foreign policy, In The National Interest, which reiterates the fact 
that: 
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"its history and culture ... give Australia strong links to Europe and 
the United States, with which Australia shares important economic 
and strategic interests." I3 
Thus, the Conservative orientation in foreign policy is partially founded on the belief 
that, as a middle power, Australia should act in symphony with the more powerful 
champions of Western interests, not just because they are great powers, but also 
because of their historical and cultural links with Australia. 
The Conservative tradition in Australian foreign policy has its roots in Australian 
history and an Australian colony that was an integral part of the British Empire. As a 
British dominion that had drifted - reluctantly - into independence rather than 
attaining independence through struggle and conflict, there was, for a period, some 
ambiguity over the independence of Australian foreign policy. 
The Statute of Westminster 1931 clearly devolved power for independent decision-
making to Australia. However, it was apparent that Australia continued to identity 
with the interests of Great Britain, and to consider British interests as being largely 
synonymous with its own for a long time. The words of Menzies in a broadcast to 
Australians in 1939, at the outbreak of war in Europe, typified such attitudes in 
Australian foreign policy. In his broadcast, Menzies proclaims: 
"It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially, that in 
consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of 
Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her, and that as a 
result Australia is at war' [italics added]." I4 
13 hi the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Canberra, 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1997. piv 
14 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Melbourne, Oxford University 
Press, 1988. p15 
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There was certainly recognition of Australian interests, as being distinct from British 
interests on some issues. This was evidenced in the concern over the direct military 
threat to Australian territory in the Second World War, and the pressure from 
Australia on Britain to invest greater resources to the defence of South East Asia and 
Australia. Nonetheless, as Coral Bell argues: 
"The real interest of Menzies's decision, as it affects analysis of 
Australia's strategic dependency, is its underlining of the point that 
the Prime Minister of the time could make the assumption that 
what might be done in London (as a member of the War cabinet) 
was more vital than what had to be done in Canberra." I5 
Hence, in spite of the fact that Australia was a middle power with considerable 
military resources of its own, there was a belief that Australia's security and other 
interests were best served by the presence and protection of a great power ally like 
Britain within its region. 
The Conservative tradition in Australian foreign policy is not simply founded on 
sentimental attachment or loyalty to great western powers but also on pragmatic 
realist assessments of power in international relations. It is based on the assumption 
that small or middle powers do not have the clout required to defend their own 
interests in a general state system where significant issues affecting international 
order are determined by great powers. Therefore, in spite of its status as one of the 
strongest powers in its own region, Australia has traditionally been guided by the 
Conservative orientation on foreign policy and has sought protection from its great 
power allies. 
15 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. p18 
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In spite of the occasional assertive posture in foreign policy, the Conservative 
approach has usually been coloured by a sense of vulnerability emanating from self-
perceived limitations of Australia's role as a middle power. The Conservative 
approach to Australian foreign policy is underpinned by the premise that Australia 
might be unable to defend itself without help from a great power but that a regional 
security regime might be inadequate. In 1947, the Australian Joint Intelligence 
Committee Appreciation voiced some of the perennial concerns driving the 
Conservative agenda in foreign policy. A report from that committee states: 
"Australia is an isolated small Power with limited manpower and 
resources. She is not able to defend herself unaided against a major 
Power. While the United Nations remains in being, there is no 
threat from a minor Power to Australia's security, but whilst the 
power of the veto exists, it would appear that the United Nations 
does not offer security against aggression by a major Power." 16 
Thus, the Conservative strategy was driven in part by a sense of vulnerability as a 
Western settlement in a region overwhelmingly populated by Asians, 17 and in part by 
a sense of scepticism towards the effectiveness of regional collective security 
arrangements. These views were recapitulated during the Cold War when Hedley 
Bull argued that: 
"The first point to make is that none of these countries [in 
Australia's region] is in a position to make a very significant 
contribution to Australia's security. Commitments which we enter 
into with any of them represent, from our point of view, a net 
liability and not an asset. Regional involvement therefore cannot 
represent a basis for Australia's foreign policy. At best it can serve 
to supplement a policy whose foundations lie elsewhere." 18 
16 Joint Intelligence Committee Appreciation 1/47, Melbourne 27 March 1947, Appreciation of 
Certain Aspects of the Strategic Position of Australia, cited in Documents on Australian Foreign 
Policy 1937-49, Volume XII: 1947, W.J. Hudson & Wendy Way (eds.), Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1995. p290. 
17 The term 'isolated' could only have been made in reference to Western powers because Australia 
has always had the company of Asian powers in its region. 
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These concerns about the inadequacy of any other foreign policy approach reiterate 
the sense of vulnerability that underpins the Conservative tradition in foreign policy. 
In contrast, support for and protection from a great power was a familiar strategy that 
had worked well for Australia. Thus, looking back at Australia's 'traditional' security 
arrangements during the Cold War, Bull pointed out that: 
"Reliance on the United States, as the lynch-pin of Australia's 
security, has provided the basis of our foreign policy for thirty 
years, and is rooted in the experiences of 1942. The argument for it 
has been that Australia could once again become the subject of 
threats which only America can meet; that we should therefore do 
our utmost to ensure that if such threats arise again, America will 
be willing to protect us again; and that this object can best be 
served by what Bruce Grant has called "loyalty to the protector." 19 
Therefore, much of the energy and initiative of the Conservative foreign policy 
approach is invested in maintaining access to and influence with a great power that 
would serve as Australia's protector. 2° Guided by the Conservative approach, 
Australian foreign policy was to, first, emphasise loyalty as dominion of the British 
Empire, and support for British interests. And subsequently, when Britain declined as 
a global military power, Australia sought to ensure America's commitment to 
Australia and Australia's region by becoming a loyal ally of the United States. 21 The 
Realist assumptions in Australia's search for a new patron were summed up 
succinctly in the words of a Canadian diplomat, who declared that "pax americana is 
18 Hedley Bull, 'Options for Australia', in Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies, 
Proceedings of the 39th Summer School, Australian Institute of Political Science, held at Canberra, 
27-29 January 1973, Canberra, Angus and Robertson, 1973. p148. 
19 Hedley Bull, 'Options for Australia'. p139. 
20 Bruce Grant, The Crisis of Loyalty: A Study Of Australian Foreign Policy,  London, Angus & 
Robertson, 1972. p 1 . 
21 Norman Harper, 'Australian Foreign Policy' in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands 
Since the First World War,  William S. Livingston and Roger Louis (ed.), Austin, University of Texas 
Press, 1979. p101. 
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better than no pax at all."22 The implied standpoint of the Conservative orientation is 
that only an international Leviathan, such as that represented by a friendly 
superpower, can ensure an international order amenable to Australia's interests. 
Since the decline of the British Empire, advocates of the Conservative approach in 
Australian foreign policy have been particularly determined to secure the 
commitment of American military forces to Australia's region. To this end, 
Australian efforts included hosting US-Australian joint defence facilities at North 
West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar in Australia, support for and participation in the 
Korean and Vietnam wars, and support for other American interests. 23 It also led 
Australia to lobby strongly and successfully for the ANZUS treaty, which it believed 
would guarantee the commitment of American military forces to the defence of 
Australia in the event of a military threat to the latter. 24 
The transfer of 'dependence' from Great Britain to the United States did signal a 
slight change in the foreign policy outlook in the Conservative tradition. While 
previous adherents to the Conservative approach in foreign policy might have 
considered Australia an integral part of Great Britain, the same could not be said of 
Australia's relationship with the United States. Great Britain was 'the mother 
country' and Australia is a dominion of the British monarch. In contrast, the United 
States was a former British colony like Australia. And a great and power friend, no 
matter how great or powerful, could not claim the historic role of Great Britain as 
Australia's political progenitor. Thus, the perception of common interests formed the 
basis of the relationship between the Australia and the United States, in contrast to 
22 Robert W. Cox & Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. p243. 
23 H.R. Cowrie, Asia and Australia in World Affairs, Melbourne, Nelson, 1987. pp 217-224. 
24 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. 
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the Menzies' belief in the special relationship that resulted in inextricable and 
synonymous interests between Australia and Great Britain. H.G. Gelber, a staunch 
advocate of the Conservative approach makes a similar point when he describes the 
relationship between Australia and the United States: 
"This is not, of course, to suggest that Australian and US concerns 
are, or even have been, identical. But it is to acknowledge that 
general political and strategic confidence and stability in the 
Pacific, East and Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean would be 
unthinkable without active American participation in its 
maintenance. It is further to say that Australia's economic welfare, 
her trading patterns, her ambitions for national development as well 
as her security, depend critically upon this stability and confidence 
and, to this extent, upon established Australian ties with the United 
States."25 
In essence, however, the overall strategy of the Conservative approach has remained 
unchanged. It remains based on the perception that Australia is best engaged in 
playing a supporting role as a 'loyal lieutenant' to a great power in international 
relations, as opposed to pursuing an independent and a leading role. 
The focus of the Conservative approach has always been on key bilateral 
relationships with great powers. While a recent White Paper referred to a "selective 
approach to the multilateral agenda" and stressed the need for Australia to 
"concentrate its involvement in multilateral issues in areas where its national 
interests are closely engaged," the tone adopted suggested doubts about the general 
efficacy of multilateral instruments. 26 The Conservative approach clearly 
demonstrates a reluctance to regard diplomatic activism within multilateral forums as 
the appropriate and primary focus of Australian foreign policy. Instead, stronger faith 
is placed in the traditional Conservative strategy of engaging in strategic bilateral 
25 H. G. Gelber, 'Australia and East Asia', in Australia's External Relations In The 1980s: The 
Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors, Paul Dibb (ed.), Canberra, Croom Helm, 
1983. p110. 
122 
relationships. The Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, In The National Interest, 
states: 
"A central feature of the Government's approach to foreign and 
trade policy is the importance it places on bilateral relationships as 
a means of advancing Australian interests. Bilateral relationships 
are not an alternative to regional and global efforts. All three 
approaches must be deployed in an integrated and mutually 
supportive way. The greater part of Australia's international 
efforts is, however, bilateral, and bilateral relationships, carefully 
nurturing newer relationships which engage key Australian 
interests, and expanding others which offer opportunities for 
Australia will be the core part of the Government's diplomatic 
activity." [italics added] 27 
Therefore, regional or global multilateral strategies, while deemed important, are 
considered secondary. Instead, the primary focus of the Conservative tradition is its 
emphasis on bilateral relations, and in particular, upon Australia's relationship with 
its traditional great power allies. 
The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy 
The Labor approach is characterised by its efforts to provide a viable alternative to 
the Conservative emphasis on Australia's relationship with great power allies in 
foreign affairs. It is based on adopting a role for Australia that is not primarily guided 
by what Australia thinks its great power allies would like it to do. The early 
examples of Australian foreign policy, which diverged from the traditional 
Conservative approach (and which might arguably be described as inchoate 
expressions of the Labor tradition), have been more closely associated with specific 
26 In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. piii 
27 In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. piii 
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personalities, as opposed to being presented as a distinctive and consistent theme in 
Australian foreign policy. 28 
T.B. Miller, the Australian historian, argues that an unambiguously separate 
approach towards foreign policy really only began with the election of Gough 
Whitlam in 1972. 29 Miller contends that, prior to Whitlam, the only significant issue 
of dispute in foreign policy had been over the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with the People's Republic of China and that there was little difference in the 
strategy adopted in terms of diplomatic goals. 3° While Miller's arguments clearly 
understate the distinctive path blazed by Evatt in foreign policy and Curtin's stance in 
the Second World War and subjective with respect to what represented a significant 
issue of dispute in foreign policy, they do tend to reflect a popular view. Such a view 
was probably reinforced by Menzies' long and dominant reign as Prime Minister. 
Australia's long preoccupation with the Cold War (and the fear of being branded 
subversive) might also have subdued assertions of independence in foreign policy or 
any significant divergence of view from the United States. 
A Labor tradition was never really acknowledged as a clearly defined and separate 
theme in Australian foreign policy by many observers until Whitlam. Regardless of 
whether Curtin or Evatt was the first to establish a separate and distinctive foreign 
policy orientation for Australia, Whitlam's imprint on the character of Australian 
foreign policy is undeniable. On the day that he was sworn in as Prime Minister and 
28For example, Evatt's accomplishment in foreign policy for Australia tends to be more closely 
identified with him as a person, rather than touted as an expression of a 'tradition' in foreign policy. 
Of course, Evatt has also been credited with establishing the principles upon which the Labor tradition 
in foreign policy are based. MacMahon Ball, 'Introduction', in H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of 
Australia: Speeches, Sydney, Angus & Robertson Ltd, 1945. 
29 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, External Relations Since 1788, second edition, Canberra, 
Australian National University Press, 1991. p330. 
30 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, External Relations Since 1788. p330. 
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Foreign Minister, Whitlam established the tone of Labor's approach to foreign policy 
and unambiguously set it apart from the Conservative tradition. Whitlam states: 
"... the general direction of my thinking is towards a more 
independent Australian stance in international affairs and towards 
an Australia which will be less militarily oriented and not open to 
suggestions of racism; an Australia which will enjoy a growing 
standing as a distinctive, tolerant, co-operative and well-regarded 
nation not only in the Asian and Pacific region but in the world at 
large."31 
Thus, with Whitlam, a Labor orientation in foreign policy that is clearly, consistently 
and deliberately differentiated from the Conservative tradition emerged. 
In contrast to the Conservative orientation, the Labor approach to Australian foreign 
policy tends to be premised on less state-centric and more idealistic principles. David 
Lee states: 
"For Labor governments this meant first, laying the foundations for 
a lasting world peace through international economic cooperation 
to achieve full employment and rising living standards, and second, 
solving international problems through diplomacy and multilateral 
institutions rather than through 'power politics' and the use of 
force. ,,32 
This is not to say that Australia's national interests are deemed less important but 
that the Labor approach to foreign policy recognises the fact that international 
relations often involves 'universal' causes that go beyond the narrow interests of a 
nation state. Therefore, within the Labor tradition, the welfare of workers, human 
rights and other universal ideals are regarded as ideals that should be defended by 
31 CNIA, Vol. 43, no. 12, December 1972. p619, cited in T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 
External Relations Since 1788. pp229-330. 
32 David Lee, 'The Curtin and Chifley Governments, Liberal Internationalism and World 
Organisation', in Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, David Lee & 
Christopher Waters (eds.), Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1997. p48. 
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Australian foreign policy, even though the language employed in championing such 
causes might often be couched in terms of national interest. 
The Labor orientation towards foreign policy is also characterised by its emphasis on 
a role that is more independent and less reliant on Australia's great power allies. As 
such, it has been traditionally inclined towards regionalist and multilateral 
institutions because these structures provide a middle power, such as one with 
Australia's capabilities, with greater opportunities for a more assertive role in 
international relations. In the Labor approach to foreign policy, the significance of 
multilateralism can be understood in telins of the fact that it represents both a value 
and a process. In part, the commitment to multilateralism represented a logical 
extension of a policy that is based on pursuing universalistic ideals which serve the 
common good, as opposed to narrow egotistical state interests. 
Multilateral consultative processes in international relations are perceived as a form 
of democracy, and support for these processes is in keeping with the pursuit of 
democratic liberal ideals. In part, the commitment to multilateralism has been based 
on the acknowledgement of a middle power's limited ability to unilaterally influence 
developments in the state system. Thus, the commitment to multilateralism, and 
particularly multilateral institutional arrangements, demonstrated by the Labor 
tradition in foreign policy is not surprising, given its desire to assert a more 
independent role in international relations and Australia's limitations as a middle 
power. The former Labor Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans states: 
"I believe that the Hawke and Keating governments were 
governments in the great Labor tradition - intensely nationalist in 
our determination to find and articulate a distinctive Australian 
place in the world; intensely internationalist in our willingness to 
work through multilateral institutions and processes in finding 
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solutions to problems; and intensely active in pursuing the 
objectives we defined for ourselves."33 
Therefore, there appeared to be a natural and acknowledged affinity between the 
defence of Australian interests through multilateral institutional arrangements and the 
ideals and aspirations inherent in the Labor orientation towards foreign policy. 
The commitment to multilateralism that has been demonstrated by the Labor 
approach to foreign policy is not merely the expression of an ideal but also a 
deliberate diplomatic strategy to maximise Australia's influence in international 
relations. Ironically, this reflects a 'Realist' appreciation of Australia's limitations as 
a middle power but adopts a different strategy to that taken by the Conservative 
approach in response to these limitations. Whereas the Conservative approach sought 
to defend Australian interests through a strategy of 'loyalty' to, and hopes of 
reciprocity from, great powers, the Labor approach sought active participation in, 
and initiation of, multilateral arrangements that would allow it to assume a more 
independent and influential role in international relations. 
The limitations on what Australia can achieve through the Labor strategy in foreign 
policy are recognised by its adherents. In defending the Labor approach, Gareth 
Evans argues that: 
"Globally, as indeed at all levels, we have to recognise our 
limitations. As a middle power, not a great or a major power, we do 
not have the clout to rely on anything other than our capacity to 
persuade - a capacity often best applied by building coalitions of 
the like-minded." 34 
33 Gareth Evans, 'The Labor Tradition', in Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign 
Policy, David Lee & Christopher Waters (eds.), Canberra, Allen & Unwin, 1997. pp15-16. 
34 Gareth Evans, 'The Labor Tradition'. p18. 
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In the context of multilateral diplomacy in the state system, the question of resources 
is a significant issue and a factor in determining influence. Barston explains that: 
"The overall impact of a delegation will vary depending on factors 
such as negotiating past history, diplomatic skills, contribution to 
the intellectual process of negotiation and formal or informal 
committee roles. In some instances, limited resources may mean 
that a delegation's input is deliberately restricted, for example to 
the legal field, (e.g. Kenya, Singapore). Larger states such as the 
United States, United Kingdom and the Netherlands have acquired 
roles, in addition to their traditional technical input, as treaty-
drafting specialists, invariably serving on drafting committees." 35 
However, as a technologically advanced middle power, Australia does not suffer 
from many of the limitations that restrict the participation or success of some small 
powers in multilateral forums. Indeed, Australia often trades upon its prestige and 
reputation for technical expertise in specific issue areas to establish a niche where it 
can play an active role (and often a leadership role) in setting the agenda for 
multilateral institutional arrangements. 
The Labor orientation in foreign policy found its strongest and most sustained period 
of expression during the 1980s to the mid-1990s, when a Labor government enjoyed 
a long spell in office. In particular, during the years of Evan's tenure as Foreign 
Minister, multilateralism was vigorously advocated as an opportunity for Australia to 
seize the leadership on various issues on the international agenda. Leaver and Cox 
expresses the view that: 
"Especially during Gareth Evans' reign as foreign minister - a 
period that commenced just on the cusp of the evident collapse of 
the Cold War order - the brief for what quickly became known as 
'middle power multilateralism' became a rallying call for the 
reform of 'the rules of the game' within regional and global 
contexts. In one field after another, Labor foreign policy under 
Evans took up postures that championed the cause of greater 
35 R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy. p173. 
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equality through the means of a higher degree of interstate 
cooperation." 36 
Evans saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity for middle powers such as 
Australia to play a more active role in shaping international affairs through 
multilateralism. According to Leaver and Cox, multilateral diplomacy, during Evan's 
stewardship, had been: 
C4
. . . conceived as an open-ended process whereby the formal but 
substantially limited sovereignty of individual states would be 
'pooled' in order to enhance the collective capacity of 'the society 
of states' to deal with problems and issues whose effects were 
increasingly global in scope. The argument implicitly 
acknowledged the limitations of unilateralism: the policies of any 
single state, no matter how powerful, were increasingly insufficient 
for solving global tasks. Cooperation was in this sense, the logical 
successor to hegemony, a modern strategy for the provision of 
world order in the wake of declining leadership by the 
superpowers. 1/37 
The Labor tradition in Australian foreign policy is also notable for its ambitions in 
actively seeking a leadership role in international relations. It was not enough to 
simply participate in multilateral institutional arrangements. Instead, the advocates 
for the Labor approach believed that as a wealthy and resourceful middle power, 
Australia could and should seek to provide intellectual and diplomatic leadership on 
multilateral initiatives to establish, expand, and extend the number of multilateral 
institutional arrangements in the state system. Thus, adherents to the Labor approach 
have devoted much energy and resources towards establishing and maintaining 
multilateral forums and regulatory arrangements, particularly within Australia's 
region. Some of these multilateral initiatives include the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, the Cairns Group, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Madrid Protocol to 
36 Richard Leaver and Dave Cox, 'Introduction: the world according to Gar', in Middling, Meddling, 
Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy, Richard Leaver and Dave Cox (eds.), Sydney, Allen & 
Unwin, 1997. p2 
37 Richard Leaver and Dave Cox, 'Introduction: the world according to Gar'. pp5-6. 
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the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention on the Southern Blue Fin Tuna and the Niue 
Treaty. 
Indeed, so enthusiastic was Evan's about the role that Australia could play as a 
middle power and so widespread was Australia's involvement in multilateral 
initiatives that this led to some unkind cynicism. Nossal notes that in some quarters: 
"There is a suspicion that middle power Initiatives are little more 
than initiative-mongering - in other words, middle powers seek 
Initiatives in order to demonstrate to their domestic publics that 
they are engaged in 'International Good Works,' or even more 
cynically, in order to gain a Nobel Peace Prize for its promoter." 38 
Whatever the motives of the individuals involved, the fact remained that the Labor 
approach remains wedded to the belief that middle powers do have the capacity to 
play a leadership role in the state system. And that Australia, in particular, is well 
suited to the role of initiating or setting agendas for multilateral institutional 
arrangements within the state system. 
Finally, the Labor approach is characterised by its emphasis on the development of 
regional structures. In contrast to the Conservative approach which regarded great 
power patronage as the key to regional security and the defence of Australian 
interests, the Labor approach (at least in recent years) has demonstrated strong 
enthusiasm for the development of regional structures to defend Australian interests. 
Leaver and Cox state: 
"Evans central theme of cooperation assumed particular pertinence 
in the Asia-Pacific region, where 'economic dynamism' had 
already delivered at least half of Fukuyama's pay-dirt during 
decades that were elsewhere associated with simultaneous inflation 
and stagnation. The lifting of Cold War structures therefore 
38 Kim Richard Nossal, 'Middle Power Diplomacy in the Changing Asia-Pacific Order: Australia and 
Canada Compared'. p214. 
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appeared to allow for precisely the kinds of intellectual leadership 
that Evans was set upon. It precipitated proposals for the 
development of political mechanisms spanning both the economic 
and strategic domains that would bed down this already existing 
victory of the market, while simultaneously expressing an 
historically new sense of community in regional affairs."39 
There was a very strong commitment towards multilateral solutions for regional 
issues during the period when the Labor approach guided Australian foreign policy. 
Indeed, so ardent was Australia's engagement with its region and in its pursuit of 
regional arrangements during the Labor Party's tenure in government (1983 to 1996) 
that there was some concern that Australia might have neglected its traditional 
allies.° 
Although adherents to the Labor approach in foreign policy have enthusiastically 
called for the development of regional structures, this has often been accompanied by 
a preference for American involvement in such initiatives. In part, this is due to the 
fact that United States' involvement represented an additional expression of its 
commitment to Australia's region - a commitment that is seen by both the 
Conservative and Labor approaches as being crucial to Australia's interests. While 
adherents to the Labor approach in foreign policy clearly do not intend for Australia 
to forsake its traditional alliances, they obviously regard the development of regional 
multilateral security structures as crucial to Australia's interests and additional 
insurance. Thus, the Labor approach is characterised by a strong commitment to a 
role for Australia in multilateral and regional structures that can be differentiated 
from a role that is based on Australia's relationship with its great power allies. 
39 Richard Leaver and Dave Cox, 'Introduction: the world according to Gar'. p5. 
413 In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. piv. 
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Common Themes In Australian Foreign Policy 
Geopolitical changes have resulted in a growing commitment to regionalism, as well 
as prompting Australia to review its strategic interest in viable regional multilateral 
institutional arrangements. The Labor tradition in Australian foreign policy clearly 
typifies the strategy expected of a middle power in international relations from 
process oriented perspectives. 4 ' The Labor approach advocates a strong role for 
Australia in international multilateral processes and sees in multilateral institutional 
arrangements an opportunity for middle powers to exercise leadership and influence 
in international relations. In contrast, the Conservative tradition in Australian foreign 
policy exhibits some of the characteristics that correspond with structuralist 
expectations of middle powers. It is based largely upon Australia's capacity to 
defend its interests by securing the good auspices of a great power, in return for 
which Australia would throw its weight as a middle power in support of the causes of 
the former. 
There are two assumptions made in the Conservative approach. First, as a middle 
power, Australia can make sufficient contribution to the cause of a great power so as 
to render itself a valuable ally. Second, Australia's capacity to defend its own 
interests is inadequate without the assistance of a great power. These assumptions 
conform to the belief that geographic circumstances permitting, middle powers may 
assume responsibility for regional security on behalf of great powers, as well as a 
significant role when a 'balance of power' is required. 42 Although the Conservative 
tradition appears to represent a stark alternative to the Labor approach, it is argued 
41 This could also be due to the fact that much of the recent literature on middle powers coincided with 
period in Australia when foreign policy was driven by Labor agendas, and thus there is a risk of 
tautology. 
42  See previous chapter. 
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that there might now be a growing consensus between the two on the issue of 
multilateralism and regionalism. The Conservative tradition in Australian foreign 
policy has been based largely on the geopolitical assumptions of an earlier era. While 
the language employed by adherents to the Conservative tradition remains largely 
unaltered and continues to stress a policy of 'loyalty to the protector', many of the 
original premises have changed. Geopolitical changes and years of strategic 
investment in regional institutions have rendered the differences between the 
Conservative and Labor approaches on the issue of multilateral institutional 
arrangements and regionalism to a question of emphasis, rather than diametrically 
opposed views. 
The main issue confronting those who favour the Conservative approach in 
Australian foreign policy is the fact that American interests and presence within 
Australia's geographic region have declined significantly since the Cold War. 43 
While the potential for regional conflict remains, in the absence of a great power 
threat to the United States, localised regional upheavals might not be regarded as a 
threat to American interests or as something that warrants American involvement. 
Thus, it is possible for Australia to find itself in a situation that was no different from 
that faced by its regional neighbours who do not have great power allies. This was a 
possibility pointed out by Soedjatmoko, who anticipated the issue 44 and warns that: 
"The other question to which Bruce Grant raises: whether a small 
or medium sized country is the same if it is non-aligned or allied to 
a major power, is most interesting. It could be a trap if some other 
factor did not come into play. This is that in the present world 
situation the possibilities for the application of external power to 
other countries, to situations in other countries, or to local 
international conflicts, has changed and has become quite limited. 
43 Daljit Singh, 'ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia', in ASEAN in the New Asia: Issues & 
Trends, Chia Slow Yue, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997. p129. 
" Soedjatmoko was probably referring to inaction resulting from a stalemate during the Cold War 
rather than lack of interest from a great power. 
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It is not inconceivable that there will be quite a number of 
dangerous international situations where the fact that one has a 
major power as an ally will be totally irrelevant. In fact the last five 
years have shown very clearly how limited the possibilities for a 
major power are to apply its power directly, either in defence of its 
own interests or in defence of its ally's interests." 45 
Thus far, Australian interests have been served when its great power allies have 
reacted to perceptions of threat from rival great powers within Australia's geographic 
region.46 However, the reliability of the strategy of dependence on great power allies 
has yet to be truly tested in circumstances where the interests of those allies are not 
directly threatened. The basis of the Conservative tradition in Australian foreign 
policy is that assistance from Australia's great power allies would be forthcoming, if 
required. The limitation of the Conservative tradition is that it has yet to address the 
possibility that Australia's great power allies might not respond as desired and the 
circumstances wherein this might occur. 
An assessment of Australia's independent capacity to defend its interests in 
international relations is essential if its status as a middle power is to be accurately 
comprehended. However, the Conservative tradition in foreign policy offers limited 
insight on Australia's capacity to assert itself as a middle power. This is due to the 
fact that irrespective of whether the policy of "loyalty to the protector" would be 
reciprocated by a great power, the question of the extent to which Australia's is able 
to influence its region unilaterally would remain unanswered. 
45 Soedjatmoko, 'The role of the Medium and Small Nations in the new Asia-Pacific Setting', in 
Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies, Proceedings of the 39th Summer School, 
Australian Institute of Political Science, held at Canberra, 27-29 January 1973, Canberra, Angus and 
Robertson, 1973. p62. 
46  This point is of course arguable, especially in the context of the Vietnam War. See Coral Bell, 
Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. pp69-86. 
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An analysis of the policy of "loyalty to the protector" would at best only reveal the 
extent to which Australia is able to lobby a great power like the United States to act 
on Australia's behalf It would not offer any insight as to the extent to which 
Australia could play a significant role in the state system, especially within its own 
geographic region, in its own capacity as a middle power. The logic of a foreign 
policy based on strategic dependence would also infer that a "repentant" New 
Zealand that made similar expressions of "loyalty to the protector" could potentially 
wield the same power and influence as a middle power like Australia both within its 
region and the general state system. 
"To question the policy of loyalty to the protector, however, is not 
necessarily to question reliance on the United States. Loyalty to the 
protector was only a means to an end. It would be perfectly 
possible for us to conclude that we should now strike a more 
independent attitude, and be much readier to dissent from 
American policies, while at the same time holding that our ability 
to rely on the United States would not be jeopardized by this, and 
remained the basis of our policy." 47 
Notwithstanding the efficacy of a policy based on reliance, it is necessary to 
differentiate between Australia's ability to solicit the protection of an ally in defence 
of its interests and its innate capacity as a middle power to assume an effective 
independent role in international relations. It is the ability of a state to defend general 
interests within its own region that is the measure of a middle power, and not simply 
its ability to secure the protection of a great power, even though a middle power 
might fmd the latter easier to accomplish. 48 
In spite of the differences between the two traditions in Australian foreign policy, 
they both share a common understanding of some of the limitations that Australia 
must face as a middle power and the significance of the changing geo-political 
135 
realities in Australia's region. The end of the Cold War and other geopolitical 
changes has resulted in a multipolar international environment that necessitates a 
reappraisal of many strategic interests. The challenge to adherents of both foreign 
policy orientations is to translate Australia's status as a middle power into significant 
influence within its region. This has seem a convergence in policy orientation 
towards a stronger focus on regionalism and multilateral institutional arrangements. 
Historically, Australia has been one of the most powerful and wealthy states in a 
region characterised by developing nations that are poor and relatively weak. Thus, 
its role has been that of a regional great power, and to a significant degree, Australia 
has been able to unilaterally cultivate a regional political environment that serves its 
interests. Ross Babbage points out that: 
"[An] important theme in Australia's security policy is the 
enduring national interest in encouraging the maintenance of a 
favourable strategic environment in the surrounding regions. 
Australian foreign and economic policies contribute significantly to 
ensuring that PNG, the Southwest Pacific and the ASEAN 
countries remain relatively free from major instability and external 
interference.'49 
Acting in the capacity of a regional great power, Australia has served as a power that 
is regarded both as an unofficial spokesman for its region (at least in Western 
councils), as well as the regional champion of Western hegemonic interests. 
Australia has also been able to offer considerable support to regional economies and 
play a significant role in defending security interests within its region either through 
direct economic assistance or such programmes as the Colombo Plan. Indeed, 
Australia's regional hegemonic status is reflected in the fact that the greater part of 
47 Hedly Bull, 'Options for Australia'. p139. 
48 See previous chapter. 
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its foreign policy has traditionally been directed at extra-regional great powers, such 
as Germany, Japan, China or the Soviet Union. And addressing the extent to which 
these extra-regional powers have been able to manifest a presence or pose a threat to 
Australian interests, in the vicinity of Australia's region. However, while extra-
regional threats still occupied the minds of Australian strategic planners, geo-
political changes have resulted in a reorientation of mindset and greater attention 
towards regional actors. 
The end of the overriding ideological divide that dominated the international political 
discourse during the Cold War has also meant that underlying differences between 
Australia and the United States have acquired greater prominence then they might 
otherwise have had. Australian interests with respect to agricultural subsidies and its 
differences with the United States and Europe on that issue are unlikely to be served 
by "loyalty to the protector". Nor is Australia's current stance on setting targets for 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions compatible with that of the United States 
or Europe. Thus, the practice of "building coalitions of the like-minded" has become 
an important alternative strategy through which Australian interests might be 
defended and secured through multilateral institutional arrangements. However, 
Australia can no longer automatically assume its traditional allies will be 'like-
minded'. 
The end of the Cold War and other geopolitical changes has also provided 
opportunities, as well as incentives for more regional multilateral arrangements, 
49 Ross Baggage, 'Australian Foreign Policy: The Security Objectives', in In Pursuit of National 
Interests: Australian Foreign Policy in the 1990s,  Medianslcy, F.A. & Palfreetnan (eds.), Sydney, 
Pergamon Press, 1988. p116. 
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which were previously absent. 5° The significance of the recent geo-political changes 
for Australia is stressed by former Prime Minister, Paul Keating who declares that: 
"For the time being, at least, the role of the great powers in shaping 
the development of the international system is less dominant than it 
otherwise might be. And this, as I said earlier, is happening at the 
very time when we are moulding the institutions and processes and 
ways of resolving problems which will form the pattern of the next 
period in international relations. I think one outcome of this 
situation is that regionalism and regional approaches will come into 
their own as never before."51 
Australia's consciousness of its geography has been reinforced by the United States' 
departure from the Subic Bay naval facility in the Philippines and by the reduction of 
the American military presence in Australia's geographic region with the end of the 
Cold War. In the strategic reassessments that ensued, defence self-reliance has 
become a theme that is stressed and repeated. The Defence White Paper 1994 
reiterates the theme of greater self-reliance and recognises the fact that with the end 
of the Cold War, the United States: 
"will neither seek nor accept primary responsibility for maintaining 
peace and stability in the region, ... [and that] Australia's security 
is not so vital to other nations that we can assume others would 
commit substantial forces to our defence."52 
Thus, there is a sense that regional solutions to regional issues are now required. 
The rapid economic growth in East Asia has also played a part in reinforcing 
Australia's sense of regionalism and has brought the fact that many of the states in 
Australia's region have developed significant new capabilities sharply into focus. 
50  Barrie Axford, The Global System: Economics,Politics and Culture, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996. 
pp I86-190. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Gregory A. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace? Great Power 
Politics in the Twenty-First Century. 
51  Paul Keating, Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1996. pp15-16. 
52 Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994. p8 & p13. 
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Economic development has reduced the level of dependency of many East Asian 
states on foreign aid, and their stronger economies have also led to the modernisation 
of their armed forces and the acquisition of modern weaponry. Thus, while Australia 
currently retains superiority in economic and military capability, it can no longer 
claim the predominance it once possessed. The previously wide disparity in terms of 
power and influence between Australia and its East Asian neighbours has diminished 
considerably. 
There appears to be much greater self-confidence among many of the states in 
Australia's geographic region, with many states assuming a stronger presence in 
international relations. In particular, Indonesia and Malaysia have been outspoken on 
the international stage and they have made a bid for leadership on various 
international causes, especially with respect to the interests of non-aligned states and 
East Asian states. Developments in the South Pacific have also resulted in a stronger 
sense of regionalism from Australia. While the asymmetries between Australia and 
the South Pacific island states remain obvious, the independence of the latter and 
consequently, the possibility that they might ally themselves to powers in 
relationships inimical to Australian interests has been an issue that has prompted 
stronger efforts from Australia to engage the region. These and other issues have 
meant that Australia's region has become significant in and of itself, both in terms of 
what it can contribute to Australian interests, as well as the potential threat that it 
might pose. 
Australia can no longer take its role as a regional great power for granted because the 
countries in its region have become significant factors in and of themselves. In the 
past, most were not regarded as anything more than props in a contest between great 
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powers and certainly incapable of posing a threat or contributing anything significant 
to Australia's security. 53 The relatively low level of development in the countries 
neighbouring Australia during the Cold War, as well as the fact that some mainland 
markets in East Asia were 'closed' to Australian exports, have also meant that 
strategic bilateral relationships made more sense than regional economic cooperation 
at the time. 54 However, rapid economic growth in East Asia, fear of economic 
protectionism organised along regional lines, the end of the Cold War and the 
changing patterns of Australia's overseas trade have overhauled Australia's 
economic relationships with its region. 55 
While region-wide economic institutional arrangements remain embryonic, the end 
of the Cold War and the growing level of development in the region have meant 
greater gains from regional cooperation, including potential rewards from intra-
regional markets and investment opportunities. Sub-regional arrangements, such as 
the economic growth triangle comprising Singapore, Johor and Batam, to exploit 
institutional linkages have become more common. 56 In non-economic areas, the 
ability to defend common political interests in global forums has also been an 
incentive for regional institutions. 57 Thus, there are compelling reasons for Australia 
to position itself strategically and advantageously within regional institutions and to 
play a significant role in setting the agenda for regional multilateral institutional 
53 Joint Intelligence Committee Appreciation 1/47, Melbourne 27 March 1947, Appreciation of 
Certain Aspects of the Strategic Position of Australia, cited in Documents on Australian Foreign 
Policy 1937-49, Volume XII: 1947, W.J. Hudson & Wendy Way (eds.), Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1995. 
54 Miles Kahler, 'Institutional-Building In the Pacific', in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and 
Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, Andrew Mack & John Ravenhill (eds.), St Leonard's, 
Allen & Unwin, 1994. 
55 East Asian Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Business 
Challenge: South-East Asia In The 1990s, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia government, 1992. 
56 It should be noted that the issue of relative gains is also inherent in such arrangements. See Micheal 
Vatikiotis, 'Chip off the block", Far East Economic Review, 7 January 1993, p54. 
57 Joseph A. Camilleri, 'The Asia-Pacific in the Post-Hegemonic World', in Pacific Cooperation:  
Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, Andrew Mack & John 
Ravenhill (eds.), St Leonard's, Allen & Unwin, 1994. p197. 
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arrangements. It is, in part, in recognition of these new geopolitical realities that the 
Labor tradition has moderated its Idealist approach towards international relations. 58 
In principle, universal ideals are still being championed, however, in practice, the 
energy in foreign policy, especially during Evan's tenure, has been focused strongly 
on pragmatic regional initiatives for the development of multilateral institutions. 
Such regional institutional arrangements are seen as the key towards regional 
security and stability. 
A 'flexible' attitude towards such universal causes as human rights has been adopted 
in foreign policy when necessary in order to secure desired outcomes. Australia's 
leadership role in rejecting the Convention Regulating Antarctic Minerals Activity 
and promoting the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty might be cited as 
examples of its international leadership in championing environmental ideals. 
However, Australia's more subtle efforts to establish and reinforce regional 
multilateral initiatives like the Kuala Lumpur Roundtable Conferences and its 
subdued rhetoric with respect to human rights in South East Asia have demonstrated 
a more pragmatic approach to diplomacy. 
Australia's efforts to engage its region were particularly pronounced during Evan's 
tenure as Australia's foreign minister. Evan's regional priorities are clearly stated. 
"The most active, and probably the most distinctive, dimension of 
Australia's diplomacy in recent years has been regional - as we set 
about trying to give systematic content to the idea of an Asia 
Pacific community ... a community, moreover, in which Australia 
is unequivocally seen not as an outsider or bit player, but as an 
accepted, involved, participating partner."59 
58 Mihaly Simai, 'Systemic Changes: Breakup of the Soviet Bloc', in The New Realism: Perspectives 
on Multilateralism and the World Order,  Robert W. Cox (ed.), Tokyo, United Nations University 
Press, 1997. 
141 
Paul Keating reiterates this sentiment, when as Prime Minister, he states: 
"Our somewhat unlikely history and geography should not change 
this fundamental conviction and this irrevocable commitment - that 
Australia is and must always be an integral part of the region 
around us."6° 
During the past decade, Australia has initiated or committed itself to a number of 
regional multilateral institutional arrangements. This represents a strategic 
investment in terms of resources and highlights Australia's determined effort to 
establish a comprehensive institutional and multilateral framework through which it 
can effectively engage its region. In view of the energy and resources committed to 
many of these initiatives, they can not be easily abandoned, not even by advocates of 
a more Conservative approach in foreign policy, especially in light of recent 
geopolitical changes. Instead, many of the established regional multilateral 
institutional arrangements are now generally acknowledged as crucial confidence 
building measures and the building blocks for a more secure regional environment. 
The role that Australia has played in multilateral institutional arrangements within its 
geographic region provides a strong indication of Australia's capacity for influence 
as a middle power. Whereas the Conservative tradition might have had differences 
with the Labor tradition as to the extent to which multilateralism is a useful device 
for maximising Australia's capacity for influence, 61 the relevance of multilateral 
arrangements on issues where Australia's "national interests [were] closely engaged" 
has not been denied. 62 Thus, even if it is only a resigned acceptance of the fact, the 
59 Gareth Evans, 'The Labor Tradition'. p19. 
60 Paul Keating, Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism. pp11-12. 
61 It should be noted that these are differences in 'orientation' and reflect a shift in emphasis, as 
opposed to radical differences in policy and/or the perceptions of national interests. For studies of 
radical shifts and restructuring in foreign policy, see K.J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy 
Restructuring in the Postwar Era, London, Allen & Unwin, 1982. 
62 In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. p47. 
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Conservative orientation in foreign policy has come to acknowledge the stake that 
Australia has in regional multilateral institutional arrangements. 63 However, it has 
been the Labor approach that has been more aggressive in pursuing Australia's 
regional interests through multilateral institutional arrangements. 
"Unlike small powers, which in all circumstances found it 
advantageous to shackle themselves to the foreign policy of a great 
protector, middle powers were said to have most to gain by 
promoting cooperation based around neutral 'rules of the game' - 
and, conversely, most to lose when such principles failed to 
materialize."64 
For the Labor approach, it is in providing intellectual leadership for the "rules of the 
game" and thereby defming the terms under which Australian interests can be best 
served by regional arrangements that Australia's role as a middle power is most 
clearly articulated. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that there are some 
Australian interests that can only be satisfactorily addressed by multilateral 
institutions. An obvious example would be the challenge of regulating activity in and 
around Antarctica. 
In short, notwithstanding the traditional differences between the Conservative and 
the Labor orientations in foreign policy, contemporary Australian diplomacy has 
been characterised by an increasing commitment to regionalism and to regional 
multilateral institutional arrangements. Geopolitical changes resulting in the 
diminution of great power interests in Australia's region, as well as the development 
of regional polities into more significant actors, have forced the reassessment of 
many Conservative premises about Australia's role as a middle power. This has 
resulted in greater convergence between the two foreign policy traditions in 
Australia. 
63 In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper.  p47. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that Australian foreign policy has traditionally been 
guided by two distinct orientations to foreign policy, the Conservative orientation 
and the Labor orientation. The Conservative tradition tends to be premised on 
structuralist perspectives on what a middle power can achieve in international 
relations. As the above discussion has shown, the Conservative approach has 
reservations about what a middle power can achieve unilaterally in international 
relations. Instead, it has emphasised efforts to secure the patronage of a great power 
in order to assuage fears about the vulnerability of Australia's geographic situation. 
Security, which is regarded as the primary interest of a state, is sought through 
strategic alliances with great powers and influence over developments in 
international relations is derived through the same means. In contrast, the Labor 
approach to foreign affairs tends to be premised on process oriented perspectives, 
which suggest that states can defend a variety of interests through multilateral 
institutional arrangements. The Labor approach recognises the importance of the 
bilateral relationships between Australia and its great power allies but emphasise a 
different strategy to achieve influence and to defend regional interests. Thus, while 
the Labor approach has maintained and promoted the strength of Australia's 
relationship with its traditional allies, it has also strongly advocated a leadership role 
for Australia in regional multilateral initiatives. 
64 Richard Leaver and Dave Cox, 'Introduction: the world according to Gar'. p5. 
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There are differing domestic interpretations about the appropriate role for a middle 
power in Australia and how it can best realise its objectives in foreign policy. The 
initiatives adopted by the Conservative and the Labor approaches to foreign policy 
represent different views about the appropriate mechanisms required to defend 
Australia's interests. However, it is argued that the Conservative and the Labor 
orientations on Australian foreign policy have both demonstrated, within their 
policies, an ambition to gain influence in international affairs, Australia's capacity as 
a middle power to achieve such influence successfully and a preoccupation with 
geography. Therefore, in terms of the working definition developed in the previous 
chapter, Australia clearly perceived itself as a middle power with both the ambition 
and the capacity to exercise significant influence in its regional environment. 
- 
This chapter also proposes that Australia has increasingly resorted to the use of 
multilateral institutional arrangements as a means of assuming a role of leadership 
and influence within its geographic region. It argues that over many years the Labor 
tradition in foreign policy has consistently favoured multilateral institutional 
arrangements. It demonstrates that strategic investments in such arrangements, as 
well as recent geo-political changes, have put pressure on adherents to the 
Conservative tradition to reassess their outlook on foreign policy and the importance 
of multilateral institutional arrangements in securing Australian influence within its 
regional environment. Therefore, notwithstanding the differences in domestic 
interpretations of Australia's role as a middle power, there has been some 
convergence in contemporary Australian foreign policy and this is characterised by 
the growing recognition of shared priorities of regionalism and multilateral 
institutional arrangements. 
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The arguments in this and preceding chapters suggest that the physical attributes of a 
state represent a necessary but not a sufficient condition for middle power status. 
Situational factors, including geography, also define the role that a middle power can 
play in international relations. As a middle power, Australia is expected to be able to 
defend general interests within its geographic region. However, Australia finds itself 
in the unique position of being guided by two distinctive foreign policy orientations 
and being situated in a geographic location where it can claim to be a part of four 
distinct geographic locations. Thus, Australia's role as a middle power is 
complicated by the fact that the defence of its regional interests and the consistency 
of its foreign policy are challenged by a variety of situational factors in four distinct 
geographic regions. 
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted Australia's sense of insecurity over its 
own limitations as a middle power, the perception of greater opportunities for 
influence within regional multilateral institutional arrangements, the strategic 
investments made in such arrangements and the geopolitical changes that have 
reduced the efficacy of other options. These factors support the argument that there 
has been a convergence between Australia's two foreign policy orientations and that, 
as a middle power, Australia has been inclined to assume a leadership role and 
influence within its geographic regions and the contemporary state system. Thus, it is 
proposed that an examination of the empirical evidence of Australia's role as a 
middle power in its four regions would reflect its tendency to assume influence 
through regional multilateral institutional arrangements. 
CHAPTER 4 
"The point of greatest relevance to the present inquiry is that 
relationships between ourselves and the Pacific Island states are 
invariably relationships of inequality. The economic gap between 
... Australia ... on the one hand and the economies of the islands 
on the other is the central fact of our mutual relations. ... In neither 
case can the richer power, as an ex-colony itself, comfortably 
accept an imperial role towards its poorer neighbours. In neither 
case can the mutual rights and obligations of the respective peoples 
be satisfactorily understood without recognising the economic 
inequality between them." - Richard Mulgan l 
Introduction 
In the examination of Australia's ambition to exercise significant influence within 
the South Pacific region, Australia's interests within that region are investigated. It is 
revealed that Australia's sense of vulnerability, emanating from the fear that a hostile 
great power may threaten its security through the possession or control of the Pacific 
Islands, has been arguably the most significant factor governing its interests in the 
South Pacific region. The perceived threats to Australian security have ranged from 
past enemies of the British Empire, such as France and Germany, to more recent 
figures of fear in Japan and the Soviet Union. These perceptions of threat have 
underpinned Australia's ambition for a sphere of influence in the South Pacific 
region. In addition to the primary interests that these security issues represent, it is 
argued that Australia is also motivated by other reasons in seeking a role of 
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significant influence within the South Pacific region. This included a sense of 
altruism that began with the interest of a liberal colonial power in the welfare of the 
native peoples of the South Pacific. And which evolved to the sense of responsibility 
or obligation to developing nations that is prerequisite of the 'good international 
citizen' and developed state that Australia has laid claim to being. Therefore, 
Australia's role in the South Pacific region is consistent with that of a middle power 
in that it clearly exhibits both the ambition and the capacity to influence regional 
developments. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the factors affecting Australia's ambition to 
assume a role of significant influence in the South Pacific region. This is followed by 
an analysis of Australia's capacity to achieve its ambition. It is argued that Australia 
is capable of assuming a hegemonic role within the South Pacific region in various 
fashions compatible with the nominal definitions of middle powers described in 
Chapter Two. A review of the South Pacific suggests that Australia's relationship 
with the other states within the region is characterised by a high degree of 
asymmetry, where Australia enjoys an overwhelming superiority in such attributes, 
often cited as indicators of power, as population, economic resources, military 
strength and diplomatic influence. The asymmetric relationship between Australia 
and the Pacific Island states is aggravated by the fact that the latter have difficulty in 
unilaterally meeting all the obligations that are expected of sovereign states and are 
strongly reliant upon foreign aid. It is also proposed that Australia's capacity to 
maintain, through logistical and other support, regional multilateral institutions in the 
South Pacific and its participation in these institutions represents some of the other 
means by which it is able to assume significant influence within the region. 
I Richard G. Mulgan, 'South Pacific People's Rights', in The South Pacific: Problems, Issue and 
Prospects, Ramesh 'Thakur (ed.), London, Macmillan, 1991. p121. 
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A closer scrutiny of Australia's capacity to realise its ambitions for influence, 
including the empirical examples of its efforts to defend its interests, in the South 
Pacific region reveals that the means by which Australia has manifested its influence 
within the region have changed. It is argued that there are three facets, reflecting 
three periods of Australian history and foreign policy, to the primary security issues 
that prompted much of Australia's active involvement in South Pacific affairs. 
The first period that informs the discussion on Australia's ambitions for an 
influential role over developments in the South Pacific and the means that it adopted 
to accomplish this end stretched from the early years following the establishment of 
the Australian Commonwealth to the end of the Second World War. During this 
period, Australia regarded itself as an integral part of the British Empire and sought 
to influence developments though the application of British Imperial power. 
The second period began with the end of the Second World War when growing 
doubts about Great Britain's ability to project itself effectively as a world power saw 
Australia search for other arrangements that would help to defend its strategic 
interests. This is manifested in the ANZAC arrangements wherein Australia, together 
with New Zealand, carved out a regional niche for itself within the context of (what 
was to become) the Western Alliance, where their primacy, in terms of interests and 
influence could be acknowledged. 2 This quest for institutional guarantees within the 
framework of the Western Alliance is also evinced by the strong Australian lobby for 
2 The 'Western Alliance' is a rather vague concept whose membership varies from time to time. In the 
context of Australia's strategic outlook, it may be taken in this thesis to refer to the network of 
security arrangements centred around the United States and the United Kingdom, based on ethnic ties 
and perceptions of common interests. See discussion on 'the Conservative tradition in Australian 
foreign policy' in the previous chapter. 
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a security arrangement with the United States and the eventual agreement they 
reached on the ANZUS treaty, which committed the latter to Australia's region. 
The third period runs concurrently with the second and is the result of decolonisation 
in the South Pacific region. With decolonisation, Australia quickly establish bilateral 
and multilateral ties with the independent Pacific Island states in order to forestall the 
rival influence of other metropolitan states over the former because it was feared that 
this might prove inimical to Australian interests. In particular, concerns about the 
possibility that the Soviet Union might establish a strategic presence in the South 
Pacific during the Cold War prompted Australia to support the creation of regional 
institutions, as well as to defend Australian interests through such regional forums. 
Especially as the appearance of consensus and institutional authority within such 
multilateral regional forums argue against the charge that Australia has treated the 
smaller Pacific Island states in a peremptory fashion. 
The primary impetus driving Australia's ambition to influence developments within 
the South Pacific region demonstrated by these three facets of Australian foreign 
policy have remained consistent. And stems from Australia's desire to defend itself 
and to pre-empt the possibility of any security threat from the region. However, the 
responses to the perception of threat and desire for security have been varied and 
these different approaches shed light on the methods that Australia has deemed most 
effective or desirable in different circumstances. In the South Pacific region, 
Australia has adopted a role that may be described as hegemonic and which is 
consistent with the many of the archetypal expectations (described in the literature 
discussed in previous chapters) of a middle power. Regardless of whether one takes a 
structuralist or process oriented perspective, it is clear that Australia has staked a 
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claim for a leadership role within the South Pacific region. Australia's ability to 
direct regional policies on key issues is demonstrated in the idiosyncratic line 
pursued by Australia on the region's response to nuclear-related issues. Australia was 
able to resist the widespread regional clamour for a ban on all nuclear related 
products or activity in the South Pacific and to redirect those sentiments in order to 
construct a regional treaty that was more in accordance with its own interests. 
Australia's ability to influence developments in the South Pacific region is also again 
revealed in the pivotal role that it played in the regional arrangements on fisheries. In 
this instance, Australia was able to defend its own interests successfully, while 
balancing the needs of the independent Pacific island states against those of its ally, 
the United States. 
Finally, this chapter argues that where structuralist perspectives provided a cogent 
explanation of Australia's earlier influence in the South Pacific region, process 
oriented perspectives have been more useful towards understanding Australia's role 
in the region following the decolonisation of the Pacific Island states. Thus, it is 
proposed that regional multilateral institutional arrangements have been an attractive 
medium of influence for a middle power like Australia, which is reluctant to be seen 
as a bully whose relationship with smaller states is explicitly based on coercion. Such 
arrangements also serve as effective vehicles of influence which enable Australia to 
successfully defend its interests within the South Pacific region and play a role akin 
to that of a regional hegemon. 
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The Pacific Ocean is the world's largest ocean and occupies one-third of the world's 
surface. Geographically, the designation of a South Pacific region  is conventionally 
used in reference to a scattering of small islands states over a broad expense of water 
in the south west corner of the Pacific Ocean and which is populated  by Melanesians, 
Polynesians and Micronesians. 3 
The polities within this region can be differentiated into three groups. The group 
comprising the largest number of these polities is represented by  the independent 
island states within the region. These polities are usually characterised by their small 
3 Richard G. Mulgan, 'South Pacific People's Rights'. p119. 
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populations and limited resource base, and are generally described as `micro-states' 
or `mini-states'. Australia and New Zealand fall within the second group. They are 
distinguished by the fact that they are metropolitan powers situated within the region, 
as well as the fact that the majority of their population is not deemed to be 
indigenous to the region. The third group is represented by the extra-regional powers, 
which maintain a presence within the South Pacific region through their colonies, 
political stewardship of Pacific Island territories or dependencies. These metropolitan 
powers include France, the United Kingdom and the United States. These three 
groups possess different levels of power and interests, and the dynamics of the 
relationship between them has been the dominant theme driving regional 
developments in the South Pacific. 
The islands within the South Pacific region has been the subject of much romantic 
literature, musicals and films, and as such, an impression of the region as a remote 
paradise and sanctuary might have been conveyed to many. History provides a more 
balanced account of colonialism, `blackbirding', disease and the struggles for 
independence. However, in comparison with other regions and other polities, 
violence and power politics have been an infrequent feature of international relations 
in the South Pacific. Certainly, the potential for violent conflict was demonstrated 
during the Second World War when Japan engaged the allied forces in great naval 
and aerial battles over the Pacific. Nevertheless, excepting occasional clashes 
between metropolitan powers within the region, the potential for violent conflict 
among the polities of the South Pacific region has been relatively low. 
Since gaining independence, many of the Pacific Island states have made a 
determined effort to keep the region free from great power conflict. One factor that 
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might have contributed to the relatively low potential for conflict among the polities 
of the South Pacific is the limited resources and military capability of the small 
Pacific Island states. The fact that all the metropolitan powers with a territorial stake 
within the region (since World War Two) have been allied to one another is another 
significant factor. Consequently, other themes have dominated inter-state relations in 
the South Pacific. 
In particular, two themes appeared to have had a strong influence on the discourse of 
politics in the South Pacific region. The first is the desire to exclude any potential 
extra-regional threat to peace and security from the region. The second is the need of 
the independent Pacific Island states to balance their dependence on economic and 
other assistance from metropolitan powers, with the desire to preserve their 
independence in foreign and domestic affairs. It is in the context of this brief review 
of the South Pacific region that Australia's role as a middle power is explored. 
A Middle Power In The South Pacific Region 
Australia's aspirations for a leadership role within the South Pacific region have 
always been open. 4 Australia's efforts to establish itself as a regional hegemon may 
be demonstrated by the history of its efforts to play a decisive role in the South 
Pacific, initially as a colonial power within the region, and subsequently through 
regional multilateral institutional arrangements. 
4Joint Committee On Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations With The South 
Pacific, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989. 
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As a colonial power, Australia signaled its ambitions by seeking to establish and 
extend a British sphere of influence within the South Pacific region (over which 
Australia would presumably have sway). Such regional influence would allow 
Britain, and consequently Australia, to pre-empt the possibility of a threat from 
hostile European powers to a remote dominion like Australia. The notion of a sphere 
of influence was revisited when a combination of British indifference and Australian 
assertiveness saw Australia give voice to its ambitions in post war councils following 
the First World War to demand acknowledgement of the primacy of Australian 
interests in the South Pacific region. In this regard, it is argued that the subsequent 
signing of the ANZAC Agreement and the ANZUS Treaty might be viewed as an 
effort to institutionalise a leading role for Australia in the South Pacific region, as the 
custodian of Western interests. 
The passing of the colonial era saw a change in attitudes towards the region. The 
decolonisation of the Pacific Island states and the advent of the Cold War resulted in 
the perception of a potential threat to Australian and Western interests from a Soviet 
presence in the South Pacific region. There was a fear that the small but independent 
Pacific Island states might succumb to the influence of the Soviet Union. This 
prompted Australia to reinforce its bilateral and multilateral relationships with the 
Pacific Island states. Thus, it is proposed that while Australia has expressed its 
ambitions for a role of significant influence in the South Pacific in various fashions, 
the primary reasons behind these ambitions have been the desire to preserve 
Australia's sovereignty and security, as well as to defend its strategic interests. 
It is also argued that Australia's ambition to assume a role of significant influence in 
the South Pacific region has been motivated by considerations apart from its strategic 
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interests. These include altruism and the determination to be a good international 
citizen by lending the resources and support of a wealthy middle power to small 
developing nations. To some extent, the two underlying motives driving the desire 
for influence, characterised by Idealism in one and Realism in the other, do overlap 
and are complementary. For example, the expression of Australia's interest in being 
a custodian of Western interests in the South Pacific region is compatible with its 
desire to protect the welfare of the native peoples in that region. Similarly, it may be 
said that Australia's efforts to play a leading role in establishing multilateral 
institutional arrangements for the South Pacific region is prompted both by Realist 
desires and Idealistic values. The former to buttress the capacity of the Pacific Island 
states to resist the real or imagined blandishments of rival powers (that might be 
deemed a threat to Australian interests). And the latter from a genuine desire to assist 
the small island states in overcome the limits of their size and limited resources. 
The nature of Australia's ambitions and its endeavour to exercise influence over 
developments in the South Pacific region are reviewed in the next section of the 
chapter. It begins by discussing Australia's sense of vulnerability as a remote British 
dominion and how it has responded to its anxiety by seeking to establish influence 
over the South Pacific region. The initiatives by Australia to exercise decisive 
influence over the South Pacific region are divided into three phases and discussed in 
terms of the different approaches adopted in each. Australia's other interests, not 
related to security, in the South Pacific region are also examined and it is suggested 
that the sincerity of Australia's altruistic declarations or actions can be difficult to 
determine. Nevertheless, these may represent additional reasons for Australia's 
active role in the region. Therefore, it is concluded that for the reasons briefly cited 
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above, Australia has demonstrated the ambition to assume a role of significant 
influence over developments in the South Pacific region. 
'Hands Off' - The Imperial Mindset 
As a British dominion in the antipodes, Australia has always felt a sense of 
vulnerability because of its geography. In particular, this sense of insecurity has 
manifested itself in periodic outbursts of xenophobia and fear, especially when 
traditional foes of the British Empire (Dutch, German or French) are espied 
anywhere in the region around the vicinity of the Australian subcontinent. Indeed, it 
could be argued that the nascent advocacy of 'strategic denial' - a concept that was to 
have great significance in later years - dated back to the beginning of the Australian 
Federation. In a speech to the House of Representatives in 1901, Mr R.A. Crouch of 
the Protectionist Party proclaimed: 
"But I think we might even now establish a Monroe doctrine for the 
Pacific. ... We are for the first time rising to the heights of 
nationhood. We meet here as the representative House of the 
Australian nation. I should like the Ministry to at once establish the 
principle of 'hands off in regard to all islands of the Pacific within 
a thousand miles of the Australian coast; that is they should be 
declared to be Australian territory within the jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth; that is having due regard, of course, to present 
rights. We should lay it down that we will allow no other 
entrenchments upon those islands of the Pacific, which are, I think, 
proper appendages to this Commonwealth." 5 
Similar sentiments were echoed by the Bulletin (Sydney) in 1904: 
5 Extract from a speech by Mr. R. A. Crouch (Protectionist) in the House of Representatives, 21 May 
1901, C.P.D., Vol. I, 1901-2, pp87-88, reproduced in Gordon Greenwood & Charles Grimshaw, 
Documents on Australian International Affairs 1901-1918, London, Nelson, 1977. p455. 
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"There is a certain natural and pardonable pride evoked by the idea, 
now current, of a 'Monroe doctrine' for Australia. That Australians 
should claim as their dominion, not only the continent, but all the 
islands of Oceania, is a large and magnificent notion which 
irresistibly appeals to the imagination. There is something 
fascinating about the prospect of crying 'hands off' to the rest of 
the world, and flaunting our flag from the west of South America to 
the east of Australia. ... The Australian Government is being 
strongly urged to shudder at the prospect of the New Hebrides 
becoming a French possession, and to take steps to prevent so 
woeful an event."6 
Thus, Australia had declared a proprietary interest in the South Pacific region, with 
the primary intention of forestalling the presence of any potentially hostile powers in 
that region, since the earliest days of Federation.' While Australia clearly regarded 
itself as an integral part of the British Empire at that time, its self-identity as a 
distinct polity was equally obvious. As a well-defined polity, Australia's efforts to 
establish a sphere of influence in the Pacific were largely oriented towards putting 
pressure on the British government, especially its Foreign Office and its Admiralty 
and War Office, to establish and extend British Imperial influence over the South 
Pacific region. The extension of British influence within the South Pacific was 
regarded as the enlargement of Australia's own influence because Australia is a 
British dominion and was the overseer of Imperial interests in its region. 
It was clear that Australia had different ideas from the 'Mother Country' about the 
stewardship of the South Pacific region. There were occasions when a combination 
of fear and frustration led Australia to take defence and diplomatic initiatives on its 
6 It should be noted that the author of the article did interject with the opinion that "If in the 
meanwhile European powers establish themselves in Oceania there is no ground for protest, no need 
for alarm. We can not take up a dog-in-the-manger attitude of keeping others off what we cannot use 
ourselves [but] The establishment of an Asiatic power in Oceania would be a different matter. Against 
that, if it were proposed, the Commonwealth might with sense and reason direct its energies." In other 
words, a 'hands-off policy is still advocated, albeit with a racial focus. 'An Australian Monroe 
Doctrine' in Bulletin (Sydney), 1 September 1904, reproduced in Gordon Greenwood & Charles 
Grimshaw, Documents on Australian International Affairs 1901-1918, London, Nelson, 1977. p461- 
462. 
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own cognisance. 8 The 'independent' line pursued by Australia and the priority that it 
placed on developments within its own geographic region was apparent from the 
beginning. The nature of Australia's dissatisfaction with Great Britain is revealed in 
Deakin's speech at the colonial conference of 1907, where he complains that: 
"But for the action of Australia and New Zealand, there would not 
be an island to-day in the Pacific under the British flag. ... 
Whatever losses there are in the Pacific ... have been due to neglect 
here [in Britain]. Every single gain has been due to pressure from 
Australia and New Zealand." 9 
Australia's attitude towards external affairs was strongly determined by geo-political 
conditions, particularly those affecting its region.' ° In contrast, as a Great Power, 
Great Britain had broader global interests that were often given priority over the local 
concerns of remote regions. Neville Meaney explains: 
"Australians resented the attempts by foreign powers to acquire 
island empires in the South Pacific. They saw them as bases from 
which attacks could be launched against the Australian mainland 
and commerce, as unwarranted intermeddling in their own sphere 
of interests. The British government could not understand how 
islands up to a thousand or so miles from Australian shores could 
be regarded as a menace to the colonies. They refused to 
complicate their international posture by pressing Australian 
claims."' I 
In contrast, Australia's sense of vulnerability, largely due to its geographic distance 
from Britain and the other bastions of British power, and its desire for security, 
weighed heavily on its mind. Australia's preoccupation with regional interests is 
7 Neville Meaney, The Search For Security In The Pacific 1901-14, Volume 1, A History of 
Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1901-23, Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1976. p9. 
8 Neville Meaney, The Search For Security In The Pacific 1901-14, Volume 1, A I-Liston , of 
Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1901-23. pp8-9. 
9 Extract from a speech by the Prime Minister of Australia (Mr Alfred Deakin), 9 May 1907, at the 
Colonial Conference of 1907, C.P.P., 1907-9, Vol. III: 'Colonial Conference, 1907. Minutes of 
Proceedings', pp. 548-550, reproduced in Gordon Greenwood & Charles Grimshaw, Documents on 
Australian International Affairs 1901-1918, London, Nelson, 1977. p458. 
1° Neville Meaney, The Search For Security In The Pacific 1901-14, Volume 1, A History of 
Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1901-23. p9. 
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revealing, in terms of the interests that preoccupy the foreign policy of a medium 
sized polity. Notwithstanding the fact that Australians had seen themselves as British 
subjects in a British dominion, their priorities reflected their interests as a medium 
sized polity, as opposed to those of the great power that was their 'mother country'. 
The difference in the priorities that guided Australian and British perceptions of 
strategic interests was a factor that contributed to Australia's nascent sense of 
nationalism. Australia's disappointment with what appeared to be apathy from Great 
Britain eventually led to a more independent line in external affairs. 
In 1914, on the outbreak of World War I, Australia and Japan moved to capture 
German colonies in the Pacific. Australia occupied and planted the British flag on 
German New Guinea in September 1914. 12 While Australia was also concerned 
about the Japanese expansion in the South Pacific, it "reluctantly acquiesced to the 
presence of the Japanese in its region under British pressure". I3 After the defeat of 
Germany, Australia was able to extend its influence over the region when it fought 
for when it received the mandate, at the post war councils, to administer the German 
colonies of New Guinea and Nauru." By securing responsibility for the 
administration of the Pacific Islands south of the equator, Australia acted in its own 
capacity as a middle power to exclude all powers that could be deemed a threat to its 
interests. In this instance, these powers included Germany, against whom Australia 
" Neville Meaney, The Search For Security In The Pacific 1901-14, Volume 1, A History of 
Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1901-23.  p9. 
12 Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study Of Australian American Relations Between 
1900 and 1975, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1987. p23. 
13 Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study Of Australian American Relations Between 
1900 and 1975. pp23-24. 
14 Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study Of Australian American Relations Between 
1900 and 1975. pp31-33. 
160 
had just concluded a war, and Japan, which managed to secure the mandate for 
administering the Pacific Islands north of the equator. 15 
Australian diplomacy following the conclusion of the First World War reflected the 
classic strategy of a middle power in international relations. First, Australia 
successfully claimed direct representation at the Peace Conference at Versailles, not 
withstanding Woodrow Wilsons' initial resistance to this. Second, Australia played a 
minor role in most of the Conference but adopted an aggressive and prominent role 
in select areas of interests such as the disposition of the German colonies, racial 
equality and reparations. Third, Australia adopted a position at the conference that 
reflected its special concern regarding the impact of the proceedings on its regional 
interests. 
Australia's determination to enforce a 'Monroe Doctrine' in its region of the Pacific 
in order to assuage its own anxieties about security could be seen in Hughes address 
to the Council of Ten. The report of the Council of Ten records: 
"The Pacific was not only greater than any other sea, it was a world 
in itself to which the construction of the Panama Canal had given 
importance. Strategically the Pacific Islands encompassed Australia 
like fortresses. New Guinea was the largest island in the whole 
world, save Australia itself, and was only 82 miles from the 
mainland. South-east of it was a string of islands suitable for 
coaling and submarine bases, from which Australia could be 
attacked. ... If there were at the very door of Australia a potential 
or actual enemy, Australia could not feel safe. The islands were as 
necessary to Australia as water to a city. If they were in the hands 
of a superior power there would be no peace for Australia." 16 
15 Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study Of Australian American Relations Between 
1900 and 1975. pp23-38. 
16 Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study Of Australian American Relations Between 
1900 and 1975. p30. 
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The stratagems adopted by Australia to establish the South Pacific region as a special 
sphere of Australian influence, which led eventually to its stewardship of New 
Guinea, were symptomatic of a theme that would be repeated. While Australia's 
regional interests were often not shared by its great power patrons, Australia still had 
sufficient capacity, as a middle power, to manifest its influence within the South 
Pacific, so long as it had the acquiescence of the former. Australia's growing 
assertiveness with respect to its interests in the South Pacific region demonstrated an 
increasing preparedness to assume greater responsibility and a larger role in the 
South Pacific region and heralded a significant transition in its attitude towards the 
region. 
The Domain Of A 'Loyal Lieutenant' 
Towards the end of the Second World War, Australia began to take a more direct 
role in the management of its region. During the Second World War, Australia had 
resented and protested many of the decisions by its Great Power allies." The 
differences over priorities between Australia and Great Britain, as well as the passing 
of British Imperial power which culminated in the decision to withdraw from British 
interests 'East of Suez', led Australia to the conclusion that it had to play a more 
prominent role in its region's affairs. And this found expression in the Australia-New 
Zealand Agreement of 1944 or ANZAC pact. 
The ANZAC pact represented an institutional arrangement between Australia and 
New Zealand to defend their mutual interests within a strategic zone that included the 
17 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study In Australian Foreign Policy. pp21-43. 
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South Pacific region." This signalled Australia's intent to carve out a regional niche 
representing a sphere of influence wherein the primacy of Australian interests is 
recognised and defended, 19 and the ANZAC pact has been described as "the first 
serious attempt at middlepowermanship by Australia, an exercise in regional 
consultation."2° Paragraph 13 of the ANZAC pact states: 
"The two governments agree that, within the framework of a 
general system of world security, a regional zone of defence 
comprising the South-west and South Pacific areas shall be 
established and that this zone should be based on Australia and 
New Zealand, stretching through the arc of islands north and north-
east of Australia to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands." 
In other words, Australia and New Zealand sought to shift the responsibility for 
decision-making by the Allied Powers on matters pertaining to the Pacific from 
London and Washington to Canberra and Wellington. One of the goals of the 
ANZAC Pact is to enable Australia and New Zealand to secure preponderant 
influence over the South Pacific region. The Pact challenged the American 
assumption that the defence of the South Pacific region should revolved around Pearl 
Harbor.21 
Australia's ambitions for hegemonic influence within the South Pacific region have 
been realised by the fact that its own capabilities, coupled with the concurrence of its 
great power allies, have enabled it to act in a manner akin to a great power. As 
mentioned earlier, notwithstanding some irritation, Australia's great power allies 
have largely indulged its ambitions in the South Pacific in the Post War councils 
18  T.B. Millar, Australia In Peace and War, External Relations Since 1788, second edition, Botany, 
Maxwell Macmillan, 1991. p278. 
19  Alan & Robin Burnett, The Australia and New Zealand Nexus, Canberra, Australian Institute of 
International Affairs, 1978. p59. 
2°  Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study Of Australian American Relations Between  
1900 and 1975. p129. 
21  Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of International Relations 
1941/1968, London, Oxford University Press, 1969. p36. 
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following both World Wars. The sacrifices made by Australia in two World Wars 
have won it some degree of privileged consideration in the councils of its great 
power allies.22 Moreover, with the end of the Second World War, all the remaining 
metropolitan powers with a territorial presence in the South Pacific region found 
themselves joined in alliance with one another, thereby reducing the potential for 
conflict within the region. And as the primary interests of these metropolitan powers 
lay elsewhere, whereas those of Australia (and New Zealand) lay within the South 
Pacific region, they offered limited resistance when Australia claimed a leadership 
role with regard to security and other issues in the South Pacific region. 
Australia's ambitions for a role equivalent to that of a hegemon in the South Pacific 
region have not been matched by faith in its own capabilities to defend itself or its 
regional interests against an aggressive extra-regional great power. The nature of the 
ANZAC pact, which called for an arrangement "within the framework of a general 
system of world security", reveals that while Australia is eager to assume a leading 
role, it is not prepared to accept unilateral responsibility for regional security. 
Australia has doubts about its own capability to defend its interests within the region 
against extra-regional powers. In particular, during the Cold War, Australia was 
concerned about a threat from the Soviet Union, which had emerged as a global 
power along with the United States following the Second World War. 23 
22Another significant consideration that influenced Australia's great power allies is Australia's 
standing within the region among the Pacific Island states, and its influence over the latter. These 
factors are examined in greater detail later in this chapter as the issues that will be explored overlap 
with the subsequent discussion on the nature of Australia's relationship with the independent Pacific 
Island states and are more appropriately covered there. 
23 Joint Intelligence Committee Appreciation 1/47, Melbourne 27 March 1947, 'Appreciation of 
Certain Aspects of the Strategic Position of Australia', reproduced in Documents on Australian  
Foreign Policy 1937-49, Volume XII: 1947, W.J. Hudson & Wendy Way (eds.), Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1995. pp277-278. 
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Australia has had to reconcile its desire for preponderant influence within the South 
Pacific region with the recognition of its own limitations, especially if it were to be 
confronted by an aggressive extra-regional great power. Thus, Australia sees itself as 
the 'loyal lieutenant' of the Western Alliance, one that would 'hold the fort until the 
cavalry arrived', in the event of a conflict within Australia's region. 24 To ensure that 
the 'cavalry' does have an interest in showing up when required, Australia also 
lobbied strongly for an institutional arrangement that would commit the military 
forces of the United States, which it recognised as a 'great and powerful friend', to 
Australia's region. Towards that end, Australia sought to establish itself (and New 
Zealand) as a 'Main Support Area' for its great power allies, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 25 
Australia had initially sought to commit the United States to participation in 'an 
overall defence arrangement' for the Western Pacific after the latter had expressed an 
interest in 1946 to maintain a military base at Manus over which Australia had 
jurisdiction.26 However, that attempt failed. 27 As with Great Britain in an earlier 
period, Australia has to confront the fact that the United States is a great power and 
that the South Pacific represented but one of its many global interests. It was not 
until 1951 that the United States filially agreed to a formal 'regional' security pact in 
the Pacific with Australia and New Zealand. 28 In securing the ANZUS Treaty, 
Australia again manifested the characteristics of a middle power. As it did previously 
in the post war councils following the First World War, Australia demonstrated its 
24  'An Appreciation By The Chief Of Staff Of The Strategic Position Of Australia', September 1947, 
extracts reproduced in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, Volume XII: 1947, W.J. 
Hudson & Wendy Way (eds.), Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995. pp292-294 
25  'An Appreciation By The Chief Of Staff Of The Strategic Position Of Australia'. pp296-297. 
26  Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of International Relations 
1941/1968. p54. 
27  Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of International Relations 
1941/1968. pp53-61. 
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ability to lobby strongly and successfully for the ANZUS Treaty and again 
highlighted the fact that, as a middle power, its interests could not be easily 
ignored.29 Thus, Australia was able to press its demands for the ANZUS treaty, in the 
face of American reluctance, in exchange for its acquiescence to America's wish to 
offer generous peace terms for Japan in the Post World War II settlements. 3° To 
some Australian eyes, 31 the ANZUS Treaty represented a formal commitment of 
American military assistance to Australia in the event of a military threat to the latter, 
as well as an institutional security arrangement that protected the geographic region 
surrounding Australia. 32 
Decolonisation And The Cold War 
The preceding arguments highlighted two distinctive periods with regard to 
Australia's role in the South Pacific region. In both, Australia claimed a high degree 
of national interests in the South Pacific region. In the first, Australia was a member 
of the British Empire and its interests were the most directly engaged by 
developments in the South Pacific region. In the second, Australia was a middle 
power and a member of the Western Alliance, and it perceived its interests as being 
best defended by regional security arrangements that were integrated within a global 
security framework. In both these instances, Australia's role and claim to influence 
in the South Pacific region have been based on its relationship with extra-regional 
28 Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of International Relations 
1941/1968. pp107-125. 
29For a detailed study of Australia's efforts to secure the ANZUS Treaty, see Coral Bell, Dependent 
Ally: A Study In Australian Foreign Policy. 
3° Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study In Australian Foreign Policy. p49. 
31 The US might have a different interpretation of ANZUS. The US could read its obligation "to 
consult" with Australia, in the event of an attack on the latter, literally, as opposed to a commitment to 
come to its defence. 
166 
powers, especially metropolitan powers with territorial possessions within the region. 
Indeed, as the entire South Pacific region was subject to colonial influence at the 
time, Australia had to engaged the metropolitan powers within the South Pacific 
region and to account for their interests in order to achieve its own ambitions. 
The decolonisation of the Pacific Island states following the end of the Second World 
War and the advent of the Cold War redirected the focus of Australian diplomacy in 
the South Pacific region. The independence of the Pacific Island states meant the 
emergence of new polities that Australia had to engage if it desired to retain a 
significant role within the region and the Cold War lent urgency to Australia's 
ambition for regional influence. In its efforts to address these issues, Australia had to 
reconcile two different roles. The first is Australia's ability to continue in its role as a 
'loyal lieutenant' of the Western Alliance, one that is capable of defending the 
interests of its allies as well as its own, within the South Pacific region. The second is 
Australia's ability to engage the newly independent Pacific Island states, as juridical 
peers, without sacrificing its leadership role or its capacity to exercise influence over 
developments within the South Pacific region. While these two roles are not 
necessarily incompatible, there have been many instances where they conflict. 
Australia's capacity to resolve the tension between these two roles has been a critical 
factor in its success as an effective middle power in the South Pacific region. 
In respect of Australia's ambition to represent Western interests in the South Pacific 
region, there has been little change following decolonisation. While the 
decolonisation of the Pacific Island states introduced 'new' actors to the South 
Pacific region that Australia had to engage, this did not diminish Australian 
32 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study In Australian Foreign Policy.  p52. 
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ambitions for significant influence over regional developments or its claims to a 
leadership role in the region. Indeed, it can be argued that the independence of the 
Pacific Island states reinforced Australia's claim to a sphere of influence in the South 
Pacific region. And that the high degree of asymmetry in power between the 
independent Pacific Island states and Australia allowed the latter to perpetuate its 
role as a 'loyal lieutenant' of the Western Alliance within the region more 
effectively. 
Australia might have been less successful in maintaining a dominant role in the 
South Pacific region if not for fact that, as a middle power, it is able to inspire the 
confidence of its allies in its ability to defend their interests within the region, as well 
as its own. As a wealthy middle power in a region comprising small and relatively 
weak states, confidence in Australia's capacity for influence in the South Pacific may 
be founded on several factors. These include the vast disparity in terms of power 
between Australia and its Pacific Island neighbours, the considerable amount of 
bilateral aid that Australia provides to the independent states in the region, and the 
financial assistance and other support that Australia gives to regional institutions in 
the South Pacific. While Australia's role, with respect to the Pacific Island states is 
examined in greater detail later in this chapter, a brief review here helps to clarify the 
willingness of Australia's more powerful allies to recognise Australia's special 
influence over the South Pacific region. 
From a structuralist perspective, Australia may be perceived as a regional hegemon. 
The asymmetries of power between Australia and the other states in the South Pacific 
region are obvious. Australia's population is three times greater than the combined 
population of the independent Pacific Island states, which is estimated to be around 6 
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million people. 33 Australia is a wealthy developed nation with abundant natural 
resources. In contrast, economic self-sufficiency, as modern independent states, has 
always been a serious issue confronting most of the Pacific Island states. The average 
per capita income of the Pacific Islanders is around US$1,000/-, and ranges from 
US$7,000/- on the phosphate rich island of Nauru to US$700/- on Kiribati and 
Tuvalu. 34 Australia also possesses military resources superior to all the independent 
Pacific Island states combined. Of the independent Pacific Island states, only Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu maintained military or para-military 
forces. 35 Fiji has about 5,000 men under arms, Papua New Guinea has 3,000, 
Vanuatu has 300, and Tonga has 200. 36 Thus, there is ample justification, at least 
from a structuralist perspective, to assume that Australia is well able to defend the 
interests of its allies as well as its own within the South Pacific region. 
In terms of security related interests, the independent Pacific Islands states have 
never been considered a military threat to a middle power like Australia. 37 Indeed, 
the independent Pacific Island states have come to depend on Australia for assistance 
in aerial and maritime surveillance of their sovereign jurisdiction. A example of this 
is the Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement 
in the South Pacific Region, which represents an institutional arrangement whereby 
Australia furnishes the Pacific Island states with the capacity to conduct maritime 
surveillance and other crucial policing functions within their territorial waters. 38 This 
is a capacity that some Pacific Island states might not have otherwise possessed 
33 Europa Yearbook 1997. 
34 Europa Yearbook 1997. 
35 Henry S. Albinski, Robert C. Kiste, Richard Herr, Ross Babbage, & Denis McLean, The South 
Pacific: Political, Economic, and Military Trends, Special Report 1989, Washington, Brassey's (US), 
Inc., 1989. pviii. 
36 Europa Yearbook 1997. 
37 'Joint Intelligence Committee Appreciation 1/47'. pp277-278. 
38 See Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South  
Pacific Region, Done at Honiara, 9 July 1992. 
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without Australian funding and assistance in providing 6 naval patrol boats, along 
with expert advisors, technical support and training. 
Australia also exercises considerable influence in the region through its economic 
relationship with the independent Pacific Island states and provides preferential 
access to South Pacific exports under the South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA). In 1991-2, Australia exported 
A$4,383 million to the South Pacific Forum countries, while importing A$3,527.8 
million. 39 Another significant issue pertaining to trade between Australia and the 
independent Pacific Island states is spelled out by Australia's Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in a report, which states: 
"Australia has had extensive commercial contacts with the South 
Pacific for over a century, with Australian companies trading and 
investing widely in the region. Australia, by virtue of its size, 
proximity, resources and development, is of major economic 
significance [to the Pacific Island states]. However, from 
Australia's point of view, trade with the region is a comparatively 
small proportion of Australia's total trade."4  
While there is no suggestion of compulsion, the nature of the long-established 
economic relationship between some Pacific Island states and Australia is such that it 
has become akin to 'structural dependence' on the much larger Australian 
economy. 41  This is partly a consequence of the historical links between Australia and 
the Pacific Island states, where Australian investment, especially in the civil aviation 
infrastructure within the South Pacific, has linked many South Pacific economies to 
39 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 1992-93, Canberra, Australia Government 
Publishing, 1994. p61 
4° Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations With The South  
Pacific. p34. 
41 Greg Johannes, An Isolated Debating Society: Australia In Southeast Asia And The South Pacific, 
Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1992. p8. 
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Australia's.42 Therefore, in view of its significant role with respect to the security of, 
as well as the economies within, the South Pacific region, Australia may be regarded 
as being well placed to protect the interests of its allies as well as its own. Thus, 
Australia's ambition to play a direct role in establishing a sphere of influence for 
itself (within the context of the security arrangements under the rubric of the Western 
Alliance) did not end with decolonisation in the South Pacific region. Instead, 
Australia's leadership role has simply been manifested differently as a consequence 
of the need to engage independent states, as opposed to colonies, within the South 
Pacific region. 
Decolonisation altered many of Australia's previous assumptions about the South 
Pacific region and the independence of the Pacific Island states introduced new 
issues and revived old fears that had to be addressed. While the South Pacific region 
might have, in the brief period following the end of the Second World War, been 
considered a Western lake, that assumption could no longer be taken for granted with 
the independence of the Pacific Island states and their assertion of sovereignty over 
those waters. The Cold War introduced a new adversary in the Soviet Union and the 
vulnerability of the small but independent Pacific Island states to the influence of the 
former reawakened Australian (and American) fears that the South Pacific region 
might once again represent a security threat. 
The independence of a growing number of Pacific Island states from the 1970s 
initiated a change in the manner in which Australia expressed its interests in the 
South Pacific region. The depiction of the South Pacific as a region where Australia 
acted as an overt hegemon with responsibilities for 'native peoples' underwent a 
42  Greg Johannes, An Isolated Debating Society: Australia In Southeast Asia And The South Pacific. 
p8. 
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radical transformation in terms of mindset and language. Instead, Australia began to 
describe and perceive its relationship with the independent Pacific Island states as 
'comprehensive engagement', according the latter the respect due to sovereign states, 
even they were not its equal in power.43 However, the perception of the South Pacific 
as a region of vital strategic significance to Australia and the need to 'deny' the 
region to potentially hostile powers remained unchanged as the guiding principles of 
Australian policy. An abiding concern about minor powers, like the Pacific Island 
states, is the fear that: 
"...their physical and economic vulnerability, together with the fact 
that they are often strategically located in the Caribbean, Indian and 
Pacific Oceans, [might be regarded as] a standing invitation to 
outside intervention and thus a threat to 'global security'." 44 
In particular, Australia (and the United States) had been anxious about the 
vulnerability of the Pacific Islands states and their susceptibility to Soviet influence 
during the Cold War. There was concern that the Soviet Union might be able to gain 
access to a Pacific Island base and secure a foothold in a strategic position within the 
South Pacific region from which it could threaten Australian (and Western) interests. 
Australia has always been apprehensive about the fact that the islands belonging to 
its South Pacific neighbours may be used as a platform for an attack on Australia by 
a hostile major power. Ramesh Thakur explains: 
"The Pacific islands could be used as stepping stones for an 
invasion of Australia from the northern and northeastern 
approaches to the continent. The country's security interests are 
therefore most directly engaged in the island states of Melanesia. 
But Australia, in partnership with its US ally, also has a vital 
43 See Gareth Evans, Australia's Regional Security, Ministerial Statement by Senator the Hon. Gareth 
Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1989. 
44 G.R. Berridge, International Politics: States, Power & Conflict Since 1945, Third Edition, New 
York, Prentice Hall, 1997. p19. 
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interest in securing the long and exposed sea and air lanes of 
communication across the Pacific vastness. This is obviously 
important for Australia's commercial interests as well. The most 
important security goal for Australia and New Zealand in the South 
Pacific has been the strategic denial of the region to the Soviet 
Union."45 
The memories of Japan's ability to threaten the security of the Australian continent 
from Pacific Island bases during the Second World War also lingered in the minds of 
many strategic planners. 46 Consequently, Australia is strongly mindful of the need to 
prevent control of or access to naval facilities on any of the Pacific Island states by a 
hostile power that might threaten Australian interests. The need to keep the lines of 
communication between Australia and the United States safe and secure is also of 
paramount importance.47 Towards these ends, Australia advocated a policy of 
'strategic denial'.48 However, the challenge for Australia in keeping the South Pacific 
a 'Western lake' is the fact that it can no longer declare "hands off" as if it were still 
a colonial overlord. Instead, Australia has to woo the independent Pacific Island 
states into accommodating its interests. 
Australia As A Great And Powerful Friend 
Australia's effectiveness as a middle power in the South Pacific region should be 
understood in the context of the geopolitical factors peculiar to the region where 
45 Ramesh Thalcur (ed.), The South Pacific: Problems, Issue and Prospects, London, Macmillan, 1991. 
p20 
46 Gary Smith, m Micronesia: Decolonialisation and US Military Interests in the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, Canberra, Australian National University, 1991. p16. 
47 Jim Sanday, South Pacific Culture and Politics: Notes on Current Issues, working paper no. 174, 
Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1988. p14. 
48 Richard A. Herr, 'The Soviet Union in the South Pacific,' in The Soviet Union as an Asian Power:  
Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok Initiative, Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), 
Melbourne, Macmillan, 1987. The policy of 'strategic denial' has also been described by critics as 
'strategic neocolonialism' — see Peter King, 'Redefining South Pacific Security: Greening and 
Domestic', in The South Pacific: Problems, Issue and Prospects, Ramesh Thakur (ed.), London, 
Macmillan, 1991. p48. 
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asymmetries of power allow Australia to assume a role akin to that of a great power 
among much smaller states.49 As a middle power, Australia is able to pursue a 
strategy to inspire loyalty among the independent Pacific Island states towards itself; 
as well as to initiate and support regional arrangements within which it can assume a 
role as the dominant partner. Australia's capacity to accomplish both these goals 
successfully has been the measure of its effectiveness as a middle power in the South 
Pacific region. 
Australia's role as a great and powerful friend to the region is premised upon the 
relative weakness of the Pacific Island states and the limitations that the latter must 
confront in meeting the obligations of a modern sovereign state. As briefly alluded to 
earlier, the independent Pacific Island possess limited resources and the disparity 
between their means and their obligations as sovereign states is nowhere more 
evident than in the example of maritime jurisdiction. The extent of the challenges 
confronting the independent Pacific Island states may be illustrated by the impact of 
the United Nations Law of the Sea on the former. Article 56 of the Law of the Sea 
states that: 
I. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or 
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-
bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds. 
The principle of extending sovereign jurisdiction over land to include adjacent seas; 
first as international customary law during the negotiation of the Law of the Sea; and 
subsequently as international law when the Law of the Sea Convention came into 
49 See discussions in Chapter 2 on Structural Perspectives of Middle Powers. 
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"In contrast to lilliputian land areas, the Pacific islands' exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) blanket 11.6 million square miles of the 
Pacific. One of the smallest states, Kiribati, has an EEZ equal in 
size to all of Western Europe." 53 
To meet the obligations of a coastal state as required under the terms of the Law of 
the Sea would stretch the resources of the Pacific Island states. Indeed, many of them 
might have difficulty simply exploiting the sovereign rights to the maritime claims 
that they are entitled to — profitably. The jurisdiction over these new maritime 
territories, including the sovereign rights to marine resources in the 200 nm 
Exclusive Economic Zone, comes with burdensome obligations for the Pacific Island 
states. This includes the responsibility to preserve and protect the marine 
environment, and to conserve marine species. 54 Such responsibilities require 
substantial resources to fulfil and it would be beyond the capability of many Pacific 
Island states, characterised by small populations and geographic isolation, to meet 
these obligations unilaterally. 
The gap between the capabilities of the Pacific Islands and their obligations as 
sovereign states provides an opportunity for Australia to play a significant role as a 
middle power in the South Pacific region. The independence of the Pacific Island 
states and their assumption of sovereignty over waters that were hitherto regarded as 
a 'Western Lake' became a matter of strong interest to Australia. In the words of the 
Australian Foreign Affairs Record: 
52 It should be noted that the many of the figures for population and GNP are forward estimates and 
should be treated as an approximation. 
53 John C. Dorrance, The United States and the Pacific Islands,  Westport, Praeger, 1992. p6. 
54 Edward P. Wolters, 'The Law of the Sea and Security in the South Pacific', Maritime Studies, 77, 
July/August 1994, pp22-29. See also United Nations Law of the Sea, Articles 24, 25, 56, and 61, 
pertaining to some of the primary responsibilities of a sovereign state with respect to its territorial sea 
and exclusive economic zone. 
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CC
... from a map in which the great spaces of the ocean were 
separated or differentiated by tiny points of land with names 
attached to them, you suddenly had a map where huge areas of the 
earth's surface were marked off as areas of claim or potential 
sovereign claim by political entities most of which were virtually 
unknown to the outside world. It was a most striking 
transformation. And it seemed to all of us contemplating that 
transformation that this was something that was going to change 
not only the resources and sovereignty map of the South Pacific but 
was going to change its political importance and its strategic 
importance to us."55 
To appreciate Australia's interests with respect to the independent Pacific Island 
states and the subsequent discussion, two factors guiding its role should be 
highlighted. Australia's desire to play a role in assisting the independent Pacific 
Island states with their obligations is consistent with the recurrent theme in its 
proprietary attitude towards its immediate geographic region, which was first 
expressed as 'hands off' and more recently reincarnated as 'strategic denial'. This 
infers a mindset which takes the view that if any state is going to play a role in 
assisting with the development or obligations of the Pacific Island states and thereby 
derive influence through any ensuing feelings of gratitude or loyalty, then that state 
should be Australia. 
A concurrent theme in Australia's relationship with its less developed neighbours in 
the South Pacific region is a growing sense of its responsibilities as a rich developed 
nation and a good international citizen. This has been manifested in terms of bilateral 
support for the Pacific Island states and strong support for multilateral regional 
institutions for altruistic reasons as well as to defend more self-serving national 
interests. 
55 'Partners, Friends and Allies: Australia and the Pacific,' in Australian Foreign Affairs Record 56, 
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General Characteristics Of Australia's Bilateral Relations With The Pacific Island 
States 
The comprehensive extent and depth of Australia's bilateral relations with the 
independent Pacific Island states is one of the significant aspects of its foreign policy 
towards the South Pacific region. Australia maintains a formal diplomatic presence 
in every independent Pacific Island state. Australia's strong presence in a region that 
is geographically remote from major political and economic hubs argues an ardent 
commitment on its part to the region and reinforces its role as a surrogate for the 
other Western powers, which maintain a less active diplomatic presence. 
Australia's strong presence within the region also enables some Pacific Island states, 
which lack the resources to maintain a diplomatic establishment in Canberra, to have 
regular access to the Australian government, as well as serve as an intermediary 
between them and other states. Australia's 'constructive commitment' to the Pacific 
Island states is premised upon the belief that: 
"As relations between Australia and the region become 
increasingly complex, it will be very important for Australia to 
have in place people with some understanding of the dynamics of 
the region, and hopefully, a strong appreciation of the aspirations 
and motivations of the individual countries. The importance of 
strong personal contacts cannot be over emphasised. Diplomatic 
staff, having established personal links at some future date to 
reactivate their contacts and build on their expertise in the 
region."56 
Australia's capacity, as a middle power, to establish an extensive network of 
personal contacts throughout the South Pacific region also ensures that it is kept well 
informed about regional developments. In particular, this 'intelligence network' 
enhances Australia's capacity to exercise influence, both formally and informally, 
September 1985. p.820. 
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within the South Pacific region, especially when it is privy to information that states 
who have less resources or who are less well-connected might lack. 
The effectiveness of Australia's influence within the region is indicated by the fact 
that Australia can usually count on the diplomatic support of the Pacific Island states 
in international forums. I.M. Cumpston notes that: 
"In the UN Australia [is] able to correlate the policies of the island 
states, so that [it] could usually rely on the votes of 8 to 10 of 
them."57 
Thus, to Australia, the Pacific Island states represent important allies, especially in 
Third World Forums. At the very least, Australia's influence over the Pacific Island 
states might be counted upon to mute their expression of opposition even when they 
do disagree with Australia on issues. Australia's resistance to common targets for the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions was, for example, not attacked by the Pacific 
Island states at Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 1996. 
The restraint demonstrated by the Pacific Island states in not challenging Australia's 
position on greenhouse gas emissions was noteworthy as they were among the most 
vocal in supporting the development of international regimes to mitigate the 
consequences of global warming. 
Another characteristic of Australia's relationship with the Pacific Island states, and 
arguably the most obvious and frequently cited, is the fact that Australia is a major 
aid donor to the developing nations in the South Pacific region. The Pacific Island 
states have limited financial resources and this meant that they faced substantial 
56Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations With The South 
Pacific. p34. 
57 I.M. Cumpston, History of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1991, Volume Two,  Canberra, 1995. 
p370. 
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difficulties in providing for the growing expectations of their people, including the 
demand for tertiary education programmes, medical facilities that provide more than 
basic health care, and other modern amenities. 58 Many of the primary industries of 
the Pacific Island states, including timber and minerals exploitation, have limited 
potential in that they are non-sustainable or non-renewable. 59 
The heavy reliance on a few industries based on resource extraction also renders the 
Pacific Island states vulnerable, especially as many of these industries may be 
established elsewhere at lower cost. The isolation of the South Pacific Islands and 
their small populations handicaps the development of many industries. Industries 
such as tourism provide valuable foreign exchange for the South Pacific region but as 
yet their potential remains largely unfulfilled.6° Thus far, the only independent 
Pacific Island states that derive significant income from tourism are the Cook 
Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu.61 The Pacific Island states are also vulnerable to 
international political and economic events, not to mention devastating 
meteorological forces that wreak enormous and costly damage. These are factors that 
have rendered many, if not all, of the Pacific Island states heavily reliant on 
remittances and foreign aid. 62 
58 Bruce Knapman, 'Economic development and dependency', in Tides of History: The Pacific Islands 
in the Twentieth Century, K.R. Howe, Robert C. Kiste, & Brij V. Lal (eds.), St Leonard's, Allen & 
Unwin, 1994. p326. 
59 A problem that confronted the Republic of Nauru after its phosphate deposits were depleted. 
Nauru's economy had been based almost entirely on the extraction of phosphates, which provided up 
to A$100-120 million annually since its independence in 1968. However, the phosphate deposits were 
almost completely depleted by the 1990s, and Nauru has had to find alternative sources of revenue. 
Europa Yearbook 1997. pp768-771. 
60 The South Pacific territories of the metropolitan powers in the South Pacific, like Norfolk Island or 
French Polynesia, have reasonably well developed tourism industries, but except for Fiji and Vanuatu, 
the tourism potential of the independent Pacific Island states have been limited or unrealised. See 
Europa Yearbook 1997. pp716-855. 
61 Robert C. Kiste, 'The Island States as Actors in the Region', in Henry S. Albinski, Robert C. Kiste, 
Richard Herr, Ross Babbage, & Denis McLean, The South Pacific: Political, Economic, and Military 
Trends, Special Report 1989, Washington, Brassey's (US), Inc., 1989. pll. 
62 For a discussion on the economic limitations of the Pacific Island states, see Bruce Knapman, 
'Economic development and dependency', in Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the Twentieth 
Century, K.R. Howe, Robert C. Kiste, & Brij V. Lal (eds.), St Leonard's, Allen & Unwin, 1994. 
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Australia's capacity, as a middle power, to assist with the needs of the Pacific Island 
states supports its ambitions to assume a role of significant influence within the 
region. In 1982, Australia replaced Britain as the principal aid donor to the 
independent Pacific Island states. 63 While Australian aid to the Pacific Island states 
has been ostensibly for humanitarian reasons, it is apparent that the provision of 
bilateral development aid and other forms of assistance has also bought Australia 
considerable influence within the South Pacific region. Moreover, the fact that 
Australia provides high levels of aid enables it to influence the nature and 
implementation of development programmes in the South Pacific region. Thus, 
Australian aid has served its interests in trade, maritime surveillance, intelligence, 
sustainable development and other issues in the South Pacific region. 64 
Total Australian Aid Flows To The South Pacific 1997-1998 65 
Country A$million 
Fiji 19.7 
Vanuatu 12.9 
Solomon Islands 11.1 
Samoa 11 
Tonga 10 
Kiribati 6 
Tuvalu 2.4 
Federated States of Micronesia 1.3 
Cook Islands 1.7 
Palau 0.3 
Marshall Islands 0.6 
pp325-336. Andrew Elek, 'The South Pacific economies in a changing international environment', in 
Rodney V. Cole & Somsak Tambunlertchai (eds.), Future of the Asia-Pacific Economies: Pacific 
Islands at the Crossroads? Australia, Asian and Pacific Development Center, 1993. pp56-78. South 
Pacific Commission, Regional Conference on Economic Development Planning, Suva, Fiji, 24-28 
October 1977, Noumea, South Pacific Commission, 1978. And also Gary Wiseman, 'Key Issues of 
the Pacific Island Economies', in Rodney V. Cole & Somsak Tambunlertchai (eds.), Future of the 
Asia-Pacific Economies: Pacific Islands at the Crossroads?, Australia, Asian and Pacific Development 
Center, 1993. p21-24. 
63 Greg Fry, 'Australia and the South Pacific', in Diplomacy in the Market Place: Australia in World 
Affairs, P.J. Boyce & J.R. Angel (eds.), Melbourne, Cheshire, 1992. p10. 
64Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations With The South 
Pacific. p76. 
65 Figures exclude Australian aid to Papua New Guinea, which amounted to about A$319.2 million in 
the same period. 'Papua New Guinea: Country Brief', www.ausaid.gov.au  
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Niue & Tokelau 0.9 
New Caledonia 1.4 
Nauru 2.9 
French Polynesia 0.4 
Regional Programmes 42.1 
Total 124.7 
Source: The South Pacific: An Overview, www.ausaid.gov.au  
A noteworthy point is the fact that while Australia is a major contributor of bilateral 
overseas development aid to the Pacific Island states, the major proportion of that aid 
has been directed towards Papua New Guinea. In terms of overall development aid to 
the rest of the region, Australia is only second to Japan in terms of contribution. This 
relative 'decline' (in terms of Australia's aid contributions relative to Japan) has led 
some to suggest that Australian influence in the region might be diminishing. 66 
However, direct bilateral development aid is merely one of a number of factors upon 
which Australian influence in the South Pacific is based. And it does not include the 
cost of other forms of assistance, such as preferential access to Australian markets, 
employment (and consequently remittances from Australia), technical and other 
administrative advice. 
In summary, Australia's preparedness and capacity, as a middle power, to engage the 
independent Pacific Island states in comprehensive bilateral relationships enables it 
to exercise significant influence over the latter. The fact that many of the 
independent Pacific Island states are dependent on the support of aid, coupled with 
the fact that Australia is in a position to supply that assistance as a wealthy middle 
power, simply amplifies the influence of the latter. In this respect, Australia's role in 
the South Pacific accords with the expectations of structuralist perspectives, which 
66  Greg Johannes, An Isolated Debating Society: Australia In Southeast Asia And The South Pacific. 
pp8-9. Japan's influence is discussed later in this chapter. 
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predict hegemonic influence for middle powers in geopolitical situations where they 
are able to capitalise on their relative superiority in power to smaller states. However, 
structuralist perspectives fall short in their ability to satisfactorily account for factors 
that might render a middle power like Australia unwilling or unable to resort to the 
use of its power in a coercive fashion. These factors are examined in the following 
sections and include Australia's preference for multilateral institutional arrangements 
that are more in keeping with the broader self-interests of a middle power, as well as 
the recognition that attempts at coercion might jeopardise its interests by alienating 
the independent Pacific Island states. 
Australia's Role In Regional Multilateral Institutions 
Australia's ambition to maintain a leadership role within the South Pacific region is 
visibly manifested in the fact that its influence may be felt in most, if not all, of the 
multilateral institutional arrangements that purport to represent regional interests. 
Australia's role as a middle power within the South Pacific region is perhaps best 
defined by its capacity to shape regional developments and to defend its interests, 
without alienating the independent Pacific Island states, through regional multilateral 
institutions. 
The establishment of regional forums has long been regarded by Australia as an 
opportunity "to have a suitable voice in the determination of policy and the shaping 
of events which deeply affect Australia wherever they may take place."67Australia's 
leanings towards formal institutional arrangements may be traced back to its efforts 
to establish the ANZAC Pact and the South Seas Commission. As with its bilateral 
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relations with the Pacific Island states, Australia's role in the multilateral institutional 
arrangements for the South Pacific region is underscored by a sense of self-interest 
and altruism. Thus, while regional arrangements, such as ANZAC are prompted 
primarily by security interests, it might be argued that other initiatives for regional 
institutions are less self-serving. And that Australia's efforts to establish regional 
bodies like the South Seas Commission (subsequently created as the South Pacific 
Commission), have been prompted by the desire to promote greater collaboration 
among the metropolitan powers to improve the welfare of the 'native peoples in the 
South West Pacific' 68 
Australia has initiated, as well as supported, the establishment of many multilateral 
institutional arrangements in the South Pacific region. Among the more significant 
initiatives supported by Australia have been the South Pacific Commission, the 
South Pacific Forum, the Forum Fisheries Agency and the South Pacific Nuclear 
Free Zone. Australia has consistently provided a large share of the funding 
requirements for multilateral institutional arrangements in the South Pacific region. 69 
In the year 1997-98, Australia provided up to A$42.1 million in aid to regional 
programmes in the South Pacific. 7° Australia's preparedness to underwrite South 
Pacific regional institutions is demonstrated as early as 1947 when it agreed to 
provide a third of the funding required for the operation of the South Pacific 
Commission, which became the first regional organisation in the South Pacific. 
Australia has also been one of the major financial backers of the South Pacific Forum 
and, together with New Zealand, provides up to two-thirds of the funding required by 
67 Percy Claude Spender, Minister for External Affairs (1950), cited in Trevor R. Reese, Australia 
New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of International Relations 1941/1968.  p119. 
" Minute from T.A. Pyman, First Secretary, Pacific Division, Department of External Affairs, to John 
W. Burton, Secretary, Department of External Affairs, reproduced in Documents on Australian 
Foreign Policy 1937-49, Volume XII: 1947,  W.J. Hudson & Wendy Way (eds.), Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1995. p834. 
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the Forum. Australian financial support is also extended to many other regional 
institutions and programmes. 
Australian support for regional institutions and programmes is not confined to 
financial aid but also includes technical advice, training, logistical support and many 
other forms of assistance. Australia, in conjunction with the World Health 
Organisation, assisted with the training of health care workers in the South Pacific, 
provided consultants, and support for the maintenance of a regional virology testing 
centre. 71 Australia has also mobilised its defence forces to support the efforts of the 
Natural Disasters Organisation and respond to regional requests for assistance 
following natural disasters. 72 Therefore, as with its bilateral relations with the Pacific 
Island states, Australia's engagement with South Pacific regional institutions and 
programmes has been comprehensive. 
As with the other issues discussed earlier, the decolonisation of the Pacific Island 
states and the Cold War are two factors that have coloured Australia's role in 
multilateral institutional arrangements within the South Pacific region. To some 
extent, Australia's support for regional multilateral institutional arrangements in the 
South Pacific has been guided by its strategic interest in reducing the vulnerability of 
the Pacific Island states. Australia's self-interest is reflected in its belief that such 
regional arrangements would fortify the regional identity of the Pacific Island states. 
And that this, coupled with the capacity building potential of regional institutions, 
reduces the likelihood that the small but independent states within the South Pacific 
69 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 1992-93. p61 
70 http://www.ausaid.gov.au 
71Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations With The South 
Pacific. p112. 
72Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations With The South 
Pacific. pp118-120. 
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region might succumb to the influence of extra-regional powers that are hostile to 
Australia. Thus, it is argued that: 
"The Australian (and allied) strategy of denial in the South Pacific 
has relied not only on discouraging external power military activity 
in the region, but especially on reducing the economic, political, 
and social vulnerability of island states to external interference. 
Australia's objectives in the region have been to build economic 
stability and resilience, to foster peaceful and democratic processes 
of decolonization and political evolution, and to facilitate regional 
consultation and cooperation. To these ends, Canberra has played a 
central role in establishing, and supporting the work of, the South 
Pacific Forum, the most important venue for regional political 
consultation, and the other regional organisations, most of which 
promote economic development. Through these and related means, 
Australia seeks to build a sense of regional community, widely 
shared interests, effective problem-solving mechanisms, and 
political stability — and in this positive way keep out unwanted 
external intervention."73 
Similar arguments are expressed in the Report of the Committee on Australia's 
Relations with the Third Word: 
"Australia's main interests in the island states of the South West 
Pacific involve security considerations. Because it is very 
important from Australia's point of view that the United States 
maintains its strategic advantage over its superpower rival in the 
general Pacific area, we wish to avoid a situation where any of the 
independent states becomes susceptible to predominant influence 
by the Soviet Union. Disproportionately prominent activity in the 
areas by China is also undesirable, both in itself and because it 
would most likely induce the Soviet Union to seek to establish 
countervailing influence. In this sense, the achievement of 
independence by a number of small, economically weak and fragile 
island societies, though welcome in itself, carries strategic 
implications which Australia and its allies cannot afford to ignore. 
One motivation for Australia's active support for the South Pacific 
Forum and other forms of sub-regional collaboration is to 
encourage a sense of collective identity among these small 
countries, which may serve to lessen their vulnerability to inimical 
external influence." [my emphasis] 74 
73 Henry S. Albinslci, Robert C. Kiste, Richard Herr, Ross Babbage, & Denis McLean, The South 
Pacific: Political, Economic, and Military Trends, Special Report 1989, Washington, Brassey's (US), 
Inc., 1989. pviii. 
186 
Therefore, Australia's strong and comprehensive role in South Pacific regional 
institutions is consistent with two of its long standing objectives, the perpetuation of 
its leadership in the region and the exclusion of rival powers from the region. 
In contrast to the motives discussed above, Australia's support for regional 
institutions in the South Pacific is also prompted by more altruistic reasons. This is 
revealed in Australia's recognition that such regional institutions can also assist the 
Pacific Island states to exploit the gains derived from economies of scale and to 
enhance their capacity to defend their common interests against others. Regional 
multilateral institutional arrangements can and have enabled individual Pacific Island 
states to overcome their inherent weaknesses. Regional institutions such as the 
University of the South Pacific, which provides tertiary level education, allowed 
states to overcome the limitations of cost through economies of scale and to provide 
services that they might not otherwise be able to afford on their own. Australia 
routinely provides financial assistance and other resources to such institutions. 
Therefore, it may be argued that a curious but not incompatible mix of self-interest 
and altruism defmes Australia's role as a middle power patron of South Pacific 
regional institutions. 
Self-Interest And Altruism In The Forum Fisheries Forum 
A good example of Australia's role as a middle power in South Pacific regional 
institutions is the part that it has played in the development and achievements of the 
Forum Fisheries Forum (FFA). The FFA was created in 1979 as a sub-regional 
organisation to deal with the fisheries related issues that are so important to the 
74 Report of the Committee on Australia's Relations with the Third World, Australia and the Third 
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Pacific Island states. And from the inauguration of the FFA, Australia has played a 
pivotal guiding role in its operations. Australia provided crucial financial and 
logistical support to help sustain the operations of the FFA, including up to a third of 
the core budget for the FFA, assistance with maritime and aerial surveillance, as well 
as maintenance, training and patrol boats for policing functions. 75 However, it was 
Australia's role and influence in the deliberations of the FFA over the membership of 
the United States in the FFA and the subsequent dispute with the United States over 
the issue of tuna fisheries in the South Pacific that highlighted its effectiveness as a 
middle power. 
A recurrent issue for Australia's foreign policy has been the tension between self-
interest and altruism. Australia has to reconcile its role as a great and powerful friend 
to the Pacific Island states with its obligation to defend the interests of its own great 
and powerful friends, especially the United States. As discussed earlier, Australia 
had claimed a role as the de facto standard bearers for Western interests in the South 
Pacific region. 76 However, this role is strained whenever the interests of the Pacific 
Island states conflicted with those of Australia's traditional allies. 
When the proposal for a regional fisheries agency was raised at the Ninth South 
Pacific Forum in Niue, one of the primary issues debated was the membership and 
powers of the proposed body. An earlier compromise on this issue had appeared to 
resolve the deadlock following many months of difficult negotiation, after the Forum 
World, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1979. p117 
75Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations With The South 
Pacific. p255. 
76 Thomas R. Adam, Western Interests in the Pacific Realm, New York, Random House, 1967. p155. 
Ramesh Thakur (ed.), The South Pacific: Problems, Issue and Prospects. p15. John C. Dorrance, The 
United States and the Pacific Islands. pp111-112, 151-152. 
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meeting at Port Moresby in 1977 agreed in principle to establish a regional fisheries 
agency. 
In June 1978, an agreement was reached whereupon the United States agreed to sign 
a treaty to establish a regional body to regulate fisheries so long as coastal state 
jurisdiction of tuna was not affirmed in the document. 77 The United States also 
agreed to abide by the decisions of the regulatory authority even if tuna was to be 
subsequently regulated by the latter. 78 However, the consensus did not last and deep-
seated suspicions about the United States resurfaced. In September 1978, at the Niue 
Forum, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji led the opposition against 
American membership of the proposed FFA. The main obstacle to agreement was the 
position of the United States on coastal state jurisdiction over migratory fish stocks. 
Ramesh Thakur explains: 
"The 1978 South Pacific Forum meeting in Niue was divided on 
the question of US membership of the proposed regional fisheries 
agency. Fiji and Papua New Guinea opposed US membership 
because of fears of US domination, because of the US refusal to 
recognise coastal state sovereignty over highly migratory species 
like tuna, and because of a potential conflict of interest if the US as 
a major distant-water fishing nation was to be involved in 
controlling South Pacific fishing on behalf of regional nations." 79 
Not all the Pacific Island states were opposed to the inclusion of the United States in 
the FFA. The Forum appeared to be evenly divided on this issue. And it was later 
revealed that Gilbert Island, Fiji, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands 
and Tonga were opposed to a FFA that included the US, whereas Australia, the Cook 
Islands, New Zealand, Niue and Western Samoa were in favour of American 
77 Richard Herr, 'Cross-cutting Pressures in Contemporary South Pacific Regionalism', in World 
Review: A Journal Of Contemporary Relevance, Vol. 18, No. 3, August 1979. p18. 
78 Richard Herr, 'Cross-cutting Pressures in Contemporary South Pacific Regionalism'. p18. 
79 Ramesh Thalcur (ed.), The South Pacific: Problems, Issue and Prospects. p16. 
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membership. 8° The bitter debate on this issue was finally resolved when Australia 
offered the compromise proposal of restricting membership of the FFA to SPF 
members pending future negotiations. 
Australia's preparedness to compromise on the issue of American membership was 
significant because the proposal for a regional fisheries agency might well have 
floundered without it. In particular, given Australia's substantial financial support for 
the FFA, not to mention bilateral aid to the countries opposed to its position 
(especially Papua New Guinea 81 ), it inferred a reluctance to resort to coercion as 
opposed to persuasion. 
Australia's acceptance of, and continued support (in terms of financial and other 
resources) for, a regional fisheries organisation that excluded the United States 
reinforced confidence in its good will towards the Pacific Island states. The presence 
of the United States in the FFA would have made it difficult to exclude other distant 
water fishing nations and the orientation of the FFA would have been very different 
as a consequence. Doulman argues that: 
"If it [the United States] had been given membership, then the 
nature and role of the agency would have been very different. With 
US participation it is likely that the focus of FFA activity would 
have been on technical aspects of tuna management at the expense 
of the economic concerns of South Pacific island countries. 
Because of the inherent conflict of interest in fisheries management 
between coastal states and DWFNs, the resource-owning island 
countries would have been financially disadvantaged by US 
participation."82 
80 Richard Herr, 'Cross-cutting Pressures in Contemporary South Pacific Regionalism', p19. 
81 Australia provides direct financial support up to a third of the Papua New Guinea budget. 
82 David J. Doulman, 'Fisheries Management in the South Pacific: The Role of the Forum Fisheries 
Agency', in The South Pacific: Problems, Issue and Prospects, Ramesh Thalcur (ed.), London, 
Macmillan, 1991. p85. 
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In conceding to a compromise on United States membership in the FFA, Australia 
demonstrated its commitment to multilateral processes and preserved the viability of 
the FFA. Australia's actions also reinforced the legitimacy of regional institutions as 
forums for collective decision-making and the fact that it seeks to persuade, and not 
coerce, through such regional bodies. 
Australia's support for the Pacific Island states was equally significant in the 
subsequent confrontation between the latter and the United States over the issue of 
jurisdiction over migratory fish stocks. The issue revolved around the differences 
between the United States, as a powerful distant water fishing nation, and the Pacific 
Island states, as coastal states, over the right of access to, and the management of, the 
highly migratory tuna species within the South Pacific region. In particular, the 
United States contested the jurisdiction of the Pacific Island states over highly 
migratory species of tuna, which spent only a part of their life cycle within the waters 
of the South Pacific region. 83 The issue was brought to a head in the 1970s when, 
"... the influential US tuna lobby was successful in having the US 
government promulgate a policy that placed the United States at 
odds with all other coastal states concerning the issue of resource 
ownership. This policy, given effect by US domestic fisheries 
legislation commonly known as the Magnusson Act (the Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976), does not recognise 
coastal state jurisdiction over highly migratory species of fish, 
unless coastal states cooperate with DWFNs in the management of 
their tuna resources. This position is rejected by coastal states on 
sovereignty grounds."84 
83 Uentabo Fakaofo Neemia, Cooperation and Conflict: Costs, Benefits and National Interests in 
Pacific Regional Cooperation,  Suva, University of the South Pacific, 1986. pp28-29. 
84 David J. Doulman, 'Fisheries Management in the South Pacific: The Role of the Forum Fisheries 
Agency', in The South Pacific: Problems, Issue and Prospects,  Ramesh Thakur (ed.), London, 
Macmillan, 1991. p84. 
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In response, the Pacific Island states organised themselves in a regional initiative to 
resist the stance adopted by the United States. 85 And in 1986, 16 South Pacific states, 
including Australia, collectively negotiated an agreement with the United States that 
resolved most of the outstanding disagreements between them through a licensing 
arrangement. 86 
Once again, the pivotal role played by Australia within the South Pacific region is 
highlighted by the manner in which the impasse over access to tuna fisheries in the 
region by the United States (and other distant water fishing nations) was successfully 
resolved through negotiation. 87 Australia was credited with a large measure of the 
negotiations' success because of its role in persuading the United States to adopt a 
more accommodating stance. Henry Albinski notes that: 
"Secretary of State George Shultz personally took up the treaty's 
cause. He was influenced by Australian Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke, who argued that American behavior had been a setback to 
the United States, to its Western friends in the neighborhood, and 
indeed to regional well-being." 88 
Australia's role in this issue is noteworthy because it had no significant economic 
interests to defend with respect to the fisheries issue within the South Pacific. While 
85 For an account of the tuna issue, see Jon M. Van Dyke & Carolyn Nicol, 'U.S. Tuna Policy: A 
Reluctant Acceptance of the International Norm', in David J. Doulman, Tuna Issues and Perspectives 
in the Pacific Islands Region, Honolulu, East-West Center, 1987. pp105-132. 
86 Australia was also referred to as one of the 16 Pacific Island nation, which also included the Cook 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and 
Western Samoa by the Americans. White House, Principal Deputy Press Secretary, Statement at 
Waukesha, Wisconsin, 23 October 1986. 
87 See Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the 
Government of the United States of America 1987.  Article 2.2 states: "The Government of the United 
States shall, as appropriate, promote the maximization of benefits generated for the Pacific Island 
parties from the operations of fishing vessels of the United States licensed pursuant to this Treaty, 
including: (a) the use of canning, transshipment, slipping and repair facilities located in the Pacific 
Island parties; (b) the purchase of equipment and supplies, including fuel supplies, from suppliers 
located in the Pacific Island parties; and (c) the employment of nationals of the Pacific Island parties 
on board licensed fishing vessels of the United States." 
88 Henry S. Albinski, 'South Pacific Trends and U.S. Security Implications: An Introductory 
Overview', in Henry S. Albinski, Robert C. Kiste, Richard Herr, Ross Babbage, & Denis McLean, 
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the issue of regulating the management of high migratory species is a concern, 
Australia's approach towards such issues in its own region has been more inclined 
towards a Law of the Sea 'Article 64-type' approach. This is reflected in the 
Convention on the Southern Blue Fin Tuna that Australia reached with Japan and 
New Zealand, which involves distant water fishing nations in the management of 
fisheries in contrast to the approach that has been taken by the FFA. 89 However, one 
of Australia's underlying concerns, during the negotiations between the Pacific 
Island states and the United States over the tuna issue, was that resentment towards 
the latter might allow the communist powers, especially the Soviet Union, to gain a 
stronger foothold within the region. Kiribati had concluded a fishing agreement with 
the Soviet Union in 1985 and Australia was afraid that the strategy of strategic denial 
might be further compromised if other Pacific Island states followed suit. 90 Thus, by 
playing upon similar concerns held by the United States, Australia was able to 
persuade the United States to accommodate the demands of the Pacific Island states 
in order to ensure that the policy of 'strategic denial' remained effective. 91 In an 
interesting twist, Australia's influence with policy makers in the United States not 
only improved its standing with the Pacific Island states, its improved standing 
within the South Pacific region enhanced its influence with policy makers in the 
United States. 92 
The South Pacific: Political, Economic, and Military Trends, Special Report 1989, Washington, 
Brassey's (US), Inc., 1989. p5. 
89Article 6 states: "The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the highly 
migratory species listed in Annex I shall co-operate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum 
utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic 
zone. In regions for which no appropriate international organization exists, the coastal State and other 
States whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall co-operate to establish such an 
organization and participate in its work." Thus, such an approach would include distant water fishing 
nations in the management of fish stocks, and the Convention for the Conservation of Southern  
Bluefin Tuna, Done at Canberra, 10 May 1993, clearly adopts such an approach. 
9° The Soviet Union also concluded a fishing arrangement with Vanuatu in 1987, as well as 
established a diplomatic presence in Papua New Guinea in 1990. 
91 A concern that was probably overstated in hindsight. 
92 Henry S. Albinski, 'South Pacific Trends and U.S. Security Implications: An Introductory 
Overview'. p6. 
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Australia's role in helping the Pacific Island states to resolve their dispute with the 
United States over the tuna issue might have been prompted by self-interest and the 
policy of strategic denial. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the licensing 
agreement that was eventually reached is regarded as beneficial to the Pacific Island 
states and provides them with an additional source of valuable revenue. The licensing 
agreement, colloquially referred to as the 'Tuna Treaty', put in place a multilateral 
arrangement wherein the right of the United States to fish in the region is recognised 
by the Pacific Island states in return for a 5 year US$60 million package of fees and 
assistance. 
The 'Tuna Treaty' between the US and the Pacific Island states provided a model for 
subsequent licensing arrangements, whereby distant water fishing states pay a fee in 
return for access to fisheries within the exclusive economic zones of the Pacific 
Island states. 93 Fees are usually determined in a per vessel basis, with the payment 
being related to the expected value of the catch of the vessel during the period that it 
is licensed to fish. Revenues received by FFA member-countries from distant water 
fishing states access fee payments are directed to their respective consolidated 
revenue funds and used to support public expenditure programmes. Therefore, even 
though the Pacific Island states do not possess large fishing fleets of their own, they 
derive considerable profit from their maritime resources, largely through the access 
fees charged to distant water fishing states, such as the United States, Japan, Taiwan 
and Korea. In several FFA member-countries revenue generated by 'distant water 
fishing nation' access fee payments accounts for more than 50 percent of the national 
93 David J. Doulman, 'Fisheries Management in the South Pacific: The Role of the Forum Fisheries 
Agency'. pp8 1-82. 
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government's budget. 94 Licensing fees, after foreign aid, have become one of the 
most significant sources of revenue for many small island economies in the South 
Pacific region. 95 The importance of these arrangements with distant water fishing 
nations is also emphasised by the fact that, in addition to fishing, the latter often 
establish industries in the South Pacific for the processing and canning of tuna for 
transshipment and export. 
Australia has been criticised for being insensitive to the Pacific Island states. 96 
However, Australia's commitment to help its smaller neighbours become more 
effective appears genuine and its support for South Pacific regional institutions, such 
as the FFA, has been crucial towards helping the Pacific Island states realise many of 
their aspirations. While Australia appears committed to its obligations as the de facto 
standard bearer for Western interests in the South Pacific, 97 its actions on the issue of 
the FFA and the dispute with the United States demonstrates that it is not merely a 
proxy for its great and powerful friend. Instead, Australia emphasised its role as the 
main arbiter of how Western interests are best served within its sphere of influence in 
the South Pacific region when it balanced the interests of the United States in tuna 
fisheries against the general Western interest in preserving the policy of strategic 
denial. By successfully persuading the United States to come to terms with the 
Pacific Island states on the issue of tuna fisheries, Australia also demonstrates that it 
is an effective middle power and justifies its claims to leadership within the South 
Pacific region. 
94 David J. Doulman, 'Fisheries Management in the South Pacific: The Role of the Forum Fisheries 
Agency'. p82. 
95 John C. Dorrance, The United States and the Pacific Islands. p57. 
96 Alan Burnett and Robin Burnett, The Australian and New Zealand Nexus, Canberra, Australian 
Institute of International Affairs, 1978. pp273-274. 
195 
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
Australia's hegemonic influence in the South Pacific region has been exercised with 
discretion in order to maintain a fine balance between the aspirations of the Pacific 
Island states and the need to defend Western interests. The position adopted by 
Australia on the issue of the nuclear free zone is another instance where it seized a 
leadership role in regional decision making processes in order to influence outcomes 
that it believed would reconcile its competing interests. 
The advocacy for a nuclear free South Pacific region had been a recurrent issue in 
regional debates since the early 1970s and many Pacific Island states have 
demonstrated strong support for the anti-nuclear cause. 98 Twelve years of nuclear 
tests in the Marshall Islands atolls of Bikini and Eniwetak, followed by eight years 
(1966-1974) of French nuclear tests in the open atmosphere of the South Pacific, and 
the subsequent underground testing (till 1996) by the French have heightened 
sensitivities within the region on this issue. 99 
Notwithstanding the obvious adverse environmental consequences, there is also 
widespread resentment among Pacific Island states over the fact that nuclear tests 
within the South Pacific region carry the insinuation that the region is expendable. 
The sentiment is that the South Pacific region had been used as guinea pig for 
dangerous experiments and dragged into a global contest between nuclear 
superpowers in which it wanted no part. Consequently, the Pacific Island states 
97 Thomas R. Adam, Western Interests in the Pacific Realm,  New York, Random House, 1967. p155. 
Ramesh Thalcur (ed.), The South Pacific: Problems, Issue and Prospects. p15. John C. Dorrance, The 
United States and the Pacific Islands, Westport, Praeger, 1992. pp111-112, 151-152. 
98 Roy Ferguson, 'Environmental Problems', in The South Pacific: Problems, Issue and Prospects, 
Ramesh Thalcur (ed.), London, Macmillan, 1991. p67. 
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developed a strong antipathy towards the presence and testing of nuclear weapons 
within their region. There was a widespread desire to exclude all harmful things 
related to nuclear technology from the region and an end to nuclear testing in the 
region. The belief is that a nuclear free zone would not only end environmentally 
harmful nuclear testing in the region but would ensure that the South Pacific region 
is kept out of any nuclear conflict between the great powers. Many Australians 
appear to have sympathy for these sentiments and openly supportive of the anti-
nuclear cause. Indeed, Australia has been "blamed for the rigid hostility island states 
have ritually held towards France." I°° 
Australian foreign policy on this issue has been more ambivalent. On the one hand, 
Australia demonstrated its support for South Pacific sensitivities both in terms of 
domestic and popular protests, as well as at a diplomatic level, against French 
nuclear testing in the Pacific. The initiative of the Whitlam government (together 
with New Zealand) to take France to the International Court of Justice for conducting 
nuclear tests in the South Pacific offended France but has been very well-received by 
the Pacific Island states.' ° ' Nevertheless, Australia's objection to nuclear testing 
within the South Pacific region is tempered by its recognition of the importance of an 
American military presence, especially one that is nuclear-armed, to its security. 102 
The narrow line tread by Australia on this issue is observed by Millar, who notes 
that: 
"For some years both Australia and New Zealand had been 
concerned about nuclear testing in the South Pacific. The small 
island states were virtually unanimous in condemning such testing 
and in seeking to have the Pacific as a nuclear-free zone. Despite 
" Roy Ferguson, 'Environmental Problems'. p67. 
Jim Sanday, South Pacific Culture and Politics: Notes on Current Issues, working paper no. 174, 
Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1988. p5. 
101 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, External Relations Since 1788. p340. 
102 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, External Relations Since 1788. p362. 
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some sympathy with the idea, Australia and New Zealand as 
American allies could not see such a zone being either practical or 
desirable, and they managed for a time to carry the South Pacific 
island countries with them." I°3 
Thus, Australia had resisted periodic calls from the Pacific Island states for a nuclear 
free zone until the mid 1980s even as they supported protests against French nuclear 
testing in the same period.'" 
The vacillation in Australian foreign policy, from the sympathetic agitation of 
Whitlam, to the silent resistance of Fraser, to the attempt at reconciliation by Hawke, 
on the issue of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific region reflected its 
ambivalence on this issue. In some respects, this highlighted the differences between 
the cynicism of the structuralist perspectives, with respect to their faith in great 
power guarantees of security, reflected in the Conservative approach espoused by 
Fraser and the bias towards multilateral responses reflected in the Labor approach. 105 
The issue of a nuclear free zone illustrated the extent of Australia's ability, as a 
middle power, to influence developments within the South Pacific region. Australia's 
refusal to countenance a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific prior to the 1980s 
corresponded with a significant lack of success in getting any regional arrangement 
for a nuclear free zone off the ground. In part, this infers the extensive influence that 
Australia possesses within the South Pacific region on issues affecting its interests. It 
also reflects the difficulty of establishing an effective regional and institutional 
response without Australian support. This conjecture is further supported by the fact 
103 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, External Relations Since 1788. p354. 
104  This tension between Australia's dual role as a champion of Western interests and Pacific Island 
interests has always been a key issue. In 1970-1971 even as Australia helped to establish the South 
Pacific Forum, which excluded the metropolitan powers, it chose to retain the South Pacific 
Commission in order to keep France and other metropolitan powers engaged in regional multilateral 
institutions. Personal interview with A/Prof Richard Herr. 
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that the modification of Australia's foreign policy on this issue in the early 1980s 
resulted in the relatively quick adoption of a regional treaty for a nuclear free zone in 
the South Pacific in 1986. 
Australia's change of heart on a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific region may be 
attributed to two main factors. The first is the strong and popular anti-nuclear 
sentiment during this period, especially within Australia's domestic environmental 
and peace-movement constituencies. The second is the concern that further resistance 
to the anti-nuclear sentiment within the South Pacific region, which had been 
gathering force, might undermine Australia's influence and interests within the 
region. In particular, the powerful nuclear sentiment in New Zealand, an erstwhile 
American ally, had not only jeopardised the ANZUS arrangement through the refusal 
to allow access to United States nuclear vessels, it also threatened to inspire other 
states in the South Pacific region to follow suit. In jumping on the anti-nuclear 
bandwagon, Australia sought to lead the discourse in the South Pacific Forum, 
defuse the tension, and re-direct the cause in its own interests. In this regard, 
Australia succeeded, albeit with a solution that has not been totally satisfactory to 
everyone. 106 
Australia was able to relieve the pressure from the anti-nuclear movement in the 
region and address the issues raised through the medium of the South Pacific Forum. 
Australia exercised its influence within the South Pacific Forum to persuade most of 
its members that "a watered down treaty was better than either of two alternatives — a 
105 See Chapter 3. 
106 Australia's success was, however, not greeted with the enthusiasm it might have expected from its 
Western Allies. The French blamed Australia for the hostility of the Pacific Island states towards 
them, and considered the SPNFZ a useless agreement. See Jim Sanday, South Pacific Culture and 
Politics: Notes on Current Issues. p9. T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, External Relations 
Since 1788. p340. 
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treaty that was totally unenforceable, or no treaty at all." 1°7 Australia argued that it 
recognised the conflicting interests of Pacific Island states and the metropolitan 
nuclear powers on this issue, but that: 
44
. . these pressures could be contained only by early 
implementation of a nuclear-free zone arrangement that addressed 
French nuclear testing, as well as the stationing or storing of 
nuclear weapons and the potential dumping nuclear waste, but 
protected essential regional security requirements. The latter were 
perceived as including freedom of high seas navigation, innocent 
passage through territorial seas, and port access by "nuclear 
ships,:o38 
Therefore, Australia led the way in the construction of a treaty that reconciled its 
own objections to French nuclear testing with its desire to ensure that American 
naval access to the region is not compromised. 1°9 
The result was the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (or Treaty of Rarotonga 
1986) which satisfied a number of Australian objectives. The South Pacific Nuclear 
Free Zone Treaty states that parties to the treaty were: 
64 
. not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have 
control over any nuclear device by any means anywhere inside or 
outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone." 11° 
In effect, the above is the 'nuclear-free' clause. However, Australia ensured that its 
own key strategic interests are protected as the Treaty also states that: 
"Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to 
decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft 
to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, 
107 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, External Relations Since 1788.  p362. 
108 John C. Dorrance, The United States and the Pacific Islands.  p43. 
109 Steward Firth, 'Strategic and nuclear issues', in Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the 
Twentieth Century, K.R. Howe, Robert C. Kiste, & Brij V. La! (eds.), St Leonard's, Allen & Unwin, 
1994. pp311-312. 
110 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 1986, done at Rarotonga. Article 3(a). 
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and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters... 19111 
Thus, American naval access to South Pacific waters is preserved and Australia's 
defence arrangements with the United States remain unaffected, even as a symbolic 
gesture was being made through a treaty to declare the South Pacific region a 
'nuclear free' zone. 
The Treaty did not result in significant material change at the time. The United States 
reserved the right to sail nuclear-capable warships within the South Pacific region 
and the French continued underground nuclear testing.' 12 Nevertheless, the Treaty 
ameliorated regional resentment on the issue and forestalled a stronger response. 
The desire to protect Australia's access to the full military capabilities of the United 
States is primarily motivated by the perception that the then-Soviet Union, China or 
some other power might someday pose a threat to Australia. However, the 
promptness with which the then-Soviet and Chinese governments became signatories 
to the Treaty of Rarotonga suggests that they never had much strategic interest in the 
region anyway, at least not with regard to nuclear deployment. Nevertheless, 
Australia's role with regard to the issue of a nuclear free zone within the South 
Pacific demonstrated its ability to defend its interests by setting the agenda and 
influencing outcomes of regional decision making processes. Australia's capacity to 
pursue an idiosyncratic line on the issue of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific 
region reflected its capacity to assume a role of significant influence as a middle 
power. Finally, Australia's attempt to reconcile the interests of Western security 
arrangements with the aspirations of the independent Pacific Island states suggests 
111 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Article 5(2). 
112 France only signed the Treaty in 1996 after it had concluded its programme of nuclear testing. 
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that, as always, its role as an influential middle power in the South Pacific region is 
tempered by the tension between self-interest and altruism. 
Conclusion 
Australia's aspirations for a leadership role within the South Pacific region have 
always been evident. Australia's efforts to establish itself as a regional hegemon may 
be demonstrated by the history of its efforts to play a decisive role, first as a colonial 
power and subsequently through regional multilateral institutional arrangements, in 
the South Pacific. As a colonial power, Australia signalled its ambitions by seeking 
to establish and extend a British sphere of influence within the South Pacific region. 
As a British dominion, Australia served as an administrative centre for many of 
Great Britain's colonial possessions and exerted influence over the South Pacific 
region. Australian advocacy for a British sphere of influence in the South Pacific 
region was also premised on the need to pre-empted the possibility of a threat from 
Britain's European enemies to a remote dominion like Australia. 
The notion of a sphere of influence was revisited when a combination of British 
indifference and growing Australian assertiveness saw the latter give voice to its 
ambitions in the post war councils following the First World War. Australia 
demanded that its great power allies acknowledge the primacy of its interests within 
the South Pacific region. And in this regard, it has been argued that the ANZAC Pact 
and the ANZUS Treaty may be viewed as an effort to institutionalise a leading role 
for Australia in the South Pacific region, as the custodian of Western interests. 
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The passing of the colonial era saw a change in attitudes towards the region. The 
decolonisation of the Pacific Island states and the advent of the Cold War introduced 
'new' actors and issues that challenged Australia's role as a middle power. The 
familiar theme of a vulnerable middle power situated in a relatively remote 
geographic location was now informed by the perception of a potential threat to 
Australian and Western interests from a Soviet presence in the South Pacific region. 
A new concern is the apprehension that the small but independent Pacific Island 
states might easily succumb to the influence of the Soviet Union and thereby 
constitute a security risk. These fears encouraged Australia to establish strong and 
comprehensive relationships, bilateral and multilateral, with the independent Pacific 
Island states in order to support its strategy of strategic denial against the Soviet 
Union. However, Australia's role within the South Pacific region has been motivated 
by considerations apart from strategic interests. These included a sense of altruism 
and the determination to be a good international citizen by lending the resources and 
support of a wealthy middle power to small developing nations. 
To some extent, the two underlying motives guiding Australia's role in the South 
Pacific, characterised by Idealism in one and Realism in the other, overlap and are 
complementary. Thus, Australia's interest in being a custodian of Western interests 
in the South Pacific region is expressed concurrently with its desire to protect the 
welfare of the native peoples in that region. Similarly, Australia's interest in 
establishing regional institutions in the South Pacific has been prompted both by the 
desire to ensure that the Pacific Island states do not succumb to blandishments of 
rival powers, as well as by the desire to help them overcome their limitations of their 
size and resources. 
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Australia's role in the development and achievements of the FFA, as well as in the 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty highlighted the tension between self-interest 
and altruism. In both, Australia had to balance its loyalty to its great and powerful 
friends with its own role as a great and powerful ally to the small but independent 
Pacific Island states. In its efforts to reconcile the aspirations of the independent 
Pacific Island states with its own interests, as well as the interests of its Western 
allies, Australia has demonstrated a reluctance to resort to coercion. Instead, 
Australia's capacity to persuade and its strong commitment to multilateral processes 
helped to bring about a successful conclusion to the issues confronted by the FFA. 
This success served Australia's interests with respect to the policy of strategic denial, 
as well as reinforced its own influence as a middle power in the South Pacific region. 
Similarly, Australia's success in setting the agenda, and establishing a multilateral 
arrangement, for a nuclear free zone within the South Pacific consistent with its own 
interests demonstrates its effectiveness as a middle power in the South Pacific region. 
Thus, it is proposed that while structuralist perspectives provide a satisfactory 
account of Australia's earlier influence as a middle power in the South Pacific 
region, Australia's influence has since been manifested in a fashion that is more 
consistent with the expectations of process oriented perspectives. 
CHAPTER 5 
"The fundamental question is this. Could the United Nations 
provide a practical alternative to the Treaty or a more effective 
framework to regulate further activities, including environmental 
protection, in Antarctica? On the basis of my own experience — and 
even as a firm supporter of the multilateral system — I would in this 
case, have to answer 'No'. We should continue to deal with all 
issues relating to Antarctica through the Antarctic Treaty System. 
My personal experience at the United Nations and of Antarctica 
have demonstrated to me that one system — the United Nations 
system — works less effectively than I had hoped, probably because 
of its sheer size, while the other system — the Antarctic Treaty 
System — works more effectively than I had expected. This 
experience has led me to the conclusion that institutionalised 
United Nations involvement in Antarctica, however well 
intentioned, would prove less effective in the management of that 
continent than the Antarctic Treaty. This has been the case until 
now; and I believe that it will be the case in the future."' — Richard 
Woolcott, Australia's Ambassador to the United Nations (1982- 
1988) 
Introduction 
The previous chapters suggest that a middle power is a state that is able to act in a 
manner akin to that of a great power within regional subsets of the state system. The 
previous chapter also argued that a middle power, such as Australia, could be 
distinguished by its affinity for multilateral institutional arrangements. In this 
chapter, Australia's role in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region is examined. 2 
Whereas Australia has been able to manifest all the classical traits of a middle power 
Richard Woolcott, 'Changes And Changes', in RA. Herr, H.R. Hall, & M.G. Haward (eds.), 
Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change?  Tasmania, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
1990. p28. 
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in the South Pacific region, some variations to these traditional expectations of 
middle power behaviour are evident in Australia's role within the Antarctic region. 
Australia's role in the Antarctic region highlights some of the challenges that would 
confront a middle power seeking influence in a region where states equal or superior 
to itself in power have taken an active interest. The geopolitical factors affecting 
Australia's role in the Antarctic region would appear to preclude the possibility of it 
assuming the mantle of a regional great power there. Australia's ability to assume the 
posture of a great power in the Antarctic region is circumscribed by the presence of 
states that are great powers and other powers with resources equal to, or superior to 
its own. Therefore, the expectations of those who hold structuralist perspectives of 
middle powers would be inclined towards a more modest role for Australia in the 
Antarctic region. However, it is argued that Australia has consistently demonstrated 
its ambition to exercise influence over the Antarctic region and that it has been able 
to do so through the Antarctic Treaty System. Thus, where structuralist perspectives 
failed, process oriented perspectives have been able to account for Australia's 
capacity to exercise significant influence over developments in the Antarctic region 
and demonstrate the manner by which a middle power can successfully wield 
decisive influence through multilateral institutional arrangements. 
In examining Australia's role in Antarctica, Davis and Herr identified 3 separate eras 
of Australian involvement in Antarctica: 
"a. idiosyncratic individualism in the 'heroic age' of Antarctic 
exploration 1890-1945: 
b. 	commitment to the Antarctic Treaty System post 1959, 
coupled with station establishment and hydra-headed science 
programs 1945-1990: 
2 All subsequent references to the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region shall simply be described as 
the Antarctic region for the sake of brevity. 
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c. 	prospective maturity management of the Antarctic 
environment in the post-CRAMRA Madrid Protocol era. 1990 
onwards."3 
For the purposes of this thesis, this schema may be slightly adjusted to reflect 3 
distinct themes affecting Australian influence in the Antarctic region; unilateral 
influence, regional multilateralism and the challenge of global arrangements to 
regionalism. These three themes correspond roughly to 3 phases, outlined above, of 
Australia's involvement with the Antarctic region. 4 It is proposed that these themes 
reflect key issues within the chronological periods with which they are respectively 
identified in this chapter although their relevance would not necessary be confined to 
these periods. For example, it is argued that Australia continues to reinforce its 
sovereign claims over the Australian Antarctic Territory even though it remains 
committed to the Antarctic Treaty System. This behaviour might be seen as 
'idiosyncratic individualism' because the persistence of 'unilateral' sovereign claims 
could be regarded as being incompatible with the theme of multilateral institutional 
authority represented by the Antarctic Treaty System. 
The classification of the issues affecting Australia's role as a middle power in the 
Antarctic region within the categories of unilateral influence, regional 
multilateralism and the challenge of global arrangements to regionalism provides a 
useful framework for discussion. Examining Australia's unilateral role in the 
Antarctic region draws attention to the limitations of structuralist perspectives in 
guiding middle powers towards an effective role in a geographic region where their 
dominance is not assured by the good fortune of being more powerful than other 
3 Bruce W. Davis and Richard A. Herr, ATS Decision-Making and Changes: The Role Of Domestic 
Politics In Australia, International Antarctic Regime Project publication series. No. 3. Fridtjof Nansen 
Institute, 1992, p2. 
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states in the same locale. In contrast, Australia's leadership role and influence within 
the Antarctic Treaty System underscores the opportunities open to resourceful 
middle powers and the utility of the insights offered by process oriented perspectives 
(at least within the Antarctic region). The schema adopted also contrasts the 
preference that a middle power like Australia has exhibited for regional arrangements 
where it may assume a decisive role on regional issues, with its antipathy towards 
global multilateral arrangements where its influence is less strongly entrenched and 
its interests less well defended. 
The first phase examined explores Australia's attempts to assume influence in 
Antarctica as a part of the British Empire and subsequently as an independent middle 
power. Australia's modest success in claiming recognition for its sovereign claims 
over the Australian Antarctic Territory demonstrates some of the limitations that 
confront middle powers seeking to establish regional influence by relying solely on 
traditional notions of power and influence. The second phase saw Australia commit 
itself to the regional multilateral institutional arrangements represented by the 
Antarctic Treaty System. It is argued that Australia's ambition for influence within 
the Antarctic region has been satisfied by these regional arrangements and that its 
capacity to influence regional developments is founded upon its ability to exploit the 
opportunities furnished by the Antarctic Treaty System. In particular, the extent and 
efficacy of Australian influence is demonstrated in its role as one of the consultative 
parties in the Antarctic Treaty and the part that it had played in the Madrid Protocol. 
The third phase saw Australia reaffirm its commitment to regional arrangements and 
resist demands for a stronger role for global multilateral institutional arrangements 
within the Antarctic region. Australia successfully assumed a leadership role, over 
Instead of a post CRAMRA, the period leading up to CRAMRA is taken as a significant phase 
where commitment to the established regional multilateral arrangements is reaffirmed and the attempt 
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other more powerful states in the Antarctic region, to defend the Antarctic Treaty 
System against the challenge of Third World nations calling for broader and 
globally-based multilateral institutional arrangements. Australia enjoyed a position of 
entrenched influence in the regional arrangements represented by the Antarctic 
Treaty System. Therefore, it is argued that, notwithstanding other possible 
consequences, the introduction of a global regulatory regime in place of or in 
addition to the regional arrangements for the Antarctic region would have likely 
resulted in the erosion of Australian influence and a diminution of its role there. 
In short, this chapter contends that Australia has demonstrated both the ambition and 
capacity for a role of influence within the Antarctic region. While its initial efforts to 
assume a leadership role over the Antarctic region had been less successful, it is 
argued that Australia eventually achieved a position for leadership and influence 
within the Antarctic region through the Antarctic Treaty System. Australia 
demonstrated its capabilities in exercising both leadership and influence when it 
rejected the proposition for a Minerals Convention and set the agenda for 
environmental protection in the Antarctic region through the Madrid Protocol to the 
Antarctic Treaty. Australia seized a leadership role again when it argued in favour of 
regional multilateral arrangements to manage the affairs of the Antarctic region. And 
demonstrated its ability to defend its own interests and its dominant position within 
the region when it successfully led the resistance to the proposed introduction of 
global regulatory arrangements for the Antarctic region. 
to replace the latter with broader global arrangements rejected. 
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The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Region 
Antarctica is often called the 'white continent'. The Antarctic region has been 
described as "a relatively inhospitable, uninhabited and 'out of the way' [region] ... 
isolated from the mainstream of international affairs." 5 It is a place "whose 
peripheral location, geographic isolation, tardy discovery, unknown nature and 
pristine features"6 has reinforced its image as 'a pole apart' from the rest of the 
world. Antarctica is characterised by geographic and climatic extremes. Steady 
winds of over 100 km/hour sweep a land that is almost totally covered in ice more 
5 Peter J. Beck, Who Owns Antarctica? Governing and Managing the Last Continent,  in Boundary and 
Territory Briefing, Volume 1 Number 1, Durham, IBRU, 1994. pl. 
6 Peter J. Beck, Who Owns Antarctica? Governing and Managing the Last Continent.  pl 
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than a mile thick. There is almost no rainfall and temperatures as low as -89.6°C 
have been recorded. Antarctica has the highest elevation of all the continents. It has 
the world's largest and driest desert. There are no land vertebrates and it is the sole 
continent without trees.' 
It is generally agreed that the Antarctic region includes the continent of Antarctica 
and the waters south of the Southern Convergence. 8 The Antarctic region is also 
defined by the Antarctic Treaty, which stipulates a region south of latitude 60 
degrees south, and by the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, which adopts the boundary established by the Southern 
Convergence. 9 
The most prominent feature about the Antarctic region is the fact that Antarctica is 
largely uninhabited and there are no people indigenous to the continent. The 
Antarctic region has been touted as a place that represents the last great wilderness 
on earth. Apart from some small settlements of scientists, adventurers and tourists, 
Antarctica has remained free from the influence of human civilisation. While there 
are no human inhabitants indigenous to Antarctica, seven states, Argentina, 
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, have laid 
claim to sovereignty over parts of Antarctica and the Southern Oceans. Several other 
states, including the United States and Russia, have not claimed sovereignty over 
territory in Antarctica but have reserved the right to do so. All sovereignty claims in 
Antarctica are disputed and the primary source of effective regulatory authority 
7 F.M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics, London, C. Hurst & Company, 1982. pl & 2. 
8The distinctive currents caused when the waters of the Southern Ocean meet the Pacific, the Indian, 
and the South Atlantic Ocean mark the boundary of the Southern Convergence. 
9 Article 6 of the Antarctic Treaty, 1959. Article 1 of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources, 1980. 
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within the Antarctic region is the network of multilateral institutional arrangements 
known as the Antarctic Treaty System. 
The Antarctic region, like the Arctic region, borders states and continents that are 
usually considered to be at the opposite ends of the earth. Therefore, even though 
states like Australia, Chile, India and South Africa are located on different continents 
and geographically distant from one another, they may all claim to share a region in 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Northern Hemisphere states like the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Poland and France have also claimed a role in the Antarctic 
region, either as claimants to sovereignty over territory in Antarctica or as signatories 
to the various multilateral institutional arrangements that exercise effective 
jurisdiction over the region or both. 
The above factors are some of the special characteristics unique to the Antarctic 
region and which render the region unlike any other. Therefore, it is in the context of 
these considerations that Australia's role, as an effective middle power, in the 
Antarctic region should be appreciated. 
Australian Antarctic Interests and Strategy In the Pre-Antarctic 
Treaty Era 
This section examines the first phase of Australia's involvement in the Antarctic 
region and reviews its early interests in the region, as well as the methods that it has 
employed to defend those interests. Australia's ambitions for significant influence in 
the Antarctic region in the pre-Antarctic Treaty era were guided by considerations 
not unlike those that shaped its early involvement in the South Pacific region. While 
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Australia's desire to protect commercial interests, related to whaling and sealing, was 
a significant factor, it was the perception of a need to defend its strategic interests 
and security that was the primary motivation for its initial efforts to claim 
sovereignty and influence over the Antarctic region. As a region that lay contiguous 
to Australia's southern (and undisputed) maritime boundaries, the Antarctic region, 
as with the South Pacific region discussed earlier, is regarded as an area of key 
strategic interest where unfriendly powers could potentially maintain bases that 
would threaten Australia's security. These concerns prompted Australia to seek 
jurisdiction over the Antarctic region, initially by supporting the extension of the 
British Empire over the Antarctic continent and subsequently by laying claim to 
sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory. 
Australia's early initiatives for influence in the Antarctic region corresponded with 
the expectations of structuralist perspectives in terms of how middle powers would 
seek to extend their influence within the state system. Australia had sought to exploit 
its relationship with Great Britain by persuading it to defend their mutual interests 
within the Antarctic region through annexation. Australia's claims to sovereignty 
over the Australian Antarctic Territory also raised issues that touch upon Realist 
concerns within structuralist perspectives. Such claims to sovereignty carry with 
them questions about Australia's capacity to enforce the rights, responsibilities and 
obligations of a sovereign, as well as its ability to maintain a monopoly over 
jurisdictional authority within the area it has claimed against states that do not 
recognised the legitimacy of its claims. Where consent to, or recognition of, 
sovereign claims are absent, Realist perspectives with regard to the power required to 
uphold such claims in the face of dispute would apply. 
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Australia's claims to sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory have made 
little impression on other states and any material impact resulting from such claims 
has (thus far) only affected its domestic constituents. Moreover, Australia's 
accession to the Antarctic Treaty has, arguably, rendered its claims irrelevant insofar 
as other states are concemed. 10 Therefore, even though there are a few states which 
recognise Australia's claims, its claims to sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic 
Territory have been largely ineffectual in providing a source of legitimate authority 
that would enable it to regulate activity and defend its interests within the Antarctic 
region. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the points raised above, it is conceded that 
Australia's persistence in repeating its sovereign claims to the Australian Antarctic 
Territory accords with its perception that its claims are legitimate and that the 
periodic reiteration of its claims is necessary to the effective defence of its national 
interests. 
Early Australian Interests And Claims In The Antarctic Region 
Early Australian interests in the Antarctic region were largely regarded as being 
synonymous with British interests. Certainly, Australia's claims to territory on 
Antarctica are inherited from the days when it was part of the British Empire. These 
claims are based on acts of discovery and exploration of the Antarctic region by 
British and Australian navigators and adventurers, including Captain Cook and 
Mawson. British explorers and adventurers had been among the first to actively 
explore Antarctica but (arguably) their intent might have been to claim glory rather 
than a continent. However, a growing range of commercial and security interests in 
10 The argument against this is that Australia's claims are irrelevant only insofar as the other 
signatories are concerned, but would have effect on those states who are not party to the Antarctic 
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the Antarctic region soon led to the view, especially in Australia, of an urgent need 
for formal claims of sovereignty to be extended over territory in Antarctica in order 
to protect those interests more effectively. 
The increase in commercial interests, especially with respect to whaling and sealing, 
dictated much of the early policy adopted towards the Antarctic region. Indeed, it has 
been argued that Australia and Britain annexed the Antarctic continent in order to 
protect their significant commercial interests in the Antarctic region by claiming 
jurisdiction over the latter before their commercial rivals could do likewise. 11 Hall 
notes that: 
"The initial annexation of Antarctica began, in the main, as a 
response to problems, questions and opportunities in what 
Fieldhouse calls 'the periphery'. For example, the concern of the 
Governor of the Falkland Islands about the operations of the 
Compania Argentine de Pesca S.A. on South Georgia 
(communicated to the British Foreign Office, Colonial Office and 
Admiralty), coupled with the Norwegian inquiry about the 
sovereignty of territories located in what is known as Western 
Antarctica, led to the issuing of ordinance to regulate the whole 
fishery of the colony of the Falkland Islands in 1906 and 
subsequent Letters Patent of 1908, which provided Britain with a 
legal foundation to control the expanding whaling industry." 12 
In 1908 and 1917, the British government issued Letters Patent declaring British 
sovereignty over Graham Land and in so doing, they made the first formal claim to 
lands in Antarctica." Australia appears to have fully supported this decision, not 
only because it regarded itself as an integral part of the British Empire but also 
because it too possessed substantial commercial interests in the Antarctic region at 
Treaty, or the other Treaties that require signatories to recognise article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Personal interview with A/Professor Richard Herr. 
11  H. Robert Hall, International Regime Formation And Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic 
Treaty, doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Tasmania, 1994. pp48-49. 
12  H. Robert Hall, International Regime Formation And Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic 
Treaty. pp48-49. 
13  Peter Beck, The International Politics Of Antarctica, London, Croom Helm, 1986. p113. 
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the time. Hobart and Sydney were homes to important whaling and sealing industries 
and the extension of British imperial influence over the Antarctic region would have 
been regarded as reinforcement of the security of its dominion's commercial interests 
in that region. 14 
While its commercial interests were significant, Australia's perception of its strategic 
interests and the importance of assuming greater control and influence over 
developments within the Antarctic region has arguably been a more compelling 
factor driving its support for British annexation of the region. Hall notes that: 
"The region's proximity to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa 
and the Falkland Islands also raised fears in the years immediately 
after World War I that during any future war, enemy submarines 
and aircraft might use Antarctica as a base for raiding operations 
against these Southern parts of the British Empire. Accordingly, 
Antarctica came to be regarded as a significant part of British 
imperial security ... [and consequently important to Australia as 
wel]" 5 
While Australian foreign policy was in its infancy, it was characterised by strong 
suspicions about the intentions of any non-British power that established or sought to 
establish a presence in the vicinity of the Australian continent and it often reacted to 
these powers in a fashion that bordered on paranoia. Thus, Australia's early attitude 
towards non-British powers in the Antarctic region is reminiscent of the attitude that 
it displayed towards similar potential rivals in the South Pacific region (described in 
the previous chapter), where the mere presence of such powers was regarded as a 
possible security threat. Hall observes that: 
"Following the French claim to Adelie Land in 1924, the 
Australian government was stirred into action and extended to 
Antarctica a doctrine of its own — a doctrine also employed in 
14 A. G. Bennett, Whaling in the Antarctic, Edinburgh, W. Blackwood & sons ltd., 1931. 
15 H. Robert Hall, International Regime Formation And Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic 
Treaty. p28. 
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regard to the Pacific Islands south of the equator 'that any land 
within a conveniently undefined distance from Australia should be 
in British possession to insure Australia's insulation from the 
attentions of a hostile power'. " Is 
Therefore, Australia adopted a strategy of defensive and pre-emptive exclusion of all 
potential rivals, save Great Britain, her dominions and allies, in its foreign policy 
towards the Antarctic region prior to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty. During this 
period, Australia consistently advocated opposition to the presence of any power 
within the Antarctic region that might be considered a potential threat to British 
interests and Australian security. The determination of Australia in this regard was 
manifested in the initial attitudes that it adopted towards Japanese and Soviet 
presence in the Antarctic region. 
Australia was strongly opposed to the presence of Japanese whaling fleets in the 
Antarctic region after the Second World War. In a series of communiqués between 
Canberra and Washington in 1947, Australia expressed concerns about the possibility 
of Japanese vessels being used for spying or for other purposes that may be inimical 
to Australian interests." In one such communiqué, Makin, the Australian 
representative to the Far Eastern Commission states: 
"We consider that the presence of Japanese in Australian or 
Antarctic waters constitutes a threat to the security and welfare of 
Australia. Factory ships are capable of conversion into tankers and 
submarine refuelling vessels, and chasers can be converted into 
naval patrol craft." I8 
16  H. Robert Hall, 'International Regime Formation And Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic 
Treaty'. p35. See also C. Hartley Grattan, The Southwest Pacific since 1900: A Modern History — 
Australia, New Zealand, The Islands, Antarctica, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1963. 
pp614-615. 
17  See Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, Volume XII: 1947, W.J. Hudson & Wendy 
Way (eds.), Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995. pp653-661. 
18  'Statement by Makin to the Far Eastern Commission', reproduced in Documents on Australian 
Foreign Policy 1937-49, Volume XII: 1947, W.J. Hudson & Wendy Way (eds.). p655. 
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Although World War II was over, Australia remained suspicious about the presence 
of the Japanese within the Antarctic region during this period. However, 
notwithstanding their success with a similar strategy in the South Pacific region, 19 
Australian (and New Zealand) protests against American `authorisation' 2° for 
Japanese whaling in the Antarctic region were largely unheeded. 21 Australia's great 
and powerful friend, the United States, was at the time more concerned about 
ensuring what it considered to be a successful outcome at the Japanese Peace 
Conference and it was not inclined to acquiesce to Australian wishes in this 
instance.22 Australia's protests against Japanese whaling in the Antarctic region 
highlighted some of the security concerns that influenced its determination to 
exercise control over its geographic region. However, the futility of the protests 
highlighted the limitations of pursuing strategies that are contingent upon the 
concurrence of great power patrons. 
Australia's apprehensions about possible security threats, which may emerge from 
the Antarctic region, were reawakened with the Cold War. And security concerns 
similar to those expressed about the presence of the Japanese in Antarctic waters 
were raised again with the growth of a Soviet presence in the Antarctic region. 
According to Hall: 
"... in Australia at this time, there was much speculation about the 
possible military value of Soviet bases in Antarctica. Echoing 
concerns expressed after World War I, newspaper editorials again 
19 See the previous chapter where the success of the strategy of strategic denial in the South Pacific 
contrasts sharply with Australia's inability to 'deny' the Antarctic region to powers that were 
perceived as potential adversaries. 
29 The United States was at the time responsible for the postwar administration of Japan through 
General MacArthur and was preoccupied with ensuring a 'successful' outcome at the Japanese Peace 
Conference. See 'Statement by Makin to the Far Eastern Commission'. pp655-658. 
21 Similar protests based on ecological arguments were much more successful in later years, 
reaffirming the view that for middle powers, the pursuit of 'universal' causes, especially where they 
coincided with national interests, was a more effective approach to foreign policy. See Chapter 2. 
22 See cablegram from Attlee to Chifley, reproduced in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 
1937-49, Volume XII: 1947, W.J. Hudson & Wendy Way (eds.). pp661-662. 
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prophesized that the Antarctic 'could become the strategic centre 
from which air and naval fleets could threaten vital sea lanes 
around the far corners of Africa, South America and Australia'." 23 
Australia's traditional sense of vulnerability as a small British dominion, which is 
geographically distant from those it considered its allies, as well as the perception of 
threats from hostile great powers, contributed to the fear and insecurity that became a 
constant feature of Australia's early outlook on international relations. 24 
Australian foreign policy, including the policies it adopted towards the Antarctic 
region, has been driven by its need to address the sense of vulnerability described 
above. 25 In his thesis, Hall argues that: 
"... the establishment of the Australian Antarctic Territory can be 
largely explained in terms of ... strategic and security 
considerations, [which] were clearly important with Antarctica 
being perceived by Australia as a proximate geographical area from 
which foreign powers should be excluded by preemptive 
annexations."26 
Nationalistic pride, as well as a sense of ownership in the Antarctic continent 
resulting from discovery and long association, can be cited as reasons for Australia's 
sovereign claims over the Australian Antarctic Territory. However, it is also clear 
that the claims to the Australian Antarctic Territory, at least initially, have been 
strongly motivated by the desire to reinforce the security of the Australian continent 
by establishing Australian jurisdiction and influence over an adjacent and 
geographically proximate region. To allay its fears of a threat from potentially hostile 
foreign power, regardless of whether they are French, German, Japanese or then- 
23  H. Robert Hall, International Regime Formation And Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic 
Treaty. p55. 
24 Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country, Macmillan, London, 1979. 
25 Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country. 
26 H. Robert Hall, International Regime Formation And Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic 
Treaty. p55. 
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Soviet, in its vicinity of its region, Australia had strongly supported the British 
exploration and annexation of Antarctica. In addition, Australia also launched its 
own programme for exploration and annexation. 
The Basis of Australia's Legal Jurisdiction In The Australian Antarctic Territory 
Australia has asserted sovereignty over approximately 42% of the Antarctic 
continent in an area known as the Australian Antarctic Territory." The Australian 
Antarctic Territory is defined as the sector between 45 degrees east to 160 degrees 
east south of 60 degrees south (excluding Adelie Land, which is clamed by the 
French). The Australian Antarctic Territory covers a vast area that spans about 2.4 
million square miles. 
Australia's claims to the Australian Antarctic Territory originated with the British 
and are based on its continuous occupation, administration and control of the area 
claimed. Auburn records that: 
"In 1922 the [British] Colonial Office held: 
The British claim to [the Ross Dependency] rests on discovery ... 
the territories being at the time of discovery, and now, wholly 
uninhabited and never having been at any time inhabited except for 
a few months by scientific expeditions. [D.P. O'Connell and A. 
Riordan (eds.), Opinions on Imperial Constitutional Law (1971), 
311.] 
At the Imperial Conference of 1926, British title by virtue of 
discovery was asserted over the whole of what now constitutes the 
Australian Antarctic Territory. 9,28 
27 Bruce W. Davis & Richard A. Herr, `ATS Decision-Making and Changes: The Role Of Domestic 
Politics In Australia'. pl. 
28 F.M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics. p7. 
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Although the task was obviously daunting, Australia's initial policy preference for 
the Antarctic region supported the annexation of the entire continent or at least as 
much of it as was feasible. 29 In 1930, R.G. Casey, then the Australian Liaison Officer 
to the British Cabinet office in London, reminded J.H. Scullin, who was then 
Australian Prime Minister, that: 
"As to the Antarctic, you will recollect that at the Imperial 
Conference in 1926, it was decided that the aim should be the 
gradual establishment of British control over the whole (or as much 
as possible) of the Antarctic continent, apart from the 
comparatively minor areas to which a good foreign title [Norway's] 
was held to already exist."3° 
The Australian government clearly exerted itself in efforts to reinforce British and 
Australian claims to territory in Antarctica and to make its own claims over the 
Australian Antarctic Territory explicit. Australia made a determined effort to 
reinforce its claims on the Enderby Land-Ross Sea area through initiatives like the 
Discovery Expedition. 3I Sir Douglas Mawson, the great Australian explorer, received 
specific instructions from the Australian Prime Minister, to lay claim or reinforce 
claims to the territory during his exploration of Antarctica. 32 Mawson was asked to 
perform legal rituals including the intonation of formal claims and the planting of the 
flag to solemnise the claims of the British Empire. 33 When exploration and 
commerce were eventually replaced by science as the primary activity in Antarctica, 
Australia established a permanent presence on Antarctica through its research bases, 
which served as visible reminders of its claims and stake in the Australian Antarctic 
29 Keith Suter, Antarctica, Private Property or Public Heritage,  London, Pluto Press, 1991. p87. 
313 Cited in Keith Suter, Antarctica, Private Property or Public Heritage. pp87-88. 
31 Keith Suter, Antarctica, Private Property or Public Heritage. p88. 
32 F.M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics. p10 
33 F.M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics. p10. It should be noted that for a time, Australian claims 
were often made in the name of the British Empire. It is debatable when independent claims by 
Australia were first made, as the actual expression of Australian sovereignty is still a matter of debate 
among constitutional lawyers. Some argue that sovereignty began with the Statue of Westminster 
1931, though it was not till a couple of years later that Australia accepted that fact. Certainly Menzize 
regarded Australia as an integral part of the British Empire as late as the 1950s. 
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Territory. 34 These efforts represented a consistent and continuous effort to 
demonstrate that Australia has an active interest in the Antarctic region and thereby 
entitled to claim influence, if not sovereignty, within the region. 
Australia assumed direct responsibility for the Australian Antarctic Territory 
following the devolution of power from Westminster to the British Dominions in 
1931. 
"[O]n February 7, 1933, a British Order-in-Council established the 
Australian Antarctic Territory, and this was followed in June of 
that year by the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 
under Section 122 of the Australian Constitution. Thus, after more 
than a decade of prompting by interested individuals within the 
Australian Community, and protracted diplomatic discussions 
between Australia and Britain, approximately three-seventh of 
Antarctica was annexed under Australian control." 35 
In law, three Acts of the Australian Parliament represent the foundations of 
Australia's sovereign claim over the Australian Antarctic Territory. They are the 
Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933, the Australian Antarctic 
Territory Act 1954 and the Antarctic Treaty Act 1960. 36 
The scope of Australia's legal jurisdiction over its Antarctic Territories has also been 
clearly defined by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs. In a report clarifying the judicial status of the Australian 
Antarctic Territory, the Committee states that: 
34  On average, about 80 people are recruited to winter at the research bases, with the number increased 
to more than threefold during the summer season. See http://www.antdiv.gov.au/ 
35 H. Robert Hall, 'International Regime Formation And Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic 
Treaty'. p37. 
36 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Australian Law 
In Antarctica,  The Report of the second phase of an inquiry into the legal regimes of Australia's 
external Territories and the Jervis Bay Territory, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, November 1992. p16. 
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"The legal regime of the Australian Antarctic Territory comprises a 
complex mix of Commonwealth legislation, ordinances specific to 
the Territory, applicable laws of the Australian Capital Territory 
and the Jervis Bay Territory, and obligations arising from the 
Antarctic Treaty. The main expression given by the 
Commonwealth to the legal regime for Territory can be found in 
the Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954 which provides for the 
following legislation to apply 
• laws, other than criminal laws, in force in the Australian Capital 
Territory so far as they are applicable and not inconsistent with 
any ordinance made under the Australian Antarctic Territory Act 
(sub-section 6(1)) 
• criminal laws in force in the Jervis Bay Territory so far as they are 
applicable and not inconsistent with any ordinance made under the 
Australian Antarctic Territory Act (sub-section 6 (2)) 
• laws expressly applying to the Territory, for example the Antarctic 
Treaty (Environmental Protection) Act 1980, and Acts expressed 
to extend to the Territory (Section 8); and 
• ordinances made by the Governor-General under section 11 of the 
Australian Antarctic Territory Act."37 
However, the effect of Australian legislation within the Australian Antarctic 
Territory is limited. It has been argued (in the preceding section) that Australia's 
declaration of sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory was initially made 
because it could defend its commercial and other interests more effectively if it could 
exercise legal jurisdiction over the Antarctic region or parts thereof. However, the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959, with its 'article 4 clause' suspending the effects of 
sovereignty, has rendered claims of sovereignty as a means of enforcing jurisdiction 
and defending other interests (apart from the claim itself) largely irrelevant. 38 
With the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, Australia could no longer regard its 
sovereign claims as a means to the end of securing commercial or strategic objectives 
in the Antarctic region. Nevertheless, national pride has its own momentum and the 
preservation of Australian sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory has 
37  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Australian Law 
In Antarctica. p3. 
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become a matter of national interest in its own right. Therefore, Australia continues 
to make periodic symbolic gestures to reinforce its claims to sovereignty over the 
Australian Antarctic Territory even though such gestures appear to have domestic 
significance only and negligible impact with respect to other nations. 
One of the primary issues confronting Australia is the fact that most states do not 
recognise its claims over the Australian Antarctic Territory. And as a middle power, 
Australia lacks the ability to unilaterally enforce jurisdiction over a claim that is not 
recognised. Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand recognise each other's 
Antarctic claims because their respective claims are all derived from a common 
British imperial policy. 39 Australia also secured the recognition of its claims from 
France and Norway in return for recognising their claims in Antarctica.° In addition, 
Australia's claims over Heard Island, McDonald and Macquarie Islands, usually 
referred to as sub-Antarctic territories or islands, are universally recognised and 
undisputed. 4 ' Unfortunately, for Australia, its claims over the Australian Antarctic 
Territory are not recognised by a vast majority of states. In fact, 11 of the 18 
consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty do not recognise the claims of the 7 
claimant states.42 And perhaps most significant of all, the only remaining superpower 
and Australia's ally, the United States does not recognise the Australia's claims, or 
those of any other country, to territory in Antarctica. Therefore, in view of the fact 
that Australia's claims are almost universally disputed, these claims would remain 
(arguably) somewhat meaningless, unless it is able to demonstrate its capacity to 
38  Why and how the Antarctic Treaty provided an alternate means of protecting national interests is 
explored in greater detail later. 
39 Peter Beck, The International Politics Of Antarctica.  p123. 
40 Peter Beck, The International Politics Of Antarctica.  p123. 
41  Christopher C. Joyner, 'The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica: The Dilemmas of Non-
Sovereign Jurisdiction', in Ocean Development and International Law,  Volume 19, 1988. p476. 
42  Sudhir K. Chopra, 'Antarctica As A Commons Regime: A Conceptual Framework For Cooperation 
And Coexistence', in The Antarctic Legal Regime,  Christopher Joyner & Sudhir K. Chopra (eds.), 
Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1988. p164. 
224 
assert de facto sovereignty over the area claimed. This would include the capacity to 
enforce compliance with Australian laws and authority by everyone, including states 
that disputes its sovereign jurisdiction within the Australian Antarctic Territory. 
Australia's inability or reluctance, as a middle power, to compel dissenting states to 
recognise its claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction within the Australian Antarctic 
Territory is clear. 43 In 1979, Australia proclaimed a 200 nm fishing zone, an area 
which would coincide with its claim of an 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone over 
the adjacent waters to all its lands and territories in 1994. 44 However, soon after the 
promulgation of the Australian Fishing Zone, Australia published a government 
gazette notice that exempted foreign vessels in waters within the Antarctic region 
from the jurisdiction of its domestic fisheries legislation. 45 Presumably, this course of 
action by Australia is intended to avoid a confrontation with states that dispute its 
sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territories and therefore its right to enforce 
Australian law in Antarctic waters. 
The House of Representative Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs has criticised the above policy and recommended that Australian laws (and 
consequently Australian sovereignty) be exercised in respect of its claims in 
Antarctic region. 46 However, Australia would certainly be confronted by enormous 
43  It is noteworthy to contrast the limitations of Australia, a middle power, with the United States, a 
great power, which was able to unilaterally declare sovereignty over its continental shelf, and to 
defend those claims in spite of verbose opposition. 
44 Donald R. Rothwell, 'A Maritime Analysis of Conflicting International Law Regimes in Antarctica 
and the Southern Ocean', in The Australian Year Book of International Law 1994, Volume 15, Centre 
for International and Public Law, The Australian National University, 1994. pp164-165. 
45 Donald R. Rothwell, 'A Maritime Analysis of Conflicting International Law Regimes in Antarctica 
and the Southern Ocean'. p164. 
46 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Australian Law 
In Antarctica. p17. Any conflict with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty would be side-stepped by 
exempting from any move to enforce Australian law and sovereignty within the Australian Antarctic 
Territory, any parties to the Antarctic Treaty or any Treaty that made a provision similar to that in 
Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty. 
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logistical difficulties and a heavy fmancial burden if it attempted to enforce its laws 
within the Australian Antarctic Territories and its adjacent territorial waters and 
exclusive economic zone. In view of these administrative challenges, as well as the 
difficulty of predicting the outcome in the event that a confrontation over the status 
of Australia's sovereign claims in Antarctica does arise, discretion might prove the 
better part of valour. Therefore, it is proposed that until a much stronger incentive to 
do otherwise is presented, Australia is likely to avoid acts, which might be deemed 
provocative, in defence of its sovereign claims within the Antarctic region while the 
Antarctic Treaty remained in force. 
Australia's ambition to play a significant and decisive role in the Antarctic region 
was clearly revealed in its foreign policy approach during the pre-Antarctic Treaty 
period. As a middle power, Australia initially sought to entrench its influence within 
the Antarctic region by supporting the annexation of the Antarctic region by the 
British Empire. This approach faltered when its sovereign claims to territory on the 
Antarctic continent were greeted by an almost universal lack of recognition from 
other states. With the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, the issue of 
sovereignty became (arguably) less relevant. Although Australia did not forsake its 
sovereign claims' within the Antarctic region, it appeared prepared to take a less 
aggressive approach to defend those claims. Nevertheless, Australia has been able to 
successfully demonstrate its interests in the Antarctic region through its repeated 
efforts to preserve the status of its sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic 
Territory. These efforts continue in spite of Australia's subsequent accession and 
undeniable commitment to the Antarctic Treaty System, and are also regarded as a 
means to reinforce the legitimacy of its right to a significant role in the Antarctic 
region. 
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Middle Power Influence Through Regional Multilateral Institutional 
Arrangements 
Australia's commitment to the Antarctic Treaty represents a reorientation of its initial 
foreign policy strategy in the Antarctic region. Instead, of a strategy based on the 
annexation of and sovereignty over Antarctica, Australia pursued its objectives 
through multilateral institutional arrangements represented by the Antarctic Treaty 
System. The Antarctic Treaty served many of Australia's interests. The Antarctic 
Treaty has successfully managed the potential conflict over disputed sovereign 
claims in the Antarctic region 47 and established viable forums for multilateral 
decision-making on regional issues. The Antarctic Treaty also initiated and fostered 
the growth of regional multilateral institutional arrangements, which subsequently 
evolved into a network of inter-related regimes known as the Antarctic Treaty 
System and enables a middle power like Australia to defend its interests in the 
Antarctic region more effectively. 
It is argued that Australia has been able to effectively defend its strategic interests, 
especially with regard to its concerns about potential threats to its security, through 
the Antarctic Treaty System. And it will be demonstrated that Australia's 
contemporary influence within the Antarctic region may be credited to its ability, as 
a wealthy and technologically advanced middle power, to exploit the opportunities 
47 W.C. Clemens, The Superpowers And Arms Control,  Lexington Books, Lexington, 1973. pp115 & 
141. J. Goldblat, Agreements For Arms Control: A Critical Survey, Taylor and Francis, London, 
1982. pp60-63. 
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offered by the Antarctic Treaty System to set the agenda on regional issues and 
assume a leadership role. 
The Antarctic Treaty 
The beginning of the second phase of Australia's involvement with Antarctic was 
initiated with the signing of the Antarctic Treaty. Australia initially resisted the 
proposal for an Antarctic Treaty because it harboured hopes that Great Britain, and 
its loyal dominions including Australia, might yet assume sovereignty over most if 
not all of Antarctica. 48 However, the fear that the hostilities of the Cold War might be 
extended to the Antarctic region, as well as the opportunities that emerged with the 
international cooperation on scientific research in Antarctica during the International 
Geophysical Year, led to a revision of prior policies in Australia. Thus, Australia 
signed the Antarctic Treaty in Washington on 1 December 1959 and became one of 
the 12 original signatories and consultative parties to the Treaty. 
Australia's strategic interests in the Antarctic region, especially its concerns about 
potential security threats from the region, are among the issues addressed by the 
Antarctic Treaty. As discussed earlier, apprehensions about security have been a 
well-established feature of Australia's outlook towards the Antarctic region concern 
and have coloured many of its policies. A study group chaired by Sir Anthony 
Parsons also observed that "the country which more than any other appears to 
connect the security condition of Antarctica with its own is Australia." 49 Hemmings 
has also identified 6 categories of potential military-related activity within the 
48  For a more detailed discussion, see H. Robert Hall, 'International Regime Formation And 
Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic Treaty'. 
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Antarctic Treaty Area; logistic and technical support activities, training and 
equipment testing, military-utility research, direct military operations, contingency 
planing for Antarctic operations, and extraneous military factors impacting on 
Antarctica. 50 
The Antarctic Treaty institutionalised a compromise, which saw a de facto 
suspension of sovereignty claims. This diminished sensitivity towards acts by states 
that might otherwise be construed as a provocative attempt to enforce or enlarge 
disputed sovereign claims. In describing the Antarctic Treaty, Beck notes that: 
"Basically, the Antarctic Treaty was designed to create a legal 
framework for the containment of both existing and potential 
politico-legal disputes in order to preserve peace and stability in the 
region and to promote the cause of science and [International 
Geophysical Year] IGY-type cooperation."51 
Thus, the Antarctic Treaty provided Australia and other states with the means to 
ensure that the Antarctic region was not used for purposes that would pose a military 
threat to them. 
The Antarctic Treaty specifically seeks to establish the Antarctic region as a 
geographic area that is, and would remain, demilitarised. Article 1(1) of the Antarctic 
Treaty states: 
"Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be 
prohibited, inter alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the 
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out 
of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of 
weapon." 
49  Report of a Study Group, Sir Anthony Parsons (chairman), Antarctica: The Next Decade, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. p105. 
5°  Alan D. Hemmings, 'Is Antarctica Demilitarised?' in RA. Herr, H.R. Hall, & M.G. Haward (eds.), 
Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change? Tasmania, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
1990. p229. 
5 1 Peter Beck, The International Politics Of Antarctica. p114. 
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Article 1 and Article 5 (which ensures that the Antarctic region remained a nuclear 
free zone) were really intended to address the possibility that the Antarctic region 
might become an arena for hostilities between the protagonists in the Cold War. 
However, these provisions dovetailed neatly with Australia's security interests. By 
prohibiting all military activity within the Antarctic region, the Antarctic Treaty 
effectively neutralised, or at the very least minimised, the danger of a military threat 
to Australia from the Antarctic region. 
The Antarctic Treaty provisions requiring transparency with regard to all activity in 
the Antarctic region also serve Australia's strategic interests. Transparency in the 
Antarctic region provides reassurance, as well as ample warning of any potential 
threat to Australia that might potentially arise. Hemmings, paraphrasing Article VII 
of the Antarctic Treaty, notes that: 
"Observers have 'complete freedom of access at any time to any or 
all areas of Antarctica', all facilities and 'all ships and aircraft at 
points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in 
Antarctica' Aerial inspections may be conducted at any time, in the 
first agreement on an 'open skies' policy. States are to provide 
advance notice of all expeditions and, of especial significance here, 
'any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by 
it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 
2 of Article 1 of the present Treaty'."52 
Therefore, the Antarctic Treaty's prohibition on any military activity within the 
region south of 60° South, as well as its measures to ensure transparency by granting 
the right to station observers, conduct aerial surveillance at any time and exchange 
information, protected Australia's strategic interests within the region. 
52 Alan D. Hemmings, 'Is Antarctica Demilitarised?' p228. 
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The demilitarisation of the Antarctic region is also supported by the fact that Article 
4 of the Antarctic Treaty suspended the effects of all activities purporting to support 
claims to sovereignty or rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. This removed the 
pressure on claimant states to arm themselves in anticipation of a potential military 
conflict over disputed sovereignty, which has traditionally been one of the primary 
causes of conflict between states. Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty states: 
"1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously 
asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any 
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may 
have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in 
Antarctica, or otherwise; 
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards 
its recognition or non-recognition of any other State's rights of or 
claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in 
force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a 
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of 
sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an 
existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be 
asserted while the present Treaty is in force." 
Article 4 provides a clause that many have taken to mean the suspension of the legal 
status of all sovereign claims while the Antarctic Treaty remained in effect. 
However, even though the Antarctic Treaty stipulated that "no acts or activities 
taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, 
supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty", this has not stop claimant 
states from seeking to reinforce the status of their claims. Therefore, in addition to 
the scientific bases that they established in Antarctica, many claimant states also 
perform periodic acts of government, such as the issue of stamps, the registration of 
births, deaths and marriages within their claimed territory in order to demonstrate 
their continuous administration and preserve their sovereignty. Nevertheless, the 
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presence of a postmaster on disputed land is far less provocative than that of an 
armed soldier. Thus, it can be argued that by suspending the status of all sovereignty 
claims within the Antarctic region, the Antarctic Treaty reduced the incentive to 
make such claims, as well as the potential for the sort of political and military 
brinkmanship that usually attend territorial disputes elsewhere. 
The Antarctic Treaty allows Australia to avoid a confrontation with those states that 
dispute its sovereignty over territories and waters within the Antarctic region. It 
might even be argued that the Treaty provides Australia with a convenient excuse to 
exempt itself from sovereign obligations that might be deemed too onerous or 
expensive without sacrificing its claims to the Australian Antarctic Territory. While 
Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty is deliberately vague, it does not appear to prevent a 
claimant state from enforcing its sovereign rights. Instead, it simply preserves those 
sovereign rights in the face of activities that would normally either erode, create or 
enlarge a state's claims to sovereignty. Therefore, claimant states could defer their 
sovereign responsibilities and obligations to regional multilateral arrangements, as 
well as tolerate activities that may normally challenge their claims to sovereignty, 
without compromising those claims. 53 
In the absence of the Antarctic Treaty, Australia would have been compelled to 
defend its sovereign claims to the Australian Antarctic Territory and its adjacent 
waters. This would include preventing unauthorised entry by foreign nationals, 
enforcing Australian law (including laws on taxation, criminal justice, and others), 
preventing the unauthorised exploitation of resources, as well as asserting the other 
rights and obligations of a sovereign within the Australian Antarctic Territory. Given 
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the magnitude of the task and its limitations as a middle power, Australia would find 
it difficult, if not impossible, to unilaterally enforce its jurisdiction over the whole of 
its Antarctic territories while the legitimacy of its claims to the latter remains almost 
universally disputed. 54 Certainly, the challenges that Australia encountered while 
responding to the problem of illegal poaching of Patagonian Toothfish in the 
undisputed waters off its sub-Antarctic possession of Heard Island suggests that 
enforcing its jurisdiction in its Antarctic Territories and adjacent waters would be 
both expensive and difficult. 55 Therefore, it may be argued that Australia is better 
served by holding the status of its claims to the Australian Antarctic Territory in 
abeyance through the Antarctic Treaty until a more propitious time when it is better 
placed to defend those disputed claims, either through international law or sovereign 
might. 
In summary, the Antarctic Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty System enhanced 
Australia's capacity, as a middle power, to defend its strategic interests within the 
Antarctic region. In particular, the Antarctic Treaty System enabled Australia to 
secure its long-standing objective of reducing the possibility of any military threat 
from the direction of the Southern Continent to Australia by prohibiting any military 
activity within the region. 56 As Parsons notes, this view is supported by the fact that 
"the Australian Government has been at pains to point out that the continued 
demilitarisation of the continent remains a substantial factor in assuring the security 
53 J.A. Heap, 'Antarctic Sovereignty: A Source Of Stress?', in R.A. Herr, H.R. Hall, & M.G. Haward 
(eds.), Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change?  Tasmania, Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1990. p187. 
54 Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country.  p526. 
55 Richard Herr, 'Patagonian Toothfish Piracy And Poaching: Inter-Regime Issues In CCAMLR 
Fisheries Management', Polar Oceans and Law of the Sea Workshop, Oslo, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 
2-5 November 1997. 
56Article 1, The Antarctic Treaty, Done at Washington 1 December 1959. 
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of Australia."57 The Antarctic Treaty also protected Australia's strategic interests by 
ensuring transparency within the region and reducing the potential for conflict by 
'suspending' the legal status of sovereignty claims. Therefore, notwithstanding its 
initial reluctance, Australia has since been a strong supporter of the Antarctic Treaty 
and the other multilateral institutional arrangements that have sprung up in its 
wake." 
Defending Australian Interests Through The Antarctic Treaty System 
With the signing of Antarctic Treaty, multilateral institutional arrangements and the 
priority that those arrangements placed on science, formed the basis upon which 
Australia built its influence within the Antarctic region. Australia has no real need to 
exploit the living or non-living resources in the Antarctic region. Nor given its 
current environmental is Australia likely to benefit it in any perceptible material 
fashion from resource exploitation in the Antarctic region, even if its claims there 
were recognised. Therefore, it is argued that most if not all of Australia's policy 
objectives in the Antarctic region are currently and effectively met by the Antarctic 
Treaty System. 
Australia's scientific bases and activity in Antarctica have been regarded by some as 
a testament to Australia's preoccupation with its sovereign claims and the result of its 
need to maintain a material basis for those claims. However, Australia's scientific 
bases and research have also been exploited as a currency of influence within the 
Antarctic region. Through its contributions to Antarctic science and its role in 
57 Report of a Study Group, Sir Anthony Parsons (chairman), Antarctica: The Next Decade, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. p105. 
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regional science agencies, Australia has been able to achieve influence within the 
Antarctic Treaty System and a significant role in the decision making processes for 
the Antarctic region. 
Australia possesses the capacity to exploit the opportunities offered by regional 
multilateral institutional arrangements in order to exercise influence within the 
Antarctic region in several ways. Australia is easily able to satisfy the primary 
requirements of a consultative party as stipulated by the Antarctic Treaty because it 
is a middle power that possesses considerable wealth and technological resources. 
Article 9 subsection 2 of the Antarctic Treaty states: 
"Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present 
Treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint 
representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in 
paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such times as that 
Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by 
conducting substantial research activity there, such as the 
establishment of a scientific station or the despatch of a scientific 
expedition." 
As the establishment of an Antarctic scientific station or the 'despatch of a scientific 
expedition' to Antarctica is a costly exercise, this stipulation obviously limits the 
number of countries that could claim consultative status. In 1997-1998, Australia's 
total outlay for its Antarctic Programme came to A$61, 918, 000. 59 The cost of 
shipping to the Antarctic region averaged A$18 million annually. ° Moreover, apart 
from the financial outlays, there is also the opportunity cost of scientific expertise to 
be considered. The capacity to devote scientific resources to conduct substantial 
research in Antarctica has been a factor that has limited the number of countries able 
to claim consultative resources. For many smaller countries, scientific expertise 
58 The Australian leadership role to preserve the Antarctic Treaty System and defend it against those 
who seek to replace it with global multilateral arrangements is discussed later in the chapter. 
59 http://www.antdiv.gov.au/misc/government.html  
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represent scarce resources that are usually committed to military or economic needs, 
which command a high priority. Therefore, the fiscal, logistical and other costs of 
active participation in Antarctic affairs meant that small or poor countries had little 
or no say in Antarctic affairs or the direction of the Antarctic Treaty System. 61 And 
apart from New Zealand and Finland, which may be described as wealthy and 
technologically advanced, none of the other consultative parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty are likely to be regarded as small powers. 
Australia's capacity to maintain its status as an Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party 
(ATCPs) enables it to claim substantial influence within the Antarctic region. ATCPs 
are responsible for many of the regulatory arrangements implemented within the 
Antarctic Region. Article 9 subsection 1 confers on ATCPs the right to meet: 
"... at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging 
information, consulting together on matters of common interest 
pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and 
recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of 
the principles and objectives of the Treaty, including measures 
regarding: 
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; 
(c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in 
Antarctica; 
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection 
provided for in Article VII of the Treaty; 
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica; 
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in 
Antarctica."62 
In effect, when consensus is reached among the ATCPs, their recommendations may 
be regarded as de facto 'law' for the Antarctic region. 63 ATCPs are also better 
60  http://www.antdiy.goy.au/misc/goyernment.html  
61 Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica. p275. 
62 Article 9 (1), The Antarctic Treaty, Done at Washington 1 December 1959. 
63 Article 9 (4), The Antarctic Treaty. 
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informed about developments in the Antarctic region. Article 7 of the Antarctic 
Treaty provides Consultative Parties with rights to designate observers, conduct 
aerial surveillance and be notified on practically all activity within the Antarctic 
region. The Antarctic Treaty provides for a wide range of measures designed to 
ensure transparency within the region and ATCPs are assured that reports from 
designated observers, as well as all other intelligence gathered under the terms of the 
Antarctic Treaty, is shared with them. 64 
The special status of the ATCPs is also acknowledged in the other multilateral 
arrangements that form the Antarctic Treaty System. For example, the Convention 
On The Conservation Of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 
specifically refers to the special role of the ATCPs. Article 5 of CCAMLR states: 
"(1) The Contracting Parties which are not Parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty acknowledge the special obligations and responsibilities of 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties for the protection and 
preservation of the environment of the Antarctic Treaty area. 
(2) The Contracting Parties which are not Parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty agree that, in their activities in the Antarctic Treaty area, 
they will observe as and when appropriate the Agreed Measures for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora and such other 
measures as have been recommended by the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties in fulfilment of their responsibility for the 
protection of the Antarctic environment from all forms of harmful 
human interference."65 
The level of influence possessed by the ATCPs may be inferred from the fact that 
many of the states which are ATCPs are also among those most strongly involved 
with the other multilateral regulatory instruments in the Antarctic region. Indeed, 
many of the other multilateral institutional arrangements, including the Convention 
on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities and the Convention for 
64 Article 9 (3), The Antarctic Treaty. 
65 Article 5, Convention On The Conservation Of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,  Done at 
Canberra, 20 May 1980. 
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the Conservation of Antarctic Seals were initiated by the ATCPs at Consultative 
Parties meetings. Thus, as an ACTP, Australia enjoys many opportunities to propose 
and negotiate regulatory measures for the Antarctic region, as well as the right to 
effectively veto any such measures deemed inimical to its interests. 
Advancing Australia's Non Security Related Interests In The Antarctic Region 
Australia's early efforts in foreign policy within the Antarctic region were primarily 
directed at defending its strategic and economic interests and its attempts to bring the 
Antarctic region under its influence through annexation were intended to accomplish 
that end. However, since Australia signed the Antarctic Treaty, its objectives have 
been expanded to include defending 'universal' environmental values and scientific 
interests in the Antarctic region. In 1989, the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs outlined Australia's interests in the 
Antarctic region as follows: 
"The Government defined Australia's Antarctic Policy objectives 
as: 
• to preserve our sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic 
Territory, including our sovereign rights over the adjacent offshore 
areas; 
• to maintain Antarctica free from strategic and/or political 
confrontations; 
• to protect the Antarctic environment, having regard to its 
special qualities and effects on region; 
• to take advantage of the special opportunities Antarctica 
offers for scientific research; 
• to be informed about and able to influence developments in a 
region geographically proximate to Australia; and 
• to derive any reasonable economic benefits from living and 
non-living resources of the Antarctic (excluding the deriving of 
such benefits from mining and oil drilling)." 66 
66 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Australian Law 
In Antarctica. p12. 
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It is clear that Australia's interests in Antarctica have changed over time. For 
example, Australia's initial interest in securing whaling rights in Antarctic waters 
and protecting its whaling industry has changed over the years to a stance 
vehemently opposed to whaling and supportive of a moratorium on whaling in the 
Southern Ocean. 
The objectives cited by the House of Representatives Standing Committee appear to 
be a fair reflection of Australia's interests in the Antarctic region since it signed the 
Antarctic Treaty and enjoys bipartisan support. 67 The current Australian government 
(the Liberal-National coalition 1996-1998) defined its objectives in Antarctica as: 
• "maintaining the Antarctic Treaty System and Australia's influence 
in the System; 
• understanding global climate change; 
• undertaking scientific work of practical importance; and 
• protecting the Antarctic environment."68 
Thus, apart from its security-related interests, Australia has also focused on the 
issues of science and the environment in its policies towards the Antarctic Region. 
Therefore, it is proposed that Australia's enthusiastic endorsement of the Antarctic 
Treaty System may also be attributed to the fact that these arrangements promote 
Australia's major policy objectives with respect to the region. Essentially, the 
Antarctic Treaty System offers a middle power like Australia the opportunity to 
influence regional policies on the environmental and science, as well as a mechanism 
to defend those interests effectively. 
67  Bruce W. Davis and Richard A. Herr, `ATS Decision-Making and Changes: The Role Of Domestic 
Politics In Australia'. p3. 
68 http://www.antdiv.gov.au/misc/goverrunent.html.  
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Science An Interest And An Opportunity In The Antarctic Region 
As discussed briefly earlier, Australia's ability to exercise influence through the 
multilateral institutional arrangements for the Antarctic region has been related to its 
capacity to conduct substantial scientific research in the region. However, in addition 
to the fact that scientific research bought Australia its ACTP status, science has also 
been significant in other ways. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Australia's commitment to the Antarctic Treaty since 
its inception has been strong and constant, it can be argued that Australia's 
confidence in the Antarctic Treaty continues to be tempered by wariness. Thus, even 
though the Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty stipulates that no actions by the 
signatories would add or detract from their sovereign claims during the period while 
the Treaty was in force, Australia still perceives the necessity to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of its claims in the Antarctic region. Or as the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs puts it: 
"... the stipulation that acts taking place while the Antarctic Treaty 
is in force do not constitute a basis for asserting or supporting a 
claim [does not] mean that those acts are themselves prohibited by 
the Treaty." 69 
Therefore, in addition to the ostensible purpose of conducting scientific research, 
Australian scientific bases are maintained at considerable cost in order to highlight 
Australia's continuous presence and administration within the area it has claimed. 
Indeed, Professor David Caro, Chairman of the Australian Antarctic Research Policy 
Advisory Committee argued a connection between research and sovereignty in 
Antarctica and proposed that Australia's claim to sovereignty would be less plausible 
69  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Australian Law 
In Antarctica. p14. 
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if it was not matched by active and visible contributions to international scientific 
research on Antarctica." Therefore, a permanent scientific presence in Antarctica has 
become the primary basis upon which Australia's sovereign claims there are 'kept 
alive'. 
Australia's expression of interest in the Antarctic region, as well as the basis of its 
right to influence developments there, has been demonstrated and asserted through 
its commitment to science in the period following the signing of the Antarctic Treaty. 
The possession of scientific expertise and other scientific resources provides 
Australia with a 'ticket' to influential committees and other intergovernmental 
groups responsible for setting the agenda for decision making in the Antarctic region. 
The capacity to mobilise scientific research and data to support and legitimate causes 
has also become an important instrument for lobbying and influencing policy within 
the Antarctic region. Thus, scientific activity is effectively translated into political 
influence, thereby giving an additional incentive for scientific research. 
The role of science has been highlighted in every Treaty or arrangement within the 
Antarctic Treaty System. Beginning with the International Geophysical Year in 
1958, international co-operation with respect to science in Antarctica has been the 
norm and a influential epistemic community concerned with Antarctic science has 
since helped to maintain the important role occupied by science within the Antarctic 
region. The institutional role of science in the Antarctic region began with the 
Antarctic Treaty, which formalised the process began in 1958 and opened up 
Antarctica to scientific research by putting aside the dispute over territorial claims 
there. Article 2 of the Antarctic Treaty calls for the freedom of scientific 
7° Cited in Peter Beck, The International Politics Of Antarctica.  p131. 
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investigation in Antarctica and co-operation toward that end similar to that 
demonstrated during the International Geophysical Year. Article 3 of the Antarctic 
Treaty provides for the exchange of plans for scientific programs in Antarctica, the 
exchange of scientific personnel between expeditions and stations, and the exchange 
of and free access to scientific observations and results from Antarctica - to the 
greatest extent feasible and practicable. Article 9 of the Antarctic Treaty adds a 
political incentive for states to participate in science by making the display of a 
strong commitment to scientific research in the Antarctic region a prerequisite to 
being a Consultative Party to the Antarctic Treaty. 
Realists might argue that science in the Antarctic region has had special significance 
only because of the need to cater to the unique and compelling political 
circumstances discussed earlier in this chapter, especially as a distraction from the 
disputed sovereign claims in the Antarctic region. However, the desire "to take 
advantage of the special opportunities Antarctica offers for scientific research" 
should also be regarded as a separate and a genuine expression of Australia's interest 
in scientific research per se. It has been noted that Antarctica offers a pristine 
environment for scientific research not available anywhere else on the planet and that 
the remote and virgin continent provided the means for scientists to conduct studies 
not possible in places contaminated by dense human habitation. 71 Australia's 
interests in Antarctic science enables it to occupy an important niche for 
specialisation and to play an important role in international scientific research. 
Antarctic research also provides Australia with important meteorological and 
oceanographic data that have a direct bearing on the lives and livelihood of many 
Australians, especially farmers, fishermen, pilots and sailors. The fact that obtaining 
71 Peter Beck, The International Politics Of Antarctica. pp95-111. 
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such data may also be significant, in terms of incidental surveillance over 
developments within the Antarctic region that might affect Australian strategic 
interests, simply adds to its value. 
The significance of science in the Antarctic region is also reflected in the fact that 
each of the treaties comprising the Antarctic Treaty System has made scientific 
research the basis of decision-making. Article 5 of the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) pertaining to the exchange of information 
and scientific advice states: 
"(4) SCAR is invited: 
(a) to assess information received pursuant to this Article; 
encourage exchange of scientific data and information among the 
Contracting Parties; recommend programmes for scientific 
research; recommend statistical and biological data to be collected 
by sealing expeditions within the Convention area; and suggest 
amendments to the Annex; and 
(b) to report on the basis of the statistical, biological and other 
evidence available when the harvest of any species of seal in the 
Convention area is having a significantly harmful effect on the total 
stocks of such species or on the ecological system in any particular 
locality. 
(5) SCAR is invited to notify the Depositary which shall report 
to the Contracting Parties when SCAR estimates in any sealing 
season that the permissible catch limits for any species are likely to 
be exceeded and, in that case, to provide an estimate of the date 
upon which the permissible catch limits will be reached. Each 
Contracting Party shall then take appropriate measures to prevent 
its nationals and vessels under its flag from killing or capturing 
seals of that species after the estimated date until the Contracting 
Parties decide otherwise."72 
Similarly, the preamble to the Convention On The Conservation Of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) clearly establishes its commitment to the fact that: 
72 Article 5 (4) & (5), Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, Done at London on 1 June 
1972. 
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"... it is essential to increase knowledge of the Antarctic marine 
ecosystem and its components so as to be able to base decisions on 
harvesting on sound scientific information."73 
Article 9 of CCAMLR also indicates that the primary responsibility of its 
Commission is to conduct scientific research on and provide advice for the 
conservation of marine living resources in the Antarctic region, which clearly 
reiterates the importance of science in the decision-making process for the Antarctic 
region. 
Similar provisions giving science a prominent role in the decision making process 
may be found in the other multilateral institutional arrangements for the Antarctic 
region. For example, the `still-born' Convention For The Regulation Of Antarctic 
Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA) places a premium on scientific research 
and scientific advice. Article 21 of CRAMRA required its Commission (a body not 
unlike that established for CCAMLR): 
"to facilitate and promote the collection and exchange of scientific, 
technical and other information and research projects necessary to 
predict, detect and assess the possible environmental impact of 
Antarctic mineral resource activities, including the monitoring of 
key environmental parameters and ecosystem components." 74 
Science as the basis of decision making is again affirmed by the Madrid Protocol to 
the Antarctic Treaty in 1990. Article 10 of the Protocol requires decision-making by 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to draw "upon the best scientific and technical 
advice available". 75 The Committee for Environmental Protection was established 
under Article 11 of the Madrid Protocol "to provide advice and formulate 
73 Convention On The Conservation Of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Done at Canberra, 20 
May 1980. 
74 Article 21, Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, Done at 
Wellington 2 June 1988. The Commission is established under article 18. 
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recommendations to the Parties in connection with the implementation of [the] 
Protocol, including the operation of its Annexes". 76 The Committee is also required, 
"as appropriate, [to] consult with the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, 
the Scientific Committee for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
and other relevant scientific, environmental and technical organizations." 77 
Therefore, science plays a significant role throughout the decision-making processes 
established by the regional multilateral arrangements for the Antarctic region, and 
Australia, through its commitment to scientific activity and the Antarctic Treaty 
System, is able to exercise considerable influence. 
Australia's influence and its ability to defend its interests within the Antarctic region 
have been facilitated by its significant role in Antarctic science, and the strong role 
that science has played in that region. Australia's deep involvement with Antarctic 
science raises the possibility that it could potentially influence the agenda on regional 
issues through science. For example, Australia has an active role in the Scientific 
Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR), and SCAR plays an important part in 
decision-making processes within the Antarctic region. Christopher Beeby observed 
that "SCAR has from the beginning, and in addition to its other functions, played a 
major part in providing scientific advice to the system." 78 Indeed, SCAR has many 
responsibilities and these include its role in helping to set the agenda for ATCP 
meetings and the fact that it is often consulted for scientific advice and policy 
75 Article 10, Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty,  Done at Madrid on 4 
October 1991. 
76 Article 12 (1), Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. 
77 Article 12 (2), Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. 
78 Christopher D Beeby, 'The Antarctic Treaty System: Goals, Performance and Impact', in The 
Antarctic Treaty System In World Politics,  Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng (eds.), London, 
MacMillan, 1991. pll. 
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making by the other regional regulatory arrangements for the Antarctic region. 79 
There are 32 state members of SCAR and Australia's prominent role is reflected in 
the fact that Australians head 2 of the 8 permanent working groups maintained by 
SCAR, and it is strongly represented in the management and the other programmes 
of SCAR.8° While there is no suggestion that scientific advice has been 'rigged' to 
advance national interests, it would be natural to assume that such advice would tend 
to reflect the national research priorities of the scientists, as well as the cultural 
outlook of their respective societies. 
Australia, the Antarctic Treaty System and Environmental Values 
Australia's significant role in science also enabled it to play a leading role and an 
effective one in the promotion of environmental values, as well as the 
implementation of conservation measures that coincide with its own interests, within 
the Antarctic region. Australia's desire "to protect the Antarctic environment, having 
regard to its special qualities and effects on region" 81 is also a clear projection of the 
environmental values and issues that dominate much of its domestic politics. 
Australia's environmental agenda for the Antarctic region includes protecting the 
ecology of Antarctica, its cultural and historical artefacts, as well as the aesthetic 
value of Antarctica as a pristine wilderness. Indeed, the protection of the Antarctic 
environment (and indeed all environments) is a policy objective that has become 
79 W.M. Bush, 'The Antarctic Treaty System: A Framework For Evolution, The concept Of A 
System', in R.A. Herr, H.R. Hall, & M.G. Haward (eds.), Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change? 
Tasmania, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1990. p130. 
8° Chief Officers of permanent working groups include A. Clarke in Geodesy and Geographic 
Information & Dr D. J. Lugg in Human Biology and Medicine. One of the two current vice-presidents 
of SCAR is also an Australian, PG Quilty. 
81 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Australian Law 
In Antarctica. p12. 
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embedded, along with such themes as egalitarianism or social welfare, as a core 
value in Australian political culture and pursued as a matter of course. 
Most, if not all, of the multilateral institutional arrangements comprising the 
Antarctic Treaty System touch upon environmental issues in some way. The Agreed 
Measures on Flora and Fauna (1962) established some of the earliest environmental 
laws for the Antarctic region. CCAS and CCAMLR specifically addressed the issue 
of conservation of marine life in the Antarctic region. The CCAS dealt with the issue 
of reviving the seal population in the Antarctic region, which had been decimated by 
indiscriminate hunting in an earlier era. CCAMLR took up the challenge to conserve 
and protect all Antarctic marine life. Environmental protection is a major theme of 
the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. And even though CRAMRA has been 
called a minerals exploitation regime, its primary concern appears to be to ensure 
that that activities pertaining to minerals exploration and exploitation do not 
adversely affect the Antarctic environment. Thus, the emphasis on the conservation 
and protection of the Antarctic environment in the Antarctic Treaty System accord 
with Australia's own environmental values and its interests. 
Australia's innate capabilities as a middle power, coupled with the opportunities 
offered by the Antarctic Treaty System has enabled it to defend its environmental 
values effectively in the Antarctic region. Australia's status as an ATCP and a 
signatory to the various regional conventions, as well as its significant role in 
Antarctic science, enables it to exercise considerable influence with regard to its 
environmental objectives on the Antarctic region. As a Consultative Party to the 
Antarctic Treaty, Australia held a special status within the Antarctic region. This 
includes the power to make recommendations binding on non-consultative parties to 
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the Treaty, privileges pertaining to the appointment of officials on a range of 
multilateral instruments and the right to be consulted on a variety of issues with 
regard to the regulation of the Antarctic region. Australia's heavy involvement with 
Antarctic science and the strong role of science in the regional decision-making 
processes opened another avenue for influence in the Antarctic region. Certainly, if 
the experience prior to the Antarctic Treaty is any indication, then Australia has been 
able to exercise far greater influence through the regional multilateral institutional 
arrangements for the Antarctic region. One indication of this is the relatively 
successful implementation of a whale sanctuary in the Antarctic region through the 
aegis of the Antarctic Treaty System, which contrasts sharply with Australia's failure 
to prevent Japanese whaling in the region after the Second World War. 
In summary, the second phase of Australia's involvement with the Antarctic region 
marked a shift by Australia towards regional multilateral institutional arrangements 
as a means of achieving its objectives. The Antarctic Treaty System provided a 
middle power like Australia with a vehicle to legitimate its interest in the Antarctic 
region. The general perception is that the decision making process in regional 
arrangements such as the Antarctic Treaty System is based on multilateral consensus. 
Thus, such decisions have greater legitimacy than unilateral decisions on matters 
may affect the interests of more than one state. Australia has also been able to 
assume an influential role in the decision-making process. Australia's influential 
position within the Antarctic Treaty System was achieved through its status as an 
ATCP and its significant role in Antarctic science. Thus, the Antarctic Treaty System 
provided Australia with the regional influence that it had sought without success 
through its earlier attempts to annex the Antarctic continent. 
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A Regional Power 
The third phase of Australia's involvement in the Antarctic region is characterised by 
its resistance to global multilateral arrangements that might have supplanted the 
Antarctic Treaty System as the primary regulatory authority and forum for decision-
making in that region. The trigger for this phase was CRAMRA, which introduced a 
chain of events that led some developing nations to regard the Antarctic Treaty 
System as a 'rich man's club'. This resulted in a debate over the status of Antarctica 
and the appropriate forum for decision-making on issues pertaining to that region. 
Australia demonstrated its effectiveness as a middle power within the Antarctic 
region when it successfully led the campaign to reject CRAMRA and when it took 
up a leadership role to resist the attempt to substitute the Antarctic Treaty System 
with broader global multilateral arrangements. 
This section reviews the role that Australia has played as a regional power to resist 
the introduction of CRAMRA. It argues that Australia's effectiveness as a middle 
power within the Antarctic region provided it with sufficient influence to 
successfully resist developments it does not favour. It further contends that 
Australia's resistance to CRAMRA should not be seen as opposition to regional 
regulatory arrangements per se but as its government's perception of its domestic 
political interests and the need to be seen by its constituents as being opposed to any 
initiative that sanctions mining in Antarctica. And that Australia's leading role in 
successfully defending and reinforcing the role of regional multilateral arrangements 
for the Antarctic region against efforts to replace these arrangements with global 
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multilateral arrangements highlights its commitment to the former and its status as a 
regional power. 
The Power To Say 'No' To CRAMRA 
In politics, the power to 'veto' is a highly suggestive indicator of power and 
influence. Thus, Australia's ability to 'veto' the introduction of CRAMRA in the 
Antarctic region is significant. Australia's role in defming environmental policy for 
the Antarctic region, first by rejecting CRAMRA and then by successfully 
supporting the Madrid Protocol and a moratorium on mining, demonstrates its 
effectiveness as a middle power and provides proof of its ability to shape 
developments within the region through multilateral institutional arrangements. 
There has always been much speculation about the amount of mineral wealth that 
could be harvested from Antarctica and the Southern Oceans. Certainly, the 
possibility of vast untapped resources in the Antarctic region was one of the main 
incentives that prompted Australia and other states to stake their claims to territory in 
Antarctica in an earlier era. 82 Christopher Joyner summed up the situation succinctly 
when he cited Admiral Byrd: 
"In 1953 Admiral Richard Byrd stated that Antarctica was a vast, 
untouched reservoir of natural resources. He also posited in 
reference to Antarctica that [a]s we recklessly squander our natural 
resources in this country, ... we will come to need new resources. It 
is imperative that they do not fall into the hands of a potential 
enemy ' ,,83 
82 It was also the reason why developing states attempted to stake a claim to resources within the 
region under the principle of common heritage. This issue is discussed later in the chapter. 
83 Christopher Joyner, 'The United States And Antarctica: Rethinking The Interplay Of Law And 
Interests', in Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 20, 1987. p89. 
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Thus, attitudes towards mineral resources have traditionally been coloured by the 
perception of Antarctica as a rich land of mineral resources and many states have 
exhibited a desire to appropriate this potential source of mineral wealth for 
themselves. The other factor that has influenced attitudes with regard to mineral 
resources in Antarctica has been the growing environmental consciousness that 
began (arguably) in the 1970s. The Stockholm Declaration, 84 the Brandt85 and 
Bruntland Reports86 contributed to the growth of the environmental movement and 
popular demands for environmental protection. This resulted in the recognition by 
many states of the need to prevent developmental priorities from compromising 
ecological values, at least in rhetoric if not always in practice. 
The recognition that there was great potential for mining in the Antarctic region was 
coupled with the desire to protect the region from the adverse effects that might 
accompany any such activity. In 1975, a proposal by New Zealand to ban all mining 
activity in Antarctica was rejected. 87 However, in 1970, New Zealand raised the issue 
again at the sixth ATCP meeting in Tokyo and proposed a regulatory regime for 
mining activity in the Antarctic region. 88 The interest in the minerals potential of the 
Antarctic region continued to grow and led to an agreement at an ATCP meeting in 
1981 to produce a convention that would regulate all mining activity in the Antarctic 
region. This resulted in negotiations that eventually resulted in the treaty known as 
" Declaration Of The United Nations Conference On The Human Environment, The United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, Having met at Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972. 
85 Willy Brandt, North-South: A Programme For Survival: Report Of The Independent Commission 
On International Development Issues, London, Pan Books, 1980. 
86 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1987. 
87 Christopher Beeby, 'The Convention on the regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities and 
its future'. p49. 
88 Christopher Beeby, 'The Convention on the regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities and 
its Future', in R.A. Herr, H.R. Hall, & M.G. Haward (eds.), Antarctica's Future: Continuity or 
Change? Tasmania, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1990. pp47-48. 
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the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
(CRAMRA). 
Many ATCPs had believed that mining in Antarctica was inevitable and that a 
blanket ban on mining activities, including the exploration for minerals, was 
infeasible. CRAMRA was seen as an option that satisfied the demands of political 
and economic realities while ensuring that the "protection of the Antarctic 
environment [remained] an over-riding thing running right throughout the text of the 
Convention."89 However, CRAMRA floundered when Australia and France decided 
to reject the Convention. And strong sentiment against mining in the Antarctic region 
coupled with the promotion of environmental values as the paramount consideration 
in all policy affecting the Antarctic region resulted in the 'still-birth' of CRAMRA. 
The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty was adopted a few years later. 
The capacity of Australia to succeed in pushing its vision of environmental 
protection for the Antarctic region forward whereas New Zealand failed is 
suggestive. 90 It raises the argument that in contrast to a small power like New 
Zealand, Australia as a middle power has sufficient influence within the Antarctic 
region to make its wishes 'stick'. Australian NGOs led the charge against CRAMRA, 
and subsequently lobbied strongly and successfully for a moratorium on mining in 
the Madrid Protocol. Australian politicians and diplomats were also quick and 
flexible in exploiting the moment, and the activities and energy of the NG0s, to seize 
a leadership role — first in rejecting CRAMRA, and then in proposing the Madrid 
Protocol. In both, the opportunities provided by the Antarctic Treaty System proved 
89 Christopher Beeby, 'The Convention on the regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities and 
its future'. p52. 
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crucial and enabled a middle power like Australia to pursue an effective strategy of 
middlepowermanship. 
Australia's success in leading the campaign to reject CRAMRA may be attributed to 
several factors. Where New Zealand had attempted to introduce a new regulatory 
arrangement for the Antarctic region, Australia was engaged in the relatively more 
simple task of rejecting a new regulatory arrangement. Article 62 (1) of CRAMRA 
states: 
"This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day 
following the date of deposit of instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession by 16 Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties which participated as such in the final session 
of the Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, 
provided that number includes all the States necessary in order to 
establish all of the institutions of the Convention in respect of every 
area of Antarctica, including 5 developing countries and 11 
developed countries." 
In effect, all seven of the claimant states had to ratify the CRAMRA before it could 
come into effect. 91 Thus, as a claimant state, Australia simply had to exercise its 
implied right of veto by abstention from the treaty in order to prevent CRAMRA 
from coming into force. This was also a demonstration of the influence that Australia 
could wield, as an ATCP, in terms of the regulatory arrangements that were 
implemented within the Antarctic region. Australia's lead in refusing to sign the 
convention was quickly followed by France. Other states soon expressed their 
sympathy for Australia's position and the mood rapidly switched from a desire to 
regulate all minerals activity to a ban on all minerals activity. 92 Therefore, when 
Australia seized the option, provided under Article 12 (2a) of the Antarctic Treaty, to 
" It may be simply a reflection of the bias of the English speaking world, but it is a curious fact that in 
the bulk of the literature on CRAMRA, the role of France receives cursory attention while Australia's 
opposition is covered in considerable detail. 
91 Keith Suter, Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage. p46 & p59. 
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call for a review of the Antarctic Treaty, it was able to successfully propose the 
Madrid Protocol and a moratorium on mining in Antarctica. 
Australia's success might also be due to the possibility that, as a middle power, it had 
the capacity to mobilise popular opinion and resources that New Zealand lacked. 
Non government organisations based in Australia, such as the Antarctic and Southern 
Ocean coalition, could reach across the Pacific to inspire similar groups in the United 
States and elsewhere and fan the growing international opposition towards minerals 
activity in the Antarctic region. 93 Australia's leadership on Antarctic issues, as 
demonstrated by the role that it adopted in defending the status of the ATCPs and the 
regional arrangements for Antarctica from the challenges in the United Nations 
initiated by Malaysia in this same period, might also have added to its stature and 
influence. 94 Thus, Australia was able to succeed in leading a successful challenge to 
the adoption of CRAMRA, which had hitherto enjoyed both American and British 
support. And to successfully lead the lobby for a moratorium on all mining activities 
in the Antarctic region through the adoption of the Madrid Protocol some years later. 
Australia's success might also be due to the fact that it pursued a regional strategy. 
New Zealand's previous proposal for a World Park had the potential to threaten the 
influence of the ATCPs by `globalising' the regulation of the Antarctic region. While 
the details were never fleshed out, New Zealand's proposal for a 'world park' in the 
Antarctic region, under the regulation of an institution that was 'global' as opposed 
to 'regional' might also have compromised the sovereign claims of many ATCPs. In 
92 Keith Suter, Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage. p46. 
93 See for example, James N. Barnes, Antarctica: The Politics Of Protection, paper presented at the 
16th technical meeting, International Union For Conservation Of Nature And Natural Resources, 
Madrid, Spain, 5-14 November 1984. 
94 The issue of Australia's role in defending the status of ATCPs and regional arrangements will be 
discussed at greater depth later in the chapter. 
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contrast, Australia pursued its interests within Antarctic Treaty System without 
compromising the influence of the ATCPs or the sovereign claims of the claimant 
states. While there were accusations levelled against Australia for having caused 
dissension within the ranks of the ATCPs by its rejection of CRAMRA, nevertheless 
notwithstanding the failure of CRAMRA itself, the influence of the ATCPs within 
the Antarctic region remained paramount and the mechanisms of the Antarctic Treaty 
System remained strong. Moreover, Australia's move to champion the environmental 
cause within the Antarctic region through the Madrid Protocol was firmly based on 
the procedures and opportunities afforded by the Antarctic Treaty System, 
recognition of the primacy of the Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty and the special 
position of the ATCPs. 95 Thus, while Australia challenged the illusion of consensus 
within the Antarctic Treaty System, it had never challenged the system itself. 
There is little doubt that Australia exploited environmental causes within the 
Antarctic region for domestic political reasons. 96 Non government organisations in 
Australia, such as the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition and Greenpeace, were 
vigorously opposed to CRAMRA and suspicious of its motives. They believed that 
the convention might have represented an attempt to open up and divide Antarctica 
for mining under the guise of environmental concern. The Hawke Labor government 
was swift to sense the mood of the increasingly 'green' electorate in Australia and 
respond by joining France in resisting CRAMRA. While the move was regarded by 
cynicism by some, it did Australia no harm in the eyes of its domestic constituents or 
among the international environmental lobby, which had grown in influence and 
strength. 
95 In particular, see Article 4, Article 5 and Article 6 of the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, 
1990. 
96 Bruce W. Davis and Richard A. Herr, ATS Decision-Making and Changes: The Role Of Domestic 
Politics In Australia. pp8-9. 
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Bob Hawke, who was Prime Minister at the time, summed up Australia's position on 
CRAMRA when he said: 
"The Minerals Convention might provide for some a dangerous 
illusion of environmental protection. But by permitting immediate 
prospecting and setting out a path by which mining might proceed, 
it will in fact be working in precisely the opposition direction. So 
with France, Australia is pursuing the initiative of a comprehensive 
environmental protection convention which will establish 
Antarctica as a 'Natural Reserve — Land of Science'." 97 
In essence, this was not dissimilar to the proposition first raised by New Zealand. 
However, Australia's success might be explained by the argument that it simply 
championed the right cause at the right time. It was also able to capitalise on the 
popular sentiment favouring stronger international environmental protection 
measures following the Exxon Valdez disaster. In exploiting these and the other 
opportunities provided by the Antarctic Treaty System, in particular, the influence 
commanded by Consultative Parties, Australia has simply exhibited the classical 
attributes of middlepowermanship to play an influential leadership role as a middle 
power in the Antarctic region. 98 
The Relationship Between Regional And Global Multilateral Institutional 
Arrangements 
Australia's foreign policy towards the Antarctic region demonstrates a commitment 
towards multilateralism and regionalism. However, there was tension when broader 
and more inclusive expressions of multilateralism threatened to erode regionalist 
97 R.J.L. Hawke, 'Australia's Policy in Antarctica', in R.A. Herr, H.R. Hall, & M.G. Haward (eds.), 
Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change? Tasmania, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
1990. p19. 
256 
arrangements upon which Australia's influence as a middle power is contingent. 
Competing interests with regard to the future of Antarctica saw an attempt by 
developing nations to remove the regional multilateral arrangements for the Antarctic 
region, or at least subordinate them, and to make global multilateral institutions the 
principal regulatory instruments for that region. However, Australia successfully 
resisted this potential erosion of its influence in the Antarctic region, and 
demonstrated the priority that it places on the Antarctic Treaty System and the 
importance of such regional arrangements to middle powers. 
Before addressing the significance of the tension between regional and global 
multilateral institutional arrangements for middle powers like Australia in the 
Antarctic region, it is necessary to briefly review the relationship between these two 
sets of institutional arrangements. While they may, to some extent be isolated from 
the general state system, regional subsystems remain inevitably a part of the whole. 
Thus, the Antarctic Treaty System does not exist in an international vacuum but is 
situated within the context of the general state system. Normative principles and 
practices that are an inherent part of global arrangements also shape the nature of 
regional sub-systems and affect many of the policies implemented within these sub-
systems, including the Antarctic Treaty System. Many global agencies are linked 
with the Antarctic Treaty System. They include the World Meteorological 
Organisation, the United Nations Environment Program, the Food Aid Organisation, 
the World Health Organisation, the International Maritime Organisation, the 
98 Refer to Chapter 3 and the discussion of the attributes of middlepowermanshIP espoused by Cox, 
Cooper, Higgot & Nossal. 
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International Telecommunications Union, the United Nations Development Program 
and UNESC0. 99 Stuart Harris observes that: 
"The Antarctic treaty encourages cooperation with UN specialised 
agencies having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica, and 
such scientific or technical interest in Antarctica, and such 
scientific and technical cooperation, as defined by the ATS parties, 
has been extensive." 1°° 
While linkages to global arrangements exist, the parties to the Antarctic Treaty 
System, especially the ATCPs, have been wary about the involvement of non 
regional instruments in Antarctic affairs. In particular, after the principle of 'common 
heritage' grew in significance and was advocated as a principle upon which the 
management of the Antarctic region should be based, the ATCPs became sensitised 
to any attempt by global multilateral institutional arrangements to exercise 
jurisdiction within their bailiwick. Proposals by UNDP and FAO to develop a 
fisheries program for Antarctica were allegedly headed off by ATS parties. 101 More 
recent FAO efforts at tentative soundings on adopting CCAMLR as a relevant 
regional organisation, in terms of the provisions of UNCLOS for fisheries 
management, and thereby extending the regulatory umbrella of UNCLOS over the 
Southern Oceans, have not been encouraging. A UNDP proposal for cooperation 
with ATS in environmental management has also been discouraged. 1°2 
Oran Young introduced several concepts of inter-regime relationships that might 
prove useful in illustrating the nature of the linkages between regional multilateral 
" Stuart Harris, 'The Influence Of The United Nations On The Antarctic System: A Source Of 
Erosion Or Cohesion?' in The Antarctic Treaty System In World Politics, Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & 
Willy Ostreng (eds.), London, MacMillan, 1991. p311. 
1°° Stuart Harris, 'The Influence Of The United Nations On The Antarctic System: A Source Of 
Erosion Or Cohesion?' p312. 
1°1  Stuart Harris, 'The Influence Of The United Nations On The Antarctic System: A Source Of 
Erosion Or Cohesion?' p312. 
102 Stuart Harris, 'The Influence Of The United Nations On The Antarctic System: A Source Of 
Erosion Or Cohesion?' p312. 
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institutional arrangements such as that represented by the Antarctic Treaty System 
and more broad-based global arrangements. 1°3 In particular, three concepts proposed 
by Young, embedded institutions, nested institutions and overlapping institutional 
linkages could be used to illustrate various aspects of the relationship between the 
Antarctic Treaty System and broader global arrangements. 1°4 
Young defines embedded institutions as: 
"issue-specific regimes in international society [that] are deeply 
embedded in overarching institutional arrangements in the sense 
that they assume - ordinarily without saying so explicitly - the 
operation of a whole suite of broader principles and practices that 
constitute the deep structure of society as a whole." 1°5 
The concept of 'embedded-ness' helps to describe some aspects of the Antarctic 
Treaty System and how they 'fie within the general state system. Many of the 
treaties and institutions that make up the Antarctic Treaty System contain 
assumptions about principles and practices that were derived from traditional 
expectations and practices from the broader state system. For example, Young points 
out: 
"Even those who pushed hard to scuttle the Antarctic minerals 
convention and to replace it with what became the 1991 Protocol to 
the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection — a set of actors 
including influential environmental groups with no great interest in 
perpetuating the dominance of the nation state — contented 
themselves with the creation of an institutional arrangement that is 
entirely compatible with the basic rules of international society. 99 106 
103 Oran R.  young, 'Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives', in Antarctica 
Offshore: A Cacophony of Regimes, Richard Herr (ed.), Hobart, Antarctic CRC, 1995. pp11-23. 
104 Oran R. Young, 'Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives'. p12. 
105 Young, 'Institutional Linkages in International Society', in Global Governance 2, 1996. p3. 
106 Oran R.  young, 'Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives'. p17. A similar 
approach in identifying linkages based on common principles and practices was adopted by Douglas 
Johnston. Johnston proposes that different 'mindsets' converge in the development of international 
institutional arrangements, and that the outcomes depend on the dynamics of the interaction between 
these mindsets. Douglas M. Johnston, 'Commentary', in Sustainable Development and Preservation of 
the Oceans: The Challenges of UNCLOS and Agenda 21,  Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute, 
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Thus, the precautionary principle, which has been more closely associated with the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also found expression 
as one of the guiding principles within the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic 
Treaty. I°7 Similarly, many of the regional institutional arrangements for the Antarctic 
region have been guided by global attitudes towards sustainable harvests of living 
resources, as well as incorporated many other values of the global environmental 
movement. 
'Nested institutions' go beyond the shared premises of 'embedded institutions' and 
often suggest a legal relationship wherein jurisdictional responsibility from a 'parent 
institution' is delegated to a 'nested institution'. In contrast to embedded institutions, 
Young defines 'nested institutions' as: 
"... linkages in which specific arrangements restricted in terms of 
functional scope, geographic domain, or some other relevant 
criterion are folded into broader frameworks that deal with the 
same general issue area but that are less detailed in terms of their 
application to specific problems. In effect, the nested components 
bring the premises of a broader regime - rather than the constitutive 
principles or rules of international society as a whole - to bear on 
specific topics." I08 
Thus, it could be argued that the discrete arrangements represented by CCAMLR or 
the CCAS are 'nested' within the Antarctic Treaty System, whereas the entire 
Antarctic Treaty System is 'embedded' within the framework of international and 
customary international law. There are also some elements of the Antarctic Treaty 
System, including CCAMLR, which are clearly 'nested' within global arrangements. 
Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference, Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, Thomas A. Mensah, & Bernard H. 
Oxman (eds.), Honolulu, Law of the Sea Institute, 1997. pp76-78. 
1°7 Article 3(2)(c), Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty,  Done at Madrid on 4 
October 1991. 
108 Oran young,  'Institutional Linkages in International Society'. p3. 
260 
CCAMLR defers regulation of whaling to the IWC, which may be considered a 
'global arrangement'. Article 6 of CCAMLR states: 
"Nothing in this Convention shall derogate from the rights and 
obligations of Contracting Parties under the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling". 109 
The 'deference' to a global regulatory framework may also be seen in the way the 
Madrid Protocol referred the details for regulating ship-sourced pollution to 
MARPOL. Article 3(1) of Annex 4 to the Madrid Protocol states: 
"Any discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixture shall be 
prohibited, except in cases permitted under Annex I of MARPOL 
73/78. 11° 
Article 5(3) of Annex 4 to the Madrid Protocol also states that: 
"The disposal into the sea of food wastes may be permitted when 
they have been passed through a comminuter or grinder, provided 
that such disposal shall, except in cases permitted under Annex V 
of MARPOL 73/78, be made as far as practicible from land and ice 
shelves but in any case not less than 12 nautical miles from the 
nearest land or ice shelf." 1 " 
Nested institutions represent more than a simple functional distribution of 
jurisdictional responsibility and may also imply that 'parent arrangements', within 
which more specific and restricted arrangements 'nest', have precedence. Thus, there 
have been efforts to resist the inclusion of Antarctic institutional arrangements as 
'nested institutions' within the more 'universal' frameworks of some global 
arrangements. For example, issues pertaining to Antarctica and the Southern Oceans 
109 Article 6, Convention On The Conservation Of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Done at 
Canberra, 20 May 1980. 
"° Article 3 (1), Annex 4 to Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Done at 
Madrid on 4 October 1991. 
111 Article 5(3), Annex 4 to Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. 
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were deliberately ignored and left vague during the negotiations of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
The status of the relationship between the discrete elements of the Antarctic Treaty 
System and the legal framework represented by the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea remains ambiguous. In particular, there has been dispute over 
whether CCAMLR could, or should, be 'nested' as a 'competent regional 
organisation' within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Migratory Species (which itself is 'nested' within the framework of 
the UNCLOS). 112 Notwithstanding the quibbling over whether CCAMLR was a 
conservation regime or a fisheries regime, 113 a significant issue is whether 'nesting' 
CCAMLR within the framework of a global arrangement would result in a situation 
that erodes the influence and position of the parties to CCAMLR. I14 
It could be questioned if some of these examples of linkages between a regional 
institution and a global one could be defined as 'nesting.' In Young's definition of a 
nested institution, the inference is that the nested institution 'fleshes-out' the general 
principles for regulation established by the broader institution. However, in the case 
of CCLAMR and the Madrid Protocol, it was not the 'nested institutions' that 
provided the specific details of regulation, but the 'broader' global but functionally 
specific arrangements. Nevertheless, the substantive issue addressed by the concept 
of 'nested institutions', that of institutional linkages based on one institution 
112 Article 63 (straddling stocks in EEZ) and 64 (highly migratory species in EEZs) and article 118 
(High Seas) of UNCLOS all call for the cooperation of states and/or the establishment of sub-regional 
or regional fisheries organisations to ensure the conservation and protection of marine living 
resources. 
"3 Chile objected to the proposal that CCAMLRs might be 'nested' within the Convention on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Migratory Species as a competent regional organisation on the grounds 
that CCAMLR was a 'conservation regime' and not a 'fisheries regime'. See CCAMLR, Report of the 
Fourteenth Meeting of the Commission, Hobart, Australia, 24 October —3 November, 1995, pp57-58. 
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deferring the details of regulation to another does describe the relationship between 
CCAMLR and the IWC, and between the Madrid Protocol and MARPOL. It also 
highlights the possible reluctance of states to compromise vested interests in regional 
arrangements and dilute their influence by accepting linkages that see the latter 
'nested' inside broader institutional arrangements, especially as they might have a 
less significant role within the latter. 
Finally, Young describes overlapping institutional linkages as "individual regimes 
that were formed for different purposes and largely without reference to one another 
[that] intersect on a de facto basis, producing substantial impacts on each other in the 
process." 115 The main feature that distinguishes Young's concept of overlapping 
institutions from embedded institutions or nested institutions is the fact that 
overlapping institutions are usually unintended, unexpected, or unforeseen. There is 
usually an element of deliberation involved with respect to the other forms of 
institutional linkages, where institutions were consciously grafted onto a chosen 
framework or functionally integrated. In contrast, deliberate intent is often absent, at 
least initially, with respect to Young's concept of overlapping institutions. Thus, as 
the United Nations Law of the Sea and the Antarctic Treaty System were formed for 
different purposes and largely without reference to one another, and their regulatory 
arrangements could result in substantial impact on each other, they might be regarded 
as overlapping institutions. 
"4 See Richard Herr, 'Patagonian Toothfish Piracy And Poaching: Inter-Regime Issues In CCAMLR 
Fisheries Management'. pp 17-21. 
115 Oran Young, 'Institutional Linkages in International Society'. p6. 
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The significance of institutional overlap within the Antarctic region lies in the fact 
that there is a potential for conflict. 116 Scholars such as Herr, Rothwell and Davis 
have alluded to this possibility for conflict citing jurisdictional overlap between 
regional and global regulatory arrangements as a potential cause.' 17 Middle powers, 
such as Australia, would also be sensitive to the implications of the linkages between 
regional and global institutional arrangements. The key issue for countries like 
Australia is the fear that the influence of ATCPs would be eroded in Antarctica by 
global arrangements. Where global arrangements were resisted, a serious concern is 
the consequences that might result from the potential conflict between regulatory 
arrangements with overlapping jurisdiction. Therefore, it is argued that the challenge 
for a middle power like Australia within the Antarctic region has been to avoid 
institutional 'nesting' where its interests and influence may be compromised and to 
resolve the issue of institutional overlap. 
A Leadership Role For Australia In Regional Arrangements 
Discussions about merits of regional arrangements, such as that represented by the 
Antarctic Treaty System, vis-à-vis global arrangements with a broader scope in terms 
of membership and interests, are often phrased in terms of what is best for the region. 
However, the reality is that such issues are often approached from the perspective of 
116  Herr, R. and E. Chia, 'The Concept of Regime Overlap: Toward Identification and Assessment', in 
Senior Practitioners Workshop on Overlapping Maritime Regimes,  held in March 1995, B. W. 
Davis(ed.), Hobart, Tasmania, Antarctic CRC Monograph. 2, 1995, ppl 1-26. 
117 Richard Herr, 'Antarctica Offshore's Order: The Cacophony And Harmony Of Overlapping 
Regimes', in Antarctica Offshore: A Cacophony of Regimes,  Richard Herr (ed.), Hobart, Antarctic 
CRC, 1995. Donald Rothwell, 'A Maritime Analysis Of Conflicting International Law Regimes In 
Antarctica And The Southern Ocean', in The Australian Year Book Of International Law 1994, 
Volume 15, Canberra, Centre for International and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National 
University, 1994. Davis, B. W. and M. Haward, Oceans Policy and Overlapping Regimes: An 
Australian Perspective, Canadian Coastal Zone Conference, September 1994, P. Wells and P. Ricketts 
(eds.), Halifax, Nova Scotia, Coastal Zone Canada Association (CZCA), Bedford and Institute of 
Oceanography, Dartmouth. 1: 155-164. 
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state interests. The conflicting priorities and interests that emerged with the issue of 
CRAMRA highlight some of the underlying concerns with regard to both regional 
and global multilateral institutional arrangements. 
Ostensibly, CRAMRA was not meant to convey the notion "that mining in 
Antarctica is acceptable or should or will take place". 1I8 Instead, Christopher Beeby 
argues that CRAMRA: 
c`... can best be characterised as an assessment regime. ... a 
mechanism for assessing the possible impact on the environment of 
Antarctic mineral resource activities, determining whether they are 
acceptable and, if so, regulating them in detail." h19 
Nevertheless, whatever the real intent of CRAMRA was, it soon became clear that 
many states, especially developing nations, held the impression that CRAMRA was 
essentially a title deed to the mineral wealth of Antarctica. There is also suspicion 
that the sudden interest in matters Antarctic displayed by better endowed Third 
World nations (who were able to achieve consultative party status quickly) had been 
motivated more by minerals than by an interest in Antarctic science (especially when 
the latter was hitherto demonstrably lacking). 
In particular, Malaysia has been very suspicious of the ATCPs and has argued that 
the ATCPs had an agenda to seize Antarctica for their own gain while the rest of the 
world 'lost out' on the last great land and resource grab. 12° Thus, in spite of the 
protestations of some ATCP members, CRAMRA was regarded with suspicion by 
118 Christopher Beeby, 'The Convention on the regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
and its future'. p49. 
119 Christopher Beeby, 'The Convention on the regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
and its future'. p49. 
120 Mr Zainal Abidin, speaking before the UN General Assembly, resolution 2222 (XaI), annex), in 
Antarctica In International Affairs, B,A, Hamzah 9ed.). p166. The issue of conflict between the 
regional arrangements favoured by ATCPs and global arrangements favoured by many Third World 
Nations would be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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many other developing states who were concerned that they might 'lose out' on any 
economic activity in the Antarctic region. This suspicion towards the Antarctic 
Treaty System and the desire to be included in any potential distribution of wealth 
led many Third World states to challenge the validity of the regional arrangements in 
the Antarctic region. Developing nations declared that Antarctica should be 
considered the common heritage of mankind and attempted to supplant the Antarctic 
Treaty System with global arrangements that would better defend their interests and 
their stake in any potential share of wealth. 
The effort to 'internationalise' the Antarctic region, by having global institutional 
arrangements play a greater role in the management and regulation of Antarctic 
affairs, has had a long history. 
"In 1947, Admiral Richard Byrd used a flight over the South Pole 
... to drop a cardboard box containing multi-colored little flags of 
the United Nations as an 'obvious symbolism' of his desire for 
international harmony in Antarctica, perhaps achieved under the uN. ,,i2i 
New Zealand has also expressed an interest in the creation of a World Park in 
Antarctica and even indicated its preparedness to surrender its sovereign claims in 
deference to global ownership. 122  In 1956, Walter Nash, Prime Minister of New 
Zealand mooted the idea of making Antarctica a 'world territory' under the 
custodianship of the UN but his proposal was rejected. 123 India made two attempts to 
place the issue of Antarctica's status on the UN General Assembly agenda in 1956 
121 Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica. p270. 
122 James N. Barnes, 'Antarctica: The Politics Of Protection', paper presented at International Union 
For Conservation of Nature And Natural Resources, 16th Technical Meeting, Madrid, Spain, 5-14 
November 1984. p3. 
123 Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica. p272. 
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and in 1958. 124 The first was withdrawn and the Antarctic Treaty, which established 
a regional regulatory arrangement for the Antarctic region, rendered India's second 
attempt moot. 125 The most recent and perhaps most serious of the efforts to extend 
global regulatory arrangements over the Antarctic region emerged with the 
development of the concept of 'common heritage' as a principle of the Law of the 
Sea. 
Questions on the status of the Antarctic region in global institutions, such as the Law 
of the Sea, have often been tactfully avoided. However, the absence of permanent 
human habitation in the Antarctic region, along with the vision that that the region 
could become the 'common heritage of mankind' set the scene for discord over the 
status of the region during the 80s. The failure of global institutions to specifically 
recognise the special position of the claimant and potential claimant states in 
Antarctica raised several issues. In the absence of a recognised sovereign, many 
developing states sought to have the Antarctic region declared the common heritage 
of mankind: 26 With Malaysia's leadership, many Third World countries challenged 
the legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System and advocated the introduction of 
global arrangements that would oversee activities in Antarctica. 127 
Dr Mahathir's call for the Antarctic region to be recognised as the common heritage 
of mankind and to be administered by the United Nations in the interests of the 
international community struck a chord with many developing nations. Many 
124 India's subsequent accession to the ATS met with heavy criticism from developing countries and 
that move has been described as a conflict between "India's moral stake in Antarctica" and "her 
national priorities". R.C. Sharma & P.C. Sinha, India's Ocean Policy, New Delhi, Khama Publishers, 
1994. pp187-189 
125 Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica. p272. 
126 Christopher C. Joyner & Ethel R. Theis, 'The United States And Antarctica: Rethinking The 
Interplay Of Law And Interests', in Cornell International Law Journal, 20, 1987. pp93-97. 
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developing nations harboured suspicions about the Antarctic Treaty System and Dr 
Hatnzah voiced some of these suspicions when-he argues: 
"Yet some members of the ATCP have made strenuous efforts to 
develop the resources even though the treaty is silent on this point. 
Since 1967, ATCP members have discussed the development of a 
mechanism to circumvent the treaty and began negotiating among 
themselves for ways and means of exploiting the resources in 
Antarctica. Finally in 1972, the ATCPs broke their covenant and 
agreed to promote the idea of an Antarctica Mineral Regime to 
govern resource development on the continent." 128 
Hamzah also referred to Antarctica as 'mankind's last treasure house other than deep 
sea resources'. 129 This perception appeared to be shared by many developing states 
and suggested that their priorities and interest in the Antarctic region lay primarily in 
obtaining a 'fair share' of any exploitation of deep sea resources. The concern that 
they would 'lose out' was reinforced by their belief that some of the scientific 
programmes in Antarctica were really a covert effort to explore for mineral wealth. 13° 
The effort to 'internationalise' the management and regulation of the Antarctic 
region was also supported by some environmental NG0s, albeit for different reasons. 
Developing countries feared losing a share of any mineral exploitation, 
environmentalists feared any mineral development, and both saw global 
arrangements as their best means of defending their interests. 131 
In contrast, it was clear that the ATCPs, including Australia, desired to retain control 
over events in the Antarctic region and to prevent the erosion of their influence and 
127 Vasiliy S. Safronchuk, 'The Relationship between the ATS and the Law of the Sea Convention of 
1982', in The Antarctic Treaty System In World Politics,  Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng 
(eds.), London, MacMillan, 1991. p328. 
128 BA Hamzah, 'Antarctica and the International Community: A Commentary', in Antarctica In  
International Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1987. pp4-5. 
' 29 BA Hamzah, 'Antarctica and the International Community: A Commentary'. p4. 
' 30 BA Hamzah, 'Antarctica and the International Community: A Commentary'. p7. 
131 Lyn Goldsworthy, 'Conservation and Antarctic Policy-Making B. 'World Park Antarctica': An 
Environmentalist Vision', in R.A. Herr, H.R. Hall, & M.G. Haward (eds.), Antarctica's Future: 
Continuity or Change?  Tasmania, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1990. p93. 
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interests. 132 The Antarctic Treaty System provided countries like Australia with 
considerable influence within the region and there was concern that global 
institutions might dilute the influence of the ATCPs, who would have greater 
difficulty exerting a similar level of influence within the larger and more diverse 
membership of global institutions. Therefore, the ATCPs resisted the attempts to 
extend the regulation of Antarctica and the Southern Oceans beyond the restricted 
scope of the Antarctic Treaty System. I33 
In the debates that ensued after Malaysia initiated its challenge to the Antarctic 
Treaty System at the UN General Assembly in 1982, Australia established itself as 
the leader of the proponents of the Antarctic Treaty System. I34 At the 1984 General 
Assembly debates, Richard Woolcott, then chairman of the Consultative Parties led 
the defence in support of the Antarctic Treaty System. I35 Australia made clear its 
opposition to any change that would replace or undermine the authority of the 
regional arrangements in place with an arrangement that allowed 'universal' 
partic ipat ion. 136 
In defence of the Antarctic Treaty System, the ATCPs argued that "their successful 
administration of Antarctica gives them special rights and responsibilities." 137 They 
also argued that the Antarctic Treaty System had successfully demilitarised 
132 Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica. p271. 
133 Australia was not the only power to do so. Argentina, another middle power and also a 
Consultative Party to the Antarctic Treaty also resisted efforts to broaden active participation in 
Antarctic affairs. An attempt to raise the issue of Antarctica at the 1976 Non-Aligned Conference by 
Sri Lanka, with a view towards reconciling the management of Antarctica with the interests of the 
wider international community was scuttled by Argentina. See Peter Beck, The International Politics 
of Antarctica. p277. 
134 Keith Suter, Antarctica, Private Property or Public Heritage. p79. 
135 Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica.  p293. 
136 Vasiliy S. Safronchuk, 'The Relationship between the ATS and the Law of the Sea Convention of 
1982'. p331. 
137 Stuart Harris, 'The Influence Of The United Nations On The Antarctic System: A Source Of 
Erosion Or Cohesion?' p316. 
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Antarctica keeping it free from state-sponsored violence, promoted the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge and protected the fragile environment of Antarctica and the 
Southern Oceans. While these arguments were certainly valid, there were other 
factors to suggest that the ATCP's reluctance to surrender their influence over the 
Antarctic region has been the primary reason for their stout resistance to global 
arrangements. 
The challenge to the Antarctic Treaty System threatened the interests of the claimant 
states (and potential claimants). These states regarded the Antarctic region as a 
special place, where the exercise of their sovereign rights and claims have been 
temporary suspended but never abandoned. All parties to the Antarctic Treaty 
System acknowledge the principles of Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty, which 
protected the interests of the claimant states and potential claimants alike. In contrast, 
no global regime has, as yet, recognised the special character of sovereignty within 
the Antarctic region. 
MARPOL did recognise the environmental sensitivity of Antarctica and declared it a 
'special area' in 1991, prohibiting all operational discharges except under cases of 
extreme peri1. 138 Similarly, the IWC did establish a whale sanctuary south of 40 0  
south in 1994 where a moratorium on whaling has been imposed. Nevertheless, 
while the fragility of the Antarctic environment is readily recognised by the global 
community, the special interests of the claimant states and potential claimants have 
yet to be universally accepted. Indeed, the special position of the ATCPs within the 
Antarctic region has been hotly disputed. Thus, it is feared that if global institutions 
(especially those established on the principle of common heritage) assumed 
138 IMO Document 30/24. 
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regulatory responsibility for the Antarctic region, the result might be the 
extinguishment of any latent rights of sovereignty or future claims to sovereignty 
within Antarctica. The concern that an 'international solution' developed at the 
global level might compromise existing sovereignty claims in Antarctica, as well as 
result in 'outside interference' in Antarctic affairs, were significant factors that 
moved the ATCPs to resist global multilateral institutional arrangements for the 
Antarctic region. I39 
The attempt by Dr Mahathir and others to extend the jurisdiction of the United 
Nations into the Antarctic region and to claim the Southern Oceans as high seas 
demonstrated the potential of conflict within overlapping institutional 
arrangements. 14° In this instance, there was an attempt to use global arrangements to 
wrest 'authority' from regional arrangements in the Antarctic region. At issue was 
whether influence over the Antarctic region would be shifted from the ATCPs to the 
global forums like the United Nations. At risk were the national interests of the 
ATCPs, especially those who have made territorial claims on Antarctica. Australia 
clearly demonstrated its wariness of global arrangements that might result in the 
erosion of its influence and compromise its interests in the Antarctic region. And as a 
middle power, Australia successfully assumed a leadership role to oppose the efforts 
of those who would supplant the Antarctic Treaty System with global regulatory 
arrangements. 
139 Stuart Harris, 'The Influence Of The United Nations On The Antarctic System: A Source Of 
Erosion Or Cohesion?' p309. 
140 Statement by Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad on Antarctica at the 37th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in New York on 29th September 1982. 
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Conclusion 
Australia has always demonstrated its clear and unambiguous ambition to assume a 
prominent role in the Antarctic region. Initially, Australia, as a part of the British 
Empire, had sought a controlling influence over the Antarctic region through the 
annexation of Antarctica. However, its efforts in this regard met with limited success. 
Although Australia lays claim to a large slice of Antarctica, that claim has never been 
recognised, save by a very few states. In contrast, since the adoption of the Antarctic 
Treaty, a weave of regional multilateral arrangements represented by the Antarctic 
Treaty System has provided Australia with the opportunity to play an influential role 
in determining policy and regulatory arrangements for the Antarctic region. This 
accorded with the expectations of process oriented perspectives on how a middle 
power like Australia could and would play a leading role in international affairs. 
Australia's prominent role within the Antarctic Treaty System, especially its status as 
an ATCP and a middle power, became the basis of its influence. Australia's capacity 
for leadership and influence was manifested in the role that it played in rejecting 
CRAMRA and in the subsequent adoption of the Madrid Protocol to ensure 
environmental protection for the Antarctic region. Australia exhibited its regionalist 
priorities when it defended the Antarctic Treaty System, as well as its own vested 
interests and influence in the Antarctic region, from the challenge of multilateral 
institutional arrangements constituted at a global level. In doing so, Australia 
demonstrated the fact that, as a middle power, its interests are bound to regional 
multilateral institutional arrangements and its influence is founded upon its capacity 
to assume a leadership role in such arrangements. 
CHAPTER 6 
"The continuing differential in growth rates between Australia and 
industrialising East Asia has implications for Australia's relative 
position in the region. In terms of economic size, and technological 
and industrial sophistication, Australia will remain a significant 
regional country. However, the gap in these areas with 
industrialising East Asia will narrow over the next fifteen years. 
Consequently, Australia will be able to rely less on its strategic and 
economic weight in the region to achieve its policy objectives." — 
In the National Interest, Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy 
White Paper' 
Introduction 
Australia has always demonstrated a keen interest in the South East Asia and one of 
the key priorities of its foreign policy has been to defend its vital national interests 
within that region. However, Australia's ability, as a middle power, to assume a 
hegemonic role in South East Asia is limited. Thus, it is argued that the role that a 
middle power like Australia is able to assume in international relations varies with its 
geography, as well as the extent of its ability to engage in regional multilateral 
institutional arrangements. 
The two attributes of a middle power that have enabled Australia to assume a role of 
influence within the South Pacific and the Antarctic region have had less relevance in 
the South East Asian region. Australia's ability to assume hegemonic influence in the 
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South East Asian region has been limited by the fact that its relations with the South 
East Asian states are not characterised by the same asymmetries of power that shaped 
its relationship with the South Pacific island states. In contrast to the Antarctic 
region, there are few regional multilateral institutional arrangements within the South 
East Asian region and these are far less comprehensive in scope. Thus, Australia's 
capacity to influence developments in the South East Asian region has also been 
limited by the fact that the central and prominent role that it played in the regional 
multilateral institutional arrangements for Antarctica could not be reprised in the 
South East Asian region. 
Australia's influence within the South East Asian region is also affected by the 
question of its status. Whereas Australia evinced a desire to be perceived as a part of 
South Pacific and Antarctic region and is accepted (albeit grudgingly at times) as a 
part of those regions, Australia has yet to be accepted as an integral part of the South 
East Asia region. Indeed, Australia is ambivalent about the question of its role and 
identity as a part of South East Asia. These factors constrained Australia's capacity, 
as a middle power, to assume an influential role within the South East Asian region 
and it has had to continuously guard against being marginalised in or excluded from 
the South East Asian region. 
The difficulties that confronted Australia in the South East Asian region highlight 
some of the limitations of a middle power, as well as the significance of regionalism, 
in middle power diplomacy. It is proposed that the capacity to initiate and encourage 
multilateralism within a regional context and to seek a greater role within such 
structures represent Australia's most promising prospect for influence and the 
I In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper,  Canberra, 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1997. p25. 
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opportunity to shape developments within the South East Asian region. Thus, 
Australia has exerted itself to promote regional multilateral institutional 
arrangements within the South East Asian region. And by doing so, it pursued a 
strategy of middlepowermanship and acted in a manner consistent with the 
expectations of a middle power. 
In contrast to the earlier 'regional chapters' where Australia's regional foreign policy 
could be neatly encapsulated within defining periods, Australia's diplomatic 
engagement with the South East Asian region is less easily situated within 
chronological periods separated by pivotal changes in history. If there has been a 
defming moment, then it could arguably be described as the early 1990s when an 
Australian Labor government embarked on an enthusiastic quest to increase 
consciousness of Asia within Australia. 2 However, as the debate over Australia's 
Asian identity has been initiated much earlier, it may be more prudent to assume a 
gradual change characterised by ambivalence in Australian attitudes towards South 
East Asia, instead of stipulating a chronological reference point from which a clear 
divide in terms of policy occurred. Therefore, in contrast to the approach adopted in 
the two preceding chapters, the discussion in this chapter is organised in terms of 
Australia's interests in the South East Asian region and its capacity to realise its 
ambitions there. 
This chapter begins by reviewing Australia's long-standing strategic interest in the 
South East Asian region. It outlines the changes that have seen Australia's interests 
in the South East Asian region grow from narrow security concerns to an expanding 
economic stake affecting its broader strategic interests. Australia's need to defend its 
2  Paul Keating, 'Australia And Asia: Knowing Who We Are', speech given in Sydney, Australia, 7 
April 1992. 
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these interests fuel its ambition to assume significant influence within the South East 
Asian region. However, it is proposed that while Australia had played a hegemonic 
role in the past, its capacity to assume a similar role in the contemporary South East 
Asian region is limited. 
Australia's role in regional multilateral institutional arrangements within the South 
East Asian region has been limited. It is not a full member of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations even though it is a dialogue partner. Nevertheless, 
Australia has continued to pursue the strategy of middlepowermanship within the 
South East Asian region, albeit in an indirect fashion. Instead of reprising the high 
profile leadership role that it had adopted in regional multilateral institutional 
arrangements in the two regions reviewed earlier, Australia played a more discreet 
role, with a stronger emphasis on 'track two diplomacy', in the South East Asian 
region. Australia's diplomacy has been centred upon fostering an environment within 
South East Asia that is conducive to multilateralism and regionalism, and 
encouraging the eventual development of formal institutions to facilitate both. 
Therefore, although Australia's direct influence in the South East Asian region has 
been limited, it has nevertheless been able to play a significant role as a middle 
power within the region. 
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Defining South East Asia 
Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/Map_collection.html  
There has always been an understanding within the international community that the 
boundaries of South East Asia stretched from Myanmar to the West, Vietnam to the 
North, and Indonesia to the East and South. 3 In general, the South East Asian region 
is deemed to include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. In one sense, this has been a region 
defined by great powers, as when the Allied Forces in World War Two defined the 
region as the South East Asian Theatre of Operations. 4 This classification gained 
3  Donald G. McCloud, 'Southeast Asia As A Regional Unit', in The ASEAN Reader, compiled by 
K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique, Chandran Jeshurun, Ananda Rajah, Joseph L.H. Tan, Pushpa 
Thambipillai, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. p12. 
4 Russel H. Fifield, 'The Southeast Asia Command', in The ASEAN Reader, compiled by K.S. 
Sandhu, Sharon Siddique, Chandran Jeshurun, Ananda Rajah, Joseph L.H. Tan, Pushpa Thambipillai, 
Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. pp20-23. 
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currency and persisted through to the Cold War. 5 The concept of a South East Asian 
region is also tautological, and it could be said that the boundaries of this region were 
based on arbitrary stipulation and perceptions of common interests held by leaders 
within 'the region'. 6 
Historically, Myanmar and the states in Indo-China have had little to do with 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei or the Philippines.' However, the concept of 
a South East Asian region proved to be compelling, both as a label and an aspiration, 
for the modern South East Asian states. The commitment to the concept of a South 
East Asian region could be seen in the considerable efforts of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to expand its membership from its five founders, 
to include all ten of the states that are deemed to be 'South East Asian'. 8 Thus, the 
South East Asian nations differentiated themselves from the three great cultural 
traditions and potential spheres of influence that surrounded them, China in the 
North, India and its satellites in the West, and Australia (ironically representing the 
West) in the East. 
Membership of ASEAN has become a mark of being formally recognised as a South 
East Asian state. There have been attempts to broaden the defmition of 'South East 
Asian', in terms of enlarging the membership of the ASEAN. Sri Lanka, Papua New 
Guinea and Australia, all nations on the geographical periphery of what is presently 
defined as the South East Asia region had all made tentative probes with regard to 
membership in ASEAN, with varying degrees of seriousness and publicity attending 
5 Bilveer Singh, The Challenge of Conventional Arms Proliferation in Southeast Asia, Jakarta, Centre 
For Strategic and International Studies, 1995. pp4-25. 
6 See Theodore Olson, 'Thinking Independently About Strategy In Southeast Asia', in Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 11, No. 3, December 1989. 
7 D. G. E. Hall, A history of South-East Asia, London, Macmillan, 1968. 
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their efforts.9 However, such attempts have, thus far, been unsuccessful. The 
significance of membership in ASEAN lay in the fact that membership conferred 
legitimacy, at least in South East Asian eyes, upon the interests of a member within 
the region. It implied recognition of the member-state as a primary stakeholder in the 
region with the concomitant right to speak out on and participate in processes that 
affected decision-making on key issues affecting the region. It also inferred the right 
to be consulted and to be involved in decision-making processes. There are, however, 
some exceptions to these normative expectations. While members of ASEAN tend to 
be considered South East Asian states, not all states deemed to be South East Asian 
have been granted membership of ASEAN. In 1997, Cambodia was denied 
membership because of lingering doubts over the legitimacy of the Hun Sen 
government, in spite of a strong desire by many ASEAN states that the former be 
eventually admitted. 1° Thus, ASEAN could not be regarded as being synonymous 
with the South East Asia region — yet. The other qualifier is the recognition that some 
states considered to be 'extra-regional' might also reasonably claim to possess strong 
interests within the region. These states are accorded observer status in ASEAN and 
engaged in regular dialogue with ASEAN. Australia currently falls into this category. 
Hence, while Australia has not been regarded 'formally' as a part of the South East 
Asian region, it is seen as an extra-regional actor with special interests within the 
region. 
It is in the context of its ambiguous status that Australia's role, as a middle power, 
within the South East Asian region should be examined. Australia's ambivalence 
8 Ranjit Gill, ASEAN Towards The 21st Century: A Thirty-Year Review Of The Association Of 
Southeast Asian Nations, London, ASEAN Academic Press, 1997. pp225-236. 
9 Thanat Khoman, 'ASEAN: Conception And Evolution', in The ASEAN Reader, compiled by K.S. 
Sandhu, Sharon Siddique, Chandran Jeshurun, Ananda Rajah, Joseph L.H. Tan, Pushpa Thambipillai, 
Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. pxxi. 
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about whether it belongs in the South East Asian region is mirrored by similar doubts 
from within the region. On the one hand, the geographic proximity and reality of the 
South East Asian region impinges forcefully upon the consciousness of successive 
Australian governments. The growing range of Australian interests, strategic, 
economic and social, within the South East Asian region necessitates a stronger role 
for Australia in the region. This is a point strongly reiterated by Prime Minister 
Keating, who states: 
"My focus is more narrowly on what happened in relation to the 
Asia Pacific, the geographic area of most immediate concern to 
Australia - where our economic and security interests are most 
intense and where we have the greatest opportunity to influence 
and shape the future. 
This must be the key foreign policy issue for any Australian 
Government: the degree to which Australia can influence for the 
better the region which will affect us most directly; how we can 
ensure that our voice is heard and that it is effective." 11 
While Keating was referring to the Asia Pacific, a broader region that encompassed 
East Asia, the South Pacific and both North and South America, it shall be 
demonstrated that the South East Asian region was the focus for many of Australia's 
diplomatic initiatives. It shall also be argued that the South East Asian region 
represented an opportunity through which Australia sought to engage the wider Asia-
Pacific community. I2 On the other hand, there is an arguably justifiable perception 
among some South East Asian states that Australia is not, or at least hesitant about 
being identified as, a South East Asian state. I3 This perception limited Australia's 
capacity to assume a leadership role within the region and to influence developments 
io Ranjit Gill, ASEAN Towards The 21st Century: A Thirty-Year Review Of The Association Of 
Southeast Asian nations. pll. 
II Paul Keating, 'Obsession: Australia And The Challenge Of Asia', speech made at the University Of 
New South Wales, Sydney, Australia on 12 June 1996. 
12 Paul Keating, Speech to the Foreign Correspondents Association, made in Sydney, Australia on 11 
November 1994. 
13 'More on Australia-Asia relationships - 6th March 1996' in Asia Pacific Management News Menu, 
http://www.apmforum.com/news/apmn18.htm.  
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within the South East Asian region. It is this tension between Australia's undeniable 
interests and the uncertainty over its status within the region that has shaped its role 
as a middle power in South East Asia. 
Asserting Australian Influence In South East Asia 
Australia has long demonstrated an interest in assuming a role of influence within the 
South East Asian region. Many of the colonial administrators in the early Australian 
settlements were British officers who had also served in the British colonies in 
Malaya and Burma. Early Australian governments, as dominions of the British 
Empire, also consistently defended British colonial interests within the South East 
Asian region. 14 Australia's interests in the contemporary South East Asian region 
have not ebbed with the end of colonialism. Australia's economic interests in the 
South East Asian region reflect the growing importance of the region to Australia in 
terms of trade and investment. 15 Australia's strategic interests in the South East 
Asian region are centred upon the perception that any threat to Australian security is 
most likely to emerge from, or come through the South East Asian region. 16 
Therefore, Australia's interests in the South East Asia region may be reviewed in 
terms of these three factors, its historical role as a dominion of the British Empire, its 
strong and growing economic interests within the region and its strategic interests 
within the region. 
14 H.R. Cowrie, Asia and Australia in World Affairs, Melbourne, Nelson, 1987. pp 226-276. 
15 East Asia Analytic Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Austrade, Australia's 
Business Challenge: South-East Asia In The 1990s, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 1992. 
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Australia's Historical Interest In The South East Asian Region 
There have always been fears that the South East Asian region represented a 
potential threat to Australia, sparking concerns for Australian security that were 
directed not simply at the European rivals to the British Empire but at the 'Asiatic 
hordes' that might descend upon Australia for any number of reasons. However, 
prior to the Second World War, Australia's interest in South East Asia had been 
cursory. British interests influenced much of early Australian policy towards the 
South East Asian region. As Michael Ong pointed out: 
"Until the end of the 1930s, when an embryonic diplomatic service 
was established, Australia's relationship with Asian countries, 
many not independent of western tutelage at that time, were largely 
determined by its imperial link with the British Empire."" 
It was South East Asia that brought home a sense of urgency about Australia's 
regional interests. The Second World War shattered Australia's faith in British 
power. The fall of Singapore and the bombing of Darwin reinforced Australia's fears 
about its vulnerability as a remote European outpost in a hostile geographic 
environment. This anxiety eventually resulted in a policy of 'forward defence', 
which argued that Australia's security is best served by committing its military 
forces to 'forward positions' in defence of its strategic interests in the South East 
Asian region. Thus, Australia committed itself to the Vietnam War (and to the 
Korean War) in an attempt to answer perceived and potential threats to its interests 
from the region." 
16 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence, 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. 
17 Michael Ong, 'The Context of Australia's Involvement in Asia' in Background Paper 9 1996-97, 
Australia's Asian Connections: A Stocictake, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Group. 
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Australia has played a direct role in South East Asia on several occasions. In the 
Second World War, Australians played a significant part in the defence (albeit 
unsuccessful) of Singapore. Subsequently, Australia served as a base from which the 
Allies recaptured South East Asia from the Japanese. After the Second World War, 
Australia continued to play a prominent role M South East Asia. Australians were 
involved in South East Asia during the Malayan Emergency when they helped to 
combat the threat of communist insurgency in the jungles of Malaya. In addition to 
an active military presence, Australia also contributed to the development of the 
South East Asian region, especially through the Colombo Plan, which "had a strong 
security objective, promoting economic development as a foil against the perceived 
threat of communism." I9 Australia also helped a newly independent Malaysian 
Federation resist the territorial ambitions of Sukarno's Indonesia in the episode 
referred to as Konfrontasi. These efforts from Australia have (arguably) directly 
affected the history of at least three South East Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Singapore. And as mentioned earlier, Australia was involved in the Vietnam War 
and the unsuccessful attempt to prevent communist regimes from taking root in 
another two South East Asian countries, Cambodia and Laos. 
Therefore, Australia has exhibited a strong interest in South East Asian affairs, both 
as a dominion of Great Britain and as an independent state. 20 In addition, Australia 
has also demonstrated its ability to play an important role, as a middle power, in its 
early relationship with the South East Asian region. 2I However, it shall be 
demonstrated that while Australia's interests within the South East Asian region 
18 It was also an effort to defend Australian interests by committing the United States to the region. 
See Chapter 2. 
19 Michael Ong, 'The Context of Australia's Involvement in Asia' in Background Paper 9 1996-97, 
Australia's Asian Connections: A Stocktake. 
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continued to grow in strength, its capacity to assume a dominant leadership role and 
to exercise significant influence within the region has since diminished. 
Australia's Economic Interests In The South East Asian Region 
Australia's economic interests in the South East Asian region are considerable. In a 
1992 report, it was argued that the South East Asian region would be increasingly 
important to Australia's economic interests and that: 
"No industrialised nation has more at stake in South-East Asia's 
economic development than Australia." 22 
Since the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade published that report, Australia's 
economic ties with South East Asian have grown significantly. From 7.9% in 1980, 
to 12.3% in 1991, to 15.2% in 1997, the ASEAN 6 23 accounted for an increasing 
share of Australian exports. 24 While the major markets (accounting for 41% of 
exports) for Australian goods and services remain in North East Asia region, the 
strategic significance of the South East Asian region to Australia's economic 
interests continued to be emphasised in its Foreign Policy. Russell Fynmore and Hal 
Hill predicted that: 
"For the foreseeable future, North-East Asia will be quantitatively 
larger in Australia's trade and investment patterns. But geography 
has conspired to define a unique and complex role for South-East 
Asia in Australia's economic, social and political future. And from 
20 See also Peter Edwards, with Gregory Pemberton, Crisis and Commitments: The Politics And 
Diplomacy Of Australia's Involvement In Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965, North Sydney, Allen 
& Unwin, 1992. 
21 See H.R. Cowrie, Asia and Australia in World Affairs. pp 226-276. 
22 East Asia Analytic Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Austrade, Australia's 
Business Challenge: South-East Asia In The 1990s. pxxxviii. 
23 The ASEAN 6 refers to Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. The 
inclusion of Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam has since raised the figure to 9. 
24 East Asia Analytic Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Austrade, Australia;s 
Business Challenge: South-East Asia In The 1990s. p107 & http..\\www.dfat.gov.au . 
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a small base, our commercial relations with South-East Asia may 
well expand more rapidly than those with North-East Asia."25 
Keating reiterates this view when he stated that: 
"Australia had a long history of engagement with Asia. ... 
[However], never before the 1990s had all our interests - political, 
economic, social and cultural - converged so intensely there." 26 
Australia saw an opportunity in the South East Asian region to position itself 
advantageously, especially relative to other Western and developed states, and has 
capitalised on its geographic proximity to this region to cultivate an image of itself as 
a useful platform for European investment in East Asia. 27 
The South East Asian region has become a major export market for Australian goods 
and services, especially the tourism and education industries. In 1993-94 exports to 
this group rose by 18.5 per cent to reach A$2.8 billion, above the trend rate of growth 
for the last decade (15.8 per cent).28 Australia had a surplus of A$382 million with 
ASEAN in 1993-94. In particular, travel services (A$1.4 billion in 1993-94) have 
grown at 25 per cent a year over the last decade. 29 In 1995-96, total inbound tourists 
to Australia numbered 3.966 million. Asian tourists (including Japan) accounted for 
2.017 million arrivals or nearly 51 per cent of the tota1. 3° Key markets in the South 
East Asian region (for 1996-97) included Singapore (222, 800), Indonesia (154, 500) 
25 East Asia Analytic Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Austrade, Australia's 
Business Challenge: South-East Asia In The 1990s. px)ocix. 
26 Paul Keating, 'Obsession: Australia And The Challenge Of Asia'. 
27 In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. p67. 
28 Tas Luttrell. 'Australia's Trade with Asia', in Background Paper 9 1996-97, Australia's Asian 
Connections: A Stocktake, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Group. 
29 Tas Luttrell. 'Australia's Trade with Asia', in Background Paper 9 1996-97, Australia's Asian 
Connections: A Stocktake. 
39 John Kain, 'Asian Tourism in Context', in Background Paper 9 1996-97, Australia's Asian 
Connections: A Stocktake, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Group. 
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& Malaysia (134, 400). 31 Given that the average daily expenditure for these three 
market groups is A$3,190, A$4,206 & A$3,258 respectively, tourism earnings from 
the South East Asian region would easily exceed A$1.8 billion. 32 
The total number of overseas students served by Australia education industry also 
increased dramatically from around 21,000 in 1988 to 140,000 in 1996. 33 Two South 
East Asian countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, represented two of Australia's top 
three markets for education, while a third South East Asian country, Singapore 
currently represents Australia's sixth largest market for exports. 34 Significantly, these 
countries all numbered among the leading recipients of Australian scholarships under 
the Colombo plan and subsequent aid scholarship programs, suggesting that there is 
an economic return for Australia's foreign aid in the South East Asian region. 35 
Australia has become the market leader in some Asian markets for education and a 
number of Australian universities have developed prominent positions in export 
markets. 36 In 1996, it was estimated that overseas students contributed over $3 
billion to the Australian economy. This represented an increase of nearly 50 per cent 
in just two years, making it the fifth largest export earner for Australia. 
The South East Asian region is regarded as being a potentially important source of 
investment for Australia. Currently, Singapore is the ninth largest source of direct 
31 'Overseas Arrivals and Departures', Australia in Brief, Australia Bureau of Statistics (3401.0), 
1998. 
32 'International Visitor Survey, Bureau of Tourism Research', Australia in Brief, Australia Bureau of 
Statistics, 1998. 
33 The Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, The Australian International Education Foundation: Review 
of the Government-Industry Partnership, Consultancy Report To The Department Of Employment, 
Education Training And Youth Affairs March 1997. p1. 
34 Dr Kim Jackson, 'Education', in Background Paper 9 1996-97, Australia's Asian Connections: A 
Stocictake, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group. The 
Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, The Australian International Education Foundation: Review of the 
Government-Industry Partnership. 
35 The Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, The Australian International Education Foundation: Review 
of the Govenunent-Industry Partnership. pl. 
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foreign investment (and sixth largest for portfolio and other investments). 37 Prior to 
the current economic crisis in Asia (1997-1998), there had also been a strong 
expectation of a growing commitment in terms of investment in Australia from the 
other South East Asian states. 38 
Australia has been persistent in its attempts to assume a more influential role within 
the South East Asian region. The premise is that Australia could ill afford to be 'left 
out' of any multilateral arrangement that might affect its interests within the region. 
Australia was the first 'extra-regional' actor to establish a dialogue relationship with 
ASEAN in 1974. 39 Australia also exhibited considerable interest in the proposed 
development of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The proposal for AFTA has 
been floated for many years° but progress has always been slowed by the reluctance 
of some ASEAN members to lift tariffs and restrictions and liberalise trade.4 ' Thus, 
the objective of AFTA has been criticised by some as being more of a mirage than 
rea1. 42 Nevertheless, the possibility of establishing AFTA, however remote, could 
potentially have a profound impact on Australia's economic interests. Therefore, 
36 The Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, The Australian International Education Foundation: Review 
of the Government-Industry Partnership. pl. 
37 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position, 
Australia 1994-95 (5363.0): Table 53. 
38 East Asia Analytic Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Austrade, Australia's 
Business Challenge: South-East Asia In The 1990s.  pp  122-126. 
39 Gareth Evans & Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In The World Of The 1990s, Carlton, 
Melbourne University Press, 1991. p181. 
40  AFTA," EAEC likely to top agenda of ASEAN Business', Business Times, Malaysia, 1 October 
1993. 
41  Mari Pangestu, 'Comments: Why ASEAN Trade Cooperation Has Not Worked?', in ASEAN 
Economic Cooperation: A New Perspective: Papers And Proceedings Of The Twelfth Annual 
Conference Of The Federation Of ASEAN Economic Associations, Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia, 
September 3-5, 1987, Singapore, Chapman Publishers, 1988. pp148-149. & Mari Pangestu, Hadi 
Soesastro & Mubarig Ahmad, Intra-ASEAN Economic Co-operation: A New Perspective, Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies, Jarkarta, December 1991. pp40-51. 
42  Mari Pangestu, Hadi Soesastro & Mubarig Ahmad, Intra-ASEAN Economic Co-operation: A New 
Perspective. p60. 
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Australia's involvement in the development of AFTA or similar initiatives remains a 
priority of its foreign policy. 43 
Australia's interests in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is 
another indication of the importance that it places upon a strong role in the South 
East Asian region." When Dr Mahathir, the Malaysian Prime Minister advocated an 
East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) that would have excluded Australia, 45 
Australia responded quickly and vigorously supported the development of APEC to 
ensure that it would not be 'left out in the cold' in South East Asia. As Keating 
explains: 
"If I may divert for a moment, it was these quite deep issues about 
the future of the region, rather than any personal animosity, which 
lay behind my disagreements with the Malaysian Prime Minister 
Dr Mahathir over APEC and the EAEC. Dr Mahathir is a 
formidable leader who has transformed Malaysia in ways I greatly 
admire, but we had different visions of the region into the twenty 
first century. The driving force in his vision was a strong pan-Asian 
nationalism which asserted that the time had come after centuries 
of colonial rule for Asia to take control of its own future. Mine has 
been shaped by the conviction I set out earlier - that Australia's 
interests and the region's are best served by making the Asia Pacific 
the focus of our institution building efforts because the dangers - 
economic, social and strategic - of creating a divide between the 
two sides of the Pacific were overwhelmingly greater than the 
advantages of an East Asia-only approach. 
And, of course, Australia's exclusion from significant regional 
bodies like that proposed was quite contrary to the Government's 
view of Australian interests. [my emphasis] 
It was also contrary to our view of the region's interests. I am 
convinced that Australia's active engagement in the region - our 
energy, our creativity our economic resources - are an asset for the 
region as a whole." 46 
43 In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. p45. 
44 Frank Frost, `APEC's Kuala Lumpur Meetings, 1998: Major Outcomes and Australia's Interests', 
Current Issues Brief 5 1998-99, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 8 December 1998. 
45 Bilveer Singh, 'The Fourth ASEAN Summit — A New Milestone In Political Will', in ASEAN And 
The European Community In The 1990s, (eds. Lee Lai To & Arnold Wehinhoerner, Singapore, 
Institute Of International Affairs, 1993. pp4 & 6. 
46 Paul Keating, 'Obsession: Australia And The Challenge Of Asia'. 
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Thus, Australia lobbied strongly for APEC, a forum that would ensure that Australia 
is included in a multilateral institutional arrangement that might potentially play a 
decisive role in economic affairs for the Asia Pacific region. 
The call for Pacific Rim Economic Cooperation has been sounded before and a pipe 
dream for years. However, Australia managed to turn this dream into a reality and 
trump Malaysia's EAEC with Hawke's proposed Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum. The EAEC has since died stillborn whereas APEC has 
assumed increasing significance within the region. Australia's success in promoting 
APEC could simply have been due to the fact that its timing was propitious. On the 
other hand, it could also have been a reflection of Australia's capacity, as a middle 
power, to initiate regional multilateral institutional arrangements more successfully 
than smaller powers. Regardless of the reasons for its success, 47 Australia's role in 
APEC clearly demonstrated its determination not to be excluded from the South East 
Asian region and its ability to play a significant role as a middle power. 
Australia's Strategic Interests In South East Asian Region 
Since the Second World War, the South East Asian region has been regarded as 
paramount to Australian strategic interests. The Australian Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence stated that: 
47 The factors affecting Australia's capacity to successfully influence regional developments will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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"... no other part of the world.., promises to be of more consistent 
importance to Australia than the region of East and Southeast 
Asia."48 
The Dibb Report and the Department of Defence Report both concluded that any 
threat to the Australian continent would most likely come from or through the region 
North and North West of Australia. 49 Even though this particular assessment of the 
potential threats to Australian security has been omitted from subsequent strategic 
assessments like the Defence White Paper 1994, 50 these security concerns about the 
South East Asian region remained valid and they represent significant issues that 
Australian foreign policy must address. 
Historically, Australia has addressed these concerns with a policy of 'forward 
defence'. Or as Menzies argued in response to the potential threat that communism 
from the South East Asian region posed to Australia during the 1960s: 
"... it is unbelievable that any responsible Australian should fail to 
see that if the battle against Communism is to be an effective one it 
must be as forward of Australia as possible. ... If Malaya is vital to 
our defence, more vital, properly understood, than some point on 
the Australian coast, then we must make Malayan defence in a real 
sense our business." 51 
Therefore, Australian forces were committed to the South East Asian region in 
response to the Malayan Emergency, Konfrontasi, FPDA commitments, and the 
48  Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and ASEAN: Challenges and 
Opportunities, px. 
49  Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence. 
Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, 1987. 
50 See Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1994. The omission was probably made out of deference to the feelings of Indonesia, which 
is situated to the North and Northwest of Australia. Indonesia had intimated that it was offended by 
the inference that it was considered a threat in the earlier White Papers released by the Australian 
Department of Defence. 
51  Announcement of further military commitment to ANZAM (British, New Zealand and Australian 
agreement for co-operation in suppressing insurgency movement in Malaya) April 1955. Neville 
Meaney, Australia and the World: A Documentary History From The 1870s to the 1970s, Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1985. p329. 
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Vietnam War. 52 Underlying these deployments was also the logic, albeit inferred, 
that the South East Asian 'troubles' should be 'contained' within that region and 
away from Australian shores. 
Australian foreign policy has undergone a paradigm shift in more recent times, 
moving away from a policy of 'containment' to a policy of 'engagement'. Australian 
foreign policy became oriented towards the premise that, as opposed to keeping 
'trouble' away from Australia shores, it was better to keep it out of the South East 
Asian region altogether. Or as Gary Brown observed: 
"Underlying this policy is the assumption that if Australia's region 
is secure in military-strategic terms, then so is Australia. Therefore 
it is considered important that Australia make, and be seen to be 
making, a positive contribution to regional security via 
engagement."53 
Australia's change in mindset could be attributed to a variety of reasons. The 
development and growing military capabilities of the South East Asian states might 
have led to the assessment that a policy of containment would be difficult, if not 
impossible. Australia's economic interests in the South East Asian region also meant 
that a policy of containment, even if successful, would still prove to be inadequate in 
terms of defending its interests. In other words, political instability in the South East 
Asian region would inevitably have an adverse effect on Australia's economic 
interests, even if it were possible to 'contain' them within that region. Thus, a policy 
of active engagement with the South East Asian region, in defence of Australia's 
strategic interests, has been deemed necessary. 54 
52 Gary Brown, 'Defence', 
Stocktake. 
53 Gary Brown, 'Defence', in 
Stocktake. 
54 Gareth Evans & Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign 
184. 
Relations: In The World Of The 1990s.  pp181- 
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Australia demonstrated its interest in the South East Asian region by maintaining 
extensive security ties with various states in that region. Australia is a member of the 
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), the only multilateral defence pact that is 
operational in South East Asia. 55 Australia had maintained a physical military 
presence in the region for many years. 56 Under the FPDA, Australian had made 
regular but limited deployments of military units to South East Asia. Thus: 
"RAAF Orion Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft fly regularly 
from the Butterworth base in Malaysia to conduct maritime 
surveillance operations. F/A-1 8 aircraft deploy on a regular basis 
for exercises. The Army has a company at Butterworth on a three 
month rotation and RAAF has a support unit at Butterworth for the 
Orions.”57 
Australia's role as a 'middle' power that maintained a 'balance' within its geo-
political region is re-enacted to some extent within the South East Asian region. In 
Konfrontasi with Indonesia, Australia clearly played an important role in maintaining 
the 'balance of power' between the smaller states in the region (including Malaysia, 
Singapore, New Zealand and Australia itself) and the South East Asian giant, 
Indonesia. Significantly, even within FPDA itself; Australia continues to play an 
important role as a middle power and a trusted 'middleman'. Gary Brown noted: 
"The FPDA runs the Integrated Air Defence System (TADS) which 
supports the air defence of Singapore and Malaysia. An Australian 
commands the IADS structure, if only because neither Singapore 
nor Malaysia would necessarily wish the other to hold this 
position."58 
55  Although the viability of the FPDA is currently strained following Malaysia's withdrawal from joint 
military exercises in 1998 and its decision to review its involvement in such exercises. Straits Times, 
Singapore, 29 October 1998. 
56  Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and ASEAN: Challenges and 
Opportunities, Canberra, Australia Government Publishing Service, 1984. p60. 
57  Gary Brown, 'Defence', in Background Paper 9 1996-97, Australia's Asian Connections: A 
Stocktake, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group. 
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Australia has conducted small-scale exercises with Brunei and Thailand. 59 Australia 
signed a security arrangement with Indonesia in 1996, making it the only country 
apart from the United States to be involved in a bilateral security arrangement with a 
South East Asian nation. 6° 
Australia's strategic interests in South East Asia have always been significant. 
However, since the early 1990s, concerns about the changing geo-political 
environment brought about by the end of the Cold War and the growing power of the 
South East Asian states have guide Australia's outlook towards the region. Gareth 
Evans, the former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, observed that: 
"With growing prosperity, overall stability and regional 
cooperation, several countries have begun to look more broadly at 
their notions of security, especially the importance of maritime 
areas. What is important about the changes of force structure that 
flow from this, such as Indonesia's improvement of its naval 
capabilities, is that they are appropriate and expected, and no more 
than what Australia has put in place, adjusting capabilities to 
circumstances."61 
The increased military capabilities, especially in terms of naval power, of the South 
East Asian states have been a matter of significance to Australian strategic planners, 
even though such capabilities have, thus far, been accompanied by better 
understanding and a more cordial relationship between Australia and these states. 
The growing military capabilities of the South East Asian states also coincided with 
nagging doubts about the continuing commitment of the United States to the South 
East Asian region. Thus, in his assessment of the region, Ross Baggage states that: 
58  Gary Brown, 'Defence', in Background Paper 9 1996-97, Australia's Asian Connections: A 
Stocktake. 
59  Rob Willis, 'The Maritime Strategic Security Setting: An Operational Perspective', in Australia's 
Maritime Bridge Into Asia, Sam Bateman & Dick Sherwood (eds.), St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 
1995. p99. 
60 Michael Ong, 'The Context of Australia's Involvement in Asia'. 
61 Gareth Evans, 'Australia's Regional Security Environment', Address to the Conference on Strategic 
Studies in a Changing World, Australian National University, 31 July 1991, p6. 
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"There are now widespread doubts throughout Asia about the 
preparedness of the Clinton and subsequent administrations to 
commit forces to this region in many circumstances of future 
tension or conflict. Special concerns relate to the reticence of the 
United States to commit forces for peacekeeping operations in 
Cambodia and to support regional countries in the event of 
increased tensions in the South China Sea. In consequence, many 
of the regional countries are reassessing the assumptions they have 
made in the past about the United States."62 
These geo-political changes have affected Australia's perceptions of its strategic 
interests within the South East Asian region. 
Two aspects of the South East Asian strategic environment pertaining to maritime-
related issues have been especially significant to Australia. These include the 
security of sea-lanes of communication and the issue of overlapping jurisdictional 
claims to the Spratly Islands within the South East Asian region. 
Australia's interests in maritime and security related issues in the South East Asia 
region are based, to a large extent, on its considerable economic interests in East 
Asia. Australia's most important markets (seven out of ten for exports and five of ten 
for imports) are in East Asia. 63 These markets, as well as Australia's major markets 
in Europe, relied on the safe flow of sea-borne trade that passed through South East 
Asian waters.64 Although shipping could be re-routed in the event of a disruption to 
traffic arising from political or military conflict in the South East Asian region, this 
62 Ross Babbage, 'The Post-Cold War Maritime Strategic Environment In The Western Pacific', in 
Operational And Technological Developments In Maritime Warfare: Implications For The Western 
Pacific, Dick Sherwood (ed.), Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no. 105, Canberra, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, 1995. p10. 
63 Merchandise exports fob, recorded trade basis, compiled from ABS unpublished data. 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/.  
64 Leonard Payne, 'Ships & Shipping', in Australia's Maritime Bridge Into Asia,  Sam Bateman & 
Dick Sherwood (eds.), St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1995. pp123-130. See also Ross Robinson, 'The 
Changing Patterns of Commercial Shipping and Port Concentration in Asia', Ross Babbage & Sam 
Bateman (eds), Maritime Change: Issues for Asia, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1993. 
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option would incur considerable costs.65 Thus, the safety and freedom of navigation 
through the transit straits and archipelagic waters of the South East Asian region 
would be a major concern to Australia. 66 Similarly, Australia is concerned about the 
dispute over the overlapping jurisdictional claims in the Spratly Islands in the South 
East Asian region. The Spratly Islands dispute affected regional stability, economic 
development, the maritime environment, as well as the safety and freedom of 
important sea lanes of communication in South East Asia, all of which might have a 
negative impact on Australian strategic interests, if conflict were to occur. 
Australia has attempted to defend its strategic interests and address the above 
concerns by seeking to play an influential role in establishing regional frameworks 
for security that are based on multilateral institutional arrangements. Australia's 
policy of engagement with its South East Asian neighbours has been directed at 
creating a strategic environment in South East Asia that would be amenable to its 
best interests.67 This included initiatives for regional multilateral institutional 
arrangements that were deemed vital towards the achievement of this objective. 68 
Australia exploited its capabilities as a middle power to promote institutional 
mechanisms for dialogue and other functional objectives within the South East Asian 
region. Influential strategic planners like Professor Paul Dibb and Commodore Sam 
Bateman promoted the view that maritime confidence and security building measures 
for the region are essential. In a paper to a workshop on "Naval Confidence and 
Security Building Regimes for the Asia Pacific Region' in Kuala Lumpur, Dibb and 
65 Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994. pp44-45. 
66 R.J. Hawke, 'Australia's Security in Asia', An Address by the Prime Minister in The Asia Lecture, 
Asia-Australian Institute, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 24 May 1991. pll. 
67 Andrew Mack, 'Strategic Security Issues' in Australia's Maritime Bridge Into Asia, Sam Bateman 
& Dick Sherwood (eds.), St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1995. pp81-94. 
295 
Bateman proposed the development of regional institutional arrangements for this 
purpose.69 In particular, the establishment of regional arrangements for maritime 
surveillance and safety, as well as regimes for the avoidance of incidents at sea, that 
would enhance the security of the region (and by inference the security of Australia) 
have been strongly advocated." There are other indications of Australia's efforts to 
influence the establishment of security forums in the South East Asian region. These 
include the Australian proposal for a Conference for Security and Cooperation in 
Asia (modelled on the regional arrangement for Europe) and its support for 
enhancement of the ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as tentative efforts to introduce 
discussion of security issues within the ASEAN forum itself. Australia has also 
initiated numerous 'track-two' quasi-official discussion forums, both to keep 
significant security issues on the agenda of South East Asian states and 'to foster a 
habit of consultation and dialogue'. These endeavours clearly demonstrated 
Australia's interests in the South East Asian region and its determination to influence 
developments there. 
In short, Australia's interests within the South East Asian region have grown in 
significance. These interests were based on Australia's growing economic linkages 
with the entire East Asian region, as well as on the perception that any significant 
threat to the Australian continent would most likely come from or through the South 
East Asian region. 
68  Tony Kevin, 'Major Power Influences On The Southeast Asian Region: An Australian View', in 
Strange Neighbour: The Australia-Indonesia Relationship, Desmond Ball & Helen Wilson, North 
Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1991. 
69  Desmond Ball & W.S.G. Bateman, 'An Australian Perspective on Maritime CSBMs in the Asia-
Pacific Region' organised by the Peace Research Centre, Australian National University and the 
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 8-10 July 1991. 
79 Desmond Ball & Russ Swinnerton, 'A Regional Regime For Maritime Surveillance, Safety and 
Information Exchange', Paper presented at Australia's Maritime Bridge Into Asia conference, 17-19 
November 1993, held in Canberra, 1993. 
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Australian Influence (or lack of) In The South East Asian Region 
The discussion that follows addresses the manner in which Australia has sought to 
defend its interests in the South East Asian region. It argues that while Australia has 
the ambition to assume a role of significant influence in South East Asia, its capacity 
to do so is moderated by its limitations as a middle power. In the South East Asian 
region, Australia does not enjoy the asymmetries of power that has characterised its 
relationship with the Pacific Island states. Therefore, in order to defend its interests 
effectively in the South East Asian region, Australia has sought to assume a role of 
influence through regional institutional arrangements. However, the fact that 
Australia has yet to be fully accepted as a part of the South East Asian region, 
coupled with the circumscribed ambit of regional institutional arrangements within 
South East Asia (as opposed to the situation in the Antarctic region) has seen limited 
scope for middlepowermanship from Australia. 
The literature suggests that middle powers could be perceived as regional great 
powers, with general interests in their region matched with the capacity to defend 
those interests. 7I This would infer that the extent to which a middle power like 
Australia is able to influence regional arrangements in contemporary South East Asia 
would be determined by its military and economic power, relative to that of the 
South East Asian states. More recent studies argued that middlepowermanship 
represents another significant avenue through which middle powers assume a role of 
influence, where middlepowermanship refers to the capacity of middle powers to 
establish, engage in and exploit multilateral institutional arrangements to their 
71 See Chapter 2, Structuralist Perspectives Of Middle Powers. 
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advantage. 72 However, an investigation of Australia's role in the South East Asian 
region suggests that geographic vagaries can affect the extent to which a middle 
power might assume an influential regional role and its capacity to manifest 
significant influence. 
Middle Power And Influence In South East Asia 
As discussed earlier, Australia had historically played a significant role in the South 
East Asian region. As a British dominion, Australia achieved industrialisation and 
the status of a developed nation much earlier than any other state in the South East 
Asian region. Therefore, Australia possessed military capabilities that far exceeded 
those possessed by the states of an undeveloped and newly independent South East 
Asian region in the years immediately following the Second World War. Australia 
had a well-trained, well-armed, and experienced military with the proven capacity to 
project itself abroad in defence of its interests. In contrast, the military forces of 
South East Asia did not have the same level of capabilities and they did not possess a 
professional military with experience beyond combating civil insurgency. Thus, for 
many years Australia was the dominant power, in military terms, within the South 
East Asian region. In 1947, Australian strategic planners were able to state with 
confidence that: 
"In the foreseeable future, which can be regarded as the period 
which planing based on present knowledge must take into account, 
Australia's physical security is not likely to be seriously 
endangered as a result of any hostile or unfriendly action in her 
own theatre. No country in ... South East Asia ... possesses the 
capacity, either in point of organisation or equipment, to conduct 
any operations against her of any significance. There is no danger 
at present discernible of any of them developing a military potential 
72 See Chapter 2, Process Oriented Perspectives Of Middle Powers. 
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which would enable them, either together or singly, successfully to 
challenge the Commonwealth."73 
As a middle power, Australia could rely upon its superior power to assume a role of 
influence and importance in the South East Asian region. For a period, Australia was 
able to resist the spread of communism there, as well as to aid in the development of 
many South East Asian states. 
Australia's contemporary position with respect to South East Asia is somewhat 
different. Decades of education, development and independence in the South East 
Asian region have reduced the disparity between Australia and its South East Asian 
neighbours substantially. Many of the region's professional armed forces currently 
surpass Australia's military forces in quantitative terms, even if they continue to lag 
behind in qualitative measures. 74 The rapid economic growth in the region has also 
meant a corresponding increase in defence spending, resulting in much better 
training and the acquisition of modern military hardware. 75 Therefore, the enormous 
military superiority that Australia had previously possessed has been greatly eroded 
and is likely to continue to diminish. Professor Paul Dibb observed that: 
"We have traditionally accepted the notion that Australia's capacity 
to absorb and operate equipment at higher technology levels than 
regional states provides us with a sufficiently advantageous margin 
for our numerical deficiencies. Given the rapid diffusion of modern 
high-technology weapons systems, and their accurate application in 
73 Joint Intelligence Committee Appreciation 1/47, Melbourne 27 March 1947, Appreciation of 
Certain Aspects of the Strategic Position of Australia, cited in Documents on Australian Foreign 
Policy 1937-49, Volume XII: 1947, W.J. Hudson & Wendy Way (eds.), Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1995. pp277-278. 
74 Ross Babbage, 'The Post-Cold War Maritime Strategic Enviroment In The Western Pacific', in 
Operational And Technological Developments In Maritime Warfare: Implications For The Western 
Pacific, Dick Sherwood (ed.), Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University, 1994. pp5-42. 
75 J.N. Mak, ASEAN Defence Orientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics Of Modernisation And 
Structural Change, Canberra Papers On Strategy And Defence No. 103, Canberra, Strategic And 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1994. 
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combat, this proposition will increasingly need sceptical 
examination." 76 
Both Indonesia and Vietnam are far more populous than Australia and they possess 
armed forces that are much larger numerically. While their military forces are not be 
as well equipped or as well trained as the Australian forces, they are certainly 
significant by regional standards. They may also, with some justification, lay claim 
to experience in war and they command sufficient resources to train and equip (at 
least) a significant portion of their forces to a high level of capability. 
Australia's traditional advantage, in terms of economic influence, in the South East 
Asian region has also been reduced. Australia had used, and continues to use, 
economic power as a medium of influence in defence of its interests in the South 
East Asian region. Australia's foreign aid, trade and investment policies have long 
been instruments of its foreign policy. Australian development assistance through the 
Colombo Plan, the Australian International Development Aid Bureau, and other 
programs enabled it to defend its interests within South East Asia. These initiatives 
have also bought a great deal of good will in the region and some scholars have 
noted the efficacy of this strategy. 77 
"Casey found from visiting most countries of SE Asia that 
Australia was in a good repute in all the free countries there as a 
friendly and interested neighbour, and the fact that was appreciated 
that their fate was joined with that of Australia. He found that they 
tended to look to Australia for advice more than to some of the 
great powers."78 
76  Paul Dibb, 'World Political and Strategic Trends', in Australia's External Relations In The 1980s: 
The Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors, Paul Dibb (ed.), Canberra, Croom Helm, 
1983. p41. 
77 I.M. Cumpston, History of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1991, Volume Two, Canberra, 195. 
p283. 
8 I.M. Cumpston, History of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1991, Volume Two, p283. 
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However, rapid economic growth in the South East Asian region has reduced the 
dependence of some South East Asian states on Australian economic assistance. 79 
Australia's gross national product was significantly greater than the combined total 
for the ASEAN states prior to the 1990s. 8° In 1989, Australia accounted about 6.3% 
of regional (East Asian) GDP (US$297.486 billion) while the South East Asian states 
only accounted for 5.8% (US$273.876 billion)." In 1995, the situation had changed. 
Country 1993 (GNP) 1995 (GNP) 
Australia US$262.8 billion US$310.8 billion 
ASEAN US$366.8 billion US$423.5 billion 
Source: Report by the U.S. Department of State, submitted to the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, and the House Committees on Foreign Affairs, and Ways and 
Means, May 1996. 82 
It is obvious that it would take some of the ASEAN nations decades, if not longer, to 
catch up with Australia in terms of GNP and other aspects of development. 
Nevertheless, the rapid economic growth that has been achieved is significant as it 
increased their capacity to pursue a greater range of policy options. 83 Moreover, 
notwithstanding the current economic crisis in South East Asia, the development of 
the South East Asian states is likely to continue. 
The economic development of the South East Asian states means greater 
opportunities for capacity building. It also means that the South East Asian states 
would be better able to resist the use of economic leverage for influence against 
them, especially by a middle power like Australia. Indeed, the reverse would be true 
79 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and ASEAN: Challenges and 
Opportunities. pxii. 
80  Report by the U.S. Department of State, submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, and 
the House Committees on Foreign Affairs, and Ways and Means, May 1996. 
81 Gareth Evans & Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In The World Of The 1990s.  p341. 
82 The figures refer to the ASEAN 6 (and excludes Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar). 
83 B.A. Hamzah, 'A Survey Of Economic Opportunities And An Overview Of The Geo-Strategic 
Environment In The Maritime Sector Of Southeast Asia', Paper presented at Australia's Maritime 
Bridge Into Asia conference, 17-19 November 1993, held in Canberra, 1993. p3. 
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and Australia has become more susceptible to pressure from the South East Asian 
states. Collectively, the South East Asian states have become Australia's most 
important trading partners after Japan and United States. While the South East Asian 
states should not be regarded as a monolithic body, ASEAN does have a record of 
being able to respond to political challenges as a collective and had successfully put 
pressure on Australia in the past. For example, in 1971 the ASEAN states were able 
to able to successfully pressure Australia into abandoning a scheme to protect its 
national carrier, Qantas, by excluding other airlines from the `Kangeroo route' 
between Australia and Britain. 84 
Australia remains the wealthiest state (in absolute terms) in the South East Asian 
region and continues to be backed by a well-trained and well-equipped military with 
considerable experience. However, the balance of power in the South East Asian 
region is now such that it is questionable if Australia can continue to lay claim to 
being a regional great power, much less play a role as such. 
In the years since de-colonialisation, the South East Asia states have become much 
more influential in international affairs and are much stronger militarily. In 
particular, Indonesia has demonstrated its aspirations to the leadership of the global 
non-aligned movement. 85 Malaysia has also exhibited similar ambitions with respect 
to the Third World, especially during the stewardship of its outspoken Prime 
" 'Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights Of Non-Scheduled Services Among ASEAN, 
Manila, 13 March 1971,' in ASEAN Document Series, 1967-1985, ASEAN Secretariat, Jarkarta, 
1985. p191. See also, Ow Chin Hock & Lim Chong Yah, The Development Of ASEAN: A 
Perspective On Relations With Australia, ASEAN-Australia Joint Project, Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN-
Australia Economic Papers No. 3, 1984. p22. 
85 Dwight King, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy', in The Political Economy Of Foreign Policy In 
Southeast Asia, David Wurfel & Bruce Burton (eds.), New York, St Martin's Press, 1990. pp97-98. 
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Minister, Dr Mahathir, on issues such as applying the principle of common heritage 
to Antarctica or applying controls on hedge-fund managers. 86 
In light of the growing parity in power between Australia and its South East Asia 
neighbours, as well as the growing ambitions of the latter, Australia would find it 
difficult to play the part of a regional hegemonic power in contemporary South East 
Asia. And to reprise the leadership role it plays in the South West Pacific region. 
Com arative Data On Australia and the South East Asian States _ 
Countrie 
s 
GNP 
(US $ 
million) 
Populatio 
n 
GNP per 
capita 
(US $) 
Armed 
Forces 
Military 
Expenditure 
(`)/0 of GNP) 
Australia 310,050 18,025,000 17,510 56,100 2.4% 
SEA 476,554 482,877,00 4,193 1,795,400 3.27% 
Total 0 
Brunei 4,001 291,000 14,530 4,900 8.4% 
Cambodia 1,580 9,610,000 170 88,500 N.A. 
Indonesia 136,620 195,283,00 730 276,000 1.5% 
0 
Laos 1,308 4,882,000 290 37,000 7.9% 
Malaysia 60,141 19,948,000 3,160 114,500 3.9% 
Myanmar 30,707 46,527,000 700 286,000 3.8% 
Philippine 54,593 70,011,000 830 106,500 2.2% 
S 
Singapore 55,372 2,989,000 19,310 54,000 4.8% 
Thailand 120,235 58,791,000 2,040 256,000 2.9% 
Vietnam 11,997 74,545,000 170 572,000 5.7% 
Source: Britannica Encyclopaedia CD ROM 1997. 
If there is a South East Asian regional great power, then it is arguably Indonesia, and 
not Australia that has better claim to the title. On the strength of its population, 
available resources and potential capabilities, Indonesia might, arguably, be 
considered a regional great power within South East Asia. However, since Sukarno's 
ambitions on Malaysia and Singapore have been thwarted, by a coalition of powers 
86 Statement by Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad on Antarctica at the 37th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in New York on 29th September 1982. Jennifer Hewett, 'Not on the 
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that included Australia, Indonesia has generally assumed a role that is defined by 
regional consensus rather than hegemonic leadership. Indeed, since ex-President 
Suharto took office in 1965, Indonesia has habitually refrained from acts of assertive 
influence within the region to forestall any impression of dominance. 87 Thus, overt 
attempts by any power in South East Asia to satisfy ambitions of regional hegemony 
have been absent for decades. Indeed, given the fact that most of the South East 
Asian states tend to be fairly evenly matched as powers, any state with ambitions to 
exercise dominance over the South East Asian region and assume the role of a 
regional great power is likely to meet with formidable resistance. 
Middlepowermanship In South East Asia 
Australia's capacity to translate its participation in regional multilateral institutional 
arrangements into effective influence has been observed in the South Pacific and the 
Antarctic region. In contrast, Australia's pursuit of middlepowermanship in the South 
East Asian region has been impeded by several factors. These include the scarcity of 
formal multilateral institutional arrangements within the region, as well as the limited 
scope of the arrangements that do exist. In addition, Australia's ambivalence about 
its identity as a South East Asian nation also undermines its influence in regional 
multilateral institutions. Thus, Australia's strategy of middlepowermanship has been 
less effective in South East Asia, relative to its successes elsewhere. 
agenda: Mahathir's attack on free market "misery" in Sydney Morning Herald, 23 July 1998. 
81  J. Soedjati Djiwandono, 'The Role of Major Powers and the Role of Indonesia as a Middle Power in 
Southwest Pacific', in The Role of Middle Powers In The Pacific: Indonesia-Canada Relations 
Towards The Year 2000, Jakarta, Centre For Strategic And International Studies, 1985. ppl 7-20. The 
notable exception was of course Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in 1975, but there were 
suggestions that even then, Indonesia had 'consulted' prior to its military action. 
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In contrast to the South West Pacific and Antarctic regions where Australia's 
strategy of middlepowermanship is premised on a highly visible leadership role, 
Australian has adopted a more discreet and less direct role in championing 
multilateral institutional arrangements within the South East Asian region. Australia 
maintained strong and cordial bilateral relationships with various South East Asian 
nations. In particular, Australia's close ties with Indonesia and Singapore provided it 
with the opportunity to persuade and influence regional developments in South East 
Asia. However, Australia's bilateral relations with the South East Asian states tended 
to fluctuate. In spite of a generally cordial government to government relationship, 
Australia's ties with Indonesia have often been strained by a variety of issues ranging 
from the deaths of 5 Australian reporters during Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, 
to a Sydney Morning Herald article on ex-President Suharto. 88 
Australia's relationship with Malaysia has been even more tumultuous, with points 
of conflict ranging from television programmes deemed offensive by Malaysia to ex-
Prime Minister Keating's now infamous label of Dr Mahathir as a `recalcitrant'. 89 
Therefore, while important, bilateral approaches have been considered inadequate in 
South East Asia. 9° 
Bilateral ties could not furnish the 'ballast' that a viable multilateral institutional 
arrangement would provide. This has been demonstrated by the Antarctic Treaty 
System, which provided a forum for cooperation between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom, even though bilateral relations between them were marked by conflict 
88 See Desmond Ball & Helen Wilson (eds.), Strange Neighbours: The Australia-Indonesia 
Relationship, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991. 
89 Peter Searle, 'Recalcitrant or Realpolitik? The Politics of Culture in Australia's Relations with 
Malaysia', in Pathways to Asia, The Politics of Engagement, Richard Robison (ed.), St Leonard's, 
Allen & Unwin, 1996. 
9° In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. p47. 
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during the Falklands War. 91 Similarly, formal multilateral institutional arrangements 
provided Australia with a platform for influence and consultation that was 
independent of its unpredictable bilateral relations with the states within the South 
East Asian region. Nossal also argues that: 
"Middle power diplomacy is guided by a belief that given the 
degree of contemporary interdependence, strictly bilateral dealings 
are a less effective, and often entirely ineffective, means of 
resolving international disputes. Moreover, bilateral arrangements 
do not promote global norms as effectively as those arrived at 
through multilateral negotiations." 92 
Australia's efforts in the South East Asian region have been guided by its interests in 
establishing a regional environment that is more amenable to its interests and where 
multilateral institutional arrangements play a more prominent role. Thus, Australia's 
primary role in the South East Asian region might be described as that of a facilitator 
for confidence building measures and 'track two diplomacy'. 93 
In the South East Asian region, ASEAN has emerged as the pre-eminent regional 
multilateral institutional arrangement. 94 ASEAN's primary role has been to 
institutionalise a process of dialogue and consultation within the South East Asian 
region. Thus, ASEAN serves to harmonise regional views on issues through its 
process of consensus building, and thereby increase the capacity of the region for 
effective advocacy in global forums on international issues. However, ASEAN is 
limited by the fact that its serves mainly as a consultative forum and a confidence 
building measure, and has in practice tended to avoid a regulatory or functional role 
91 Peter Beck, The International Politics Of Antarctica, London, Croom Helm, 1986. pp83-84 
92 Kim Richard Nossal, 'Middle Power Diplomacy in the Changing Asia-Pacific Order: Australia and 
Canada Compared', in Charting the Post-Cold War Order, Richard Leaver & James L. Richardson 
(eds.), Boulder, Westview Press, 1993. p215. 
93 J.N. Mak, Defending Australia: Rhetoric or Regional Engagement? p7. For a discussion on the role 
on the utility of confidence building measures, see Andrew Mack, 'Confidence and Security Building 
Measures and Military Security', Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, vol XIII, 
No. 3, 1990. pp142-156. 
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in economic or security issues. 95 Therefore, unlike the South Pacific region where 
multilateral institutional arrangements are developed to overcome the individual 
limitations of the Pacific Island states, or the Antarctic region where the Antarctic 
Treaty System is the de facto regulatory authority, South East Asian regional 
institutional arrangements have played a more limited role. 
The relative scarcity of regional arrangements dedicated to functional or regulatory 
objectives in the South East Asian region might be attributed to several factors. One 
significant factor is the lingering suspicion that the South East Asian states still feel 
towards one another. Notwithstanding the talk of unity in ASEAN, member states 
clearly regard each other as economic and political rivals. 96 There are also 
differences among ASEAN members on regional priorities, appropriate economic 
policies and security issues. 97 Therefore, Neorealist considerations, based on 
suspicion and fear of potential rivals, appear to have inhibited the expansion of 
regional arrangements within South East Asia. 98 This meant that there are very few 
formal multilateral institutional arrangements in the South East Asian region within 
which Australia could assume a role of influence through middlepowermanship, 
either as a member or by providing technical or legal expertise. 
94 Alison Broinowski (ed.), Understanding ASEAN, London, MacMillan, 1982. 
95 Mohammad Kamlin, The Meaning Of Integration In The ASEAN Region, Working Paper No. 8, 
Faculty Of Arts & Social Sciences, Universiti Brunei Darusalam, 1991. 
96 Hans H. Indorf, 'Political Relations Within ASEAN', in The ASEAN Reader, compiled by K.S. 
Sandhu, Sharon Siddique, Chandran Jeshurun, Ananda Rajah, Joseph L.H. Tan, Pushpa Thambipillai, 
Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. pp87-94. 
97 Hans H. Indort 'Political Relations Within ASEAN'. pp87-94. 
98 For a detailed discussion of Neorealist concerns with relative gains, see Robert Powell, 'Absolute 
and Relative Gains' in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David A. Baldwin 
(ed.), New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. pp209-233. & Micheal Mastanduno, 'Do Relative 
Gains Matter? America's Response To Japanese Industrial Policy', in Neorealism and Neoliberalism:  
The Contemporary Debate, David A. Baldwin (ed.), New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. 
pp250-264. For a brief discussion of intra-ASEAN suspicions of member states towards one another, 
see Hans H. Indorf, 'Political Relations Within ASEAN'. 
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Australia's role as a middle power in the South East Asian region is also limited by 
the fact that it is yet to be acknowledged as a part of the region. 99 Therefore, any 
advocacy on the part of Australia could be and has been deemed the 'meddling' of an 
'outsider'. 10° In contrast, Australia's effectiveness in the South West Pacific and the 
Antarctic can be attributed (in part) to the fact that it is seen to be acting in the 
capacity of a 'regional actor' within those regions. Australia's effectiveness in South 
East Asia has also been limited by the fact that it is not actually a member of 
ASEAN. While Australia has been granted observer and dialogue partner status in 
ASEAN, the fact that it is not a member meant that it could be excluded from 
regional forums like the proposed EAEC or the ASEAN-EC dialogue', both of 
which can have strong bearing on Australia's interests. 1°2 Australia's own 
ambivalence about its 'Asian identity' has not helped. Australians have mused upon 
their identity as a part of the South East Asian region for many years. 1°3 Although the 
importance of the South East Asian region to Australian interests appears undeniable, 
there are lingering fears that Australia's cultural identity might lose its distinctive 
European character or that its democratic political institutions might be at risk from 
association with Asia. Consequently, there has been a reluctance to embrace and 
engage the region by many Australians. Some South East Asian states also resent 
Australia and that has made it difficult for the latter to assume a more prominent role 
in South East Asian affairs. For example, 
" Meg Gurry, 'Identifying Australia's 'Region': From Evatt to Evans', in Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 1, May 1995. p30. 
1°° Peter Searle, 'Recalcitrant or Realpolitik? The Politics of Culture in Australia's Relations with 
Malaysia'. p59. 
Km Also referred to as ASEM or the Asia-Europe Meeting. 
102 Ramesh Thalcur, 'Australia's Regional Engagement', in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 20, 
Number 1, Singapore, Institute Of Southeast Asian Studies, April 1998. p2. 
103 K.C.A. Shann, 'Our Future As An Asian Nation: A Review', in Our Future As An Asian Nation: 
Facts And Factors Conditioning Speculative Thought Concerning Australia's Future Role In Asia, 
Theme Lectures From Summer School, University of Western Australia Adult Education Board, 
1967. & F.K. Crowley, 'Australia: Outpost of Europe', in Australia: A Part Of Asia? Papers presented 
at the symposium held at the University of New South Wales on November 7 1968. 
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"Malaysian leaders, and Dr Mahathir in particular, have frequently 
complained that Australians have not yet fully rid themselves of a 
'colonial mentality' or a 'superiority complex' where their 
pronouncements and dealings with Malaysia are concern."'" 
The impression that Australia did not sincerely consider itself to be a part of the 
South East Asian region was reinforced by Australia's decision to dispatch warships 
to the Gulf without informing, or consulting with, any South East Asian state. 1°5 
As it had been suggested that one of the primary characteristics of a middle power is 
its capacity to play a leadership role in multilateral institutional arrangements, 1°6 the 
opportunities for middlepowermanship by Australia in the South East Asian region 
have been seriously circumscribed by the factors discussed above. Thus, Mak argues 
that: 
‘`... while Canberra can aspire to be a regional leader, it can only 
lead from behind. This is because Australia, .. is considered in 
some quarters as an opportunistic Johnny-come-lately. ... As such, 
any Australian initiative must be seen as a cooperative, joint effort, 
preferably with some Southeast Asian partner 'leading' the way" 107 
Therefore, in order to play an effective role in the South East Asian region, Australia 
has had to modify the strategy that it has adopted in the regions discussed earlier and 
take a more subtle and less vociferous role. Towards this end, it shall be argued that 
Australia pursued a strategy based on encouraging the development of an 
environment in South East Asian region where 'habits of regional security 
consultation and dialogue take root'. Australia's capacity to set the agenda for 
regional discourse through track-two and other initiatives, in the face of its exclusion 
1°4 Peter Searle, 'Recalcitrant or Realpolitik? The Politics of Culture in Australia's Relations with 
Malaysia'. p59. 
105 J. Mohan Malik, The Gulf War: Australia's Role And Asian-Pacific Responses.  p45. 
106 See Chapter 2, Process Oriented Perspectives Of Middle Powers. 
107 J.N. Mak, Defending Australia: Rhetoric Or Regional Engagement?  Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian 
Institute of Maritime Affairs, 1995. p9. 
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from formal regional institutions like ASEAN, reflects its ability to influence 
regional affairs as a middle power in the South East Asian region. 
'Leading From Behind' — Middlepowermanship in South East Asia 
Australian attempts at an overt leadership role in the South East Asian region have 
enjoyed limited success and aroused some resentment. Australia's greatest recent 
success in a direct and visible leadership role in the South East Asian region is the 
role that it adopted in Cambodian issue. In 1989, Australia proposed a United 
Nations sponsored peace plan to address the conflict in Cambodia, and followed up 
on its proposal with vigorous advocacy. 108 This resulted in a peace accord in 1991, 
followed by popular elections in 1993. 
Australia's successful diplomacy with regard to the Cambodian issue might have 
been simply due to the good fortune of putting forward an idea "whose time had 
come". 109 However, it is also a reflection of a middle power's agility in seizing 
'windows of opportunity' and exploiting them through middlepowermanship. In 
particular, Australia's capacity for intensive diplomatic 'legwork' in 'driving' the 
agenda on the 'UN peace plan' for Cambodia must receive credit for much of the 
success. 110 Certainly, it is significant that after years of ASEAN diplomacy on this 
issue, 111 it was a middle power like Australia that brought about the final settlement 
to the Cambodian problem. However, Australia's success also aroused resentment 
108 Gareth Evans & Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In The World Of The 1990s. pp206- 
218. 
109 Gareth Evans & Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In The World Of The 1990s. p214. 
110 Gareth Evans & Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In The World Of The 1990s. pp210- 
218. 
III ASEAN Document Series, 1967-1985, ASEAN Secretariat, Jarkarta, 1985. pp327-347. 
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within South East Asia. There was irritation over what was perceived as cynical 
opportunism and diplomatic grandstanding. Thus, Evans' Cambodian initiative has 
been seen by some as stealing the credit for the years of hard work by ASEAN on a 
settlement. 112 This resistance towards any overt attempt by Australia to adopt a 
leadership role in South East Asian region meant that Australia had to adapt its 
strategy and exercise its influence in a more discreet manner within the region. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum 
The South East Asian states have generally been cool towards any hint of an attempt 
by extra-regional actors to influence developments within their region and this 
limited the scope for Australian leadership within this region. The difficulties faced 
by Australia are illustrated again when the concept of a 'Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Asia' (CSCA) was first mooted by Evans in 1990.' 13 Australia's 
intent was to encourage the development of a forum for formal and regular dialogue 
on security issues. As Evans and Grant explained: 
"The suggestion was made that if such processes of dialogue were 
to get under way, and if they were successful in enhancing 
confidence and developing new patterns of co-operation among 
various groups of countries in the region, then at some stage there 
might evolve a more formal structure — perhaps a 'Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Asia' (CSCA) along the lines of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
established in Helsinki in 1975." 114 
112 J.N. Mak, Defending Australia: Rhetoric or Regional Engagement? p9. 
113  Gareth Evans, 'Alliances And Change', Inaugural R J L Hawke Lecture, delivered at the Edward A 
Clark Centre for Australian Studies, University of Texas, by Senator Gareth Evans, Australian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austin, 9 October 1990. 
114  Gareth Evans & Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In The World Of The 1990s. pp110- 
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This proposal met with considerable opposition from the ASEAN states. Australia's 
role in the Cambodian peace process had already been perceived by some ASEAN 
states as an attempt to 'steal the thunder' from them and their years of diplomatic 
effort in this cause. Therefore, with the 'baggage' of residual resentment over 
Australia's Cambodian initiative, Australia's CSCA proposal was seen as yet another 
attempt at grandstanding by some in the region. Others criticised it as an unrealistic 
attempt, in spite of protestations to the contrary by Australia, to clone a European 
institution based on Western norms and expectations in South East Asia. 
Nevertheless, in spite of its initial hostile reception, Australia's proposal for a 
security forum did inspire a significant amount of discussion on the appropriate sort 
of multilateral security forum for the region. Indeed, Australia sponsored much of the 
discussion itself through track-two initiatives, such as academic conferences, round-
table discussions and numerous discussion papers and publications on the subject. In 
particular, Australia initiated and supported the Asia-Pacific Round Table, which 
organised many conferences encouraging dialogue and networking among academics 
and government officials on strategic issues affecting the region. Another important 
Australian initiative was the development of an open source for strategic maritime 
information by the Australian Department of Defence, which provided a useful and 
uncontroversial start to a Maritime Information Database." I15 The intent of these 
initiatives is to "ensure that habits of regional security consultation and dialogue 
[would] take root" in South East Asia. I16 
The idea for a formal multilateral arrangement that institutionalised dialogue on 
security issues gradually gained acceptance and took the form of the Council for 
115 Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper On Practical Pro_posals For Security Cooperation In 
The Asia Pacific Region, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1994. p8. 
116 Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper On Practical Proposals For Security Cooperation In 
The Asia Pacific Region. p24. 
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Security and Co-operation in Asia. Sum Nahi-Ling described the Council for 
Security and Co-operation in Asia as a forum intended: 
"... to provide a non-government dialogue and give direction and 
research support for ARF in the manner that PECC used to function 
for APEC by sponsoring seminars and reports." 7 
Thus, through its persistent and subtle lobby, Australia did eventually secure its 
objective of a multilateral institutional arrangement, albeit a 'non-government' 
arrangement, to facilitate dialogue on security issues and to provide a structured 
environment for regional confidence building and security among Asia-Pacific 
countries. 118 
Australia's desire for a regional multilateral arrangement that would institutionalise 
government to government discourse on regional security in East Asia was finally 
realised with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 119 The ARF 
is a forum based on the core membership of ASEAN and was created to 
institutionalise and facilitate regular dialogue and consultation on East Asian security 
issues by ASEAN and other key actors in the Asia Pacific region. 12° 
"Australia has been an active supporter of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) since its initiation in 1994. The ARF includes all the 
major powers with interests in East Asia and in 1996 it was also 
expanded to include India. Although still at an early stage of 
development, the ARF provides the basis for a process of regular 
dialogue about major issues of regional security and its specialist 
117 Ngai-Ling Sum, 'The NICs and East Asian Regionalism', in Andrew Gamble & Anthony Payne, 
Regionalism and World Order, London, Macmillan, 1996. pp220-221. 
118 For more on CSCAP, see Desmond Ball, 'The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP)', The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1993, pp495-505. 
119 See Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper On Practical Proposals For Security 
Cooperation In The Asia Pacific Region. & Yuen Foong Khong, 'Making Bricks Without Straw In 
The Asia Pacific', in The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1997. p292. 
120 Paul Evans, 'Reinventing East Asia: Multilateral Cooperation and Regional Order', in East Asian 
Security, Spring 1996. pp18-19. 
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working groups offer a concrete way of expanding communication 
and confidence among its members." 121 
Australia's interest in regional multilateral institutional arrangements like the ARF 
lies in the fact that they provided forums where security issues that affected the 
region could be aired and the concerns of various parties in the dispute discussed. 122 
Thus, Australia's strategy in South East Asia has been centred upon persistent track-
two advocacy (discussed above) for such forums. 
Australia has also been energetic in its efforts to develop a concept of region that is 
compatible with its interests within South East Asia. In 1996, Keating revealed that 
Australian policy has been: 
44
. . to ensure that China is engaged comprehensively in global and 
regional institutions. This has been a major aim of APEC and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum — to engage China, not to contain it or 
isolate it ... And, in part, that means building institutions and 
structures which engage all the countries of the region in a dialogue 
about the firture."123 
In other words, regional multilateral forums were used as vehicles to advance 
Australia's policy vis-à-vis countries like China by providing a mechanism for 
engagement and dialogue. Keating also declared: 
"I think there will be all sorts of definition of the "region". I 
mentioned in my speech my Foreign Minister's definition which is 
the East Asian hemisphere, from East Asia and through 
Australasia. ...One thing all of us are clear about, I think, is that its' 
good for us to have the largest economy, the largest liberal 
121 Dr Frank Frost, 'Australia's Foreign Relations with Asia', in Background Paper 9 1996-97, 
Australia's Asian Connections: A Stocktake, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Group. 
122 see J.N. max,' 'The Law Of The Sea After UNCLOS: Implications For The South China Sea 
Disputes', Paper presented at the Law of the Sea Conference, November 4-5 1994 held at the Centre 
for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia. pp8-9. 
123 Paul Keating, Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism,  Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1996. p15. 
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democracy in the world, economically and strategically engaged in 
East Asia and that's the United States." 124 
Thus, the ARF included the nine members of ASEAN, as well as Australia, 
Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. 125 In promoting the expansion of 
the ARF, an ASEAN based forum, to include states that spanned the Asia-Pacific, 
Australia sought establish a forum that would enable it to address its own security 
concerns. Membership of the ARF provided Australia and the other member states 
with the opportunity to articulate their concerns with regard to the region, and to 
exercise their powers of persuasion or influence within the forum. 126 
The development of regional arrangements like the ARF also helped to put forward a 
more liberal concept of 'region', thereby reinforcing Australia's image as a part of 
the East Asian region; or at the very least, a state with a legitimate stake in East Asia. 
Keating stresses the importance to Australia of how the region is defmed, when he 
states: 
"I was sure that the structures supporting Australian policy in the 
region, and the broader regional structures themselves, needed to 
change. My aim was to address both the form and the intensity of 
Australia's engagement with the region and, in doing that, to help 
change the region itself. The problem which confronted us in the 
early 1990s was two-fold. How could Australia encourage the 
institutional changes in this part of the world which were 
increasingly necessary in the post Cold War environment? How 
could we ensure that Australia was part of the conversation? 
The institutional changes depended first on the question of how the 
region was defined. [my emphasis] 
124 Paul Keating, Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism. p31. 
125 James E. Goodby & Daniel B. 0' Connor, 'The Utility of International Organizations in Regional 
Conflicts' in Regional Conflicts: The Challenge to US-Russian Co-operation, James E. Goodby (ed.), 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. p217. 
126 Ngai-Ling Sum, 'The NICs and East Asian Regionalism'. p220. 
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The key issue for us was to ensure that we were dealing with a 
trans-Pacific region - with the Asia Pacific, not just East Asia." I27 
The use of an 'inclusive' strategy may also be seen in Australia's promotion of 
APEC. Australia's original proposal had been aimed at a more limited membership. 
Nayan Chanda points out that: 
"In March 1989 Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke floated the 
idea of forming a trade and economic grouping of the Pacific Basin 
countries, but initially excluded the United States from the core 
group because of the reluctance of some Southeast Asian countries 
as well as Australia's own displeasure with US trade policies." I28 
It was only when Australia found itself in danger of being excluded from the EAEC 
that the concept of APEC was successfully re-introduced as a preferred alternative 
and broadened to include a more liberal definition of region. While a distinction 
between South East Asian and extra-regional states remained, forums like the ARF 
and APEC suggest that there could a role for the latter in multilateral institutional 
arrangements within South East Asia; and thus an opportunity for an enterprising 
middle power like Australia to wield influence. 
Track Two Diplomacy 
The strategy of 'leading from behind' may also be used to describe Australia's heavy 
reliance on 'track two diplomacy' and other forms of indirect diplomacy within the 
South East Asian region. I.M. Cumpston, commenting on Australia's contemporary 
role within South East Asia, states that: 
127 Paul Keating, 'Obsession: Australia And The Challenge Of Asia'. 
128 Nayan Chanda, 'The External Environment For Southeast Asian Foreign Policy', in The Political 
Economy Of Foreign Policy In Southeast Asia, (eds. David Wurfel & Bruce Burton), New York, St 
Martin's Press, 1990. p54. 
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"In this complex situation Australia's role could only be modest, 
but it could be persistent. The thread uniting its efforts was a call 
for dialogue and compromise." 129 
Therefore, while Australia's opportunities were restricted by its exclusion from 
ASEAN, it has continued to exploit its resources as a middle power to establish 
institutional processes for 'track two diplomacy' and other confidence building 
measures. In doing so, Australia has been able to set in place the building blocks for 
successful regional multilateral arrangements that could be used to defend Australian 
interests on such issues like the Spratly Islands dispute. 
In the Spratly Islands dispute, issues of law have to be reconciled with strategic 
interests, economic interests, and national pride; and this must be accomplished 
within an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility among some of the claimants." ° 
However, it has also been suggested that the reliance on international law as a 
response to the Spratly Islands dispute might not actually be conducive to the 
establishment and maintenance of order in the South East Asian region. 131 There is a 
fear that states might assume dangerous risks, such as the deployment of military 
forces or other acts asserting sovereignty, in order to establish or reinforce their 
claim in law. Therefore, any solution pursued required a common frame of reference 
for understanding the issues involved and which cultivated a greater sense of 
confidence and trust among the claimants. Australia's initiatives in facilitating 'track 
two diplomacy' and developing confidence-building measures helped to address 
these needs. These initiatives provided the basis for more formal regional 
129 This was actually a comment on Australia's role in the issue of Cambodia in South East Asia. I.M. 
Cumpston, History of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1991, Volume Two. p326. 
1313 Choon-Ho Park, 'The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns What', East Asia And The Law Of 
The Sea, Seoul, National University Press, 1983. R. Haller-Trost, The Spratly Islands: A Study on the 
Limitations of International Law, Canterbury, Centre of South-East Asian Studies, University of Kent, 
1990. 
131 Gerardo M. C. Valero, The Dispute Over The Spratly Archipelago: Is The Question Of 
Sovereignty Still Relevant? pll. 
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institutional arrangements by helping to foster 'habits of dialogue and 
cooperation'. 132 Although Australia modified its role from that of assuming 
'leadership' in multilateral institutional forums to facilitating the development of 
such forums, it continued to play a significant role in regional affairs and encouraged 
the development of a political environment that served its interests. 133 
The significance of Australia's role, as a middle power, within the South East Asian 
region may be illustrated in the manner in which it addressed its concerns over the 
Spratly Islands dispute through 'track two diplomacy'. As a non-claimant and a state 
that is considered an extra-regional actor, it would have been considered 
presumptuous of Australia (within the South East Asian region) to claim a leadership 
role in the mediation of the Spratly Islands dispute. However, there is enormous 
academic and international interest in this issue because of the importance of 
reaching an amicable settlement on the Spratly Islands dispute, as well as the fact 
that the process by which the dispute is resolved is of profound significance to East 
Asia. Therefore, discussion on the issues pertaining to the Spratly Islands dispute has 
been an important theme at many of the academic workshops or conferences 
organised by Australia or Australians. These 'academic' discussions often included 
government officials in their private capacity as academics or as policy experts. 
Therefore, they provided a useful sounding board on the sentiments and intent of the 
respective parties in the dispute 134 and facilitated the development of consensus on a 
common frame of reference with regard to the issues discussed. 135 
132 J. Mohan Malik, The Gulf War: Australia's Role And Asian-Pacific Responses. p2. 
133 Gareth Evans, 'Australia and Asia: Role of public diplomacy'. 
134 Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper On Practical Proposals For Security Cooperation In 
The Asia Pacific Region. p9. 
135 David Ong & B.A. Hamzah, 'Disputed Maritime Boundaries and Claims to Offshore Territories in 
the Asia-Pacific Region', paper presented at International Boundaries and Environmental Security: 
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Australian institutions like the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre or the 
Department of International Relations at the Australian National University also 
played a significant role by extending invitations to many senior regional academics 
to visit with and publish working papers on issues of interest to Australia: 36 
The above initiatives facilitate the process of confidence building in the region by 
increasing transparency on the actions and motivation of the state actors: 37 The 
networking that resulted from the regular contact of the participants, in an 
environment that is relatively more congenial than the adversarial atmosphere that 
could be expected at a negotiating table, also helped to establish an epistemic 
community that would be more likely to fmd common ground on issues: 38 
Therefore, Australia played a prominent role in promoting 'track two initiatives'. 
And the strategy of influencing mindsets and advocating norms in order to defend 
national interests became a significant aspect of Australia's middle power diplomacy 
in the South East Asian region. 139 
Australia's indirect approach towards defending its interests within the South East 
Asian region also included the use of regional 'proxies' where necessary. Like 
Australia, Indonesia has also described itself as a middle power in world affairs and 
perceived a significant role and responsibility for itself within the South East Asian 
Frameworks for Regional Cooperation Conference, 14-17 June 1995, held at RELC, Singapore. pp7- 
8. 
136 Ramesh  Thakur, 'Australia's Regional Engagement'. pp12-13. 
137 Craig A. Snyder, 'Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea', in Asian 
Perspective, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring-Summer 1997. pp14-17. 
138 See Antonio G.M. La Vina, 'South-South Cooperation in the East Asian Seas: Developing 
Regional Networks for Environmental Management', paper presented at International Boundaries and 
Environmental Security: Frameworks For Regional Conference, 14-17 June 1995, held at RELC, 
Singapore. Emmanuel C Lallana, 'Prospects For Cooperation in the South China Sea', paper presented 
at International Boundaries and Environmental Security: Frameworks For Regional Conference, 14-17 
June 1995, held at RELC, Singapore. 
139 Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper On Practical Proposals For Security Cooperation In 
The Asia Pacific Region. p3. 
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region. 14° Unlike Australia, Indonesia is a member of ASEAN and is unquestionably 
and universally regarded as a South East Asian state. Therefore, within the South 
East Asian region, Indonesia appeared to be in a better position to play the regional 
role of a middle power that Australia has traditionally adopted in other regions like 
the South West Pacific or the Antarctic. Recognising this, Australia and Canada have 
often encouraged Indonesia to assume the role of a middle power and to initiate and 
maintain multilateral institutional arrangements in response to regional issues in 
South East Asia. One expression of this role was the Indonesian-sponsored 
workshops, which were a series of annual discussions that focused on the Spratly 
Islands dispute, co-initiated by Canada and Indonesia. 141 
The Indonesian-sponsored workshops enjoyed several advantages. Indonesia's 
motives with regard to the issue of the Spratly Islands dispute are not regard with 
suspicion. In contrast, some of the East Asia states involved in the dispute are 
suspicious of extra-regional actors and Western states. 142 China, for example, has 
fears that its 'legitimate rights' would be ignored because of Western anxiety over its 
ascendancy in the region; and that its claims on the Spratly Islands might be 
compromised by attempts to 'contain' it. Western criticism and commentary have 
often been seen as being patronising towards East Asian nations. 
There is also a desire for regional initiatives to regional issues. Therefore, even 
though extra-regional interests in the matter were acknowledged, the participation of 
extra-regional actors and their involvement in the Spratly Islands dispute was 
140 See J. Soedjati Djiwandono, 'The Role of Major Powers and the Role of Indonesia as a Middle 
Power in Southwest Pacific', in The Role of Middle Powers In The Pacific: Indonesia-Canada 
Relations Towards The Year 2000, Jakarta, Centre For Strategic And International Studies, 1985. 
pp17-20. 
141 See William G. Stormont, 'Managing Potential Conflicts In The South China Sea', in Marine 
Policy, 1994 18 (4). pp353-356. 
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diplomatically kept discreet and minimal. These attitudes towards states perceived as 
extra-regional actors limited the role that Australia could play in the South East 
Asian region, even though its interests are directly engaged on issues such as the 
Spratly Islands dispute. In contrast, Indonesia's prestige as a leader of the non-
aligned movement and as a middle power that is 'of the region' made it the perfect 
host for workshops that also served as forums of mediation for the claimants to the 
Spratly Islands. 143 At the very least, the desire to 'give face' to their Indonesian hosts 
would assure the attendance of the Asian states involved in the dispute and amicable 
discussion of the issues, even if agreement is not reached, at the workshops. 
Multilateral institutional arrangements, whose primary purpose it is to provide a 
forum for dialogue, have often been criticised for the fact that they did not represent 
anything more concrete other than the opportunity for talk. 144 However, in their 
analysis of the relevance of game theory for understanding regimes, Andrew Kydd 
and Duncan Snidal point out that 'talk' is also important in the context of 
international relations. 
"Cheap talk refers to communication that is essentially costless in 
itself; where verbal communication is a prime example. Its 
importance for regime analysis is clear." 145 
Multilateral institutional arrangements for formal and regular discussion of security 
issues served a useful purpose as confidence building measures, as well as provided 
142 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, ASEAN: An Emerging Regional Security Community? Jarkarta, Centre 
For Strategic And International studies, 1991. pp21-24. 
143 Indonesia played a similar role when it hosted a meeting of APEC in Bali. The significance of the 
role played by Indonesia might be seen in the fact that the meeting in Bali was attended by Malaysia, 
even though it boycotted the first. 
144  Craig A. Snyder, 'Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea', in Asian 
Perspective. pp29-30. 
145  Andrew Kydd & Duncan Snidal, 'Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International 
Regimes', in Volker Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Regimes, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1997. pp123-124. 
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an opportunity to states for persuasion and advocacy. 146 Thus, the quasi-official 
status of the Indonesian-sponsored workshops provided an informal 'track-two' 
channel for diplomacy that made them more than idle academic speculation, but stop 
short of formal negotiations. This also allowed a more open and relaxed approach to 
the problem without compromising the official positions taken by the states in the 
dispute. Thus, even if the Indonesian-sponsored workshops should ultimately fail to 
bring about more formal diplomatic arrangements, they would still have served their 
purpose as confidence building measures. 147 
Australia played a deliberate role in fostering the "habits of dialogue and 
cooperation" within South East Asia. However, the extent to which Australia could 
claim credit for the development of new regional multilateral institutional 
arrangements in South East Asia is more difficult to measure. It would be difficult to 
prove a causal link between Australia's efforts in promoting 'track two initiatives' 
and the increasing preparedness of the South East Asian states to engage in a wider 
range of multilateral institutional arrangements. No quantitative measure exists to 
gauge the influence of a speech by an Australian minister, or a paper presented by an 
Australian academic, or a conference, seminar or workshop funded by Australia 
within South East Asia. Indeed, scholars like Amitav Acharya contended that it has 
been ASEAN, and not Australia, which has led the way in establishing new 
multilateral institutional arrangements to address the issues of regional security in 
South East Asia. 148 Nevertheless, there is considerable circumstantial evidence to 
146  See B.A. Hamzah, The Spratlies: What Can Be Done To Enhance Confidence, Malaysia, Institute 
of Strategic and International Studies, 1990. pp  14-16. Ji Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes and 
Prospects for Settlement, Malaysia, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1992. pp26-27. 
147  See Ted McDorman, 'The South China Sea Islands Dispute in the 1990s: A New Multilateral 
Process and Continuing Friction', in The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 8, No. 
2, May 1993. pp263-285. 
148  Amitav Acharya, 'ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Managing Regional Security', in New 
Challenges For ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues, Amitav Acharya & Richard Stubbs (eds.), 
Vancouver, UBC Press, 1995. p182. 
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suggest that Australia has played a significant role in encouraging states to be more 
receptive to the notion of multilateral institutional arrangements. 
Etty Argoes notes that the maintenance of multilateral institutional arrangements 
could be costly for developing countries and that most of the initiatives, not to 
mention funding, for such arrangements tends to be extra-regional. 149 However, a 
wealthy middle power like Australia has the capacity to foster institutionalised 
arrangements within South East Asia to facilitate dialogue and cooperation, albeit 
limited by its extra-regional status and has been able to play a significant role in the 
region in this regard. Therefore, while the extent to which the 'track-two' promotion 
of multilateralism by Australia contributed to the development of formal regional 
institutional arrangements may be doubted, the fact that it has helped to "define the 
terms of the security debate" and influence the nature of the discourse can not be 
denied. 15° 
Conclusions 
It has been proposed that a middle power is one that demonstrates both the ambition, 
as well as the capacity, to exercise significant influence within its geographic region. 
It has also been established that Australia's effectiveness as a middle power could be 
attributed to its dominant influence (because of the asymmetries) in the South West 
Pacific, as well as its capacity to assume a leadership role in multilateral institutional 
arrangements within the South West Pacific and Antarctic regions. 
149 Etty 	Agoes, Territorial And Jurisdictional Conflicts In The South China Sea: Prospects and 
Constraints for Marine Regionalism. p14. 
15° Amitav Acharya, 'ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Managing Regional Security'. p184. 
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Australia also demonstrated its ambition to assume a role of significant influence in 
the South East Asian region. Australia has important economic and strategic interests 
within the South East Asian region and these interests require Australia to seek a role 
of influence within the region. However, while Australia enjoyed hegemonic 
influence within the South East Asia in the past, the geopolitical changes that have 
occurred since the decolonialisation of South East Asia meant that Australia could no 
longer count on its previous superiority in power within that region to defend its 
interests. Australia is still the most powerful in the South East Asian region in many 
respects. However, the disparity in power between Australia and the South East 
Asian states is not sufficient to qualify the former as a regional great power. In 
contrast to its successes in the South Pacific and Antarctic region, Australia's 
capacity to influence developments in South East Asia through its leadership of 
regional multilateral institutional arrangements is also handicapped by the fact that it 
is not a member of the premier regional organisation, ASEAN. Australia's policy of 
middlepowermanship is also inhibited by the relative paucity of multilateral 
instruments within the region. These factors challenged Australia's effectiveness, as 
a middle power, in the South Asian region. 
Australia's strategic and economic interests within the South East Asian region could 
not be ignored. Australia had to ensure that it remained relevant in the South East 
Asian region and it had to do so within its limits as a middle power; in a region that 
has yet to accept Australia as a part of it and where it could no longer exercise 
hegemonic influence. Towards this end, Australia modified its strategy of 
middlepowermanship to encourage the development of an environment that would be 
amenable to its interests. On occasions when Australia has attempted to adopt a 
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prominent leadership role, such attempts, including its successful efforts to introduce 
democratic elections in Cambodia and its proposal for an East Asian security forum, 
have often irritated states within the South East Asian region. Australia's attempts to 
assume the leadership of South East Asia have been regarded as presumptuous or 
grandstanding by its critics. Therefore, in contrast to its role in the South West 
Pacific and Antarctic regions, Australia has adopted a less visible role in South East 
Asia, deferring the leadership role to others, while actively fostering a culture that 
facilitates multilateral institutional arrangements and concepts of 'region' that serve 
its own interests. Australia's capacity to quickly adapt, as well as to switch to the 
'second track' in diplomacy, demonstrated its ability to exploit available 
opportunities and to successfully defend its interests through a modified strategy of 
middlepowermanship in the South East Asian region. 
CHAPTER 7 
"The Indian Ocean has historically played a somewhat peripheral 
role in Australian foreign policy, and it is only in comparatively 
recent times that this has begun to change." — William Maley 
Introduction 
Australia's interests in the Indian Ocean region might best be described as cursory. 
The vast potential of the Indian Ocean region and its strategic and economic 
significance to Australia appears obvious. Yet even though the strategic and 
economic potential of the Indian Ocean region is recognised, the possibility of 
realising this potential appears to be remote and the opportunities for a middle power 
like Australia to play a major role within the region are limited. The absence of a 
significant role for Australia in the Indian Ocean region, in contrast to the influence it 
commands in other regions, demonstrates the significance of geography in 
determining the role of middle powers. 
In reviewing Australia's role in the Indian Ocean region, Australia's ambition and 
capacity to exercise significant influence within that region are once again employed 
as benchmarks to measure its effectiveness as a middle power. In contrast to the 
regions surveyed earlier, Australia's role in the Indian Ocean has seen relatively little 
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1 William Maley, 'Australia And The Indian Ocean', in Australian Foreign Policy: Into The New 
Millennium, F.A. Mediansky (ed.), South Melbourne, Macmillan, 1997. p269. 
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change. In spite of periodic rhetoric to the contrary, Australia has not shown much 
interest in playing a more significant role within the Indian Ocean region. As a 
dominion in the British Empire, and subsequently, as an ally of the United States, 
Australia has supported the presence of its great and powerful friends within the 
Indian Ocean region. However, as a middle power, Australia has yet to demonstrate 
an ambition to play a more direct role in its own capacity in the region. A review of 
Australia's past record and its capabilities also suggests that its capacity to play a 
significant role in the Indian Ocean region is likely to be limited. 
The absence of and resistance to the development of significant multilateral 
institutional arrangements within the Indian Ocean region2 limits the usefulness of 
process oriented perspectives and the effectiveness of middlepowermanship as a 
foreign policy strategy is circumscribed. In contrast, structuralist (power-oriented) 
perspectives, which advance the view that a middle power like Australia is unlikely 
to wield significant influence in a region occupied by much larger states with greater 
potential in terms of power, appear to be of greater relevance. And many of the 
archetypal expectations of the Neo-Realist school are validated within the Indian 
Ocean region. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section begins by questioning the 
viability of the concept of an 'Indian Ocean region'. It argues that the concept of an 
Indian Ocean region has remained vague and that long-standing hostilities make it 
difficult for a sense of regionalism to develop. Thus, while it is possible to delimit 
the geographical boundaries of an area that we can call the Indian Ocean region, the 
concept of such a region lacks the collective sense of identity that is the basis of the 
2 The resistance to the development of regional multilateral institutional arrangements is largely due to 
historical factors that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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regional political communities, which characterises the regions discussed in earlier 
chapters. 
The second section reviews Australia's interests within the Indian Ocean region. It 
examines Australia's stated interests within the Indian Ocean region and queries the 
extent to which attention has been given to these interests in its foreign policy. It 
argues that Australia's interests within the Indian Ocean have yet to be a priority in 
its foreign policy, and consequently, its ambitions for influence within the Indian 
Ocean region have been relatively modest. 
The third section reviews Australia's capacity to assume a role of significant 
influence within the Indian Ocean region. It argues that Australia's potential role, as 
a middle power, in the Indian Ocean region must be considered in the light of the 
traditional hostilities between India and the other states within the region, as well as 
the aspirations of the former to be considered a great power. India's great power 
ambitions meant assertions of Indian hegemony that limited a leadership role for 
Australia within the Indian Ocean region. The hostility and rivalry between India and 
its neighbours also presented a significant obstacle to the development of regional 
multilateral institutional arrangements as such initiatives are contingent upon the 
recognition of common interests. This in turn reduces the opportunities for a middle 
power like Australia to seize the opportunities inherent in such regional arrangements 
for influence, as it has done in other regions. Therefore, Australia has been only 
capable of a modest role within the Indian Ocean region thus far. And even though 
Australia does have a few concerns about strategic developments within the Indian 
Ocean region, its capacity to address those concerns directly have been limited. 
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The fourth section addresses the issue of Australia's limited interests in the Indian 
Ocean region and how it has been able to compensate for its modest role within the 
region through its relationship with its great power ally, the United States. It argues 
that Australia has supported United States interests within the Indian Ocean region as 
being consistent with its own and has relied on the strategic presence of the United 
States on the island military base of Diego Garcia to defend its own interests. 
The chapter concludes that Australia's experience within the Indian Ocean region 
highlights the challenges for a middle power in a region where it is not only unable 
to capitalise on asymmetries of power but where multilateral institutional 
arrangements through which it might defend its interests are also absent. Many issues 
affecting the Indian Ocean littorals held in abeyance during the Cold War remain 
unresolved, including the long-standing hostility between the various littorals of the 
Indian Ocean, which have assumed greater significance with the end of the Cold 
War. Many of these issues have yet to affect Australia's interests directly or 
adversely. However, it is proposed that these issues may be best addressed while they 
are inchoate and before they grow in complexity into more intractable problems fed 
by politics, jealously, and regional rivalries. Thus, it is proposed that there is a 
potential role for a middle power like Australia in the Indian Ocean to foster the 
development of regional multilateral arrangements that could serve as confidence 
building measures. Nevertheless, it is also acknowledged that although Australia has 
demonstrated consistency by applying the strategy of middlepowermanship towards 
the Indian Ocean region, such efforts have yet to achieve significant success. Instead, 
Australia has had to rely on great power patrons to defend its interests in order to 
address its own limitations as a middle power, within the Indian Ocean. 
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The Indian Ocean Region 
Source: Perry-Castaileda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/Map_collection.html  
The Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world's oceans. It is flanked by the 
continent of Africa to its West, the subcontinent of India to its North, and South East 
Asia and Australia to its East. The waters of the Indian Ocean sweep across the 
shores of more than 30 countries, which accounts for over 31 per cent of the world 
population. Encompassing a population of almost two billion, the market potential of 
the countries on the Indian Ocean Rim is tremendous. 3 Four main gateways to major 
sea routes lead into the Indian Ocean. The Suez Canal links the Mediterranean Sea to 
the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea and the Gulf of Yemen. The Cape of Good Hope 
links the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The South China Sea (through the Straits of 
Malacca) and the Java Sea (through the Sunda Straits) links East Asia to the Indian 
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Ocean. The Bass Straits links the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. 4 These sea 
routes serve intra-regional trade among the littorals of the Indian Ocean as well as 
trade between Europe and Asia, including the shipments of oil that 'flow' from the 
Persian Gulf States to Japan. 
Although the geographic parameters of the Indian Ocean may be used as a guide to 
establish the notion of an Indian Ocean 'region', the validity of such a grouping is 
doubtful. In contrast to the earlier three regions reviewed, there is no significant basis 
for the concept of an Indian Ocean region expressed in terms of a political 
community. Indeed, Prescott expresses the view that: 
"The Indian Ocean exists as a coherent political concept only in the 
rhetoric of politicians." 5 
The reference to a region in international relations usually infers some sense of 
collective identity or at least some sense of common interests among polities situated 
within a geographic locale vis-à-vis the general state system. However, states along 
the eastern shore of the African continent would have little in common with states in 
Middle East, which in turn would have little in common with states on the Indian 
subcontinent or South East Asia, even though all of them may be described as Indian 
Ocean littorals. Therefore, given the disparate priorities and interests of the polities 
that lie on the rim of the Indian Ocean, it is debatable whether these states represent a 
sufficiently cohesive political community or possess a regional identity, which merits 
the label of an Indian Ocean region. 6 Moreover, unlike the South West Pacific, South 
3 Joseph H.L. Tan, Straits Times, March 20 1997. 
4 For a more detailed discussion of the geographic parameters of the Indian Ocean, see Vivian Forbes, 
The Maritime Boundaries Of The Indian Ocean Region,  Singapore, National University of Singapore, 
1995. pp27-33, 35-41. 
5 Victor Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries Of The World,  London, Methuen, 1985. p178. 
6 Bateman and Bergin identified 46 independent states that may be considered littorals of the Indian 
Ocean. Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, 'Building Blocks for Maritime Security in the Indian 
Ocean', Ocean Development & International Law, 1996, p237. 
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East Asian or Antarctic regions, which have been associated with such regional 
groupings as the South Pacific Forum, ASEAN and the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties, a cohesive regional grouping associated with the Indian Ocean region has yet 
to emerge. Instead, the size and composition of the Indian Ocean region have 
complicated the development of a sense of regionalism and regional multilateral 
institutional arrangements within the region. 
In spite of the fact that it is ill defined, there is usually an expectation that the Indian 
sub-continent is included when a reference to the Indian Ocean region is made.' 
Therefore, to avoid the complications that would arise in a discussion based on a 
broad conceptual framework, a more narrow definition of the Indian Ocean region is 
stipulated for this chapter. While recognising the fact that the boundaries of an Indian 
Ocean region have yet to be clearly defined, it is proposed that the core of such a 
region is likely to be centred on South Asia and particularly on India. Australia's 
interests within the Indian Ocean region have been strongly engaged by 
developments in the Indian sub-continent during the Cold War and it is likely to 
continue have interests in the subcontinent. Therefore, to focus attention where 
Australian interests are most significantly engaged, the Indian Ocean region shall be 
deemed to refer to the region framed by the Indian sub-continent in the West and 
Australia in the East. 
7 See for example, Robert Bruce, 'A West Coast Perspective', in Strategic and Naval Roles: Issues for 
a Medium Power, Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood (eds.), Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, 1993. pp125-134. 
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Australian Interests In The Indian Ocean Region 
The Australian continent occupies the South East corner of the Indian Ocean and 
Australia is custodian of one of the gateways (via the Bass Straits) between the 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Several offshore Australian Territories lie within the 
Indian Ocean, including the Cocos and Christmas Islands. 8 A huge area of the 
Australian exclusive economic zone lies within the Indian Ocean and a large 
proportion of Australian shipping plies the waters of the Indian Ocean. Therefore, as 
a littoral, it would have been reasonable to expect Australia to demonstrate an 
interest (as it has done in other regions) in assuming an influential role within the 
Indian Ocean. However, except for displaying some concern about the strategic 
implications of Soviet access to the Indian Ocean during the Cold War, Australia has, 
thus far, only expressed a mild interest in the Indian Ocean region. 
Australia has generally pursued a modest role within the Indian Ocean region. 
Australia's attitude towards the Indian Ocean region is unusual because although it 
clearly has interests within the region, it has only demonstrated a mild ambition to 
play a more significant and direct role in defending those interests. In contrast to 
South East Asia or the South West Pacific, which have been frequently alluded to in 
official speeches and the focus of numerous reports and studies, Australia's attitude 
towards the Indian Ocean region appears to be characterised by indifference. Sandy 
Gordon drew attention to this impression when he made the observation that 
"compared with the cut-and-thrust of trans-Pacific strategy and trade, South Asia was 
8 Sam Bateman, 'The Indian Ocean in Australia's Maritime Strategy', in Maritime Studies 71, 
July/August 1993. p12. 
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perceived to lie in a strategic and economic backwater."9 Nor has the Indian Ocean 
region captured the popular imagination in Australia in the way that Antarctica does. 
There is an impression that references to the Indian Ocean region in Australian 
policy come as an afterthought, a sense that while the region should not be ignored, it 
is not considered a priority on Australia's foreign policy agenda either. 1° Certainly, 
the weight that Australian foreign policy has attached to the Indian Ocean region 
might be inferred from the fact that the latter received far less attention in 
comparison to the effort employed to establish an Australian presence in the South 
West Pacific, Antarctic, and South East Asian regions. Indeed, Bill Hayden has 
likened "Australia's attitude to the Indian Ocean to 'Aunt Tilly's expensive bone 
china teaset', an object of occasional curiosity but of not much practical use." 
Two related concerns, shipping and security represent Australia's primary interests in 
the Indian Ocean region. For much of its history, the Indian Ocean has been a 
conduit of trade between the civilisations of the East and the West and a source of 
wealth and power to the naval powers that ruled its sea-lanes. 12 Indian empires 
controlling the Indian Ocean were able to influence the establishment of the South 
East Asian empires of Sri Vijaya, Majapahit and Mataram. Islam was also brought to 
South East Asia through the trade routes of the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese, the 
Dutch, and then the British established control over the South East Asian region and 
the trade routes to the East through their domination of the Indian Ocean." Thus, 
9 Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And Beyond, 
Canberra, Australia Foreign Policy Publications Programme, 1993. p3. 
I° See also Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. 
Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. p21. 
I ' Vivian Forbes, The Maritime Boundaries Of The Indian Ocean Region. pp41-51. 
13 V.K. Bhasin, Super Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi, S. Chand & Company Ltd, 
1981. pp1-8. 
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control of the Indian Ocean region has traditionally been the prelude towards 
influence over much of the South East Asian region. 
The Second World War brought an end to the colonial era. The independence of 
Indonesia and India in 1945 and 1947 respectively m inspired many of the other states 
under colonial rule along the Indian Ocean rim and prompted them to follow with 
their own declarations of independence. However, while it might be argued that the 
end of the colonial era began in the Indian Ocean, the shadow of extra-regional 
power and influence remained in the region even after the period of de-
colonialisation. The advent of the Cold War perpetuated the presence of extra-
regional great powers in the Indian Ocean. In pursuit of their interests during the 
Cold War and in the context of their rivalry with each other, the United States built 
and maintained a naval base in Diego Garcia, whereas the Soviet Union conducted 
regular ship visits to ports within the region. These developments coloured the 
subsequent developments in the Indian Ocean region, as well as Australia's own 
relationship with the Indian Ocean region. 
In contrast to the situation in the other geographic regions adjacent to Australia, the 
British Empire was firmly entrenched in India and Burma (Myanmar) prior to the 
Second World War. Therefore the anxieties that characterised Australia's usual 
attitude towards near-lying regions (especially with regard to potential threats from 
rivals to its great power allies) were never extended towards the Indian Ocean region 
— until the Cold War. Australian really only expressed concern about the Indian 
Ocean region after the Second World War when the region became one of several 
theatres of operations in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. 
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The Cold War revived Australia's old fears of a potential threat from a hostile power 
within its own geographic region. Australia's strategic perceptions of the Indian 
Ocean region during this period are revealed in the Australian Defence White Paper 
of 1976. In the White Paper, Australia "expressed concern at the Soviet presence in 
the Indian Ocean and the build up of Russian military strength." I5 While that concern 
was qualified by the view "that the Indian Ocean was of marginal importance to the 
central balance" in the Cold War, the White Paper stressed "the security of oil to 
major allies" and the need to remain watchful of the situation in the Indian Ocean. I6 
Fears that the Soviet Union would secure a foothold within the Indian Ocean region 
and thereby gain a strategic vantage from which to threaten Australian security were 
also heightened with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. Therefore, 
Australian policy towards the Indian Ocean region during the Cold War was based 
on addressing the potential threat that the Soviet Union might pose to it from within 
that region. 
As with its practice in the past when confronted with the presence of a rival power 
within its geographic region, Australian interests in the Indian Ocean became 
"conceived in terms of neutralising potential threats from the region."" Towards that 
end, Australia exploited its relationship with the United States, its great and powerful 
friend. Australia actively supported the presence of the United States within the 
Indian Ocean region as a means to safeguard its own interests within the region. In 
doing so, Australia returned to its tried and true policy of dependence upon a trusted 
14 Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, but it was engaged in an armed struggle for 
independence against the Netherlands for control of Indonesian territories (Dutch East Indies) till 
1949. 
15 Defence White Paper, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 1976. 
16 Kim C. Beazley and Ian Clark, The Politics of Intrusion: The Super Powers and the Indian Ocean, 
Sydney, Alternative Publishing Cooperative Ltd, 1979. p138. 
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and powerful ally. Thus, as with its 'early policy' in the South West Pacific and 
Antarctic regions, Australia's strategy in the Indian Ocean has been to ensure the 
pre-eminence of its great power ally within the region. Australia's policy and role 
might be seen in its effort to provide logistical and other assistance to support the 
military presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean. Australia's efforts also 
included hosting a communications base at Exmouth, the development of naval 
facilities at Cockburn Sound (where the Australian submarine fleet is believed to be 
based), as well as positioning half its surface fleet at Stirling in Western Australia. I8 
Australia has consistently and openly voiced strong support for a dominant American 
military presence within the region. In particular, the conservative governments in 
Australia have always been firm in their advocacy for a strong American military 
presence in the Indian Ocean and this became a pronounced feature of their foreign 
policy objectives towards that region. While pursuing essentially the same line, the 
Labor approach to the Indian Ocean made some attempt to distinguish its foreign 
policy from its conservative counterpart by including support for the concept of a 
'Zone Of Peace' in the Indian Ocean. It also called for 'mutual reduction' in the 
military presence of the two superpowers within the region. Nevertheless, these 
objectives were qualified by the recognition that: 
"diplomatic activity on the Indian Ocean issue would however be 
pursued along bilateral channels using the American relationship to 
press upon the United States the value of limiting its presence in 
the area." 19 
17 Kim C. Beazley and Ian Clark, The Politics of Intrusion: The Super Powers and the Indian Ocean. 
p130. 
18 Vivian Forbes, The Maritime Boundaries Of The Indian Ocean Region. p55. Sandy Gordon, The 
Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And Beyond. pp18-19. 
19 Kim C. Beazley & Ian Clark, The Politics of Intrusion: The Super Powers and the Indian Ocean. 
p134. 
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Given Labor's predilection for multilateralism and regionalism in foreign policy, this 
represented a strong concession to the view that such instruments had only limited 
utility in the Indian Ocean region, relative to the reliance on Australia's 'great and 
powerful friend'. Instead, Beazley and Clark argued that: 
"This view accorded with a long standing attitude of Whitlam's on 
foreign policy that the American relationship ought to be used to 
press upon the United States distinctively Australian positions." 2° 
Regardless of whether it was Fraser's support for a strong American presence or the 
Whitlam's efforts to reduce the military presence of both super powers in the Indian 
Ocean region, Australia's relationship with the United States has been identified as 
the key to defending its interests in that region. 21 
Australia's policy of supporting the presence of a more powerful ally to defend its 
interests in the Indian Ocean region is contingent upon the United States' 
assessments of its own need to remain engaged in the region. However, the geo-
political changes following the end of the Cold War have forced a re-assessment of 
United States' priorities in, and its commitment of military forces to, the Indian 
Ocean region. Therefore, the end of the Cold War and the fact that no rival super 
power is likely to pose a threat to American interests in the Indian Ocean region 
suggests that the United States might be prompted to reduce its presence in the 
Indian Ocean region. On the other hand, the recent Gulf War, India and Pakistan's 
entry into the nuclear club, and the numerous hot-spots of violence within or near the 
India Ocean region suggests that the United States is likely to remain at its military 
base in Diego Garcia for some time. 
20 Kim C. Beazley & Ian Clark, The Politics of Intrusion: The Super Powers and the Indian Ocean. 
p134. 
21  Kim C. Beazley & Ian Clark, The Politics of Intrusion: The Super Powers and the Indian Ocean. 
pp127-141. 
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The geopolitical changes that required the United States to reassess its role within the 
Indian Ocean also brought about a reappraisal of Australia's own perceptions of its 
interests within the region. The dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that the 
possibility of a direct security threat to Australia, resulting from the Soviet presence 
in Indian Ocean region, was no longer an issue. Thus, one of Australia's primary 
reasons for supporting a strong United States presence within the Indian Ocean 
region became irrelevant. 
In contrast to the 1976 White Paper, the Australian Defence White Paper 1994 totally 
omitted any strategic assessment of the Indian Ocean. Indeed, except for some 
expressions of intent to foster closer bilateral ties with the more powerful Indian 
Ocean littoral states such as India and Pakistan, there were no references to the 
Indian Ocean as a strategic environment at all. In part, this relaxed attitude might 
also have been due to the assessment that with the end of the Cold War, even the 
most powerful (arguably) of the Indian Ocean littoral states, India, would not be able 
to pose a threat to Australia. Robert Bruce argues that: 
"India still has limited capability to project force very far from 
India, and mainland Australia is out of reach of India's limited 
power-projection capabilities and will remain so during the next ten 
years."22 
Therefore, with the threat of the Cold War ended, Australia's primary interests 
within the Indian Ocean have changed. While some issues remain, including the 
potential for violent conflict in Sri Lanka, Kashmir, India and Pakistan, these issues 
are not perceived as a direct threat to Australia's security. 
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Australia continues to support for the presence of the United States in the Indian 
Ocean region but this is based primarily on its role as a loyal ally as opposed to the 
need to counter a perceived threat. Australia might also be motivated by the fact such 
a policy corresponded with its broader objective of ensuring that the United States 
remains actively engaged in international affairs in a post Cold War era. However, 
for its own part, Australia would have to redefine its own relationship with the Indian 
Ocean region and the role that it seeks to play within that region. 
In contrast to its relationship with the South West Pacific, Antarctic or South East 
Asian regions, Australia's engagement with the Indian Ocean region has been shaped 
primarily by security issues and the depth that characterised its role in other regions 
is absent. Australia's relationship with the Indian Ocean region lacked the extensive 
economic interests that had characterised its relationship with South East Asia. The 
sense of political responsibility and leadership that have distinguished Australia's 
role in the South West Pacific region are also absent in its policy towards the Indian 
Ocean region. Nor is Australia's evangelical passion with regard to its pursuit of 
scientific interests and environmental concerns in the Antarctic region reprised in the 
Indian Ocean region. Indeed, apart from the game of cricket, Australia has relatively 
little in common with the states in the Indian Ocean region. Consequently, with the 
end of the Cold War, Australia found itself in a policy vacuum with respect to the 
Indian Ocean region and it has yet to clearly defme the nature and scope of its role as 
a middle power in that region. 
Recent assessments of Australia's role within the Indian Ocean region have 
challenged its sense of complacency and argued for a more proactive policy for 
22 Robert Bruce, 'A West Coast Perspective'. p131. 
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Australia within the region. 23 The premise is that as a littoral of the Indian Ocean, 
and a middle power in the region, Australia should seek to influence developments in 
the Indian Ocean, and that it has the capacity to do so through the development of 
multilateral institutional arrangements. The object is for Australia to foster an 
environment that is favourable to its interests within the Indian Ocean through its 
own efforts. This has been a strategy that has been pursued by Australia in the South 
East Asian region with some success. However, even though the advocacy for the 
development of multilateral institutions has been determined and enthusiastic, the 
results in the Indian Ocean region have been less encouraging, especially when 
compared with the successes of Australian diplomacy, both 'track two' and formal, 
in other regions. Moreover, given the intermittent interest in the Indian Ocean region 
displayed by Australia to-date, Australia's role within that region is likely to remain 
modest. And in view of the constraints on Australia in terms of its resources and 
priorities, Australian interests and diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region are likely to 
take second place to its pursuit of middlepowermanship elsewhere. 
There are many difficulties confronting Australia's attempts to chart a new course for 
itself in the Indian Ocean. Strategically, the region posed no threat to Australia now 
that the Soviet Union is defunct. Although several Indian Ocean littorals possessed 
significant military capabilities, none of them are significant naval powers and 
lacked the capacity to project their power beyond the Indian sub-continent. Indeed, 
both Bhutan and Nepal are landlocked and their strategic significance to Australia (if 
any) would be minimal. In economic terms, there is very little within the Indian 
Ocean region to interest Australia. Many of the region's economies are still in the 
early stages of development and the largest economy, India, is tightly controlled and 
23 Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, 'Building Blocks for Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean'. 
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relatively 'closed'. 24 While there is some scope for greater social interaction, visitor 
numbers and other forms of social contact between Australia and the Indian Ocean 
region have been relatively modest in comparison with other regions. Bateman cites 
another reason for Australia's neglect of the Indian Ocean region and argues that 
historical factors, such as the fact that Australia's main population and industrial 
infrastructure are concentrated on its South East Coast, may have conditioned 
Australia's perspective of the world around it. 25 These factors suggest that the scope 
of Australian interests in the Indian Ocean region is likely to continue to be limited. 
In short, Australia has traditionally regarded the Indian Ocean region with 
complacency and has been content to rely on the presence of the United States there 
to safeguard its interests. Currently, Australia is unlikely to be threatened by any 
naval power of significance from within Indian Ocean region and its economic 
interests in that region are minimal. Therefore, Australia's interest in the Indian 
Ocean region have been sporadic and mild and this represents a sharp contrast to its 
attitude within the South West Pacific, South East Asia and Antarctic regions where 
it has demonstrated its ambition to assume a role of influence and leadership. 
24  Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. p4. See also East Asia Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, India's 
Economy At The Midnight Hour: Australia's India Strategy,  Commonwealth of Australia, 1994. 
25 Sam Bateman, 'The Indian Ocean in Australia's Maritime Strategy'. pll. 
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Australia's Capacity For Influence In The Indian Ocean 
Australia is an affluent middle power within the Indian Ocean region and possessed 
significant military capabilities. However, it would have difficulty in translating 
these resources into influence within the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, Australia's 
apparent lack of interest in assuming a leadership role as a middle power in the 
Indian Ocean region might also be attributed to the possibility that it had moderated 
its ambitions because it lacked the capacity to assume such a role. Instead, Australia 
has traditionally relied upon great powers, notably its great and powerful friends the 
United Kingdom and the United States, to defend its interests within the Indian 
Ocean region. 
Australia could not rely on asymmetrical superiority of power between itself and the 
other states in the Indian Ocean region. Nor could Australia pursue a strategy of 
middlepowermanship and use regional multilateral institutional arrangements as a 
vehicle of influence within the Indian Ocean region because such arrangements were 
few and had a limited role there. 
The immense populations of the states within the Indian Ocean region dwarfed that 
of Australia. Although Australia might be much wealthier in per capita terms, the 
very size of the populations of these states limit the utility of Australia's wealth as an 
instrument of foreign policy. Thus, even if Australia were to allocate its entire 
foreign aid budget to the Indian Ocean region, the impact would be relatively less 
than a similar allocation to the South Pacific or the South East Asian region. 26 
26 See A. Clunies, 'Possibilities Of Australian Economic Assistance To India', in J.D.B. Miller (ed.), 
India, Japan, Australia: Partners In Asia?, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1968. 
pp I80-182. 
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Countries GNP 
(US $ 
million) 
Population GNP per 
capita 
(US $) 
Armed Forces Military 
Expenditu 
re 
(`)/0 of 
GNP) 
Australia 310,050 18,025,000 17,510 56,100 2.4% 
IOR 356,737 1,235,333,0 313 2,015,500 3.48% 
Total 00 
India 262,810 935,744,00 290 1,145,000 3.3% 
0 
Banglade 25,882 120,093,00 220 115,500 1.5% 
sh 0 
Bhutan 253 816,000 170 7,000 - 
Nepal 3,174 20,093,000 160 35,000 1.4% 
Pakistan 54,045 140,497,00 440 587,000 6.4% 
0 
Sri 10,573 18,090,000 600 126,000 4.8% 
Lanka 
Source: Encyclopzedia Britannica CD 97 
India's GNP is smaller than that of Australia's. However, India has historically been 
cast in the role of hegemon within the Indian Ocean region. Johan Galtung ranked 
India as the 7th largest state in the world with the second largest population, the 4th 
largest army, and the 6th largest navy. 27 Galtung also points out that: 
"a country does not accumulate assets with GNP/capita but with the 
GNP; and India's GNP is big enough in absolute terms." 28 
India's defence industries are impressive, with research and development amounting 
to a value of S$1.58 billion, conducted in forty laboratories and production in thirty-
five factories.29 Thus, even though Australia is clearly the wealthiest among the 
Indian Ocean states, Australia's capacity to assume a role of influence within the 
Indian Ocean is limited with the presence of India. 
27 Johan Galtung, On The Way To Superpower Status: India And The EC Compared,  Indian Ocean 
Centre For Peace Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1991. p5. 
28 Johan Galtung, On The Way To Superpower Status: India And The EC Compared.  p5. 
29  This figure does not include the nuclear and space industries, which might also spawn military- 
related technologies. A.D. Gordon, 'India, Neigbourhood And Region', Agenda For The Nineties: 
344 
Australia has enjoyed some diplomatic success in engaging other Asian powers such 
as China and Japan. However, the capacity to assume a role of influence in the Indian 
Ocean region, and with respect to India, has eluded Australia so far. Comparing 
Australia's diplomatic successes in China with the disappointing results with regard 
to India, Sandy Gordon explains that: 
"For China, Australia provided a valuable point of entry into the 
process of modernisation without the pitfalls associated with over-
dependence on any of the large powers. For many years, India had 
no such imperative driving its relations with Australia. Those 
Australian diplomats, officials and politicians who dealt with both 
nations quickly noticed a willingness on the part of China to 'lock 
into' the benefits provided by Australia, whereas often the Indian 
response gave the impression that Australia did not matter."3° 
While subjective, Gordon's observations suggest that India's resistance to Australia's 
influence has been an impediment to the latter's capacity to play a significant role in 
the region. J. Malik also adds that: 
"it is obvious that though India regards Australia as a legitimate 
Indian Ocean power and a friendly state whose influence 
contributes to regional stability, it would not look favourably on 
Australia's active role in areas in India's vicinity or places close to 
what it considers its sphere of influence (e.g. the northern Indian 
Ocean region and Sri Lanka). 31 
In short, given its history, size and share of the region's resources, India has regarded 
itself as a regional great power and is in a strong position to claim such a role — even 
if its other neighbours have always hotly contested that assumption. 32 Therefore, in 
view of the hegemonic role occupied by India, which has demonstrated both the 
Studies Of The Context For Australian Choices In Foreign And Defence Policy, Coral Bell (ed.), 
Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1991. p181. 
3° Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. p3. 
31 J. Mohan Malik, The Gulf War: Australia's Role And Asian-Pacific Responses, Canberra, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, 1992. p24. 
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ambition and capacity to assume such a role, Australia's capacity to influence 
developments in the Indian Ocean region is limited. 
Limits Of Middlepowermanship In The Indian Ocean Region 
The practice of middlepowermanship is a means by which Australia has successfully 
assumed an influential role in three regional subsets of the general state system, 
namely the South Pacific, the Antarctic and the South East Asian regions. However, 
there have been fewer opportunities for Australia to capitalise on its strengths in 
regional institutional multilateral arrangements within the Indian Ocean region in 
order to assume a more influential role and consequently very limited scope for a 
strategy of middlepowermanship. 
The smaller states of the Indian Ocean region have traditionally been suspicious of 
any attempt by India to dominate the region but thus far any resistance to Indian 
hegemony has been unilateral and uncoordinated. There have been no indications 
that a multilateral institutional arrangement, along the lines of the Five Power 
Defence Arrangement (FPDA) in the South East Asian region, would be developed 
by the smaller states as a counter-balance to India. Nor has Australia demonstrated 
an interest in the development of any such arrangement. Arguably, Australia's apathy 
towards any arrangements that might have been perceived as an anti-India coalition 
might be explained by its concern that any such initiative is more likely to provoke a 
confrontation within the region rather than forestall one. The fear that any such move 
during the Cold War might provoke India to become more sympathetic towards the 
32 R.P. Anand, 'South Asia and the Law of the Sea: Problems and Prospects', paper presented at the 
28th Annual Law of the Sea Conference, 11-14 July 1994, Honolulu, Hawaii. pp3-8. 
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Soviet Union might also explain the absence of any FPDA-type security arrangement 
in the Indian Ocean region. 
The absence of any significant multilateral regional institutions because of the 
longstanding antagonism between the various polities in the region has been the most 
significant obstacle to successful middlepowermanship from middle powers like 
Australia. Philip Allen argues that: 
"Despite chauvinisms to the contrary, there are no solid precedents 
for Indian Ocean unity. Elaborate networks of commercial and 
cultural interchange have left fundamental loyalties fragmented 
along personal, ethnic, class and caste — occasionally national — 
demarkations, without establishing the political nucleus for an 
Indian Ocean civilization."33 
The frequent outbreak of internecine wars, political assassinations and expressions of 
chauvinism within the region have not improved the situation. 34 Consequently, 
multilateral arrangements, which are premised on cooperation or at least the 
acknowledgement of common ground, have been unsurprisingly absent in the Indian 
Ocean region. 
One of the best opportunities for the development of regional multilateral 
institutional arrangements in the Indian Ocean region surfaced in the 1970s. 
Suspicion of the former colonial powers, the advent of the Cold War, and the threat 
of a nuclear holocaust had sparked resistance to the growing military presence of 
extra-regional powers within the Indian Ocean region. In addition to the concerns 
about neo-colonialism, there were also fears that the polities of the Indian Ocean 
region would be embroiled in any potential nuclear conflict. Similar concerns had 
33 Philip M. Allen, Security And Nationalism In The Indian Ocean: Lessons From The Latin Quarter 
Islands, Boulder, Westview Press, 1987. p8. 
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emerged in the South West Pacific and South East Asian region where the South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) and the Zone of Peace and Neutrality 
(ZOFPAN) had been proposed respectively. While the actual effectiveness of these 
'nuclear-free' zones might have been in question, they nevertheless provided a cause 
and focus for regionalism in these regions, and to some extent, they represented 
building blocks for more comprehensive multilateral security measures or other 
regional arrangements. In the Antarctic region, concerns about the potential presence 
of military forces and nuclear weapons within the region because of the Cold War 
brought about the Antarctic Treaty, which subsequently led to a comprehensive 
network of regional multilateral institutional arrangements. Thus, identical concerns 
about the Cold War and the presence of super power military forces within the Indian 
Ocean region led to similar calls for regional multilateral arrangements to address the 
issue of extra-regional conflict, especially nuclear conflict. 
In 1971, Sri Lanka proposed a de-militarised Indian Ocean and called for the Indian 
Ocean to be declared a 'Zone of Peace'. The concept of a Zone of Peace within the 
Indian Ocean was given some support, especially by the smaller East African 
nations. The Soviet Union and China even voted in support of the Zone of Peace 
when it was introduced as a resolution in the United Nations. However, given the 
fact that neither the Soviet Union or China was as well situated in the Indian Ocean 
as the United States and its allies, a de-militarised Indian Ocean would not have 
affected their interests as much. In contrast, 
"The United States and other leading Western nations with interests 
in the Indian Ocean were opposed to the ZOP proposal for 
fundamental reasons of strategy. In their view, the Indian Ocean 
was the 'great connector' into the Middle East. Creation of a ZOP 
would leave the Western position exposed vis-a-vis the Soviet 
34 See Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. pp59-72. 
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Union in the event of a another Middle East crisis, since the latter 
had potential land access to the region and was much more 
proximate to it. Nor would it allow the West to counter the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan or Soviet influence through 'proxies' such 
as South Yemen." 35 
Not surprisingly, the United States, which is well entrenched at Diego Garcia, and its 
allies ignored the attempt to exclude them from the Indian Ocean. 
Australia's response to the concept of a zone of peace was subtle. Australia was a 
member of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean that explored 
the feasibility of Sri Lanka's proposal to designate the Indian Ocean region a Zone 
Of Peace. However, as Gordon explains: 
"The Australian government of the day knew ... that such efforts 
would not bear fruit because of strong opposition to them from the 
US, Britain and France. Australia's underlying attitude to a ZOP in 
the Indian Ocean paralleled its attitude to a Southwest Pacific 
Nuclear Weapons free Zone; that is it was dictated largely by the 
US alliance interests, which were seen to parallel Australia's 
interests."36 
Thus, Australia was secure in the knowledge that its interests would continue to be 
defended by the military presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean region 
and could avoid taking an overt role in 'opposing' some of the other Indian Ocean 
littoral states on this issue. Australia's approach on this issue contrasts with the blunt 
comments of less subtle littorals that shared its reservations about the wisdom of a 
'zone of peace'. Singapore was one of the absentees when Sri Lanka proposed the 
resolution for a Zone of Peace at the United Nations but explaining his country's 
decision a few days later, S. Rajaratnam, the foreign minister at the time said: 
35 Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. p15 
36 Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. p15. 
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"It would, therefore, be unrealistic to believe that the Indian Ocean 
would for long remain a vacuum of power or that the Big Powers 
would be prepared to see it come under the collective responsibility 
of many nations fringing this ocean. These nations have yet to 
develop a naval capacity sufficiently credible for them to fill the 
vacuum themselves, assuming they can act collectively in this 
matter. ... Nor are declarations that this Ocean should be a Zone of 
Peace likely to frighten away the major naval powers, the most 
powerful of whom are the United States and the Soviet Union. Both 
are newcomers to the area. They have no established areas of 
interest to delimit their presently unlimited ambitions." 37 
Whatever its reasons, Singapore's reservations about the Zone of Peace in the Indian 
Ocean region might be taken as an informative indicator of the lack of consensus 
within the Indian Ocean region. Especially as Singapore had endorsed the concept of 
ZOFPAN in a show of solidarity with other South East Asian states, even though the 
reservations expressed about the Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean region should 
also apply to South East Asia. Philip Allen describes the absence of solidarity within 
the Indian Ocean region thus: 
LG
... the solidarity that all pledge as a principle of third world 
destiny is nullified by the exigencies of discreet states, competitive 
among themselves, insecure within their own societies, tributary to 
overseas patrons of economic, political, military, and/or ideological 
stability."38 
A crucial concern for many states in the Indian Ocean region, with regard to the issue 
of the proposed 'zone of peace', has been the issue of India's ambitions in the 
region.39 
The fear of Indian hegemony is a factor that has argued against the eviction of a 
'benign' superpower like the United States from the region. India was and remains a 
37  S. Rajaratham, The Straits Times, 11 Jan 1972, cited in V.K. Bhasin, Super Power Rivalry In The 
Indian Ocean, New Delhi, S. Chand & Company Ltd., 1981. 
38 Philip M. Allen, Security And Nationalism In The Indian Ocean: Lessons From The Latin Quarter 
Islands. p5. 
39 RP. Anand, 'South Asia and the Law of the Sea: Problems and Prospects'. pp3-8. 
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great power in potential, if not in fact. Therefore, the exclusion of strong extra-
regional powers from the Indian Ocean would have resulted in a 'power vacuum' 
that would see Indian hegemonic influence strengthen within the region. However, a 
situation where there are no powers that might serve as an effective counter weight to 
India in the Indian Ocean would have been as unwelcome to some of the smaller 
powers of the Indian Ocean rim as the presence of extra regional powers. 
The Cold War and concern about the fact that the Indian Ocean region might be 
converted into a theatre of the Cold War between the two superpowers provided an 
opportunity for multilateral cooperation and the development of an embryonic sense 
of regionalism. However, contrary to the experience in the South West Pacific, South 
East Asian and Antarctic region, the Cold War and the threat of nuclear conflict in 
the Indian Ocean region proved to be an inadequate catalyst for the development of 
regionalism and multilateralism there. The proposals for a zone of peace fell short of 
the initial expectations of many and this inchoate expression of regionalism never 
coalesced into permanent and formal institutional structures for the region. Thus, the 
opportunities for middlepowermanship by a middle power like Australia have been 
limited. Instead, Australia has pursued a policy supporting the military presence of 
the United States within the region, as opposed to any unilateral initiative of its own, 
to forestall the escalation of any hostilities within the region or threat to its own 
interests. The limits of any unilateral action on the part of a middle power coupled 
with the absence of any appropriate regional multilateral security arrangements 
emphasised the importance of a powerful United States presence within the Indian 
Ocean region that was capable of defending the interests of an ally like Australia. 
Thus, the familiar quid pro quo of the Australia-United States relationship, in the 
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form of Australian support in exchange for United States support, was reprised in the 
Indian Ocean. 
The United States In The Indian Ocean Region 
As alluded to earlier, Australia's primary interests in the Indian Ocean appears to be 
based upon the fear that the former Soviet Union might gain a foothold in that region 
and thereby pose a threat to Australia's security. Certainly, much of the strategic 
thinking and literature concerning the Indian Ocean region has its roots in the politics 
of the Cold War. Neither of the super powers, the (former) Soviet Union or the 
United States, are littorals of the Indian Ocean. In fact, as Dieter Braun points out, 
the Indian Ocean is "the United States' most distant ocean while, for the Soviet 
Union, it is the second nearest (after the Pacific), [and] maritime access is both 
distant and fraught with complications." 40 Nevertheless, as is consistent with the 
behaviour of super powers, both have sought to maintain a presence in the Indian 
Ocean — at considerable expense — simply because they are super powers. 
It might be said that the navies of super powers sail where they must to remind other 
states that super powers are able to project power where and when they please. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan's influential work on the significance of geographical factors 
on national power concluded that naval "control of the seas, and especially of 
strategically important narrow waterways, was crucial to great power status.” 41 The 
Indian Ocean commands access to the gateways to three of the world's most 
40 Dieter Braun, The Indian Ocean: 'Region of Conflict or Peace Zone'? New York, St Martin's Press, 
1983, pp21-22. 
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important narrow and strategic waterways, the Suez Canal, the Cape of Good Hope, 
and the Straits of Malacca. 42 Therefore, the naval presence of the super powers 
within the Indian Ocean is, in light of Mahan's theories, understandable, if not 
inevitable. As Bateman points out: 
"The Indian Ocean is of great importance both strategically and to 
world trade. It is a major highway of international trade that carries 
a considerable proportion of the world's shipping traffic. The 
countries of Northeast Asia, particularly Japan, are heavily 
dependent on oil from the Middle East and raw materials from 
other countries in the Indian Ocean region, including from 
Northwest Australia. Oil bound for Europe and North America is 
routed from the Persian Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope and 
into the Atlantic."43 
The need to protect these sea-lanes against the threat of interdiction by a hostile rival 
or its satellites meant that a super power like the United States had to establish a 
naval presence, capable of defending its interests in the Indian Ocean region, during 
the Cold War. Darshan Singh estimated that in the period between 1972 and 1978, 
the United States despatched warships to the Indian Ocean up to 18 times." These 
displays of 'gun boat diplomacy' included the despatch of a naval task force led by 
the nuclear carrier Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in 1971 and another led by the 
Constellation into the Persian Gulf in 1973. 45 In so far as Australia shared an interest 
with its ally the United States in ensuring that sea routes within the Indian Ocean 
region remained open to commercial and military traffic, its interests are served by 
the presence of the latter within the region. 
41 James E. Dougherty, Robert L. Pfaltzgraf Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A 
Comprehensive Survey (second edition),  New York, Harper & Row, 1981, p61. Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783,  Boston, Little, Brown, 1987. 
42 Vivian Forbes, The Maritime Boundaries Of The Indian Ocean Region,  pp36-41. 
43 Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, 'Building Blocks for Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean'. 
p243. 
44 Darshan Singh, 'Problems Of Security', in Indian Ocean And Great Powers,  Saral Patra (ed.), New 
Delhi, Sterling Publishers Ptd Ltd. p54. 
45 Darshan Singh, 'Problems Of Security'. p54. 
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The naval presence of super powers within the Indian Ocean region is also a crude 
reminder of Realist assumptions in international relations. The naval presence of the 
super powers in the Indian Ocean was not only an expression of prestige but also a 
clear signal to other states that they possess the capability of projecting military 
power into that region against their enemies. However, the dynamics of the Cold War 
were such that the respective superpowers feared that the littorals of the Indian 
Ocean region might fall to the control of their rival. Hence, a naval presence in the 
region was deemed necessary by the respective superpowers to support allies and to 
deny outright control of the region to their rival. 
In the context of the long standing hostilities between India and Pakistan and their 
'flirtation' with both super powers, the presence of the latter within the region might 
also be seen as both a cause and a consequence. Sandy Gordon states that: 
"It would not be an exaggeration to say that cheap Soviet weapons 
have underwritten India's emergence as a major power in the 
Indian Ocean region."46 
However, the 'friendliness' of India towards the Soviet Union and Soviet ship visits 
to Indian ports prompted an immediate reaction from the United States and China, 
who would then offer military and other forms of assistance to Pakistan and other 
South Asian nations. In the 1956 war between India and Pakistan, Chinese 
manoeuvres on the Himalayan frontier kept Indian troops pinned down. In response 
to potential Chinese assistance to Pakistan when another confrontation with the latter 
was imminent, India signed a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1971. 47 
46  Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. pll. 
7 Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. p12. 
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Similarly, United States policies in the Indian Ocean region have been guided by its 
perceptions of the Soviet threat. 48 In 1969, the United States took over and 
transformed the British possession of Diego Garcia into a military outpost in the 
Indian Ocean and it has steadily upgraded its military capabilities in the region 
since.49 The United States incorporated Diego Garcia into a worldwide chain of 
strategic military facilities capable of supporting aerial and naval operations, as well 
as providing surveillance and communications, in defence of American strategic 
interests. 50 It is also suspected that the American base at Diego Garcia is capable of 
deploying nuclear weapons. 5I 
Although the Soviet Union had "no comparably versatile military facilities at its 
disposal anywhere in the Indian Ocean area",52 it did maintain regular ships' visit to 
the ports of its allies and friendly powers in the region. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1980 also meant that it had control of a littoral of an Indian Ocean 
littoral. Indeed, Chinese policies were coloured by the belief that the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan was an attempt to gain access to the Indian Ocean. Australia shared 
these apprehensions about the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. 
"... to the extent that the Australian view of the Indian Ocean 
region was one of instability and threat, the rapidly increasing US 
presence in the latter part of the 1970s and 1980s was on the whole 
welcomed by Australia." 53 
48  For a brief survey of the military forces deployed by the super powers in the Indian Ocean in the 
mid 80s, see M.C.W. Pinto, 'The Indian Ocean As A Zone Of Peace', in The Denuclearisation Of The 
Oceans, R.B. Byers (ed.), London, Croom Helm, 1986. pp148-151. 
49  This was accomplished through a treaty that provided the Americans with the right to use the island 
for military purposes. 
59 Dieter Braun, The Indian Ocean: 'Region of Conflict or Peace Zone'? pp39-47. 
51 A Nizamov, 'A Zone Of Peace, Good Neighbourliness And Cooperation', in Indian Ocean And 
Great Powers, Saral Patra (ed.), New Delhi, Sterling Publishers Ptd Ltd. p20. 
52 A Nizamov, 'A Zone Of Peace, Good Neighbourliness And Cooperation', in Indian Ocean And 
Great Powers, Sara! Patra (ed.), New Delhi, Sterling Publishers Ptd Ltd. p20. 
53  Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. p15. 
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Therefore, in view of the limited utility of any unilateral Australian response to a 
Soviet threat, Australia married its interests to that of the United States and relied on 
the latter to defend their common interests within the Indian Ocean region. 
The Limits Of A Middle Power 
It has been argued that Australia's contemporary interests in the Indian Ocean region 
are ill defined and that its capacity to defend those interests, whatever they might be, 
are limited. As it has been proposed earlier that a middle power, such as Australia, 
would have both the ambition and the capacity to defend its interests within its 
geographic region, 54 its inconspicuous role within the Indian Ocean leads to two 
inferences. The first is the inference that Australia is not really a part of the Indian 
Ocean region as earlier suggested and therefore cannot be expected to play a 
significant role within that region as a middle power. The second inference is that the 
earlier assumptions about the interests and capabilities possessed by middle powers 
within their own geographic region are wrong. And that while a great power is 
capable of defending interests throughout the general state system, the capacity of a 
middle power to do the same within regional subsystems is subject to geopolitical 
variables. 
That Australia is geographically situated within the Indian Ocean region is obvious. 
However, geography is only one aspect of regionalism and it is also clear that the 
consciousness of a regional identity that would mark the polities of the Indian Ocean 
54 See Chapter 2. 
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region as a collective has yet to emerge. Therefore, until a genuine sense of 
regionalism of which Australia is a part emerges, Australia's casual interest in the 
Indian Ocean is understandable and likely to remain unchanged. 
Australia's capacity to defend its interests, ill defmed though they might be, within 
the Indian Ocean region is a better test of whether the earlier assumptions about 
middle powers are valid. Australia's middle powers capabilities have been sufficient 
to enable it to play a prominent role in resisting the spread of communism during the 
Cold War within the South West Pacific and South East Asian regions. In contrast, 
Australia's capacity to play a significant role within the Indian Ocean region have 
been limited because its capabilities as a middle power proved inadequate when 
confronted by much larger states and the absence of regional multilateral institutional 
arrangements within that region. As a middle power, Australia's capacity to 
unilaterally assume a role of influence in the Indian Ocean region, which is inhabited 
by more powerful and certainly more populous states, is limited. Instead, Australia 
has relied on its 'great and powerful friends', Great Britain and later the United 
States, to defend its interests in the Indian Ocean region. 
The end of the cold war signalled the end of a period of confrontation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. However, many of the 
strategic issues that underpinned the interests of the super powers in the Indian 
Ocean remain. The Indian Ocean continues to be of vital strategic importance as a 
major highway of sea-borne trade and communication. The national interests of 
many nations continue to be dependent on their safe and free access to these sea-
lanes of the Indian Ocean. The use of naval power continues to be a factor affecting 
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the politics of the region, as the Gulf War and subsequent embargo on Iraq so aptly 
demonstrated. 
The decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s 
accomplished what the proposed Zone of Peace was never able to fully achieve. The 
Indian Ocean is no longer an arena of confrontation between extra-regional super 
powers and their satellites. Even though the American naval base at Diego Garcia 
remains, the danger of a confrontation between extra regional military giants in the 
Indian Ocean has receded. Nevertheless, the geo-political realities of the Indian 
Ocean are such that issues that may potentially be of serious concern remain, even 
though there does not appear to be a pressing need to deal with those issues at 
present. Thus, complacency about the Indian Ocean region is unwise as the recent 
nuclear test by India demonstrated. The recent explosion of a nuclear device by 
India, and subsequently by Pakistan, in expressions of nationalistic chauvinism has 
not only buried any residual hopes for a nuclear free zone, it also demonstrated that 
the potential for nuclear conflict remains a serious threat within the Indian Ocean 
region. 
Strategic analysts, including Commodore (retired) Bateman have argued that the 
Indian Ocean region remains strategically relevant to Australia. 55 This is a point 
reiterated by Vice Admiral MacDougall of the Royal Australian Navy, who states: 
"My feeling is that more could be done to foster cooperation in the 
Indian Ocean region. Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness in 
the region of the need to be more involved in the Indian Ocean 
especially as the sea lines of communication through the Indian 
Ocean region are vital in world trade terms. In particular, major 
global strategic interests are focused on the Arabian Gulf and its 
approaches where 60% of the world's oil supplies are located and a 
55 Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, 'Building Blocks for Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean'. & 
Sam Bateman, 'The Indian Ocean in Australia's Maritime Strategy'. 
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huge volume of these supplies, and other trade, crosses the Indian 
Ocean — including 30% of Australia's trade." 56 
The Indian Ocean continues to be a vital conduit for international trade. 57 Any 
conflict in the Indian Ocean that might potentially disrupt the sea-lanes would be 
would be a threat to Australian interests. Indeed, the end of the impasse between the 
superpowers in the Indian Ocean may well lead to a situation where conflict between 
states, no longer inhibited by the threat of nuclear holocaust, becomes more common, 
prone to violence, and disruptive. J. Malik points out that: 
"Australia also maintains a national as well as Western alliance 
interest in an uninterrupted supply of the Persian Gulf oil and in the 
free flow of international shipping through the [Indian Ocean] 
region."58 
The security of sea-lanes of communication through the Indian Ocean was 
imperative during the Cold War. Although the need to counter the Soviet threat has 
ended, the operational effectiveness of the Western Alliance remains contingent upon 
the security of the supply lines represented by these sea-lanes. 
Apart from purely strategic considerations, the sea-lanes of communication that pass 
through the Indian Ocean are also important to Australia's commercial interests. 
Australia's major trading partners, especially Japan, rely heavily on Persian Gulf oil 
and other commodities shipped through the sea routes in the Indian Ocean, and any 
disruption to that traffic would have an adverse impact on their, and indirectly on 
Australia's national interests. 
56 I.D.G. MacDougall, 'The Naval View', Paper presented at Australia's Maritime Bridge Into Asia 
conference, 17-19 November 1993, held in Canberra, 1993. p2. 
57 Sam Bateman, 'The Indian Ocean in Australia's Maritime Strategy', in Maritime Studies 71, 
July/August 1993. 
58 J. Mohan Malik, The Gulf War: Australia's Role And Asian-Pacific Responses.  p9. 
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The changes in the geopolitical environment within the Indian Ocean region also 
demand a re-assessment of Australian priorities. Even before the Cold War ended, 
Australia has had a growing appreciation of the strategic significance of the Indian 
Ocean region in its own right aside from the issue of the Soviet Union. Malik states: 
"During the past decade, the erstwhile trans-Pacific orientation of 
Australian defence policy has been abandoned in favour of a more 
balanced approach, which also takes into account security threats 
emanating from the Indian Ocean region. Consequently, Australia 
appears to be gradually accepting a more active regional role in the 
Pacific as well as Indian Ocean regions."59 
The growing military and in particular naval capabilities of the Indian Ocean littoral 
states can not be summarily discounted, even if they did not represent a serious threat 
to Australian security at present. 
Although the Cold War has ended, India appears committed to retaining and 
expanding its naval capability. India has retired the Vikrant, one of its two aircraft 
carriers, but the Viraat, remains operational. 6° Even though economic problems and 
budgetary priorities have limited India's capacity to expand its military capabilities, 
it has continued to maintain its rhetoric to do so. India has publicly stated its plans to 
acquire another aircraft carrier, the Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which is 
presently on lease to the Indian navy. 61 In addition, India has continued to develop 
major mainland naval base at Karwar and Port Blair, even during a period of fiscal 
J. Mohan Malik, The Gulf War: Australia's Role And Asian-Pacific Responses. p1. 
60 A.D. Gordon, 'India, Neigbourhood And Region'. p186. 
61 The issue of whether or not India will get a third aircraft carrier is shrouded in a great deal of 
uncertainty. The latest news (NEW DELHI, June 22, 1997 (P11)) is that the price tag of the Admiral 
Gorshkov is unacceptable to the Indian Navy, and hence there are now plans to manufacture its own 
air defence ship (ADS), a smaller version of an aircraft carrier instead. Nevertheless, regardless of 
how or when, it does appear that India is determined to maintain the capacity for power projection 
(albeit a limited capacity). 
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stringency in 1993. 62 India's ambition for naval acquisitions raises some issues. As 
Richard Armitage observes: 
"Given her great size and enormous population, one doesn't 
necessarily begrudge India a robust military capability; yet when 
India has thus far been unable to articulate the foreign and defence 
policy into which that robust capability fits, then queries become 
unavo idable." 63 
The Southeast Asian nations have also begun to modernise and expand their naval 
capabilities to defend their interests in the South China Sea. There has been much 
written about the significance of the growing naval capabilities for force in the South 
China Sea, especially in light of the dispute over the Spratly Islands. In contrast, 
there has been very little said about the implications that these same naval forces 
would have for the Indian Ocean, a region to which many of the ASEAN states also 
belong. The fact that many of the South East Asian states, including Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are also littorals of the Indian Ocean is often 
overlooked. A modern and expanding navy that is capable of operations in the South 
China Sea is equally capable of operations in the Indian Ocean. This was a factor 
when (ex) President Sukarno of Indonesia offered to send two submarines into 
India's maritime territory in the Andaman and Nicobars as a diversion in support of 
Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. 64 Even though relatively little interest 
has been expressed by any South East Asian state in the Indian Ocean since, the 
potential ability of states in the South East Asian region to play a role in the Indian 
62 Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. pp68-69. 
63 Richard Armitage, 'Not History's End, But History's Resumption', in Tomorrow's Pacific, Papers 
presented at a Conference of IPA Pacific Security Research Institute and the US Heritage Foundation, 
Perth, 1993. 
64 Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. p81. 
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Ocean remains a fact of geography. 65 Admiral MacDougall acknowledges this 
strategic reality of Australia's geography, when he states: 
"The Australian decision to base up to half of our fleet on the West 
Coast is evidence of the importance we place in maintaining a 
presence in the Indian Ocean. While this move puts us nearer our 
primary interests in Southeast Asia, it will also allow us to focus 
more clearly on Indian Ocean security." 66 
Hence, there is a growing appreciation that concerns over security and stability in 
East Asian waters should logically also apply in the Indian Ocean. 
Unlike the South East Asian or Antarctic regions, the issue of overlapping 
jurisdictional claims has not been prominent in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, they 
exist. The introduction of the United Nations Law \  of the Sea saw many boundaries 
redrawn and notwithstanding the dispute resolution mechanisms built into UNCLOS, 
disagreement on the delimitation of new boundaries could be a strong cause for 
conflict.° The maritime boundary between India and Pakistan has yet to be 
demarcated. There is a serious dispute between Bangladesh and its neighbours India 
and Burma about the delimitation of their respective overlapping boundaries. And 
the Maldives' maritime claims are potentially subject to dispute from the UK and 
Mauritius. 68 These and other maritime disputes69 are exacerbated by the political, 
racial, and religious tensions in South Asia, which would make resolution even more 
difficult (in contrast to the dispute in the South China Sea where relations among the 
claimants are relatively cordial by comparison). 
65 Sandy Gordon, The Search For Substance: Australia-India Relations Into The Nineties And 
Beyond. pp81-88. 
66 I.D.G. MacDougall, 'The Naval View', Paper presented at Australia's Maritime Bridge Into Asia 
conference, 17-19 November 1993, held in Canberra, 1993. pp2-3. 
67 For a brief survey of the maritime disputes in the Indian Ocean region, see Victor Prescott, The 
Maritime Political Boundaries Of The World.  pp158-178. 
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In the 1990s, several factors have altered Australia's perspective on the Indian 
Ocean. The cold war has ended and the littorals of the region are growing in strength. 
Consequently, the Australian approach towards the Indian Ocean must change as 
well. Even though it is still possible for a superpower such as the United States to 
play 'global cop' in the region (and for Australia to benefit from such an 
arrangement as its ally), any attempt to influence regional affairs through extra-
regional American power would certainly be regarded with great suspicion. For 
example, the despatch of a United States carrier group into the Bay of Bengal in 
1971 (a period of tension involving India, Bangladesh and Pakistan) was regarded by 
India as expression of coercive (and nuclear) diplomacy. 70  Malik also points out that: 
"One day after Iraq occupied Kuwait came news of the US 
deployment of naval forces in the Gulf Given India's antipathy to 
the involvement of extra-regional powers in regional conflicts, such 
a development was seen as 'ominous' by Indian foreign policy 
makers.' 
Therefore, over-reliance on the United States might prove counter-productive for 
Australia because any exercise of American power within the Indian Ocean region 
has the potential to excite resentment from the littorals there. Thus, there is a need to 
explore alternative arrangements through which Australia might defend its interests 
within the Indian Ocean region. 
Many of the issues pertaining to resource management, conservation, pollution and 
other matters in the Indian Ocean also require multilateral responses 72 and can not be 
resolved simply by the hegemonic presence of any power, even one as powerful as 
" R.P. Anand, 'South Asia and the Law of the Sea: Problems and Prospects'. p19 
69 See R.P. Anand, 'South Asia and the Law of the Sea: Problems and Prospects'. pp9-40. 
7° Jasjit Singh, 'Proliferation Issues In The Indian Ocean Area In The Post Cold War Era', paper 
presented at the International Seminar On Changing Prospects For Peace In The Indian Ocean Area, 
Centre For Indian Ocean Studies, Perth, 14-16 January 1991. p13. 
71 J. Mohan Malik, The Gulf War: Australia's Role And Asian-Pacific Responses. p10. 
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the United States. Hence, Australia has begun to engage the region as a middle 
power, independent of its close relationship with the United States. 
In the Indian Ocean region, the lack of a clearly defmed regional identity has proven 
to be a stumbling block in any effort towards multilateral engagement. In the attempt 
to find "common ground on which to build a sense of regional community, maritime 
issues have emerged as a strong common interest of Indian Ocean littorals and island 
countries." 73 However, MacDougall warns that: 
"Given the size of the Indian Ocean and the political, economic and 
cultural diversity of its littoral states, the foreseeable future is 
unlikely to bring speedy developments in maritime cooperation." 74 
Nevertheless, in 1995, there were two inter-governmental meetings in Mauritius on 
economic and trade issues pertaining to the Indian Ocean region. There was also a 
'track-two' meeting in Perth to "actively and constructively explore possibilities for 
regional cooperation across a notional Indian Ocean `region'." 75 Naval exercises 
involving Australia and India have also been initiated in an effort to promote 
cooperation, along with visits from senior naval officers, including those from India 
and Pakistan to conferences and seminars hosted by Australia. 76 The Centre For 
Maritime Policy in Woolongong, Australia, has also been actively canvassing 
discussion and interest in the Indian Ocean. 77 
A platform upon which Australia can build potential regional multilateral 
arrangements for the Indian Ocean region is its relationship with various South East 
72 Sam Bateman, 'The Indian Ocean in Australia's Maritime Strategy'. pp  11-16. 
73 Centre for Maritime Policy, Newsletter No.2, 31 Jan 1996. 
74 I.D.G. MacDougall, 'The Naval View'. p3. 
75 Centre for Maritime Policy, Newsletter No.2, 31 Jan 1996. 
76 I.D.G. MacDougall, 'The Naval View'. p3. 
77 See www.uow.edu.au/arts/mar pol. 
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Asian states, which are also Indian Ocean littorals. Australia is already engaged in 
regular talks and a variety of multilateral initiatives with these states on a variety of 
issues, including maritime surveillance, conflict resolution on the Spratly Islands, 
environmental management in South East Asian waters, sea-robbery in the Malacca 
Straits and other issues. Such initiatives have invariably been focused on maritime 
issues specific to the South East Asian region and scant attention has been given to 
the Indian Ocean in Australian foreign policy. Nevertheless, it should still be feasible 
to expand the scope of some of these initiatives to include the Indian Ocean or to 
broaden the some of the existing mechanisms in South East Asia to include the 
littorals of the Indian Ocean as well. 
Even though Australia has yet to assume an influential role within the Indian Ocean 
region, there are several factors that suggest it might be able to do so eventually. As a 
wealthy (and relatively congenial) middle power, Australia enjoys prestige in the 
region. Australia also possesses the resources to sponsor the "track two" initiatives 
and it has shown in the South East Asian region that such initiatives could prove 
useful in establishing common ground upon which subsequent international 
arrangements are built. Nor is Australia likely to be regarded with suspicion as 
having hegemonic aspirations even if it takes up a leadership role in the Indian 
Ocean region. And as Paul Dibb points out, Australia would still be able to capitalise 
on its traditional relationship with the Western great powers: 
"For Australia there is the particular point that, as a medium-sized 
power, we gained considerable international stature from being 
seen as one of the close inner group of United States allies (along 
with Britain and Canada)." 78 
78  Paul Dibb, 'The Regional Outlook: the Australian Viewpoint', in Tomorrow's Pacific, Papers 
presented at a Conference of IPA Pacific Security Research Institute and the US Heritage Foundation, 
Perth, 1993. 
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In addition., Australia possesses the resources and expertise (assets that many of the 
other less developed States in the Indian Ocean region might lack) to fund and 
sustain initiatives for regional arrangements. Unfortunately, except for a few 
attempts to initiate 'track-two' meetings, most notably by the Centre for Maritime 
Studies in Wollongong, Australia yet to make any serious attempts to establish 
regional arrangements to address maritime issues in the Indian Ocean. 
Conclusion 
In the regions reviewed earlier, Australia demonstrated an interest in assuming a role 
of influence in regional affairs and the capacity to do so. Australian ambitions with 
regard to a role of regional influence have usually been based on the practice of 
middlepowermanship, which is in turn facilitated by regionalism. However, in 
contrast to the role that it has played in other regions, Australia's role in the Indian 
Ocean region has been modest. Australia has not exhibited much interest in playing a 
larger role within the Indian Ocean region and its capacity to assume such a role is 
uncertain. Australia was concerned with the threat of Soviet expansion within the 
Indian Ocean region and supported the presence of its ally, the US, to defend their 
mutual interests there. However, in contrast to the other regions where Australia has 
played a more prominent role, it has had relatively weak economic or other interests 
in the Indian Ocean region. Consequently, the pressure to assume a stronger role 
within the Indian Ocean region has been absent. 
Australia's size and limited resources as a middle power also restrict its capacity to 
assume a more significant role within the Indian Ocean. From a structuralist 
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perspective, the presence of much larger states, such as India and Pakistan, limits the 
role of a middle power like Australia. From a process oriented perspective, the 
absence and resistance to the development of regional multilateral arrangements 
within the Indian Ocean region limits Australia's capacity to play a significant role in 
the region through alternative mechanisms of influence. Thus, Australia has 
traditionally relied upon and supported the presence of its great power allies, in 
particular the United States, to defend its interests within the Indian Ocean region. 
Notwithstanding its lack of interest or success in assuming a more influential role 
within the Indian Ocean region, Australia is a wealthy middle power with 
considerable assets. Although Australia's post-Cold War interests within the Indian 
Ocean are largely inchoate, they may yet develop into something more substantial. 
Sea-lanes of communication important to Australia run through the Indian Ocean. 
The end of the Cold War removed the spectre of super-power conflict from the 
Indian Ocean but the potential for conflict among the littoral States remains. Many of 
the littoral States of the Indian Ocean have had a long history of hostilities with their 
neighbours. And as the littoral states of the Indian Ocean (including India, Pakistan, 
and the Southeast Asian nations) continue to develop and to strengthen their naval 
capabilities, the potential for the existing land-based hostilities to extend seaward 
would also increase. 
A middle power like Australia has the potential to play an important role in defining 
the post Cold War environment within the Indian Ocean region in order to ensure 
that its interests remain protected. The strategy of middlepowermanship is a policy 
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that has been successfully pursued in other regions and represents Australia's best 
opportunity to secure a role of influence within the Indian Ocean region. 79 
79 See Sam Bateman, 'The Indian Ocean in Australia's Maritime Strategy'. 
CONCLUSION 
Academic forays into relatively unexplored fields of study are always fraught with the 
danger of making more of an issue than it deserves. In querying the role of middle 
powers in international relations, there has been a conscious effort in this dissertation not 
to overstate the role of Australia within its region or to magnify the importance of issues 
beyond their real significance simply because they are the subjects of study. 
Nevertheless, the close scrutiny of Australia's role as a middle power in this dissertation 
has highlighted issues that are often overlooked in studies that focus on the actions of 
great powers but which are no less important as they also affect the dynamics of 
international relations. In particular, this dissertation introduces a methodological 
approach to investigate the role of middle powers and draw attention to factors that 
affect the foreign policy considerations of a middle power. 
The thesis proposed in this dissertation is that middle powers like Australia are inclined 
to rely on multilateral institutional arrangements as a means of securing a role of 
regional influence. This thesis is based on the assumption that states can be usefully 
differentiated from one another in terms of power; and that middle powers are 
distinctively characterised by their ambition and their capacity to assume a role of 
significant influence in their own geographic region. 
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There have been differing accounts of how middle powers may play a role of influence 
in international relations and it is proposed that these explanations may be categorised 
into structuralist and process oriented perspectives of middle powers. Structuralist 
perspectives tend to be premised on Realist assumptions about the nature of the state 
system. They focus upon the physical attributes of a middle power and the extent to 
which the superior resources of a middle power can be brought into play against smaller 
or weaker states, or serve as an enticement to secure the patronage of a great power, in 
international relations. Whereas process oriented perspectives tend to be based on 
Idealist, Neoliberal or Rationalist assumptions about the nature of the state system. 
Process oriented perspectives are premised upon the presence of multilateral institutional 
arrangements within the state system and desirability of establishing such arrangements. 
They focus on the extent to which a middle power is able to exercise a leadership role 
with respect to such arrangements and exploit the opportunities presented by such 
arrangements to serve its own interests. These issues were addressed in chapters 1, 2 and 
3 of this thesis and it was concluded that in the contemporary state system, middle 
powers are inclined to rely on multilateral institutional arrangements in foreign policy as 
a means of securing regional influence. 
In chapter one, the context in which states operated was reviewed. The emergence of the 
general state system, the concept of power, and the growth of multilateral institutional 
arrangements as vehicles for state influence were discussed. It concluded that while 
- 
power remained an important factor in the determination of foreign policy, the 
opportunities provided by multilateral institutional arrangements represented an 
increasingly significant avenue for states to defend their interests in international 
relations. 
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In chapter two, the concept of a middle power was explored. The various characteristics 
associated with the foreign policies of middle powers were canvassed. This included the 
traditional view that that a middle power could be described as a minor power capable of 
assuming the role of a great power within a regional subset of the general state system. 
Another trait that has been associated with middle powers is the alleged proclivity of the 
latter to engage in middlepowermanship, which might be loosely defined as 
participation, initiation, and support, for multilateral institutional arrangements. It 
concluded that in spite of the difference between perspectives that may be described as 
'structuralist' and 'process oriented', a working definition of a middle power that may 
be generically applied in most situations could be developed. And it was proposed that a 
state with both the ambition and the capacity to assume a role of significant influence in 
a limited sphere of international relations, including within its geographic region, might 
be deemed a middle power. 
In chapter three, the mindsets that have traditionally guided Australian foreign policy as 
a middle power were reviewed and two distinctive orientations in Australian foreign 
policy were highlighted. These two orientations have been described as the Conservative 
approach, which emphasised the bilateral relationship between middle power Australia 
and its great power allies; and the Labor approach, which emphasised multilateralism 
and regionalism. In this chapter, it was argued that these orientations really only differed 
on the issue of the degree of emphasis instead of representing diametrically opposed 
positions on foreign policy. It concluded by advancing the hypothesis that a middle 
power like Australia is attracted to the use of multilateral institutional arrangements and 
is likely to assume a role of leadership and influence within its geographic regions. 
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Four geographic regions, the South West Pacific, the Antarctic, South East Asia, and the 
Indian Ocean, were examined and Australia's role in each of these regions reviewed. 
Australia may claim to be a part of each of these regions and the investigation of its role 
as a middle power in these regions would establish if the empirical evidence supports the 
hypothesis. Towards that end, Australia's ambition and its capacity to assume a role of 
significant influence in each of these regions, as well as the means by which it employed 
to assume such a role, were queried. 
The review of Australia's role, as a middle power, in the South West Pacific region 
highlighted the asymmetries of power that characterised the relationship between 
Australia and the Pacific Island states in that region. Australia's capacity to capitalise on 
this asymmetry to assume a hegemonic role in the South West Pacific region was clearly 
demonstrated in this chapter. However, it was argued that Australia sought to initiate and 
support regional multilateral institutional arrangements as vehicles for its influence in 
the region, as opposed to defending its interests through its capacity for crude coercion 
through its superior power. In accordance with the expectations of structuralist 
perspectives, Australia clearly possessed the capacity to exercise coercive influence in 
the South Pacific region. However, Australia was clearly disinclined to resort to blatant 
realpolitik measures to defend its interests in the South Pacific region. Instead, regional 
multilateral institutional arrangements firnished a middle power like Australia with the 
means to defend a broader range of interests within the South Pacific region. 
Australia's role in the Antarctic region also highlighted the opportunities that regional 
multilateral institutional arrangements provided to a middle power such as Australia. 
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The asymmetries of power that characterised Australia's role in the South West Pacific 
region are absent in the Antarctic region. Indeed, Australia would rank low in any 
hierarchy of power that reflected the capabilities of the respective states engaged in the 
Antarctic region based on Realist premises. However, there is a strong network of 
multilateral institutional arrangements that have claimed jurisdiction over the Antarctic 
region and over the decision making on issues affecting the region. And it was argued 
that Australia has been able to seize the opportunities offered by these regional 
arrangements, collectively known as the Antarctic Treaty System, to assume a 
significant and influential role within the Antarctic region and thereby to defend its 
interests there successfully. Thus, even though the expectations of structuralist 
perspectives would have been a minor role for Australia within the Antarctic region, its 
experiences have been to the contrary. Instead, process oriented perspectives have been 
more successful in accounting for the influence enjoyed by a middle power like 
Australia within the Antarctic region. 
Australia's role within the South East Asian region has been more difficult to explain. 
Australia could not claim for itself a dominant role within the South East Asian region 
on the basis of the asymmetries of power, such as that it enjoyed in the South West 
Pacific region. Nor could Australia claim for itself a significant and influential role 
within South East Asia that is similar to the part it played within the Antarctic Treaty 
System and the Antarctic region. Although there are regional institutional arrangements, 
notably ASEAN, that play a significant role in South East Asian regional affairs, 
Australia's involvement in these arrangements have been limited relative to the role it 
has been able to assume in similar multilateral arrangements in the South West Pacific 
and Antarctic regions. Instead, ambiguity about Australia's status in the South East 
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Asian region saw Australia excluded from full participation in some regional forums 
there. Nevertheless, it was argued that Australia's interests, as a middle power, to initiate 
regional multilateral arrangements remained strong in the South East Asian region and 
that the promotion of such arrangements serves Australia's interests. Therefore, even 
though its role within South East Asian regional multilateral institutional arrangements 
has been discreet, Australia has been able to successfully defend its interests and play a 
significant role through its persistent efforts at fostering habits of consultation and 
dialogue. 
In contrast to its experience and strategy in the other three regions, Australia's role, as a 
middle power, in the Indian Ocean region has been anomalous. It was argued that 
Australia has demonstrated neither the ambition nor the capacity to exercise significant 
influence in its own right as a middle power within the Indian Ocean region. Instead, 
Australia has been content to support the presence of the United States in the Indian 
Ocean and to rely on the latter, its great and powerful friend, to defend its interests there. 
The Indian Ocean region is also distinct from the other regions in that multilateral 
institutional arrangements have not been significant within the region. Thus, process 
oriented perspectives have had little relevance. Indeed, the Indian Ocean region 
challenges arguments that suggest the inevitability of international cooperation and 
development of multilateral institutional arrangements. Instead, the inability of a middle 
power like Australia to assume a more significant role within the Indian Ocean region is 
more satisfactorily explained by the structuralist perspectives, which tend to assume that 
minor powers have a limited role in international relations whereas great powers have a 
larger role. Thus, the arguments that middle powers are only expected to play a role 
supportive of great power allies and may only assume a more direct role with the 
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acquiescence of the latter appear to match the situation in geographic regions such as the 
Indian Ocean region. 
The review of Australia's role in four geographic regions provided evidence that 
supports the hypothesis that multilateral institutional arrangements enhance the capacity 
of a middle power like Australia to assume a role of leadership and influence within its 
geographic region. 
South Pacific 
region 
Antarctic 
region 
South East 
Asian region 
Indian Ocean 
region 
Ambition Yes Yes Yes No 
Capacity Yes Yes Yes No 
Capacity For Influence Based On: 
Physical 
Attributes 
Yes 
Institutional 
Arrangements 
Yes Yes Yes 
Other factors Great Power 
Ally 
In three of the four regions surveyed, Australia's capacity to exploit the opportunities 
provided by multilateral institutional arrangements has been the primary determinant of 
its ability, as a middle power, to defend its interests. In the South Pacific Region, there is 
also the additional factor of superior power. In an earlier era, simple superiority in terms 
of power might have been sufficient to enable a middle power like Australia to 'lord it 
over' weaker states in its geographic region. However, as the review of Australia's 
experience in the South West Pacific region has demonstrated, the contemporary state 
system is such that a more sophisticated approach is required. The use of crude coercive 
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influence has fallen into disrepute and the use of coercive influence is unlikely to serve 
the broad interests of middle powers, which would be more inclined to prefer a state 
system where multilateral institutional arrangements determined outcomes, as opposed 
to superior force. 
Globalisation and increasing interdependence means an increased reliance on 
multilateral institutional arrangements and this is reflected in the South West Pacific, the 
Antarctic, and the South East Asian regions. These regions have witnessed a growth in 
the number of regional multilateral institutional arrangements and the scope of the 
functional roles performed by these arrangements is also expanding. In the South West 
Pacific, the Antarctic, and the South East Asian regions, regional multilateral 
institutional arrangements provided the principal forums for decision-making on 
regional affairs. Australia's prominent role in such regional forums in the South West 
Pacific and the Antarctic regions meant that it possessed a significant measure of 
influence over developments in those regions. Similarly, even though it is excluded from 
ASEAN, Australia's role in fostering a culture of consultation and dialogue have 
furnished it with an avenue for regional influence, as well as helping to secure a place 
for itself within other regional forums such as the ARF and APEC. 
The fact that process oriented perspectives, as well as middle powers, have their 
limitations was clearly illustrated in the chapter on Australia's role in the Indian Ocean 
region. The review of Australia's role in the Indian Ocean region was useful in that it 
highlighted the fact that successful middlepowermanship is contingent upon the presence 
of viable multilateral institutional arrangements. It also demonstrated that there are 
regions where Neorealist assumptions carry greater weight than those of the Neoliberals 
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and that in such regions, there would be difficulty in developing multilateral institutional 
arrangements. Clearly, the situation in the Indian Ocean might change in the future and 
cooperative arrangements might become the norm in that region. Conversely, the 
circumstances that have led to the existing multilateral institutional arrangements in the 
other regions might also be challenged by future developments. Thus, the meta-theories 
that seek to explain the dynamics of international relations are subject to situational 
factors specific to a particular time or region. In the context of this thesis, this implies 
that in so far as a middle power like Australia is concerned, its geographic situation is 
such that multilateral institutional arrangements currently represent the means through 
which it can successfully assert influence and defend its interests within its regional 
environment. While the Indian Ocean region represents an exception to this general 
proposition, it does not invalidate it. 
In the course of this thesis, other issues have been explored as well. This dissertation has 
also adapted conventional theories on international relations to the study of middle 
powers. In particular, it has tailored Neorealist and Neoliberal theories on the behaviour 
of states to the study of a middle power and applied this to the investigation of the 
foreign policy considerations of Australia within its geographic region. The situational 
factors that would render Neorealist assumptions applicable in the context of a middle 
power like Australia were discussed. And it has been argued that even where middle 
powers such as Australia were in a position to exploit the advantages of coercive power, 
they might still opt for co-operative multilateral arrangements, which are perceived as 
being a more effective means of defending their interests. Thus, this dissertation has 
argued that Neoliberalist arguments have provided a more compelling explanation on 
how middle powers are likely to react in international relations. 
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It appears self evident to say that minor powers must restrict their foreign policy to 
selectively targeted issues or their geographic regions because of the obvious limitations 
upon their capacity to engage other states in international affairs. Unlike major powers, 
which might claim an interest throughout the general state system, minor powers must 
be content with more modest objectives. However, middle powers stand out among 
minor powers, as polities with greater resources and logically that should imply a larger 
role in international affairs as well. 
The literature suggests that regional subsets of the state system represent a sphere of 
international engagement in which middle powers might assume a significant, even a 
dominant role. This thesis demonstrated that a middle power like Australia could indeed 
assume a decisive role through its capacity for leadership in, or exploitation of, 
multilateral institutional arrangements. The use of multilateral institutional arrangements 
by minor powers to amplify their influence in international relations is by no means 
restricted to middle powers. Logically, many of the advantages derived by Australia 
from middlepowermanship, and demonstrated in this thesis, should be accessible to any 
affluent small power with the capacity for diplomatic activism in selected issues or 
geographic regions. Thus, another topic for further study would be to establish the extent 
to which small powers can emulate the practice of middlepowermanship and duplicate 
the success of middle powers in international relations. A study of this nature might 
redefine assumptions about the divide between small and middle powers in the state 
system. 
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In conclusion, this thesis has argued that Australia's role as a middle power is largely 
defined by the extent of its ability to influence the development and decision-making 
processes within regime arrangements that represent regional subsets of the global state 
system. It has demonstrated that the pursuit of, and participation in, regional multilateral 
institutional arrangements has offered a middle power like Australia significant 
opportunities to favourably influence regional developments in a fashion that served its 
interests, as well as enabled it to play a decisive role in its geographic region. It 
proposed that although Australia's capacity for Realist expressions of coercive power 
varied in different regions, its capacity for leadership role within regional multilateral 
institutional arrangements and its ability to exploit the opportunities presented by such 
arrangements have enabled it to assume an influential role in regional affairs. 
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